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 Abstract 
 
 
There are many studies of the air campaigns of the first World War: almost all 
have concentrated on the strategic and tactical issues, on the technical 
development of aircraft or the skill and daring of the aircrew concerned. 
 
The effects of the dangers of flying and air combat, which tested aircrew to their 
limits both physical and mental with consequent psychological disorders have 
been ignored. 
 
This study examined and analysed the operations of the RFC/RAF over the 
Western Front from 1014-1918 with the aim of establishing the incidence of 
aircrew failure for nervous disorders. 
 
The factors affecting the psychological and psychiatric reactions of aircrew to 
combat have been examined.     The significance of morale as a factor affecting 
the psychological responses of aircrew has been assessed and the effects of 
leadership, training, fatigue and aircraft performance and reliability are explored 
in relation to aircrew failure due to psychological disorder.  The outcomes of this 
thesis were compared to similar studies for Second World War Aircrew. 
 
Medical and casualty records, official histories and operational reports have been 
used in conjunction with personal accounts and memoirs to establish the prime 
causal factors for psychological disorder in aircrew and its incidence in the 
RFC/RAF on the Western Front.   The treatment and disposal of aircrew 
diagnosed with ‘flying sickness’ have been described and the results evaluated.  
The incidence of breakdown has been compared with similar studies for Second 
World War Aircrew. 
 
It concludes that the incidence of failure due to psychological disorder for the 
tears 1914-1917, was low and manageable.       However, in the last year of the 
war, the incidence not only vastly increased but became a significant part of the 
total wastage rate and seriously affected RAF strength on the Western Front.  
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           Introduction and Historiography   
This thesis explores the extent of psychological disorders suffered by flying 
personnel of the Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air Force during the First World War.  
It responds to questions relating to aircrew stress, morale, and combat 
effectiveness.    The objective is to establish the incidence of these disorders and to 
determine the main causal factors influencing aircrew breakdown in combat.     
Several writers have addressed this question, but always in individual cases; no one 
has made any attempt to establish the incidence of aircrew failure for psychological 
reasons, or its impact on the operational efficiency of the RFC/RAF. 
To meet this objective this study will examine and analyse the operations of the 
squadrons flying over the Western Front from 1914-1918 and identify the demands 
of air warfare on RFC/RAF pilots and observers and their response to combat 
stress.  
This introductory chapter will explain the context to the RFC/RAF’s operations 
over the Western Front and will define the medical and operational aspects of the 
study.     The sources used will be described and the relevant literature of the air 
war and the psychological aspects of combat considered.   The chapter will 
conclude with an account of the structure of the thesis and methodology    
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Background 
The First World War was the first in which aircraft had a significant impact on the 
operations of armies in the field.     The early years of the twentieth century were 
also a time of rapid development in aviation (enhanced by the war) and aircrew had 
to adapt to major advances in the operational performance of aircraft.    
Consequently, aircrew had not only to deal with the technical challenge of the new 
weapon and the effects of a new and very demanding environment, but also the 
considerable stress of combat.  
Aeroplanes were first used as a weapon in the Turkish-Italy conflict of 1911-1912, 
when on 26th October 1911 an Italian aircraft patrol discovered and reported 
advancing Turkish troops.   In February 1912 a Captain Piazza fitted a camera to 
his Bleriot aircraft and photographed enemy positions, later grenades were dropped 
in enemy positions.1        In Britain, military aviation was mostly concerned with 
balloon operations, until in 1912, partly as a response to public concern about the 
development of aviation in France and Germany, the Royal Flying Corps was 
formed with balloon and aircraft wings.    At the start of the First World War the 
RFC had a strength of four squadrons and about 40 useful aircraft.     However, like 
 
1 M. Paris, ‘The First Air Wars-North Africa and the Balkans’ Journal of Contemporary History Vol 3 (1991) pp. 
97-109. 
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all military authorities in Britain, Brigadier-General Sir David Henderson 
Commander RFC, believed it would be a short war and accordingly sent all four 
existing RFC squadrons to support the BEF in France, leaving behind only a small 
flying training organization.2  This tiny force was in fact the harbinger of the largest 
air force of the First World War.    In May 1918, the British Armies in France would 
be supported by ninety-three squadrons engaged in reconnaissance, artillery 
spotting, photography, bombing, low level ground attack and all protected by 
hundreds of fighters.3 
The first five months of war demonstrated the usefulness of the aircraft for 
reconnaissance to both sides.        At first neither side attempted to interfere with 
the enemy’s aircraft, although by early 1915, aircraft were carrying not only the 
crew’s personal weapons, but sometimes machine guns fitted in the observer’s 
position.   This crude ad-hoc system was not successful, and, in any case, the early 
aircraft could not easily carry the extra weight of weapons and ammunition.        
However, by early 1915 improved engines and better aircraft enabled weapons 
designed for aircraft to be carried and serious attempts were made to inhibit enemy 
air activities.  The fighter aircraft was born.     In 1916, the great battles of the 
 
2 W. Raleigh, Official History of The War: The War In The Air - Volume I (six Volumes) (HMSO, 1927-1936), 
pp.283-292. Only first volume by Raleigh, remainder H A Jones.  (Hereafter TWITA) 
 3 Jones, TWITA, Appendices. Appendix XXVI p.126. The RAF also had a large training organization in UK together 
with the Home Defence Squadrons and 17 squadrons covering, the Middle East, Balkans and India 
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Somme and Verdun were the catalyst for intense battles in the air now involving 
specialist aircraft and better trained aircrew.    At first casualties were light, but the 
bearable rates of 1915 were followed by heavy losses in 1916, (many due to 
operations over the Somme battlefield) becoming serious in 1917 and by mid-1918 
wastage from air fighting and accidents was close to being unsustainable.     
Additionally. from June 1918, the bombing operations of the Independent Force, 
which had little effect on Germany’s war effort, added many aircrew casualties to 
the RAF’s total.  
The resultant demand for replacement aircrew, at a time when all services and all 
arms were desperate for manpower, produced a cycle of instability, large gaps in 
squadron crews were filled by inadequately trained aircrew, who soon became 
casualties themselves and were replaced with more inadequately trained aircrew, 
which resulted in casualty rates in some squadrons so heavy that they were taken 
out of the line for short periods.    This turbulence undoubtedly had deleterious 
effects on the morale and fighting efficiency of the aircrew concerned.  
By the end of 1916, an additional factor significantly affecting squadron aircrew 
numbers, was the number of pilots and observers removed from flying duties 
because of psychological disorder. 
Although psychological breakdown in combatants had been recognized as an 
outcome of battles since at least the Napoleonic war, the British army was surprised 
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by the emergence and especially the extent, of battle neurosis which came to be 
called ‘shell shock’ in soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force. 4  
The newly established Royal Flying Corps’ medical officers also found that as 
early as 1915, before any serious fighting had occurred in the air war, that pilots 
and observers were showing symptoms of psychological disorders arising from 
exposure to flying and combat.5   The hazardous and exhausting nature of flying 
duties was recognized; but a preoccupation with the physical aspects of flight such 
as cold, fatigue, noise, effects of slipstream and problems with lack of oxygen, 
overshadowed consideration of the mental stresses of flying and fighting.  
In fact, by the end of 1915, six aircrew had already been removed from flying duties 
suffering from nervous disorders: five suffering from Neurasthenia and one 
diagnosed as shell shock (although he had never served in any ground unit).    
Removals for nervous reasons increased in each year of fighting until by September 
1918, when the wastage in that month from KIA and missing was 389 aircrew, a 
further 102 were removed suffering from Flying Sickness as a result of combat 
stress.        
 
4  E Jones & S Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War (London, 2005) pp 
22-24; R H Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War  (London, 1958) pp.4-6;  C 
Corns & J Hughes-Wilson, Blindfold and Alone (London, 2001) pp.309-311. 
5 Royal Air Force Museum Archives. Classification, Casualty Cards - Personnel/Incident, Dunn, Ferris, Welsh         
(Hereafter RAFM CC)  
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  The Official History of the War in the Air refers to the aviator’s fear of: 
fire, bone-crunching crashes caused by mechanical failure, the deadly impact of multiple fighter 
clashes, or the prospect of being set upon by a swarm of enemy machines.6    
It is the effects of that fear, the psychological responses of aircrew to combat and 
the disorders which result, which will be analysed in this study.     Unlike other 
studies it will exploit medical evidence and examine the psychological origins of 
those fears.   
 
Sources and Historiography  
Sources 
As noted above this thesis is concerned with the responses of aircrew of the RFC 
(from April 1918 RAF), to the strains of air combat, physical and mental.     
Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the development of the air war and the 
involvement and experiences of aircrew over the western front.    
The original evidence of the RFC’s operations in the war, including squadron and 
wing reports and casualty reports and returns is to be found in the Air 1 series of 
files in the National Archives at Kew.    Most of the files relating to the RFC and 
the Royal Naval Air Service were brought together during the preparation of the 
 
6  Raleigh, TWITA Volume I, p.13. 
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Official History of the war in the air. (W Raleigh and after his death H A Jones.)7    
Casualty reports and summaries for 1916/17/18 are in Air1/843-865 (with some 
odd numbers interspersed).      The Australian casualties are in Air1/970.  There are 
also lists of Canadian casualties in Air1/967.  Air1/76 contains service records of 
RAF Officers and Air /79 records of RFC Officers.   Although the operational files 
are indispensable for accurate coverage of air operations, they are in the main 
purely factual accounts of actions and combats and few personal attitudes are 
apparent.  The casualty lists, which are extensive and cover casualties by brigade, 
by wing and squadron and do not always agree.    Accordingly, in this work for the 
most part statistics for operational losses and wounded together with details of 
combats and accidents, have been taken from Henshaw’s accurate and 
comprehensive work: The Sky Their Battlefield (2014):8 (compiled from official 
sources), checking the Air 1 records as necessary.     
The prime source for this work is the unique Casualty Card and Incident Cards 
Archive   held at the Royal Air Force Museum.     During the First world War a 
casualty card was raised for each officer who was killed in action or accident, was 
wounded or admitted to hospital for other illnesses. These cards are the only 
 
7 See below for assessment of that history. 
8 T. Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield: Air Fighting and Air Casualties of the Great War (Fetubi Books, 2014)  
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complete record of RFC/RAF officers removed from the front suffering from 
psychological disability (flying sickness).  The cards show officer’s name, initials 
and unit and the initial medical diagnosis and disposition noting subsequent moves 
to field or general hospital or return to Home establishment.   Medical cards also 
record a return to duty date, if applicable.  The unit identification enables relevant 
squadron and operational records to be used to note an officer’s involvement in the 
air war.      Several cards show hospital treatment extending to 1922.        In the 
case of ‘Incident ‘cards an account of the cause of the injury or death is given (eg 
Crash on takeoff).      There are upwards of 27,000 RFC/RAF officers Personal and 
Incident cards in the archive.    All were accessed over a period of six months and 
regularly consulted as necessary thereafter.  These Casualty cards are a unique 
source of medical information about the subjects of this study and have enabled 
every recorded case of’ ‘Flying Sickness’ in the RFC/RAF in the First World to be 
examined.9          Additionally, the cards provide an accurate source for statistical 
information of aircrew breakdown in World War One.       Other sources were used 
in order to obtain further individual details and case studies.     These include, The 
London Gazette, Army and RAF lists and biographies and personal memoirs and 
AP3139, together with Gilcrest’s 1918 report. (noted below) 
 
9 The term Flying Sickness encompasses all descriptions of aircrew psychological disability used in the First World 
War. 
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This thesis focuses on the psychological and psychiatric outcomes of exposure to 
flying and combat stress.     It is concerned with psychological ‘breakdown’ which 
if occurring to BEF personnel was defined (misleadingly) as’ shell shock’.   
The 1922 War Office Enquiry into Shell Shock did not feel that that name was 
appropriate and felt that the condition would be better defined as: 
emotional shock, either acute in men with a neuro-pathtic predisposition or developing 
slowly as a result of prolonged strain and terrifying experience. The final breakdown 
being sometimes brought about by some relatively trivial cause.  (OR) Nervous and 
mental exhaustion, the result of prolonged strain and hardship.10  
 
Regarding the RFC, the consultant in psychological medicine to the RAF (W H R 
Rivers) in his evidence to the committee said that in his view officers who broke 
down were usually suffering from ‘anxiety neurosis’ which might be combined 
with hysteria.11     In fact the description/diagnosis used in the  RFC to identify 
breakdown varied considerably until December 1916 when the term ‘Flying 
Sickness’ became standard.      
Primary published sources concerning psychological and psychiatric disabilities 
resulting from combat and/or flying stress are extensive.  Those used in this study 
include AP 3139 Psychological Disorders in Flying Personnel of the Royal Air 
 
10 Cmd 1734 Report Of The War Office Committee Of Enquiry Into ‘Shell Shock’  (HMSO, 1922)  p.92 
11 Cmd 1734   p.56. 
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Investigated During the War 1939-45 (HMSO,1947)     Although the studies in this 
AP concern the Second World  War many chapters reprise the World War One 
position, and comprehensively describe and explain the basis of psychological 
disorders.    Two sources which specifically address First World War aircrew are, 
firstly the Official Medical History12 and secondly, H. G. Anderson’s early study 
of the mental and physical aspects of the individual in the air.13       Anderson’s 
detailed evidence of the responses of pilots to their first exposure to flying and the 
detailed accounts of those pilots who during their training, suffer psychological 
disorders or otherwise fail to reach the required standard is of great evidential value.  
Other contemporaneous primary sources are reports of the Medical Research 
Council, (1920), Meyer’s book on Shell Shock (1921) and Gilcrest’s analysis of 
breakdown in aircrew (1918).     Gilcrest’s report is especially valuable as his 
subjects were pilots and observers who had been removed from flying duties 
suffering from war neurosis (flying Sickness)14   Other useful secondary works are: 
E J Dearnally & A J Warr, Aircrew Stress in Wartime Operations. (1947),   S C 
Rexford-Welch,  Medical History of the Second World War,   US Air Force 
 
12 W. P. Macpherson. History of the Great War Medical Services: Volume II Diseases of the Mind, Volume III 
Aviation (HMSO, 1923) 
13 H. G. Anderson, The Medical and Surgical Aspects of Aviation (London,1919) 
14 Medical Council Reports No 53   Medical Problems of Flying, Reports 1-VII (1920); C. S. Meyers, Shell Shock in 
France 1914-1918 (London, 1920); N. S. Gilcrest ‘An Analysis of Causes of Breakdown in Flying’ The British 
Medical Journal, Volume 2 No 3015 (1918)   
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Historical Study No 78. Morale in the AAF in World War Two (1953) and R R 
Grinkler & J P Spiegel Men under Stress (1945).  This book is a comprehensive 
study of aircrew of the United States Army Air Force and their response to combat 
stress, including sixty-five detailed case studies.15    One valuable source is the 
series of near contemporaneous World War One reports, not published until 1943. 
The Neurosis in War Edited by Emanuel Miller.  This work is a collection of reports 
and essays which contain many of the essential areas of the study of combat stress, 
including the onset of symptoms, treatment in the field and morale.16   Further 
published prime material comprising articles and published lectures by 
psychiatrists which has been accessed include W H Rivers,  ‘The Repression of 
War Experience’, E Jones,  ‘LMF, The use of psychiatric Stigma in the RAF in the 
Second World War’ and with S Wessely, ‘Battle for the Mind world War One and 
the birth of military psychiatry’.17       
 
15 E. J. Dearnally & P. B. Warr. Eds, Aircrew Stress in Wartime Operations (HMSO, 1948);  S. C. Rexford-Welch, 
Medical History of the Second World War the Royal Airforce Medical Services Volume II Commands (HMSO, 
1955); R. R. Grinker & J. P. Spiegel, Men Under Stress (New York, 1945) 
16 E. Miller, The Neurosis in War (New York, 1943) 
17 W H R Rivers, ‘The Repression of War Experience’ The Lancet Feb 2 1918 this is the printed version of an address 
to the Royal Society of Medicine  setting out his method of treating war-neurosis;  E Jones, ‘LMF, The use of 
Psychiatric Stigma in the RAF in the Second World War’ The Journal of Military History Vol 70 (2) (2006) 
pp.439-458; E Jones &S Wessely  ‘Battle for the Mind: World War 1 and the birth of military psychiatry’ Lancet 
Vol 348 (2014) pp.1708-1714.      
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 Many personal memoirs which included examples of psychological responses to 
stress were used, including:  Mannock (diary 1923): Jones (1954), Gould-Lee 
(1969), Lewis (1936).18                 
Many articles and reports of direct relevance were studied  including: C N Baker, 
‘A Regimental Officers Analysis of Morale’ (1962),  M D Collins ‘A fear of flying, 
Diagnosing  traumatic neurosis among British Aviators of the Great War (2015)’,     
E Jones & S Wessely  ‘Forward Psychiatry in the Military’ (2003) and, D. Stafford-
Clark ‘Morale And Flying Experience: Results of a Wartime Study’ (1949)19    The 
articles by Edgar Jones and Simon Wessley (and also their book, ‘Shell Shock to 
PTSD’  and the report of Strafford-Clark are essential to the understanding of 
aircrew psychological disorders. 
A perhaps unusual but very useful source for RFC crews attitude to flying and 
fighting is  V M Yeats’s autobiographical novel ‘Winged Victory’ 20  It is 
considered that his account of operations in the air is factual and substantially 
 
18 E. Mannock Personal Diary Annotated F. Oughton (London,1966); I. Jones Tiger Squadron (London,1954); A. 
Gould-Lee Open Cockpit (London,1969); C. Lewis Sagittarius Rising  (London, 1936,1995)   
19 C. N. Barker, Lt Col ‘A Regimental Officer’s Analysis of Morale’ RUSI Journal 107 (1962); M. D. Collins ‘A 
fear of flying: diagnosing traumatic neurosis among British aviators of the great war’   First World War Studies. 
Volume I  No 2  (2015); D. Stafford-Clark ‘Morale and Flying Experience: results of a Wartime Study’  The 
British Journal of Psychiatry Volume 95 (1949)  E. Jones & S. Wessely  ‘” Forward Psychiatry” in the Military: 
its Origins and Effectiveness ‘ Journal of Traumatic Stress Volume 16 No 4 (2003) 
20 Y M Yeates, Winged Victory (London 1934,2010) 
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accurate: but more importantly for this study is the fact that Yeates was removed 
from flying duties  suffering  from ‘Flying Sickness’ and his book is in fact a 
valuable personal account of the effects of combat stress. 
Relevant and useful journals, often publishing personal accounts and interviews of 
aircrew are the ‘Cross & Cockade’: The Journal of the First World War Aviation 
Historical Society and the Journal of the Royal Air Force Historical Society.  
Other journals with important contributions on The First World War in the air and 
those involved are:  Royal United Service Journal, Journal of Contemporary 
History Journal of Military History, Journal of Strategic Studies, and Air Power. 
 The psychiatric and psychological aspect of aircrew responses to combat stress in, 
both World Wars, is considered in many useful articles in: The British Medical 
Journal, British Journal of Psychiatry, The Lancet, British Heart Journal. Journal 
of the Royal Society of Medicine. Journal of Traumatic Stress and The American 
Journal of Sociology.   
  The recorded interviews of World War One RFC veterans held at the Imperial 
War Museum Sound Archive have been accessed and several firsthand accounts of 
the air war have been used.    Additionally, several personal accounts of combat 
stress and its impact on aircrew recorded in a documentary shown on BBC West in 
1987, have been accessed.    Oral accounts and TV interviews certainly provide 
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valuable personal accounts of combat.  However, the oral accounts, (four accessed) 
were all produced many years after the event and with respect to the participants 
own responses to combat, did not note any psychological effects.    On the other 
hand, the documentary ‘Cavalry of the Clouds’21 an account of the air war on the 
western front, which includes live interviews with RFC/RAF participants in that 
campaign did provide useful insights into the psychological reactions to combat.   
In several cases these interviews can be compared with their memoirs. 
Historiography      
The historical treatment of the first war in the air to a large extent revolves round 
the supposed glamour of the fighter pilots.  There is a lasting view that air fighting 
in World War One saw the last echoes of chivalry, which may well have been given 
credibility by the words of Prime Minister Lloyd George, when in October 1917, 
he said: 
‘They are the cavalry of the clouds. High above the squalor and the mud…. They fight out the 
eternal issues of right and wrong…. They are the Knighthood of this war, without fear and 
without reproach.     They recall all the old legends of chivalry….by the nobility of their spirit’22 
 
 
21Cavalry of the Clouds Documentary Film TV West 1987  
22Quoted in J. Sweetman   Cavalry of the Clouds Air war over Europe (Stroud, 2012) p 9    It is fair to add that 
Sweetman as at pains to show that was not how it was. 
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There is certainly a common opinion that only single seater fighter aircraft were 
involved.   In Sweetman’s book Cavalry of the Clouds, a history of the air war, 
observers are not mentioned at all, reconnaissance rarely.        On the other hand, 
some historians have focused upon the question of ‘air power’ and its arrival in 
war, but these often give little space to the details of the action.23       Many accounts 
of the air war concentrate of the lives and exploits of the ‘Aces’ both British and 
German, and the roles of the air forces and their ‘operations’ have in the main been 
left to official histories.    
   The first of those, the British, produced in six volumes between 1922 and 1937 
has several shortcomings.24     The original author, Sir Walter Raleigh, a Professor 
of English at Oxford University, knew nothing about aviation.   He completed the 
first volume bringing the story of aviation to 1914. His approach was something of 
the social historian and his account of the beginnings of flight includes some 
flowery language that does not help understanding.      The operations of the RFC 
take up only the last quarter of volume one and is a somewhat muddled account.    
Raleigh died after producing this first volume and the role of official air historian 
fell to his research assistant H A Jones.   The handover was not straightforward; 
 
23M. Dean (Sir) The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars (London, 1979)     B. Collier, A history of Air Power 
(London,1974)      
24Sir Walter Raleigh & H. A, Jones Official History of The War.   The War in the Air. Being the part played in the 
Great War by the Royal Air Force, 6 volumes + volume of appendices (Oxford, 1922-1937)   
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Trenchard, wanting to ensure his version of the contribution of the air service was 
not lost, first approached Maurice Baring, his wartime assistant.   Baring refused 
and Trenchard asked T E Lawrence with whom he was friendly.  Trenchard knew 
that Lawrence wished to return to the service and felt that this could be achieved 
by Lawrence being its ‘official historian’.   However, Lawrence also refused.   So, 
by default Jones got the job.        His history undoubtedly  met Trenchard’s main 
objective,  that of ensuring that the RAF’s contribution to the war effort was fully 
recognized.25  Jones also had the advantage of service with the RFC in the war as 
an observer with Number 17 Squadron, he had played a small but heroic part in the 
campaign in Macedonia.26  His history is a factual straightforward and sometimes 
dull narrative.  He does not give source references, but as noted above he was 
provided with all the relevant material much retained in Air 1.    One difficulty with 
using his work is that it does not deal with operations in any coherent sequence, or 
other matters such as training or supply in any rational order.  Thus, the air war in 
France is covered in different volumes mixed with chapters on other areas of action 
(Middle East, Italy) and of entirely different subjects (Home Defence).    It does 
mean that, for almost any subject, it is necessary to consult all six volumes and the 
appendices.      Jones took until 1937 to complete his work and in that time the only 
 
25For an account of the search for a successor to Raleigh, see A. Boyle Trenchard (London,1962) pp 513-516  and  
J Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia  The Authorised Biography  (London, 1988) p 741 
26G. Norris., The Royal Flying Corps (London,1965)    pp 198-199 
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other operational history of the air war in France produced was the first Australian 
Official History published in 1923.27        Unlike the other British colonial countries 
whose aircrew served with the RFC, Australia formed its own air service.    This 
consisted of four squadrons: one serving in the Middle East and three under the 
operational control of the RFC in France.    F M Cutlack, a former Intelligence 
Officer with the 3rd Division of the Australian Imperial Force, produced a detailed 
narrative history based on squadron and wing war diaries and personal accounts.   
It is only concerned with the Australian squadrons.   Nevertheless, because the 
Australian Flying Corps (AFC) squadrons operated under RFC operational control 
it is an especially useful source for RFC operations.    It is also much easier to use 
than Jones, being arranged in a strictly chronological order.  One other notable 
difference in approach is the appendices, unlike Jones, where most appendices are 
statistical, Cutlack has produced what amount to useful short studies on: the aircraft 
used in the war: (British, German and French), Training in RFC/ RAF, and the 
organization of, and the roles of ground officers in the RAF.   A second Official 
Australian History was produced for the Centenary of the Great War.28    Although 
this history is ostensibly about the operations of the squadrons of the AFC serving 
 
27 E. M. Cutlact., The Official History of Australia In The War Of 1914-1918 Volume VIIIP: The Australian Flying 
Corps. (University of Queensland Press, 1923) 
28M. Molkentin., The Centenary History of Australia and The Great War Volume 1; Australia And The War In The 
Air (Oxford,2014) the first of five volumes. 
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in the Middle East and France.  In fact, as the squadrons in France were always part 
of RFC wings commanded by the RFC, their operations were always part of the 
RFC effort.   This history in several ways more comprehensive than either Jones or 
Cutlack.    Account is taken of the political and strategic background and details of 
the results of rapid RFC expansion in 1916, leading to the problems arising from 
inadequately trained pilots are covered.      Additionally, Molkentin also notes the 
medical aspects of the selection and training of aircrew, and albeit briefly, discuss 
casualties and morale. 
   All the British colonies gave considerable support to the war effort and provided 
aircrew for the RFC including pilots from New Zealand, South Africa, and 
Australia.   However, Canadian aircrew made an exceptional contribution to the air 
war and by early 1918 some 25% of pilots on the Western Front were from the 
training schools in Canada.  Unlike Australia, Canada did not form its own air 
force, and instead (after some political wrangling) concentrated upon training 
aircrew at home, for supply to the RFC/RAF.      Despite this significant effort it 
was not until 1980 that the Canadian Official History was produced.29   
 
29 S F Wise., The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force Volume I, Canadian Airman and the First World 
War  (Toronto, 1980)  
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 S F Wise (a Second World War Pilot) produced an exhaustive study of the 
Canadian contribution on all fronts (including the RNAS, which also received 
many Canadian aircrew) and set out to record the activities of Canadians in the war.   
As with the Australian histories the large number of aircrew involved in all theatres 
and with all areas of RFC work, meant that the history was in effect another 
operational history of the war in the air.      Wise takes a broad view of the war in 
the air and takes account of political and strategic matters as well as operations.   
This history is a factual, comprehensive and readable account of all RFC/RAF 
operations in France and is the best history of the air war,    An important area 
covered by this thesis the ‘strategic’ bombing campaign carried out by the 
Independent Force in 1918 and this campaign is addressed by Jones and Molkentin 
as well as Wise,  Many Canadian aircrew served in the squadrons which took part 
in the campaign and suffered many casualties.    Wise is critical of Trenchard’s 
offensive policy and indeed the concept of strategic bombing so, it is right to note 
that this history was written at a time when Canada was engaged in controversy 
about Canada’s involvement in the RAF’s Second World War bombing campaign 
against Germany. This probably explains why Wise makes the point that Canadian 
aircrew were not responsible for either the strategy or the tactics of the RFC.     
Nevertheless, Wise’s history is the most useful of the operational accounts of the 
war in the air.    
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      As noted, the greater part of the historiography of the Great War in the air 
concerns the newsworthy air fighting and the achievements of the ‘Aces’.   Most 
of these accounts ignore the psychological effects on the pilots and observers 
involved, in fact most also ignore the fact that two-seated aircraft existed.  An 
exception to this is the detailed account of the air war by Ralph Barker.30    He 
covers all the major battles from Mons to the final battles over the German retreat.  
This history is described as an ‘anecdotal’ history,31 but he has produced a 
comprehensive account of operations and he does acknowledge and describe the 
psychological effects of air warfare.       A general history of the air campaigns of 
the Great War, which unusually includes political, industrial  and cultural aspects 
of aviation as well as operations is Morrow’s  The Great War in the Air.32    He 
covers the war on the ground and in the air chronologically, giving each year of the 
war a separate section; within the section the war is addressed from each of the 
major nations involved in the air, Britain, France, Germany and Russia. Austria-
Hungary and Italy.     He emphasizes the importance of the industrial backing 
required to fight a technological war and the cultural aspects of recruitment of 
 
30 R. Barker.  The Royal Flying Corps in World War One  ( London,2002) 
31P Garland,  Daily Telegraph     Daily Telegraph Book of the Year 
32J. M. Morrow., The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from 1909 to 1921 (Smithsonian Press USA, 1993) 
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aircrew. He is one of few to note the psychological strains on those pilots who 
became aces.    
The historiography of ‘shell-shock’ is immense.   The term was first used by Lt Col 
C S Myers, who was consultant psychologist to the British Army in France.    He 
used the term because the first patients he saw had been in or near explosions which 
seemed to have caused the symptoms of neurosis shown in these men; that term 
was soon realized to be inappropriate and by 1916 it was changed to ‘nervous 
shock.’  This also was unsatisfactory and ‘shell Shock Sick’ was used for non-battle 
casualties and ‘shell shock nervous’ for battle-casualties.33    Apart from the official 
medical histories and the report of the War Office Committee on Shell Shock  noted 
above,  Ahrenfelt’s History of Psychiatry in World War Two has a very useful 
account of the Army’s difficulty in World War One in accepting that combatants 
suffered psychiatric disorders resulting from combat stress.34    Although the 
historiography of shell shock is extensive very few works cover the psychological 
disorders of combatants in units other than forces engaged in the ground offensive, 
mainly infantry and artillery.  However, Winter’s The First of the Few, a detailed 
account of the war of fighter pilots in the First World War does acknowledge the 
 
33C. S. Meyers., Shell Shock in France 1914-1918 (London,1940)  pp 12-14 
34R. H. Ahrenfeldt., Psychiatry in the British Army in The Second World War (London,1958) pp 4-14 
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mental strain involved and briefly notes some of the symptoms suffered.35     
Additionally, a recent publication by James Hamilton-Paterson, Marked For 
Death, addresses both the physical and mental stress involved and discusses not 
only the stresses upon both pilots and observers, but some of the outcomes and the 
medical response.36     Although these accounts are often anecdotal the are usually 
based on some research and they are often confirmed by aircrew’s personal 
accounts.   Winter’s source notes are particularly useful.    The Dangerous Sky, is 
a substantial work covering aviation and medicine from the early days of flight and 
can be fairly described as a textbook of aviation medicine (although the author 
discounts such a title)  Dr Robinson devotes considerable space to the First World 
War and the psychological problems of aircrew.37             Two books which 
specifically address aircrew and the psychological outcomes of operational flying 
, albeit in World War Two are, The Flyer by Martin Francis and Courage and Air 
Warfare, by Mark Wells.38    Francis’s work is a scholarly and wide ranging  study 
of the social, cultural and personal aspects  of aircrew, in this case of the Royal Air 
Force.   As a cultural history of military aircrew, it is in some respects an academic 
 
35D. Winter., The First of The Few (London, 1982) pp 175-190  
36J. Hamilton-Paterson., Marked For Death: The First World War In The Air (Londom,2015) pp 155-177 
37D. H. Robinson., (Dr) The Dangerous Sky: A history of Aviation Medicine (Oxford,1973) pp72-178 
38M. Francis., The Flyer (Oxford, 2008)        M. K. Wells   Courage and Air Warfare (London,1995) 
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book about ‘Aces’, although it recognizes that not all pilots are aces (and that not 
all flyers are pilots).     There is however, an exceptional and unusual aspect of the 
book.  That is the extended discussion of the reaction of society to the 
psychologically damaged pilots, something not found elsewhere. 
Mark Wells does directly address the subject matter of this thesis: the psychological 
conflict between fear and duty and why aircrew continue to fight on despite heavy 
casualties.  Wells compares operations of RAF Bomber Command and the United 
States Eighth Air Force in the bomber offensive in World War Two.   He examines 
the causes of stress in aircrew in both forces, the interaction between social attitudes 
and effectiveness and he also addresses military psychiatry outlining how both 
command and the medical branch viewed the nature of courage.  Wells sets out 
clearly the causes of stress on aircrew, which range from the accident rate (in both 
wars accidents were about 10% of casualties) in training and on operational 
squadrons, the mastering of new and complex aircraft, the effects of bad weather 
and the strain of operations being delayed and the consequent waiting, sometimes 
actually in the aircraft, and perhaps most stressful of all, watching friends and 
comrades die.    He stresses the importance of leadership on morale.  Virtually all 
the matters discussed and analyzed by Wells are as relevant to World War One as 
they were to the Second World War.   
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  The historiography of war neurosis is now large, is topical and recognized as a 
legitimate academic study.  There are several general accounts which examine the 
development of diagnoses and treatment of war neurosis from beginning of the 
twentieth century.   Some of these accounts debate the question of whether 
psychiatric symptoms produced by battle stress are disorders defined by military 
and medical knowledge of the time or essentially the same and already known 
conditions, differently expressed.   These matters are discussed in two major books: 
Ben Shephard’s A War of Nerves (2002), a history of psychiatry in the twentieth 
century, starting with World War One and examining why some combatants fail to 
resolve the fear /duty dilemma.      A second valuable study is Shell Shock to PTSD 
by Edgar Jones and Simon Wessley (2005) an analysis of the evolution of military 
psychiatry.   The first three chapters describe the evolution of military psychiatry 
from the early ‘wind contusions’ of the Napoleonic wars, through the ‘disordered 
heart’ of the American Civil war to shell shock’ of World War One. (the work in 
fact continues its analysis to the Gulf War).       The development of specialized 
hospitals for sufferers of war neurosis and the continuing differences in treatment 
methods well after 1918 are other matters not covered elsewhere.       The 
historiography of military psychiatry includes several works which set out an 
alternative view of the causes and treatment of war neurosis in World War One.  
These works argue that that Army medical officers did not effectively protect 
soldiers suffering from psychiatric of psychological disorders from unfair 
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disciplinary action.        For the Sake of Example (1983) by Anthony Babbington 
39 dismisses the efforts of medical officers to respond effectively to the onset of 
large numbers of soldiers being removed from the front line with neurosis.  The 
writers view is seen by a remark in the preface,’ the Army doctors seem to have set 
themselves up as extra branch of the provost corps’. His premise is that the 346 
soldiers sentenced to death by courts martial between 1914-1920 were denied 
justice partly because of the failure of medical officers.   A postscript by Major-
General Frank Richardson (an army doctor), who said that RAMC doctors involved 
in these trials should have spoken up for the accused, as he did not accept that 
psychiatry was ‘in its infancy’ at that time.          Another writer has taken a similar 
view of the army doctor’s failure to intervene in courts martial on the grounds that 
many soldiers executed were in fact suffering from neurosis.  The Thin Yellow Line 
by William More (1974).40   On the other hand, in Blindfold and Alone (2001) by 
Cathryn Hughes and John Hughes-Wilson,41 the writers point out that at that time 
the average doctor, in or out of the service knew nothing of psychiatry and if a man 
appeared sane, he was fit for duty.  
 
39 A Babington, For the Sake of Example (London, 1983) 
40W Moore, The Thin Yellow Line (London,1974) 
41C Corns & J Hughes-Wilson, Blindfold and Alone (London,2001) 
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  Additionally, as Corns and Hughes-Wilson note, it was made clear to Army 
doctors that malingering was an ever-present problem.   They also noted that the 
army was slow to accept that shell shock could occur unrelated to a physical wound.  
They  (unlike Moore and Babington) did have access to the court martial records 
and they concluded, that it was impossible to assess how many of the accused 
suffered from a mental breakdown, but with hindsight it seems probable that most 
offers and men who served at the front suffered from what is now called post-
traumatic stress disorder. 
 
Methodology  
Methodologically, this study combines three types of evidence War. First the 
unique medical records of 27,000 RFC Officers are exploited in conjunction with 
operational records and reports to establish the incidence of aircrew breakdown 
with psychological disability.  Second, the evidence relating to the causes of 
psychological and psychiatric effects of combat flying contained in Official 
medical histories and reports, monographs and learned articles has been examined.  
Finally, use has been made of personal accounts, official psychiatric studies, Air 
Publications, Official Histories of the First World War in the Air, and many 
relevant articles. records and reports to establish the effects on operations of 
aircrew wastage due to psychological or psychiatric disorder.    
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     To establish the numbers of removals from operations for psychological or 
psychiatric reasons the Casualty Card for the RFC/RAF, held in the RAF Museum 
have been accessed.  
 These cards were raised for all RFC/RAF Officer casualties in World War One, 
including killed in action, wounded in action, killed in flying accident, and 
missing/pow.  For this study some 27,000 Officers’ personal and incident casualty 
cards were accessed.42   Personal cards give details, usually including rank, 
squadron number, initial date of admission to reporting hospital, diagnosis, 
treatment and disposal to the RFC/RAF wing in the military hospital at Etaples, or 
more often to one of the RFC hospitals dealing with psychiatric cases in the UK.  
Incident cards give similar information regarding the patient, but with a short 
account of the accident or incident (eg crashed on takeoff).     These cards are a 
unique record of the medical history of all RFC/RAF Officer aircrew in World War 
One. However, despite their authority and accuracy, there are some difficulties with 
these cards.   The cards are completed by doctors or medical attendants who were 
usually very busy. They are in manuscript, which is sometimes impossible to read, 
 
42  Although the vast majority of RFC/RAF aircrew in World War One were Officers, some 1400 NCO observers 
also served, together with an unknown number of airmen gunners. There were significant numbers of NCO pilots 
in Western Front Squadrons, a fair estimate is that in 1918 each squadron had two/three NCO pilots.  It has not 
proved possible to examine the medical records of NCO and Airmen aircrew in this study, but it can be noted 
that in the years 1914-1918, some 169 NCO and Airmen aircrew were KIA, with a further 95 made POW and  
44 killed in flying accidents at the front.    
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and cards are sometimes incomplete.   A further difficulty is that the RFC did not 
reach a consensus about the diagnosis to be made for aircrew suffering from 
psychological or psychiatric disorder until December 1916, before then there are 
some unusual diagnosis/descriptions.  Lastly care is needed in interpreting the cards 
as sometimes cards include several diagnoses referring to successive illnesses.       
Nevertheless, a study of these cards does establish with reasonable certainty the 
incidence of aircrew removed from operations with a psychological disorder. This 
study also examines from these evidential sources the impact of varying morale on 
the incidence of aircrew psychological breakdown.  
 Following this introduction, the first chapter, is concerned with one of the most 
important elements of this thesis, the development and maintenance of high morale 
in combat units.   It has been shown that high morale has a significant effect on the 
number of cases of war neurosis.     The War Office Report on Shell Shock noted 
especially the effect of high morale in reducing the rate of cases of shell shock in 
units.    This chapter surveys the factors influencing the state of morale in 
individuals (aircrew) and units (squadrons) 
 Chapter two examines the recruitment procedures and intake of pilots and 
observers for the Royal Flying Corps from its formation and into the world war.    
This chapter establishes that the recruitment process did not involve any serious 
medical requirement and shows that no account was taken of any temperamental 
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or psychological requirements for successful aviators.  By the third year of war, it 
had been recognized that air combat could cause psychological problems, but this 
knowledge had no effect upon recruitment arrangements. 
  Chapter three covers the training processes of the RFC noting the importance of 
efficient training in the building of high morale. The effect of heavy casualties on 
demand for replacements and the consequent fall in training standards is 
considered.    The psychological effect of the many training accidents on aircrew 
is examined and   the effect of the introduction of the Smith-Barry system on both 
training and morale is assessed.  This study examines the reasons for the large 
wastage rates in training, which continued throughout the war, especially the 
effects of the high incidence of accidents. 
 Chapter four first surveys the history of war neuroses, noting the reluctance to 
consider a psychological reason for its occurrence.     It then examines the physical 
and psychological reaction of First World War aircrew to the stress of flying and 
fighting in the air.  This chapter also describes the psychiatric background to the 
disorders caused by combat stress and outlines methods of treatment used during 
the First World War. 
   Chapters five and six examine the development of air war over the Western Front 
from 1914-1918.  Combat stress and its effects on the crews of the RFC /RAF are 
analysed.    The increasing intensity of the air war is examined, together with the 
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effect of casualties and constant turnover of crews.    Individual cases of breakdown 
are considered. 
  Chapter seven examines the operations of the Independent Force, during the last 
five months of the war stressing the heavy casualties suffered and the effect on 
morale and aircrew break down. 
This thesis set out to establish the extent of aircrew breakdown for psychological 
disorders in the RFC/RAF, the causal influence of casualties on breakdown and the 
effect of high morale in prevention of breakdown.    The conclusion records the 
completion of these objectives, setting out the incidence of cases of Psychological 
Disorder in pilots and observers of the RFC/RAF in World War One and the 
significance of these cases in the overall casualty figures.     It establishes the 
relationship with the casualty rate, and the influence of training and morale upon 
aircrew failure.    
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                                                   Chapter One 
 
                                                 Aircrew Morale  
 
This study is concerned with the psychological breakdown of aircrew during the 
First World War.  It has generally been accepted that good morale and discipline 
in a fighting unit not only enhances ‘fighting spirit’ but has a significant effect in 
reducing the number of cases of war neurosis.1   Accordingly, this chapter will 
examine the nature of morale and the factors which enhance or degrade the state 
of morale in combat units, with particular reference to RFC/RAF squadrons.               
Many successful commanders have appreciated the importance of morale, 
notably Field Marshal Montgomery, who consistently emphasised the need to 
maintain high morale in his lectures and speeches: 
[The soldiers] training is the most important consideration in the fashioning of a 
fighting army.  All modern science is directed towards his assistance but on his 
efforts depend the outcome of the battle.  THE MORALE OF THE SOLDIER IS 
THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE FACTOR IN WAR. 2       
 
Later as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, he said “without a high morale no 
success can be achieved in battle”.3      Many writers have also recognised the 
importance of morale, describing it as ‘of great operational significance’4  or 
 
1 Report of the War Office of Enquiry Into ‘Shell-Shock (HMSO, 1922)  pp.49-51; M. K. Wells, Courage and 
Air Warfare (London,1995) pp.101-103; R. H. Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry In The British Army In The Second World 
War (London, 1958) pp.272-273; R. R. Grinker & J. P. Spiegel, Men Under Stress (New York, 1963), chap 3. 
2 IWM, BLM/161 Montgomery’s ‘Morale in Battle’ April 1946. Emphasis in original, quoted in S Hart, 
Montgomery’s, ‘Casualty, Conservation and ‘Colossal Cracks’, 21st Army Group Operational Technique in NW 
Europe 1944-5’, Journal of Strategic Studies Vol 19 (4) (1996) pp.132-153.   
3 Hart, p.135. 
4 P. Mileham, ‘Morale Counts’ RUSI Journal Vol 145 (6) 2000, p.62. 
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‘high morale motivates the soldier to fight and shields the ordinary recruit from 
his fear.’5     
On the other hand, the results of low morale in a unit can be disastrous.  Number 
10 (Naval) Squadron was transferred to the Western Front from Dunkirk in May 
1916.       The squadron immediately experienced the same attrition rates as the 
RFC and suffered heavy losses.    These heavy (and unexpected) losses resulted 
in a shortage of pilots, causing the establishment to be reduced from twenty to 15 
and pilots fresh from flying school to be sent to the squadron.        There was an 
almost immediate crisis in the squadron with some pilots finding excuses to avoid 
flying and others breaking down.  There was also a failure in leadership, one of 
the most important determinants of morale.    The squadron was returned to 
Dunkirk.6   
Morale is vital but intangible, and not only intangible but variable, often 
described vaguely as ‘high’ or ‘low’.   Although morale applies both to 
individuals and groups, the characteristic problems of morale involve the 
individual’s relationship to the group: ‘esprit de corps’ is a group phenomenon:7 
Unless the individual is reasonably content, he will not willingly contribute 
to the unit.  He might desert or mutiny, but he is more likely simply to 
refuse to work wholeheartedly towards the goals of the group, High group 
morale, or cohesion, is the product of a high state of morale existing among 
the members of that unit.8    
 
5 J. Fennell, ‘Courage and Cowardice in the North African Campaign; The Eighth Army and Defeat in the 
Summer of 1942’, War in History Vol 20 (1) 2013 p.99. 
6 S. R. Wise, Official History of the Canadian Air Force Vol 1 Canadian Airmen in the First World War 
(University of Toronto, 1980) pp.173-174. These events are covered in chapter six of this thesis. 
7 W. E. Hocking, ‘The Nature of Morale’ The American Journal of Sociology Vol 47 (3) (1941) pp.302-320 & 
p.311. 
8 G.D.Sheffield, ‘Officer- Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army 1902-1922’  (Thesis, 
University of London  1994), p.64.  
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Although many of the factors reflecting the state of morale can be objectively 
assessed, such as desertion rates, disciplinary offences in a unit, or physical 
conditions of service, other factors such as leadership or loyalty to the cause, 
inevitably involves the evaluation of subjective evidence.  
Notwithstanding these difficulties, almost all military historians and many 
commanders, have produced definitions of morale and an examination of some 
of these, particularly those relating to aircrew is useful before considering the 
factors which influence the state of morale in any military unit.  
An early attempt at a military definition is that of a former RAF First World War 
pilot writing in 1926:  
Morale, that instinct which inspires achievement as against self-preservation is the 
most important factor contributing to success in war, for it increases the efficiency 
of a force out of all proportion to its physical strength. 9 
 
This emphasises the individual factor, the state of mind which in military 
situations determines the willingness to fight.     Another similar approach is that 
of a First World War commander, Brigadier-general Crozier, who said (in post-
war memoirs): 
The question of ability to ‘stick it’ and do the right thing in the heat of action, is largely 
one of morale.10   
 
 
 
9 E.J. Kingston-McCloughry, ‘Morale and Leadership’ RUSI Journal Vol 74 (1929) p.305. 
10 F.P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land, (London, 1930). 
 34 
He went on to point out that fear of the consequences of not ‘sticking to it’ was 
an important factor in maintaining that morale.   
Another example from the First World War notes the importance of the individual 
aspect of morale:  
self-respect is the second indicator of morale.   Soldiers who have good morale reflect 
a pride in themselves in two ways which can be examined using qualitive evidence.  
First, soldiers who are good at their jobs and proud of themselves will naturally become 
clean and tidy. Secondly soldiers with good morale keep their environment as clean as 
possible.11  
 
A few years after the end of the First World War, Air Commodore Henry Brooke-
Popham, the first Commandant of the newly formed RAF Staff College and a 
pilot in that war, gave a lecture to college students, during which he considered 
several definitions of morale.  He first pointed to the Webster’s dictionary 
definition, ‘the mental state of a body of men’ as a true but not very helpful 
statement.  Another suggestion, from a student, was ‘the attitude of mind which 
balances duty against discomfort and danger.’ The final suggestion, which 
although shorter is not dissimilar to later and perhaps more considered 
definitions, was ‘the spirit to endure’. 12  
Arguably, all these suggestions are accurate but simplistic.   Brooke-Popham 
pointed out that before analysing the factors which make up morale, it was 
necessary to examine human nature, which he explained as ‘instinct’.   He noted 
 
11 L. S, Lemisko, ‘Morale in the 16th (Irish) Division 1916-1919’ The Irish Sword Vol XX (1997), pp. 216-232 
& p.218. 
12 ISMAY 32 00004, The Serving Soldier, Kings College London p.7, (accessed 24 Oct 2012). Brooke-Popham 
served in the RFC in the First World War as Commander of 3rd Wing and later as GSO 1 at RFC HQ. 
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that self-preservation of self, group or tribe, often motivated by fear was a counter 
to a high state of morale.     He went on to describe the reasons for high morale 
in several historical settings, including Nelson’s navy, where the inculcation of 
hatred of the enemy overcame fear.   Of course, this was not generally the attitude 
of the servicemen in 1914-18 and is not often a factor in sustaining morale.   Nor 
in the First World War was it the case that any army was induced to fight because 
the soldiers feared their own officers and NCOs more than the enemy, as Brooke-
Popham suggested occurred in the Prussian Army.  Strangely, Brooke-Popham, 
although an airman talking to RAF officers, did not specifically consider the 
position of aircrew or the war in the air. 
One of the first writers to define and analyse the morale of aircrew specifically 
was Strafford-Clark, a psychiatrist attached to a Bomber Command squadron in 
World War Two.     He flew on 15 operations in order to to study at first hand the 
reactions of crews and spent four years with a bomber squadron observing 
aircrews on the ground before and after flights.    A few years after World War 
Two, he analysed the effects of wartime operational flying upon the morale of 
Bomber Command.13         Morale was at first simply defined as, ‘the basic attitude 
of the men to their job’14  and this was later expanded to encompass the mental 
state necessary for a man to continue his tour of operations, defined as, 
 
13 D. Strafford-Clark, ‘Morale and Flying Experience, Results of a Wartime Study’ British Journal of Psychiatry 
Vol 95 (1949) pp.10-50. 
14 Strafford-Clark, p.14 
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‘Confidence, assessed as a blend of resolution, bravery and fearlessness’ 15     
Strafford-Clark noted that morale was heavily dependent on a number of internal 
and external factors affecting the individual.   He stresses the importance of 
confidence in victory combined with belief in personal survival as a basis for high 
morale and the role of appropriate training in instilling the necessary 
confidence.16 
Grinkler and Spiegel, writing in 1945 in a major study of aircrew stress in the 
United States Army Air Force in the Second World War, defined morale as: 
the psychological forces within a combat group which impel its men to get into the 
fight. “Good morale” is ordinarily used to describe a state in which the men feel 
confident, satisfied, united and ready for combat activity.  “Poor morale” implies 
that the men are dispirited, dissatisfied, disorganised and shy of combat.17  
 
This definition noted the vital connection between morale and fighting spirit.      
 Morale, both in individuals and groups may be affected by many factors, 
including leadership, discipline, fear, loyalty, training, group coherence, 
regimental loyalty and the effectiveness of a unit: usually measured by success in 
combat.18   This last is especially important in relation to the casualty rate in a 
unit (squadron), as heavy casualties may be accepted if it is believed that that unit 
objectives are being achieved. 
Apart from these specific and immediate factors there are also several general 
sources affecting morale which include, trust in national leaders, patriotism and 
 
15 Strafford-Clark p.19.  
16 Strafford-Clark p.23. 
17 R.R Grinker & J.P. Spiegel, Men Under Stress, (New York, 1945) p.37. 
18 P.Mileham, ‘Morale Counts’, p.62. 
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ideological commitment.  These may be affected by the status of the individual, 
especially whether he is a volunteer professional or a conscript, as it seems clear 
that a volunteer will at least initially have good morale.   This is of relevance to 
the RFC/RAF as all pilots and observers were volunteers.   
In many cases these various factors can be evaluated to determine the state of 
morale in a military unit.    Additionally, personal matters such as food and 
accommodation and individual welfare also matter.      
As noted above morale is variable often taking time to establish at a high level, 
but also subject to rapid degradation following unexpected or stressful events.        
It can also be the case that different units of the same armed forces can be 
differently affected by similar conditions.    In the later stages of the Russian 
campaign in the Second World War (1944) the fighting spirit of the German 
Army was maintained (as discussed below) under very difficult conditions.    
However, during the same period and in the same area, Luftwaffe aircrew and 
ground crew morale deteriorated when subjected to the same very cold weather 
and poor living conditions affecting the army and Luftwaffe fighting efficiency 
suffered severely.19    
Considered below are the major factors which, it is submitted, influence morale 
in military fighting units.  They are arranged in random order to reflect the fact 
that for units in different circumstances the most important factors may vary. 
 
19 J. S. Haywood, Stopped at Stalingrad The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East 1942-43 (UP Kansas, 
1998) p. 37.  
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Group Effectiveness (Success in combat) 
It is arguable that of all the factors affecting morale the most positive is success 
in combat.      A notable example of the dynamic positive effect of operational 
success is shown by its effect upon Coastal Command aircrews in anti-shipping 
operations in 1945: 
The spirit in the anti-shipping squadrons is so terrific that one is conscious of it the 
moment one walks into the mess……….I am always afraid of over-writing times such 
as these and I  asked a Wing Commander who has done over a hundred operational 
flights along the French  coast and the Bay of Biscay, if he felt the change.     I said to 
him “do you imagine something terrific in their enthusiasm?”  He said “no, you are 
right. It is like a man who has been catching fish for a long time and suddenly hauls 
them in, one after the other.  He becomes anxious to catch as many as he can while they 
are still biting and naturally he keeps on until he can no longer see the cast”     The 
expressions on the faces of the aircrews as they look at the photographs of their attacks 
are good to see.  It is something like the fever that comes to a gambler when he knows 
he cannot go wrong.20  
 
 
It is worth noting that for most of their war the aircrews on anti-shipping 
operations had been suffering loss rates of up to 45% on operations, with an 
average rate of 23%.   A torpedo bomber aircrew had a 17.5% per cent chance of 
surviving a first tour and 3% for a second.21         By 1945, German defences were 
weaker, the aircraft and weapons were much improved and both results and 
morale were at high levels.     The other side of the coin is that lack of operational 
success hurts morale, as was the case in Bomber Command during its attacks on 
Berlin in 1944: 
 
20 H. Bolitho, Task for Coastal Command (London, 1945)  p.110  quoted C J M Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive 
(London, 2005)  pp.228-229. 
21 Goulter, p.155. 
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In the Battle for Berlin, Bomber Command endangered its morale by pressing the 
attacks to the point at which the results achieved did not compensate for the losses 
sustained.22 
  
Group Coherence 
It has been argued by several writers, that one of the most convincing indicators 
of good morale in a military unit is ‘group coherence’, a term which is especially 
relevant when considering morale in a squadron, almost the ideal example of a 
coherent fighting unit.        The formation of feelings of obligation and loyalty to 
any group with which one is identified is of the highest significance to good 
morale.23  This group loyalty is often exclusive of ethical, political or moral 
considerations.      Group coherence has been suggested by several writers as a 
prime reason for the efficient performance of German army units in both the First 
and Second World Wars.   In both conflicts, German troops continued to fight on 
even after it was clear that the war was lost.24 
Shils and Janowich argued that among the reasons for the effectiveness of small 
groups (section or squad) as positive morale builders is that the individual’s need 
for esteem and affection from both comrades and officers is met within this small 
group.25     They pointed out that as the army is often separated from civilian 
influences, the individual soldier comes to depend more on his military primary 
 
22 C. Webster & N Frankland,  History Of The Second World War: The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 
1939-1945 Vol III  (London, 1961),  p.310. 
23 Grinker & Spiegel p.40. 
24 S. A. Shils & Morris Janowich ‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II’ Public 
Opinion Quarterly Vol 12 (1948) pp.289-315. 
25 Shils & Janowich p.281. 
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group.     In the Second World War German soldiers often stressed the high level 
of comradeship, referring to their units as ‘one big family.’26             Strachan has 
noted that this theory has been adopted almost without question by western 
armies as the rationale fits well with a volunteer army  training for and (until The 
First World War ) participating in ‘small wars’ and having strong regimental 
loyalties.27    
Writing about a later war, Nora Kinzer Stewart, a US Army sociologist noted the 
reasons why British forces had fought well in the Falkland campaign:  first, the 
war was felt to be a just cause, second, the best troops were sent.           
Additionally, noting the high morale and cohesion of British Army units, she said: 
Soldiers and NCOs were confident that their officers were versed in battle tactics. 
British NCOs were trained to accept responsibility at all levels of command.     An open 
organizational climate with little regard for the privileges of rank and accompanied by 
good humour led to continual adaptation in the fluid and ever-changing battle and 
spelled swift success on the battlefield.28 
 
 
However, the strength of small group cohesiveness and morale can be 
undermined by several factors.      It is argued that once groups disintegrated 
morale declined and fighting efficiency was lost.29   One such weakening factor 
is the arrival of replacements following combat losses.    Often these arrive 
directly from training units and sometimes do not have time to integrate before 
 
26 ibid p.28. 
27 H. Strachan, ‘Training, Morale and Modern War’ Journal of Contemporary History Vol 41 (2) (2006) p.211. 
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further casualties exacerbate the problem.  This was certainly the case in the 
Royal Flying Corps at some periods in the First World War when losses were 
particularly heavy and on some squadrons morale was affected.30            During 
these periods of heavy losses during the battles of the Somme and Arras and on 
the bombing squadrons of the Independent Force, it was common for replacement 
pilots to spend only a few days on the squadron before becoming a casualty.31        
Although replacements and losses within the unit can adversely affect morale, it 
is also true that the Wehrmacht especially in Russia and North West Europe, 
though much weakened and with many only partly trained replacements, 
continued to fight tenaciously to the end.     This has led to other factors, including 
ideological commitment, being suggested as reasons for the continued combat 
motivation of the Wehrmacht, the U-boat force and the Luftwaffe despite the 
great superiority of the Allies and the realisation that the war was lost.      During 
the last year of the war the Germans continued to fight fiercely even though the 
‘primary group’ factor had collapsed due to personal losses, shortage of food and 
supplies and lack of medical facilities.  Bartov has shown how an elite Motorised 
Division in fourteen months of combat lost 98.4% of its 18,000 men and 194% 
of its officers.     One company in 15 weeks of fighting had eleven changes of 
command.32    Clearly with this level of loss and turnover it is unlikely that a 
 
30 R. Barker, The Royal Flying Corps in World War One, (London, 1995) pp.188-189; L A Pattinson, History of 
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cohesive group loyalty could develop and some other motivation explains the fact 
that at very late stage (only a few weeks before the end), morale remained high 
enough for units to be able to fight efficiently.    Bartov suggested several possible 
factors, pointing out that some matters, including ideology, patriotism, or national 
pride must be instilled before the soldier arrives at the battlefield.33       
 Undoubtedly the factors noted above applied to the German forces, but on the 
battlefield other motivational forces may apply, including fear, which in the 
German armed forces was certainly a factor.    
 
Fear 
On the Russian front and later in France and Germany, German commanders 
considered that morale and motivation needed to be bolstered by a fear of the 
consequences of failing to carry out any military duty.  For example, 
Generalleutnant Erwin Menny, commanding 72 Infantry Division (speaking 
when a prisoner of war), described his actions after receiving an order forbidding 
surrender:   
I issued an order like that in Russia and it succeeded in restoring the position.   I had 
just taken over a new ‘Division’ there which had newly come from Norway, so that it 
was yet fresh and was still good.   The enemy broke through simply because a few 
fellows had run away.    Immediately I insisted in fetching the deputy judge advocate 
general from O staff at the rear and brought him to the front- his knees were knocking 
together with fright- and we tried the men directly behind the place where the enemy 
had broken in and sentenced them immediately and shot them on the spot.    That went 
round like wildfire and the result was that the main defensive line was in our hands 
again at the end of three days.    From that moment on there was quite good order in 
the ‘Division’.    It acted as a deterrent, at any rate no one else ran away unnecessarily.    
 
33  Bartov, p.204. 
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Of course, a thing like that is contagious, it is demoralizing when everyone runs 
away.34   
  
Also in the Russian campaign, the German high command’s concern about the 
fighting spirit of senior officers led to the formation of a Flying Court Martial 
under the command of a general (Hubner), who had the power to court martial 
and shoot on the spot any officer not showing the ‘correct’ attitude.      The first 
victims were four officers who were held responsible for the loss of the Bridge at 
Remagen in April 1945.35 
During the Second World War, some 21,000 executions were carried by Germany 
for military offences and many thousands more were sentenced to 
imprisonment.36  It is true that continuing to fight because of the consequences of 
refusing may be effective but does not lead to high morale.  These exceptionally 
punishment figures can be compared with those for the German Army in the First 
World War when there were only forty-eight executions for military offences.37           
The German figures for the First World War are also in sharp contrast with the 
British experience in that war.    In the years 1914-1918 British Courts-Martial 
sentenced 3080 men to death.    Of those 18 were executed for cowardice and 266 
for desertion and some 30 for other offences (including Murder, which still 
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involved the death penalty in this period) the remaining sentences were 
commuted to terms of imprisonment, which was often suspended so that the 
soldier concerned could be kept at the front.38   
The ordeal of trench warfare and the large numbers of casualties brought about 
by the continued artillery bombardments undoubtedly influenced morale.   It is 
therefore not surprising that the Commanders in the field felt it necessary to use 
the extreme sanction to ensure the fighting spirit of the troops was maintained.   
Members of courts-martial were aware of the effect their verdict could have: 
A memory that disturbs me is the hint or warning that came down from above…that 
morale needed a sharp jolt, or that a few severe sentences might have a good effect.   It 
was expedient that some man who had deserted his post under fire was shot to 
encourage the others.  Sometimes discipline would be screwed a few turns: death 
sentences would be confirmed and executed.39  
 
Although the number of executions on the western front, (about one in ten of 
those sentenced) shows an awareness of the need for a deterrent, commanding 
generals and Haig as GOC invariably considered all possible mitigation before 
confirming or recommending death sentences.    A study of the cases shows that 
confirming officers were aware of the needs of both morale and discipline, as 
there were undoubtedly some bad cases of breakdown.        In August 1916, the 
commanding officer of the 16th Cheshires wrote to his brigade commander: 
Dear General, 
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I am ashamed to say that the Battalion is quite demoralised.  I do not think they would 
stand up against anything and I do think that it would be safer to get them relived if 
possible.   Company commanders tell me that very few men would follow their officers 
over. They are quite hopeless.40   
 
 
This is an extraordinary letter, but it does explain the viewpoint of some 
commanders, that strong disciplinary measures would maintain fighting spirit if 
not morale.      In the First World War as we have seen there were 266 executions 
for desertion, thus confirming the recognition by senior commanders that the 
number of desertions is an indicator of morale and of the willingness to fight by 
the new armies.     The overall desertion rate in the First World War was 10.26 
per 1,000 men.       It was apparent by 1915 that desertion was a growing problem 
and in June 1915, the War Office issued a notice, pointing out there had been 
1251 desertions from the Expeditionary Force and over 20,000 from the new 
army and regular units and continuing:   
Desertion during active service is one of the most serious crimes a soldier can commit, 
a fact that does not appear to be everywhere sufficiently appreciated  by the officers 
who as presidents and members of courts martial have to deal with this , as sentences 
in not a few cases have been exceedingly lenient.41      
 
 
This edict seems to have had some effect upon the decisions of courts-martial as 
most of the executions for desertion were imposed between the second half of 
1916 and 1918.     However, it is submitted that the use of the ultimate sanction 
of the death penalty as motivation for the maintenance of fighting spirit was not 
effective in the First World War, particularly as a deterrent to desertion.    Of 
 
40 TNA WO 95/2485 War Diary 105 Brigade  
41 Corns & Hughes-Wilson, Blindfold and Alone, p.216. 
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those men who were executed for desertion, many had offended more than once, 
some several times.42   
In the First World War, most accounts of the state of the British Army’s morale 
refer only to soldiers and NCOs.    Two only of the 346 death sentences imposed 
were upon officers and one of those was for murder.     However, there was 
concern about the morale of officers and at least one officer was court-martialled 
and dismissed for refusing duty.43       In fact as will be discussed later in this 
work, officers who were removed from the front, including RFC aircrew, were 
treated differently from soldiers and NCOs, almost certainly from concern about 
the effect upon morale of the inevitable publicity following courts-martial.44    
The death penalty for military offences (except for treachery and mutiny) was 
abolished in 1930.    
In the Second World War, there were several periods when the morale of British 
Armies was a matter of concern, especially in North Africa and Italy, where 
desertion rates were considered unacceptable.   Representations were made by 
several senior generals for the death penalty for military offences to be 
reintroduced.       It was pointed out that deserters often preferred detention or 
imprisonment to action in the front line, knowing there would almost certainly be 
an amnesty after the war.    The matter was raised by the C-in-C Middle East, Sir 
Claude Auchinleck, in April 1942, who said that there had been 291 convictions 
 
42 Corn & Hughes-Weston, p.223. 
43 W. Philpott, Bloody Victory (London, 2009) pp.480-481. (The case of Lt Max Plowman). 
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for desertion and 19 for cowardice in the command and believed that the death 
penalty would be a ‘salutary deterrent’45  
He repeated his request in July 1942, soon after Tobruk fell to the Germans, 
asking: 
in the strongest possible terms for earliest agreement to reintroduce death penalty for 
specified offences.  Recent desertions show alarming increase even amongst troops of 
highest category.    Present punishments that can be awarded insufficient deterrent.   
Would stress that cases where deserter takes truck containing food water and means 
of transport of his comrades are far more serious than similar cases during last war.46 
 
The matter was raised again in Italy in 1944-45, when the C in C in Italy, Sir 
Harold Alexander, raised the matter of reintroducing the death penalty.  Due to 
the high casualty rate in the Italian campaign and the difficulty of obtaining 
replacements, the high desertion rate was a significant problem.      Between 
January 1944 and May 1945 some 11,458 soldiers deserted.47           The command 
accepted that morale was badly affected by the difficult conditions of the front 
line.       All troops, but especially the infantry suffered from the constant rain, 
chilling winds and very heavy mud which made all movements difficult and 
despite the rain there was shortage of fresh drinkable water.48  
It is arguable that if desertion was to be treated as an indication of the morale of 
the British Army in the Second World War, there was no need for an extreme 
sanction, as the rate of desertion overall in the Second World War was better than 
 
45  French, ‘Discipline and the Death Penalty’, p. 539. 
46  French, pp. 539-540.  
47  W. Jackson, History of The Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East Vol VI Part II p.374. 
48  Jackson, pp.366-367. 
 48 
in the First World War at 6.89 per 1000.49      However, the reason for refusing 
the generals request for the restoration of the death penalty for military offences 
was pragmatic and political, as the Army Council pointed out to Churchill: 
Directly we introduce legislation we are in the following dilemma.  If legislation is 
necessary, the facts and figures must be very serious.   But if they are serious, we can’t 
afford to tell either to our friends or to our enemies.50 
 
The concern of senior officers about desertion rates and courts-martial shows the 
importance of disciplinary factors as a measure of the state of morale, even though 
as noted above firm discipline does not of itself mean good morale, although some 
service authorities may believe that is the case.       So much so that when 
presenting the naval estimates in parliament in 1928, the First Lord noted that the 
“morale of the fleet had never been higher” evidenced by the fact that the annual 
number of courts-martial had reached its lowest figure ever.51 
 
Ideology  
 
 Obviously, punishment, however effective as a disciplinary measure, is a 
negative factor in promoting high morale and fighting spirit.    A more positive 
factor is most certainly ‘ideology’ which almost certainly applied in the case of 
the Wehrmacht in the last years of the Second World War.      The performance 
of the German forces in 1944-45 was undoubtedly influenced by a large measure 
of ideological support for the Nazi regime in general and for Hitler. 
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Shils and Janowitz did not assume that the ‘primary group’ theory alone was 
motivation for the fighting spirit of the Germans, even though they felt it was the 
major factor.   They also noted the crucial role of faith in Hitler of the German 
troops, despite the continual reverses suffered in France and Germany after D-
day and the retreat in Russia.    Opinion polls of German Prisoners of war showed 
continued faith in Hitler and even some belief in final victory.52     This was in 
large part that from 1938, the training that all German soldiers received included 
a large amount of National Socialist indoctrination and most male youths had 
been subjected to the influence of the ‘Hitler Youth’ organisations.  Officers were 
required to learn and believe in the ‘National Socialist’ world view.53  British 
First World War aircrew were not subjected to this sort of indoctrination.    
 
Leadership 
Although there are many factors which affect the state of morale, it is very 
unlikely that ‘high’ morale can be achieved without confidence in the leadership; 
conversely ‘low’ morale is often the result of bad or inept leaders.     Leadership 
itself has many definitions but a few examples will show that a few basic 
attributes are always mentioned:   
Among other things the military leader has to know his men, take an interest in their 
careers, earn their respect and their loyalty, eschew cursing them, promote their comfort 
and welfare, be patient, considerate, firm and vigorous, keep the men informed, show 
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enthusiasm, explain the reason behind orders, preserve good health … and bid the 
furloughed soldier a cheery farewell. 54  
 
That is a very comprehensive account of a leader’s responsibility, another shorter 
but compatible definition is:  
the leader must have professional skill and the ability to put it across ... he has to be an 
enthusiast ... and there must be loyalty-up and down.  Obviously the leader has to have 
judgement.55 
 
Kingston-McCloughry, (who flew fighters in the First World War and was later 
a senior RAF commander) already noted above for a definition of morale, also 
defines leadership, pointing out that leadership is the quality which influences 
and inspires officers and men.   He set out the qualities required as: 
the first quality required of a leader is reason; a reason prompted by high ideals and 
directed by knowledge, efficiency, energy, judgement and self-confidence.    The 
second quality is imagination……he must feel the pulse of his own force and be able 
to place himself in the midst of the conditions being experienced by his men…….Lastly 
a leader requires a strong and determined will, with energy to carry through a 
resolution. 56 
 
A very clear example of the correlation between leadership and morale is that of 
Admiral Donitz and the U-Boat command in the Second World War.     The 
measures which established the high morale of U-Boat crews had been instilled 
by Donitz in the first years of the war.  
An essential part of this spirit which he sought to instil from the first was the feeling of 
belonging to a special or elite corps within the larger brotherhood of the service; one 
rather theoretical manifestation of this was his insistence that no U-Boat man shaved 
while at sea even on the short passages made by the small boats of the 1st Flotilla.57 
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His success in creating high morale was noted in a report on the U-Boat service 
which noted the: ‘Military and comradely spirit in the flotilla is above all praise’.    
The U-Boat crews had confidence in his knowledge of submarine warfare and his 
personal interest in their performance, manifested by his practice of meeting 
every crew on their return from patrol and when appropriate decorating captains 
and crew members at the dockside.   It was noticeable that when U-Boat 
command (BdU) was forced to move from the French bases, first to Paris and 
later when Donitz was appointed C-in-C German Navy in 1943, to Berlin and this 
practice was not possible, morale was affected.    The last move to Berlin which 
coincided with the disastrous losses of early 1943, certainly contributed to a 
significant lowering of morale in the U-boat force.   
One matter which Donitz felt important in maintaining morale was the award of 
decorations and he was insistent that any awards to U-Boat crew were made as 
quickly as possible, he said; 
I also made it a practice of presenting at once, in the name of the Commander-in –
Chief, any decorations which the captains of the boats had recommended and of which, 
bearing in mind the need for equal treatment for all U-Boat crews, I had approved.   
Where decorations were concerned, there was no correspondence and no red tape in U-
Boat command ... I regard this practice of immediate awards to those engaged upon 
operations as psychologically important.58 
 
This attitude to publicising awards, which was also the policy of the German Air 
Force in the First World War, was in sharp contrast with the British policy of ‘no 
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publicity.’     The result was that German Aces were well known (and sometimes 
feared) by RFC aircrew and the public, whereas the successful British pilots were 
virtually unknown, certainly in the first two years of the war.59    
Apart from Donitz’s leadership at the top of U-boat command, the leadership 
qualities of the individual captains were vital to the maintenance of morale.  The 
early U-boat ‘Aces’ were of the highest quality both as seamen and commanders, 
but their replacements in 1942/3 were clearly of a lower standard and morale 
suffered accordingly.   The lowering of morale caused by the high casualty rate 
(41 U-boats lost in May 1943) was evidenced by, failures to press home attacks, 
avoiding convoy routes, crews showing lack of confidence in captains and crew 
failures.60 
The U-Boat experience, with its fluctuation of morale over time, can be compared 
with that of the RFC in 1914-18.         Aircrew of the Royal Flying Corps 
undoubtedly considered themselves an elite and certainly at the start of air 
operations in 1914 and early 1915 were full of keenness and confidence.  By mid-
1916 both confidence and morale at least in some units had suffered and the heavy 
casualties suffered supporting the Army in the Somme battles had a serious effect 
on morale.  It seems that Trenchard’s many visits to the Squadrons, although 
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inspiring some aircrew, did not have the same overall effect as Donitz’s to his 
crews.61     
The influence of the factors noted above on the morale of aircrew specifically has 
been considered by several writers.   Apart from Strafford-Clark, who was 
concerned with RAF Bomber Command, Mark Wells has covered the general 
aircrew experience in World War II and a major report by the United States Army 
Air Force was produced at the end of the Second World War.  As already noted, 
Grinker & Spiegel produced a comprehensive account of the effects of combat 
flying on US aircrew.  
All these writers concluded that, as with U-Boat crews, probably the most 
important and most direct influence on the morale of aircrew is the quality of 
leadership.  Aircrew are usually specially selected and at least during training are 
well motivated and morale is inherently high.  This factor is emphasised in the 
report on the morale of the United States Army Air Force in World War Two.    
Having noted how leaders should act it, goes on to set out the leadership qualities 
needed:  
certain fundamental traits are essential………these include vigour, interest in the 
welfare of all personnel, and perhaps most important of all, the ability to inspire 
confidence by demonstrating both a grasp of the work at hand and a capacity for doing 
it’62 
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Although other qualities are needed to lead aircrew, a failure of competence or 
courage has a particularly bad effect.   The courage required of aircrew 
commanders includes the moral strength to send pilots or crews on operations 
which will inevitably incur heavy losses.  In the First World War, Squadron 
Commanders were initially barred from operational flying and although some 
ignored the order, memoirs of the air war often comment that the flight 
commanders who led the squadrons in the air were the real leaders. 
In the Second World War there was discussion in both British and American Air 
Forces as to whether squadron commanders should fly on operations or should 
remain as administrative commanders.   It was clear that from the perspective of 
the crews themselves, morale was enhanced if all commanders led from the front 
by flying operations.  As General Curtis Le May put it: 
How can any commanding officer send his people into combat when he knows nothing 
about it?  So, I started out leading all missions personally.  Not only did I feel that in 
order to lead the people fighting under me, but I had to find out things… you have to 
get in there and fight to find out what it’s about.63      
 
Not all senior commanders were able to do what Le May did, but all had to 
maintain the morale of their crews. In Bomber Command, many group 
commanders would have liked to fly on operations, for similar reasons to Le 
Mays, but the C in C Bomber Command (Harris) specifically forbad group 
commanders from flying operations 64   Nevertheless, Harris was always 
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concerned about the morale of bomber crews and did not restrict Station 
Commanders or other senior officers from flying on operations as he felt this was 
helpful to the morale of those who had no choice about flying.       In contrast 
with the RFC command’s initial view in the First World War, he felt strongly that 
Squadron Commanders should take part in operations.   
Harris was also concerned about the effect on morale of individual crew 
leadership, that is by aircraft captains.      He was aware of the dissatisfaction in 
Bomber Command of some Squadron commanders who disliked NCO captains 
and felt that all captains should be at least Flight Lieutenants, a view supported 
by many group commanders.65    Harris pressed for officer rank for all captains 
of heavy bombers but was unable to convince the Air Ministry and Treasury.    
Unlike Donitz and Trenchard, Harris was not often seen by his crews, but could 
maintain their respect and trust, largely because the crews felt that he had their 
interests at heart.    Those visits he did make were undoubtedly helpful to morale: 
as is shown by a visit in September 1943 to a squadron whose operational record 
was poor and morale very low.  He reminded crews of their duty in forceful terms 
and answered many questions.  The next day at another squadron he was met with 
cheers from the assembled aircrew.66  
Harris like Donitz was aware of the importance for morale of successful crews 
and individuals receiving appropriate decorations.67       However, although the  
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impact of good leadership by senior commanders was important, it was the 
quality of commanders of the front-line squadrons in the RAF and the USAAF 
had the most immediate effect on morale.    This importance is reflected in a 
remark by an RAF unit medical Officer: 
Send a good leader to a squadron of low morale and in a short space of time he will 
build it up; put a bad leader into a squadron with high morale and, given time the 
standard will deteriorate.68  
 
The USAAF report noted the importance of leadership, putting its importance as 
the strongest factor affecting morale, and pointing out; 
There was widespread agreement that unit morale acted as “a complete barometer and 
gauge of the fighting spirit, capacity for leadership, and general all-round ability of the 
commander.69 
 
Several post-World War Two studies of aircrew emphasised the importance of 
leadership in promoting good morale.    In a major report published in 1947, two 
RAF psychiatrists, who examined 22 RAF station and squadron commanders and 
25 squadron medical officers in Bomber Command, found that good leadership 
was thought to be vital, indeed many felt that it was the most important of all.    In 
fact, 37 of the 45 said that ‘the squadron commander is the most important man 
in the RAF’. They also noted that it was important for morale that the squadron 
commander flew on operations.70 
 
Training and Weapons (Aircraft) 
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The lack of ‘air fighting’ training or in some cases no operational training at all 
was a constant factor in the RFC experience of war and undoubtably affected 
squadron morale.     It cannot have helped morale that many squadrons found that 
some replacement pilots had to be sent home for further training, thus increasing 
the burden on other pilots.   
Training especially combat training is a vital component of morale.            Strachan 
has noted five fundamental functions of training which lead to proficiency with 
weapons and creates self-confidence.  They are, firstly, to counter boredom, 
secondly to distinguish the soldier from the civilian, thirdly, it can create unit 
cohesion, fourthly, soldiers can assimilate tactical thinking and fifthly it enables 
trainees to master innovative technologies. 
He also pointed out that a large part of training is psychological, aiming to build 
self-confidence.71        For aircrew, it is particularly important that confidence in 
the type of aircraft flown must be established.  Sometimes this task is more 
difficult because an aircraft may have a reputation for difficulty or unreliability. 
Fear of a particular aeroplane had first appeared in the RFC in the First World 
War when the DH2, earned notoriety and the name ‘Flying Coffin’ or ‘spinning 
incinerator’ because of engine troubles and a tendency to spin, both factors 
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causing crashes and fires.  Even after it had been shown that recovery from a DH2 
spin was possible, this aircraft continued to cause anxiety in the RFC.72 
Another First World War aircraft which had a bad reputation was the Morane. 
Cecil Lewis called it ‘one of the recognised death traps’ which pilots in training 
hoped never to fly.73    Morale on Morane squadrons was very low mainly due to 
the high accident rate. 
In the Second World War several USAAF aircraft encountered difficulty in 
getting the confidence of their crews.   The Fighter P-38 suffered a series of 
unexplained accidents in 1942, which resulted in large scale requests by pilots for 
transfer to other units.      Even worse was the story of the medium-bomber the 
B-26.      From its first delivery to service, this aircraft proved difficult to maintain 
and worse, dangerous to fly, causing many accidents.   As the AAF report noted 
the effect on morale was profound: 
As disaster piled on top of disaster, a mood of panic spread like a pestilence from one 
B-26 base to the next and helped to add to the accident rate.   The situation became so 
serious that when an opportunity for transfer arose, every eligible pilot in the 30th 
Bombardment Group, with the exception of the commanding officer and his executive, 
either formally or informally stated a desire to escape from B-26 training to a safer 
kind of flying activity.74     
 
It took some design changes and several demonstration flights before morale was 
restored and aircrew convinced that the B-26 was safe to fly.       The USAAF 2nd 
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Air Force flying the four engined B-24 also had problems following several un-
explained accidents which had a chilling effect on aircrew morale.   
Apart from the problems with a particular aircraft, the accident rate in training 
was also a cause of concern to command and aircrews alike.   Bomber Command 
suffered the loss of over 8,000 aircrew in training accidents, with another 4000 
injured.75      
Throughout the First World War in both the RFC and later the RAF the number 
of accidents was a major cause for concern, both for aircrew under training and 
on operational squadrons.76    
Morale in the RFC, despite concerns about some aircraft, was undoubtably 
enhanced by the introduction of the Smith-Barry system and together with the 
Avro 504 (introduced as the standard basic training aircraft) which was: 
a nice tempered, reasonable machine that obeys a simple honest code of rules at all 
times and in all weather.  And by shedding a flood of light on the mysteries of its 
control he drove away the fear and the real danger that existed for those who were 
flying aeroplanes in the blackest ignorance of first principles.77 
 
 
The system and the aircraft gave pilots the confidence which came of conscious 
mastery of their aircraft, and although the only real training for war is war, pilots 
were able to approach operations able to concentrate on fighting and not be 
concerned about controlling the machine, with a very positive effect on morale.   
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Casualty Rate 
Another major source of changes in the morale of aircrew in both World Wars 
was the operational casualty rate.      In the Second World War, between 1939 
and May 1945, Bomber Command lost (in addition to the training losses noted 
above) 47,258 aircrew flying on operations.78    The first of these heavy casualties 
came in very early raids by Bomber Command, on 8th and 18th of December 1939.  
On both days Wellington Bombers made daylight attacks on the German Naval 
Base at Wilhelmshaven, on the eighth five out of six aircraft were lost and on the 
eighteenth 12 out of 22 aircraft were lost.79 Among the direct results of these high 
loss rates (change to night bombing, change of target policy) was  a loss of 
confidence by many aircrew.  Another immediate result was start of urgent 
enquiry at the Aim Ministry about the much operational service should aircrew 
serve before resting or removal from operations, The only previous experience 
the RAF had was from the First World War, when the usual but not official period 
of front line service was six months.80  
All RAF commands were consulted and the first set of limits for operational 
flying were introduced, it being generally accepted that a ’datum line’ would be 
introduced giving the individual a 50-50 chance of completing his tour.   For 
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Fighter Command the tour length was to be 200 hours operational flying, Coastal 
Command were unable to decide at that time, and for Bomber Command, the 
immediate cause for concern, 30 missions not exceeding 200 hours.81      By 1941 
with the increased intensity of operations and introduction of many inexperienced 
crews, there had been an increase in cases of ‘Flying Stress’ the RAF Medical 
Service carried out a survey of cases in Bomber Command to determine the 
factors influencing flying stress.82 Following the survey it was appreciated that 
apart from alleviating  (where possible) the factors causing  flying stress, cases 
could be addressed in two was,  Firstly, individuals could be removed from 
operational when they began to show signs of stress, or secondly, tour lengths 
limited to an amount of operational flying which would be within the capabilities 
of the average member of aircrew.  As it was almost impossible to anticipate 
psychoneurotic breakdown in any individual by signs of nervous fatigue, the 
practical option was limitation of tour length.83       In 1942 an investigation into 
psychological disorders in flying personal in Bomber Command inter alia 
considered the question of tour lengths.   Station and squadron commanders and 
station and squadron medical officers were consulted, and all except three were 
in favour of limit of operational exposure. The reasons in favour included: 
squadron commanders needed a yardstick  with a standard reference point from 
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which he can measure the performance of individual squadron members, the 
limits help the crews themselves, they can have something at which to aim and if 
the limit is within the reach of the average member of the crew he could be 
removed before deterioration begins and possibly  remain efficient for a second 
tour.84    Following this investigation, the number of operations which would 
constitute a tour was set at a figure which would give the notional 50% chance of 
survival.85   In Bomber Command this was set at 30 completed operations, and 
for a second tour, recognising the statistically increased risk, 20 operations.    
Other Commands used the number of operational hours flown to complete a tour; 
in Fighter Command, it was day fighters 200 hours and night fighters 100 hours; 
Coastal Command set 800 hours for anti-submarine operations and 200 hours for 
Torpedo squadrons and other squadrons employed offensively (anti-shipping 
operations).86  With regard to Bomber command, the C-in-C Sir Arthur  Harris 
was not entirely in favour of a set tour length, being unwilling to encourage the 
idea that crews were involved in some form of ‘trade union’ contract. 
Nevertheless, he accepted the necessity of such an arrangement.87 
In the event, in 1941, a bomber crew had a 44% chance of surviving a first tour 
of 30 operations and a 19.5% chance of surviving a second: by 1943, the casualty 
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rate had increased so that these figures had fallen to 33% and 16%.88    Flying 
with Coastal Strike forces (losing over 4000 men), with an even greater loss rate, 
which meant a 17.5% chance of surviving a first tour and a 3% chance of a 
second.89    The USAAF Eighth Air Force lost some 26,000 killed with survival 
rate of slightly less than 25%.90  
At the start of the First World War in August 1914 the RFC’s strength was 146 
Officers and the RNAS 130 Officers.91     Almost all the officers were pilots.   At 
the end of the war the total officer strength was 27333 officers, with another 
16681 cadets and NCOs under instruction.92   Total casualties to November 1918 
were:  6166 aircrew killed and some 3212 missing PoW or interned, another 7245 
were wounded.93       Of course the RFC losses are minute compared to the killing 
rates in trench warfare but were nevertheless a very high proportion of the total 
force engaged. It is probable that the casualty rate in 1918 was the heaviest of any 
arm of the British forces.     Although combat losses in air fighting and bombing 
were high, the casualty rate for ground attack/ contact sorties was greater, often 
30% of aircraft dispatched.94   The heavy losses suffered by the RFC during the 
Somme battles most certainly had a serious effect on morale.  It did not help that 
many pilots felt that these heavy losses were in part at least due to inadequate and 
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outgunned aircraft.      These combat losses were in addition to the many aircrew 
killed in accidents, 491 on the Western Front.    Additionally, there were possibly 
twice as many in England in training and on the home defence squadrons.    The 
extremely high casualty figures for 1917 and 1918 also affected the morale of the 
squadrons on the western front.95  
In both world wars, morale on RFC/RAF squadrons was significantly affected by 
casualties.      The casualty rate which is bearable (without loss of fighting spirit) 
depends in large part on two factors, firstly whether the individual feels that he 
has a chance to survive and secondly whether the unit is successful enough for 
his sacrifice to be acceptable.     As the casualty rate varies so does the unit morale 
change.96      
 
Willingness to Fly (LMF) 
One sure indicator of low morale on a flying unit is a reluctance of aircrew to fly 
and to find excuses for not completing or turning back on operations.  An example 
of this relationship is found in the operations of the Independent Force in 1918  
the three day squadrons suffering most casualties (and aircrew breakdown) had 
the highest percentage of early returns: 12% of aircraft despatched in each case.97  
Many of these cases may have been avoided if aircrew had been rested and morale 
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would certainly have been enhanced and maintained if a limit on their exposure 
to danger had been provided.  
In the Air War of 1914-18, there seems to have been little or no consideration as 
to how long aircrew could remain effective in combat.  In trench warfare, it was 
recognised that front line troops should be given rest and be moved out of the 
line, but although Trenchard on occasion accepted that individuals should be 
rested (sometimes after they had requested a rest) he failed to institute any firm 
policy about ‘tours’ for aircrew.98 
Nevertheless, it seems to have been accepted generally, that after six months’ 
survival in a front-line squadron, aircrew might be returned to the Home 
establishment, often as instructors (just as dangerous as operational flying).   In 
fact, aircrew survival times at the front averaged between eight weeks and four 
and a half months depending on the level of air activity, although there were 
periods during which many pilots and observer’s survival time was less than a 
week.99     
In the Second World War operations, heavy  casualty rates had a similar  effect 
on morale which was often shown by crews returning for ‘technical’ or ‘personal’ 
reasons before reaching their targets: jettisoning bombs over the sea, or, when 
approaching the target ‘creeping back’ (dropping early).100    There was also an 
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increase in crew sickness and a lack of confidence in the chances of survival.    It 
should be noted that these symptoms of low morale are like these exhibited by U-
Boat crews in 1943, noted above.      In Bomber Command during the ‘Battle for 
Berlin’ in 1944 there was severe criticism of bomber crews by the C-in-C of the 
pathfinder force, that: 
the amount of bombing on the markers which they dropped was negligible………many 
bombs are wasted en-route in an effort to increase aircraft performance and that 
unfortunately the command suffered from many “fringe merchants.101   
 
Although Harris (C-in-C Bomber Command) was aware of the tendency for the 
‘bomb line’ to creep back on operations against difficult targets, he did not 
respond to this criticism.   
The exceptionally  losses suffered by Coastal Command on anti-shipping sorties, 
on some operations 45% of aircraft attacking, certainly affected morale and led 
to a perception among crews that they were being sent on ‘suicide’ operations.102 
In the USAAF statistical records were kept on ‘early returns’ and it was noted 
that in January 1944, 109 (5%) aircraft returned because of ‘personal failures’, 
which could include physical problems or crew difficulties.   The rate of returns 
was used as an indicator of unit morale.103    The rate of early returns was also a 
cause for concern in the Canadian Bomber group (Group 6) of Bomber 
Command, particularly in the ‘Berlin’ campaign in 1944.  As noted in the 6 Group 
history: 
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A good measure of morale among aircrews on a squadron was to be found in the 
records of early returns.  As the Berlin campaign progressed, the numbers of early 
returns increased, but never enough to jeopardize operations.   Most of the young men 
swallowed their fears and got on with the job.    Many have harsh memories of the few 
who dumped bombs en route to their targets so that they might gain more altitude.104   
 
As noted above, it was the rate of losses in the early raids by the RAF in World 
War Two led to the introduction of set requirements to be met before aircrew 
were given a rest from operational flying.   
However, some aircrew were unable to fulfil their commitment to complete a tour 
for physical or physiological reasons and caused considerable difficulties 
regarding their treatment and disposal.    The problem was first noticed in the 
RAF after the daylight raids in 1939, with their losses of up to 50%.    Based upon 
First World War experience the Medical Training Manuals had expected that 
there would be some incidence of anxiety and depression after operations, but it 
had been anticipated that these be found only in men who had been fatigued by a 
long period of operational duty.105   It seems that little or no account had been 
taken of the medical evidence concerning aircrew psychological disability in or 
soon after the First World War.106 
 Wells discusses the extraordinary strains placed on aircrew in the allied bombing 
campaign in the Second World War.    These strains included, accidents (10% of 
casualties), new and complex aircraft. bad weather. stress of operations being 
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delayed and subsequent waiting and perhaps most stressful of all-seeing friends 
and comrades die.  As he noted, it is not surprising that some men failed to win 
their personal battle when the only reward was survival, which the statistics 
showed to be unlikely.107    
In the event, medical officers noted that appearance of fatigue, a facial tic and 
undue irritability, and such physical ailments as insomnia and gastric pain, which 
were recognised as the symptoms of a possibly disabling condition indicating the 
need of a rest, appeared in men who had carried out few or in some cases, only 
one operation.108   
This unexpected and serious problem arose following these early operations when 
some men who had been subjected to no special stress reported that they were 
unable to carry out their operational duties. The Official RAF Medical History 
noted:    
That Flying Stress existed was not admitted by many experienced aircrew. They held 
thar all cases were ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’.   The majority of personal who held this view 
were of a type who did not know  or would not recognise danger when they met 
it……..their operational flying was less of an ordeal than for the majority of aircrew 
who possessed a higher degree of introspection.   On the other hand, many aircrew were 
equally emphatic that flying stress did exist and was a real problem.  In their own 
experience they had known the effects of marriage, family responsibilities, living out 
and the effects of alcohol and other factors on their flying performance. 109 
 
 
These differing views did not help to simplify the problem especially as there was 
also a feeling among the flying Branch of the RAF (General Duties Branch) flying 
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stress was synonymous with LMF and it was very difficult to draw a line on one 
side of which a man is a coward and on the other he is a victim of circumstances 
beyond his control.        As Reid pointed out: 
For a fighting service at war, such men pose a difficult and delicate problem.  If they 
are excused operational duty but retain the privileges and prestige attached to flying 
status, such action is bound to engender a feeling of resentment among those who 
have successfully struggled to control their own anxiety and fear and continue to 
face the perils of war.  On the other hand, morale is also affected when men believe 
that a comrade has been harshly and unjustly treated.110  
 
The RAF elected to treat this problem as an administrative matter rather than a 
psychological diagnosis and introduced a label of LMF (lack of moral fibre) to 
classify aircrew who refused to fly without having an acceptable medical 
reason.111      This was a controversial matter, with operational commanders 
supporting a system which deterred aircrew from avoiding duty.   On the other 
hand, the RAF medical branch, particularly squadron medical officers, who were 
aware of the needs of those in their medical charge and who often sympathised 
with them, took a more cautious view.    The Official History of the RAF Medical 
Services describes the separation of responsibility: 
The view held at Command and Group by the medical staff was that the maintenance 
of morale was essentially an executive responsibly and that the postponement of the 
inevitable effects of flying strain depended chiefly on morale and on the method adopted 
to sustain this at a high level.      It was considered that strain could not be endured 
indefinitely and that a station medical officer’s usefulness in this sphere depended on 
his practical knowledge of flying personal and their environmental conditions and on 
his ability to detect the early onset of strain before this became cumulatively 
disabling.112     
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Most commanders (especially squadron commanders) seem to have taken a similar 
view to that of Air Chief Marshal Harris C in C Bomber Command, who had little 
sympathy with those ‘weaklings and waverers’ who may contaminate others.113   
Group Captain Leonard Cheshire, one of the RAF’s most decorated airmen , 
certainly took this view, he said: 
I was ruthless with ‘morale fibre cases’ I had to be.  We were airmen not psychiatrists.  
Of course, we had concern for any individual whose internal tensions meant that he could 
no longer go on; but there was the worry that one really frightened could affect others 
around him. There was no time to be compassionate as I would like to have been.   I was 
flying too, and we had to get on with the war 114  
 
 
 
It is fair to add that Harris did appreciate the role of the medical officer in making 
the decision as to whether a man was to be classified LMF: 
 
It is possible for a good doctor to anticipate the onset of stress and to encourage and 
assist some individual through a passing phase of slight loss of confidence… he can 
also advise the CO whether an individual is a genuine case of stress…..or should be 
dealt with disciplinary means under Air Ministry procedure.115  
 
The view held by the medical staff was that the maintenance of morale was an 
executive responsibility and that the postponement of the inevitable effects of 
flying stress depended on morale and the methods used to sustain this at a high 
level. 
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Although the number of aircrew stigmatised as LMF was very low, (about 20 per 
month in 1943)116 there was a continuing feeling by Group and Command leaders 
that any lenient treatment of these airmen could lead to a widespread lowering of 
morale.117   Additionally, a fear of contagion among other crews was the resulted 
in aircrew adjudged to be classified LMF being removed from units 
immediately 118      Punishments were severe; an officer’s commission was 
terminated and he was refused any further service employment, NCO aircrew 
were reduced in rank to airman and if he had a ground trade, was re-mustered to 
that trade without promotion prospects.   If no ground trade was involved NCO 
aircrew were reduced to the lowest rank of airman.  In all cases, all aircrew flying 
badges were forfeited.119   On the other hand there likely to be considerable 
resentment among aircrew if somebody who had clearly done his best (say 10/12 
operations) was treated harshly. This concern about resentment may be one 
reason that from 1942 aircrew on their second tour were excluded from the LMF 
provisions.120   
It seems that these penalties were in the end deterrent enough, as although there 
were fears for the morale of Bomber Command crews in at least two periods 
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during the campaign, the number of aircrew categorised as LMF was never more 
than 300/400 a year.121   
The USAAF also had to contend with a threat to morale by aircrew who 
deliberately avoided operational duty by ‘subterfuge, feigned illness or outright 
refusal’.    By 1942 it had adopted the term “Temperamental Unsuitability” for 
these cases, which by the end of 1943 amounted to about 200/300 a year. 122 
As with the RAF there was some difficulty with the medical definition of this 
condition, which in practice was treated like the RAF’s LMF classification, 
although some medical authorities disliked the term: 
Since the most significant defect lies less in the strong tendency to develop anxiety 
under stress than in the attitude toward the anxiety, ‘lack of moral fibre’ comes closest 
to describing the reaction.  Yet ‘moral fibre’ is not a good term, since it implies a 
philosophical or ethical value in an attitude which for most soldiers is based simply 
with on identification with a group.   Whether the group is right, whether its aims and 
purposes are ethical, whether giving ones devotion to it show ‘moral fibre’, must be 
left to history to decide. 123   
 
The USAAF treated the threat to morale caused by these cases in a similar way 
to the RAF.   Officers lost their commission and were reassigned or were 
dismissed from the service.     Enlisted men were reduced in rank to private, 
removed from flying status and assigned to basic duty.124      At first unlike cases 
in the RAF, officers and enlisted men were not at once removed from the base 
and this lenient approach did affect morale, particularly as some reassigned 
enlisted men received accelerated promotion because of manpower shortages: 
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It was not long before combat flyers began grumbling about this situation, particularly 
as the increasing tempo of operations caused an increase in the numbers of these 
grounded airmen, so hard feelings against them and against flight surgeons who had 
let them escape combat grew more pronounced.125 
     
Action was taken in both matters and by 1943 not only were men removed from 
stations immediately, but discipline had hardened to the extent that some cases of 
LMF were court-martialled and not only dismissed the service, but in some cases 
sentenced to two years hard labour.126            Arguably, the measures introduced 
in both services to ensure that discipline and fighting spirit were maintained, 
properly addressed the difficulty noted by Dr Reid  of possible resentment if LMF 
was  treated too leniently or illness too harshly.127        Although both services 
suffered periods when the command was concerned about the state of morale, 
there was never a time when operations were threatened by a failure of aircrew 
to maintain their fighting spirit.    It is also clear that the maintenance of what the 
USAAF report described as ‘high or fairly high’ morale was achieved in both 
services throughout a long campaign with very heavy casualties, by: 
the early realisation that after a certain number of missions or combat hours-varying 
according to the nature, intensity and  locale of operations, a  hypothetical average flyer 
would decline in efficiency and , if not relived in time, ”burn-out” led to the development  
of a system of aircrew rotation.128     
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It is an interesting point that neither air force felt that there was any need to 
consider that the morale of their ground crews needed to be maintained by being 
relieved or rested, even when serving in difficult climates.  
It is accepted that using such measures as early returns, numbers of men reporting 
sick or the disciplinary record of a unit as indicators of the state of morale of 
aircrew and its variation over time, is subject to problems of interpretation.      
However, despite these difficulties, it is argued that it is practical to assess the 
overall state of morale by the performance of squadrons. 
The treatment of aircrew failure in the First World War was based on that given 
to those officers and men who had been withdrawn from the front line in France 
for shell-shock or war neurosis and treated as a medical rather than a disciplinary 
matter.  
However, the early return rate was clearly an indicator of squadron morale, as 
evidenced by the Independent Force operations in 1918, when all day squadrons 
suffered heavy casualties and significant numbers of early returns.    Two 
squadrons (99 & 104) were withdrawn from operations whilst replacement crews 
were trained, and morale recovered.129    
The factors which have the most significant effect on both individual and unit 
morale were, as in all conflicts, Training, Leadership, Equipment (including 
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aircraft, both British and enemy) and personal and unit successes.   One factor 
which arguably had an always a positive upon RFC morale was that living 
conditions generally were good.      Although in the early months RFC squadrons 
were subjected to some turbulence and changes in bases and support services, by 
mid-1916 most squadrons had a reasonably permanent base and when changes 
were made, they were planned.      It is clear from many personal accounts of RFC 
aircrew that they felt, especially when compared with soldiers in the trenches, 
that they had a comfortable situation.       Additionally, at least until 1918, when 
the air intensified most aircrew had reasonable rest periods between combat 
actions.    By 1918 some squadron aircrew suffered from fatigue due to 
continuous operations.     The report of the War Office Committee of Enquiry 
stated that chief among all factors of importance in diminishing the incidence of 
‘mental disorders’ in the field was morale130.     It is submitted that statement 
applies equally to the Royal Flying Corps/Royal air Force.  
 The factors affecting morale, especially casualties and leadership, will be 
examined in subsequent chapters of this work to assess their effect on personal 
morale and aircrew psychological disorder.           
 
 
 
 
130 Cmd 1734 Report of the War Office Committee of Enquiry Into “Shell Shock”, (HMSO, 1922) p. 151. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Recruitment 
 
 
This chapter will consider the recruitment of aircrew for the RFC and the RNAS in the 
First World War.   Selection of suitable candidates is a necessary pre-requisite for any 
fighting service, but as will be seen, recruitment of flying personal for the British air 
services was from the beginning haphazard and remained a problem throughout the 
war.    The fact that no assessment of psychological aptitude for flying took place was 
probably a major factor in both the accident rate and failure rate in training.  Even when 
psychological failure in aircrew was a recognised medical problem, recruitment 
selection involved no psychological input.  However, it should be remembered that 
there was no precedent for aircrew selection and both selectors and candidates knew 
little about aviation.       
In early 1910, following government concern about Germany’s aggressive attitude and 
public alarm about Britain’s lack of any aerial force, the War Office decided to enlarge 
the scope of the Balloon Factory, the only military unit concerned with aviation.     
Accordingly, the formation of an Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers was announced.1   
The unit was entrusted with: 
The duty of creating a body of expert airman, organised in such a way as to facilitate the 
formation of units ready to take the field with troops .........in addition the training and 
 
1 C. F. Snowdon-Gamble, The Air Weapon Vol 1 (Oxford, 1931), pp.126-127. 
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instruction of men in handling kites’ balloons and aeroplanes, will also devolve on this 
battalion.2 
 
The order setting up the battalion enacted that officers would be selected from ‘any 
regular arm or branch of the service on the active list,’ but were required to possess 
certain qualifications, including previous experience of aviation and the possession of 
a Royal Aero Club Certificate.3  
It should be noted that initially few officers were needed by the air battalion as its total 
officer strength was fourteen officers only, divided between No 1 Company (Airships) 
and No 2 (Aeroplanes).     In 1909 the Committee of Imperial Defence recommended 
that a rigid airship be built for the Royal Navy.4     At that time, bearing in mind  the 
very short endurance of early aeroplanes, it is not surprising that the Admiralty felt that 
the airship would be more useful operating over the sea than the aeroplane and 
therefore put most of its effort into the developing airships.     Nevertheless, it did take 
some interest in aeroplane development, particularly when a member of the Royal Aero 
Club offered to lend two aeroplanes for naval officers to learn to fly free of charge.       
The offer was accepted, and a General Fleet Order (December 1910) stated that two 
machines were at the disposal of naval officers. (four officers were allowed to take up 
this offer).5   In fact, by January of 1911, the Admiralty had decided that aeroplanes 
 
2  Snowdon-Gamble, p.126.   Army Order of 28th February 1911. 
3 The other requirements were, rank not above captain, medical fitness for air work, good eyesight, good map reader, 
unmarried, not less than two years’ service, under thirty, good sailor, taste for mechanics, under 11 stone 7 pounds. 
4 R. D. Layman, Naval Aviation in the First World War (London, 1996), pp. 36-37. 
5 AP 125 The Royal Air Force in the Great War (Air Historical Branch, 1936), p.16. 
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might after all be useful and following a lecture on aviation by Colonel Massey of the 
‘Aerial League of the British Empire’  to officers of  the Home Fleet, officers were 
invited to apply for an ‘aviation course’: some two hundred applied, three were 
selected.6    An indication that the Navy  accepted the aeroplane into naval aviation, 
was the decision that the airship bases on the east coast would be for ‘airships and 
seaplanes’.7   
The number of pilots required by the Air Battalion and the Royal Navy during the 
period up to the formation of the Royal Flying Corps was very small and both services 
could easily obtain the required number of pilots, virtually all of whom would be 
serving officers.       
However, in 1911 a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was 
instituted to examine the state of Britain’s air defence, which was much inferior to that 
of France and Germany.    The committee recommended the setting up of a unified air 
service, with naval and air wings and a Reserve.       This imaginative idea, accepted 
by the CID, resulted in the formation of the Royal Flying Corps which almost 
immediately caused problems, particularly for the Royal Navy.8     The RFC absorbed 
the Air Battalion and the Naval Air Service. into one organization and the intention 
 
6 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p.151. 
7 W. Raleigh and HA Jones, Official History of the War: The War in The Air Vol 1 (London, 1922-37), (henceforth- 
TWITA) pp. 264-265. 
 
8 Raleigh, TWITA, Volume 1, pp.198-243. 
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was that the RFC would maintain both a Naval and a Military wing.9      Putting all 
aviation matters into a unified organisation, was a sound idea.      However, it soon 
became apparent that the Admiralty had a different philosophy and it seems more 
money to spend on aviation, as during the next two years the Navy ordered a number 
of new aircraft directly from the new air industry whilst the Army (RFC) continued to 
be reliant on the Government controlled Royal Aircraft Factory.10   The Naval wing 
with the active support of the more technically minded and independent Admiralty, 
continued to develop separately until on 23 June 1914 the Admiralty unilaterally 
established the Royal Naval Air Service.11  
At the outbreak of war in August 1914 the military wing of the RFC had a total strength 
of 147 officers and 1,079 men and 179 aeroplanes.12     At the review of the fleet in 
July 1914, shortly after the formation of the RNAS, seventeen seaplanes and two flights 
of aeroplanes flew past the fleet; almost the total strength of the RNAS at that time.13  
Concerned by the minimal numbers of active pilots available at the start of the war 
Colonel Sefton Brancker (Director-General of Military Aeronautics)  obtained  a list 
of all qualified pilots in the UK and discovered that although there were 862 holders 
 
9 The Royal Flying Corps was constituted by Royal Warrant on 13th April 1912. 
10 C. Cole & E, F, Cheeseman., The Air Defense of Great Britain 1914-1918 (London, 1984) p.3. 
11  AP 125 The Royal Air Force, pp 22-23. On 1st July 1914 the Naval Wing re-organized, introducing a new rank structure 
and was renamed RNAS.  This was the start of a long struggle between the two services, intensified with the formation 
of the RAF in 1918 and continuing until the present time.   The struggle was mostly at political and High Command level 
and largely about resources, cooperation was willing and effective in two world wars at the operational level  
12 P. G. Cooksley, The Royal Flying Corps Handbook 1914-1918 (Stroud, 2000), p.19. 
13  Raleigh, TWITA Volume 1, pp.273-274. 
 
 
80 
of the RAeC’s Certificate only 55 of those were competent  enough for active service.14    
This shortage was emphasised shortly after the outbreak of war, when all the trained 
pilots available to the RFC were sent to France with the four active  RFC squadrons 
which flew to France (12th August) with a fifth squadron following a few days later.        
Even before they went into action on 19th August, two aircraft had been lost with the 
deaths of two pilots (and two mechanics), their replacements being the first of 
thousands of aircrews recruited, trained and sent to France, the Middle East and Italy.     
Additionally, the RNAS, which was (until February 1916) responsible for the air 
defence of Great Britain, required some hundreds of pilots and observers.    Both 
services relied on the output of the Central Flying School for all their pilots and even 
before the outbreak of war it was clear that the school was not large enough to meet 
the needs of both services.15  
To help meet the immediate demand for trained pilots, all civilian flying schools were 
either closed or taken over by the War Office and the pre-war policy of making pilots 
pay for their own training discontinued.16      There was in fact, no shortage of 
volunteers from serving personnel who could meet the qualifications required by the 
Air Battalion, (now the RFC) which were: 
      1 Selected from members of Regular Services 
       2 Possession of Aviators Certificate 
       3 Previous experience of Aeronautics 
 
14  Raleigh TWITA Volume 1, pp 422-421; D. Winter, The First of The Few (London, 1982), p.18. 
15 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, pp.11-12. 
16 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p.35. 
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       4 Good map reader and field-sketcher 
       5 Not less than two years’ service 
       6 Good sailors 
       7 Aptitude for mechanics17 
 
These requirements (apart from ‘previous experience’) could easily be met by the 
average Army Officer, and the flying personnel of the four squadrons that went to 
France in August 1914 were drawn from forty different regiments. Only a few direct 
entry pilots had joined the RFC Reserve and they were still training.18 
However,  it soon became clear that service sources would not be able to supply enough 
aircrew and in 1915, to facilitate the entry of civilians and other ranks in the services 
who wished to volunteer, a Cadet Wing was formed.19    The minimum age for entry 
was eighteen, although some aircrew were accepted who were younger.20       The actual 
selection of aircrew was  arbitrary with a great deal of emphasis  placed on the initial 
interview.  Many writers have described this interview, and much has been made of 
the questions asked the candidate, especially the frequently asked ‘can you ride a 
horse?’  Some writers have taken this to be an example of class bias in selecting those 
who could be assumed to have an aptitude for flying.21      Although this question does 
not seem to be particularity relevant to flying, in 1914 it was a logical one.  Few people 
(including the officers responsible for selection) had any experience of flying.   On the 
 
17 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p. 9. 
18 R. Barker.  The Royal Air Force in World War One (London, 1995) p. 22. 
19 AP 125   The Royal Air Force, p.75. 
20 C. Lewis, Sagittarius Rising (London, 1936) p.10. 
21 D. Winter, The First of the Few (London, 1982) p.19-20; R Money, Flying and Soldiering, (London, 1936) p.10.      
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other hand, at that time, many people would have some experience of horses.   Horse 
riding demands self-confidence, a measure of co-ordination, and some nerve, 
particularity if hunting or point to point racing.    In fact, at that time ‘to be familiar 
with horses and horsemanship was an outstanding recommendation’.22  Another 
question which was often asked was; ‘have you sailed a boat?’ an activity requiring 
similar qualities.23   No consideration was given to the psychological fitness of recruits 
for flying, presumably it was felt that as most flyers were chosen from officers of the 
Army or Royal Navy, selecting recruits from similar backgrounds was a sound system.      
And it is fair to note that as in the BEF, where the extent of the effects of ‘shell shock’ 
on ground troops was a surprise, psychological disorders occurring to flyers operating 
in this new environment were not anticipated.      In any case, there was at that time, 
little knowledge of the physical or psychological effects of flying or the reactions of 
pilots and observers to operating and fighting in this new environment.    
Flying was still a novel activity in 1914, sustained flight was only a few years old and 
the use of the air in war was almost unknown.24  The early recruiters for the RFC 
undoubtably preferred candidates who came from the social elite, particularly public 
school or university graduates.  Those who had showed enthusiasm for sports were also 
favoured.  Of course, many of the first volunteers were from serving officers, who 
 
22 D. H. Robinson, The Dangerous Sky (Henley, 1973) pp.83-84. 
23 N Macmillan, Into the Blue (London, 1929). 
24 P. Lewis, The British Bomber Since 1914 (London, 1974) pp.18-19.   The first use of aircraft in war was in 1911, 
when in the war between Italy and Turkey, fought in Libya, the Italians dropped four bombs on the Turkish troops. 
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would in any case be from that background, so it would be natural for recruiters to use 
the same criteria for selecting civilian volunteers.  The aviation press (small but noisy) 
noted that ‘adventurous youth’ would need ‘nerve’ to fly’ in the war.25  It is worth 
noting during recruiting in 1914 and 1915, the first period of expansion, the press and 
public were not yet being subjected to glamorised  accounts of air fighting  as  ‘duelling 
in the clouds’ by handsome aviators with the RFC described as the ‘Cavalry of the 
Clouds’.26   
By the middle of 1915, losses were steadily increasing, and the RFC was at the 
beginning of its expansion to (eventually) 93 squadrons in France and more aircrew 
were ungently required.   The Army also needed officers to replace the huge losses and 
recruiters were forced to widen the net.    During the period of expansion and 
development of the RFC and the RNAS, assessing the qualifications and qualities 
needed to be a successful pilot or observer was largely a matter of guesswork and 
opinion.    There was a vague sense that the qualities thought to be possessed by the 
products of the English Public-School system might be appropriate, but aviation was 
new, and nobody was sure.      However, Sefton Branckner, an early pilot himself and 
very much involved with the organisation and development of the RFC (he was 
 
25 The Aeroplane, 2 September 1914. 
26 L. S. Cobden. ‘The Nervous Flyer; Nerves, Flying and the First World War’ British Journal for Military History Vol 
4 (2018) pp.121-141. 
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Director of Air Organisation), was in no doubt about the qualities required of an RFC 
pilot:   
The popular impression is that a special temperament is required for success in the air, it is 
rather assumed that an artistic temperament, a vivid imagination, careless and reckless daring 
are great assets in the psychology of a pilot.      I have always found that the most useful pilot 
in war was the man who would have made the best officer in the old regular 
army………unimaginative  but absolutely reliable-courageous and honourable to a fault, 
rather stolid, devoted to the hardy sports of the hunting field and the jungle and caring nothing 
for the artistic side of life-this type could usually be trained into a useful pilot at almost any 
age within reason.  But most unexpected people turned into good pilots.       Age was always 
a most debatable point.    Young men naturally learn more quickly and easily than those 
bordering on thirty, but they do not last as long under active service conditions. The demands 
of war forced us to train boys of eighteen, or even seventeen to fly and then send them of to 
the front, but I always said that the ideal fighting age was more like twenty-five.      There is 
no doubt in my mind that for peace conditions the younger a man starts to fly the better.   
During the war it paid us to teach a proportion of older men because they were invaluable as 
Squadron and Wing Commanders.27 
 
The RNAS had started the war with 130 pilots to cover, in addition to its naval 
activities, the defence of Great Britain against air attack.        By January 1917 this 
number had grown to 839 and there were some 300 observers on its strength.28   
Casualties among naval squadrons carrying out naval roles such as reconnaissance or 
anti-submarine work were relatively light.     However, in 1916 several naval squadrons 
had been attached to the RFC in France and in common with that service, subjected to 
the ‘same deadly problem of attrition’ 29         It was this intensification of air fighting 
 
27 N. Macmillan, Sir Sefton Branckner, (London, 1935) pp.38-39. 
28 AP 125 Royal Air Force, pp.274-275 & p.421. 
29 S. F Wise, Official History Of The Royal Canadian Air Force Vol 1 Canadian Airmen in the First World War 
(Toronto, 1980) pp.160-162. 
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in early 1916, with its heavy casualties which first caused concern about RFC and 
RNAS recruitment. 
However, apart from concern about a possible shortage of candidates, it was not long 
before concern was raised regarding the fitness of RFC recruits.    The medical 
examination was the same as for other Army officers as it was not appreciated that 
aircrew would face unique conditions and dangers in the air and there was no 
consideration of the temperamental suitability of candidates for aircrew selection.  It 
had also been alleged that some men disabled by injuries received in combat in France 
had been accepted for aircrew training.30  The RFC had also found that in the first year 
of the war, some 65% of all accidents were due to some physical defect in the pilots 
concerned.31  
In response to these concerns, a Medical Research Committee was set up to advise the 
RFC and RNAS on aeromedical matters.32     The committee was led by Major Martin 
Flack (RAMC), who established six medical examination stations in England to 
undertake medical evaluations of all applicants for both services.33      An account of 
 
30 M. Molkentin, The Centenary History of Australia and the Great War, Volume I Australia And The War In The Air 
(Oxford, 2014) pp.51-52.  Major James Birley (consultant to BEF) had noted that there was a ‘high proportion’ of AFC 
Pilots and Observers’ suffering breakdown and he suggested that it may have been partly due to previous service at the 
front. 
31 US Air Service- Medical Chapter VI Report of Officers from England, France & Italy (US War Department, 1919), 
pp. 95-96. 
32 Robinson, The Dangerous Sky p.84. See also H. G. Anderson, The Medical and Surgical aspects of Aviation, 
(London, 1919, 2010) pp.5-19. 
33 Robinson, The Dangerous Sky, p.85. 
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the physiological tests  required for aircrew was produced in 1917 by Captain Dudley 
Corbet, the RAMC officer in charge of the RFC ward at 24 General Hospital Etaples: 
If the candidate is found generally fit, he should undergo physiological tests to determine 
whether he is likely to suffer from dizziness or sickness, and further, to what height he should 
be able to fly without experiencing symptoms of oxygen starvation.   His reaction time to 
visual, auditory and tactile impressions should be taken in order to test the general alertness 
of mind and body.34 
 
The medical examination centres set up by Major Flack’s committee introduced the 
tests suggested by Corbett, often with equipment devised by Flack, who also dealt with 
the provision of oxygen equipment for aircrew.35 
In 1915 aircrew losses on the Western Front were sustainable.    From the arrival of the 
RFC in France until December 1914, four aircrew were killed and a further 30 were 
casualties, either wounded or captured.    In 1915, which saw the beginning of serious 
fighting in the air, 46 aircrew were killed and there were some 193 other casualties.36   
However, although this level of casualties was manageable: from early in 1915 new 
squadrons were being formed almost daily, substantially increasing the demand for 
trained aircrew.       Another significant reason for the great increase in demand for 
more aircrew, was Trenchard’s policy of sustained aggression, first put forward within 
two days of taking command of the RFC in France (August 1915).        This policy 
intended to meet the needs of the army, was a major reason for the heavy casualty rate 
 
34 D Corbett, Article in US Air Service Medical Chapter VI pp.114-115. 
35 Medical Research Council.  Reports 1-VII ‘The Medical Problems of Flying’.  Introduction pp.3-4. 
36 T. Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield, (London, 2014). Appendix 3 p.347. Most of these were wounded, but there 
were some missing or POWs 
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and in the view of some squadron commanders for the loss of many inexperienced 
pilots.37    
Expansion of the RFC in France steadily increased throughout the air war, so that by 
1918 there were 93 squadrons in France.      Additionally, there were 14 in the Middle 
East, 4 in Italy and 16 in the Mediterranean, making a total of 127 squadrons.    At 
home there were 18 squadrons involved in Home Defence and 18 marine squadrons 
and 56 training Stations each consisting of 3 training squadrons.38  This continued 
expansion combined with steadily increasing casualties meant that there would 
inevitably, be a continuous shortage of aircrew with consequent pressure on both 
recruitment and training. 
One way of meeting the demand, not often reported, was the considerable recruitment 
of non-commissioned pilots, observers and, rarely mentioned, gunners.   In fact, the 
first RFC injury suffered through enemy action was to an NCO observer, Sergeant-
Major D S Billing, who was wounded in the leg whist flying with No 2 Squadron.39     
Provision for non-commissioned pilots had been made as early as 1912, when in the 
White Paper setting out the arrangements for the formation of the RFC, it was noted 
that each squadron would have twenty-six pilots, half of whom would be 
 
37 See Also Chapter Seven, Jones, TWITA Volume II p.165; R. Barker, The Royal Flying Corps in World War One  
(London, 2002)  pp.278-279  It has been suggested that this offensive policy was in fact introduced by Sykes and 
continued by Trenchard. See E. Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution (London,1999), p.42. 
38 Jones., TWITA Appendices: Appendix XXIV pp. 116-123.        
39 Raleigh, TWITA Vol 1 p.301.  
 
 
88 
commissioned.40        The first non-commissioned pilot was Corporal Frank Ridd, who 
qualified on 4th June 1912.     Others followed but numbers were always well below 
those of commissioned pilots and a return of all officers and aircrew serving with the 
RFC in April 1916, showed  thirty-one non-commissioned pilots on the strength, but 
only three with squadrons in France.41    NCO pilots continued to be employed in the 
RFC until the end of the war, but the ratio of commissioned to non-commissioned was 
always in the order of about twenty-seven to one.42    
For Observer’s establishments, figures were only finally settled in 1918, the numbers 
varying with the role of the unit,43 
Role                                 No & Type            Organisation                   Observers  
                                           Aircraft                                                 Officers      NCOs 
Fighter/Reconnaissance   18 x F2b                HQ+3 Flts                    14               6 
Night Flying                     18x FE2b              HQ+3 Flts                    20               - 
Day Bomber                     18x DH 4/9           HQ+3 Flts                    14               6 
Night bomber                   10x HP 0/400         HQ+2 Flts                    5               11 
Corps Reconnaissance     24x RE8/FK8         HQ+3 Flts                    20               6   
 
Though the figures for observers are clear, the number of NCO pilots can only be 
estimated as one or two per squadron. By 1918 the shortage of aircrew generally was 
such that the:    
 
40 Snowden-Gamble, The Air Weapon, pp.167-189. 
41 G. C. Jefford, Observers and Navigators, (London, 2014) p.97. 
42 It is worth noting that one of the Victoria Crosses awarded to RFC personnel was to Sergeant Thomas Mottershead of 
No 20 Squadron. 
43 Jefford, Observers and Navigators p. 97.  Effective date 1st April 1918 (formation of RAF). 
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whole of the class from which army officers come had been absorbed into the service and 
could no longer be counted upon to yield the requisite number of flying personal    
Consequently, it was arranged that there should be pilots and observers of NCO grade.44 
 
 
By 1918 the RAF had determined to actively increase recruiting NCOs, although in 
fact, the war ended before any significant numbers were trained. 
One aircrew category which has received even less attention than NCO pilots and 
observers, is that of the aerial gunner.        Since its formation, the RFC had been 
employing mechanics as ‘de facto’ gunners, but despite authority given in 1915 for 
them to be granted observers ’wings’ very few had been awarded their flying badge.  
By 1916, the demand for observer/gunners was beginning to outstrip supply and in 
April the War Office ordered that arrangements should be made to train enough NCOs 
and men to fill up 50% of the of the establishment of the two seater squadrons.45  
Although arrangements were made to send volunteers to a gunnery school at Hythe, it 
seems that not many reached the school, but were instead sent directly to a squadron 
for training.     Even that arrangement was haphazard as the experience of infantryman 
Alfred Koch showed when posted to No 1 squadron: 
was given no briefing by the Adjutant or anyone else as to my testing and not a word as to 
what I should do with myself while waiting.   Not a single introduction to anyone, officer, 
NCO or even airman—and it was a week before anyone before a call came to report to Captain 
Somebody or other on the aerodrome.      Somebody did take pity on me and provided me 
with a flying coat, mitts, helmet and goggles and the pilot standing by the machine was the 
first man to take notice of me as a human being.46 
 
 
44 AP125 The Royal Air Force, p.377. 
45 Jefford, Observers and Navigator, p. 39; Jones, TWITA Volume VI, pp. 76-78.    
46 Jefford, p.38. 
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Koch was then given a three-minute briefing and then into the air for the first time.    
His experience or something similar probably happened to many gunnery recruits, as 
the School at Hythe which could only deal with ten students at a time was overwhelmed 
and the squadrons in France had to recruit gunners locally.     Some were obtained from 
squadron mechanics, but others were volunteers from the infantry.       As these recruits, 
did not have the benefit of the Hythe training the RFC had to lay down a qualification 
standard for squadron trained gunners.      In 1917, the qualification standard was laid 
down as one months’ probation, during which several tests of technical knowledge and 
practical skill had to be passed, after which the squadron trained gunners were certified 
as competent and entitled to the observer’s badge.47    It is not possible to ascertain how 
many NCO gunners served in the RFC, partly because many later qualified as observers 
or pilots.    As to NCO aircrew generally, in November 1918, there were 137 NCO 
observers with the Squadrons in France together with an unknown but estimated, two 
or three NCO pilots per squadron.       Jefford estimated that perhaps some 1000 
qualified NCOs flew as Observers in the war.    Added to this number should be the 
many hundreds of untrained NCOs, air mechanics and naval ratings who (especially in 
the first two years) flew as untrained and temporary crew members.  
 
47 Jefford, Observers and Navigators, p.39; N Steel & P. Hart   Tumult in the Clouds (London, 1997) pp.313-315;   
James McCudden VC  the most decorated RFC airman started his career as a ’squadron trained’ Air Mechanic Gunner. 
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It had become clear by 1916, that the huge demand for pilots and observers could not 
be met from the United Kingdom alone and even with the flow of volunteers from the 
USA, South Africa and New Zealand demand still exceeded supply.     Thus, it was 
fortunate that early in the war Australia and Canada offered help with the provision 
and/or training of aircrew.    The provision of aircrew from Canada started in a small 
way with the RFC and the RNAS sending representatives to Canada to investigate the 
possibility of British born volunteers for aircrew service.  This led to an unedifying 
period in the summer of 1915, when the RFC and The RNAS contrived to ‘outbid’ 
each other by in turn offering better conditions to applicants.48    Later with the co-
operation of the Canadian naval and military authorities, recruiting proceeded 
smoothly.   By the end of 1916 the combined total of RFC and RNAS recruits was 
some 700, about 350 of were certificated pilots.49    Despite these encouraging figures 
there were still problems with tapping into the undoubtedly large numbers of Canadian 
citizens who wished to volunteer for aircrew duties.   There were several constitutional 
and political problems: which were eventually overcome by General Brancker50 after 
considerable frustration, by applying pressure on General Henderson, (C-in-C RFC) 
and the Canadian authorities.      He continually emphasised the urgency of the aircrew 
supply position and the need to implement the long-discussed scheme of flying training 
 
48 Wise, Canadian Airmen, pp.32-33. 
49 Wise, Canadian Airmen, p 39 
50 Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.74. Branckner was the Director of Air Organization in the War Office who had warned 
early in 1916 that casualties in other arms ‘would make officers increasingly difficult to obtain’.    
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schools in Canada.    Finally, on 23rd December 1915 Canada RFC training scheme 
was announced.51    Recruiting in Canada had several advantages over the UK.   Apart 
from the glamour accorded to the still little-known pursuit of flying, there was by 
volunteering for the RFC the certainty of avoiding service with the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force.   It was also probably helpful that the Canadian recruits were 
unaware of the heavy casualties suffered by military flyers on the Western Front.   The 
qualifications required for entry to training in Canada were very like those for RFC 
entry: 
Age 18-25 
High School Education, including Algebra and Geometry 
Speak good English 
‘have the marks of a gentleman’52 
 
Canadian recruiting was a great success and by the end of the war the Canadian flying 
schools were producing an average of 230 pilots a month.                   
The Australian contribution to the war in the air was made not by training aircrew, the 
Canadian preferred method, but by providing a national air force.   Although the 
Australian government had a national policy of forbidding the transfer of personnel 
from Australian to British Forces, there was no objection to Australian citizens 
enrolling in British services.       Those Australians who were already serving in the 
RFC and RNAS, did so well that the Army Council offered to commission 200 men of 
 
51 Jones, TWITA Vol III, pp 292-293. 
52  Wise, Canadian Airmen, pp. 87-88. 
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the Australian Expeditionary Force into the Special Reserve of the RFC.         
Notwithstanding their no-transfer policy, Australian authorities agreed to allow this, 
and 197 candidates came forward: 183 were accepted.53    
Despite agreeing to the above arrangement, the Australian Government had it fact 
already taken action with the aim of forming its own Flying Corps.54      Realising the 
value of an air force for the future as well as the present emergency it had already 
formed its own central flying school and trained nineteen pilots.55   On 27 December 
1915, a commitment was made to provide one squadron in Egypt.    Additionally, by 
1917 another three squadrons were flying on the Western Front under RFC command.     
The aircrew recruited in Australia received basic training in Australia and advanced 
training at training bases in England.56  The main source of recruitment of aircrews to 
meet the needs of the Australian squadrons came mainly from men already serving in 
the Australian Imperial Force, many of whom had spent months in combat.     Although 
selectors commonly felt that such candidates were good material, in February 1918, 
Major James Birley (Consultant neurologist to the RFC) drew the attention of the 
Australian Imperial Force (AIF) authorities to the high proportion of breakdown in the 
Australian Flying Corps (AFC), both pilots and observers and suggested that it might 
 
53 E. M. Curlack, Official History of Australia In the War of 1914-1918 Vol VIII The Australian Flying Corps 
(University of Queensland, 1923) , Appendix No 2, p. 421. 
54 M. Molkenten, Centenary History of Australia and the Great War Vol 1 (Oxford, 2014) pp.20-22. 
55 Curlack, Official History, p.422. The Australians had already responded to a request by the Indian government and 
supplied a ‘half flight of aircraft and pilots for service in middle East.  This later became No 1 Squadron AFC.   
56 M. Molkentin, Centenary History, pp. 53-59. 
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be due, at least in part to their previous service.57    In that context an RFC medical 
report in 1917, concluded (following a survey of active pilots) that as many who did 
well were men who had served in the trenches. a ’degree of natural selection had been 
at work’. From this preposition they came to the view that would be better to select 
men aged 20-27 for aircrew, but that youths of 18-20 would be more efficient in the 
infantry.58 
By the end of the war the numbers of officers (nearly all aircrew) on RFC strength had 
risen from 146 (with another 130 RNAS) to 27,333 plus some 16,681 cadets and NCOs 
under instruction.   A further 291,161 groundcrew supported the 133 squadrons in 
France, Middle East, Italy and the Mediterranean and the 55 Home Defence Squadrons 
and the Training units in the United Kingdom 59   
During the period of expansion and development of the RFC and the RNAS, assessing 
the qualifications and qualities needed to be a successful pilot or observer were largely 
a matter of guesswork and opinion.  There was a vague sense that the qualities thought 
to be possessed by the English Public-School system, might be appropriate, but 
aviation was very new, and nobody was sure.  Brankner, quoted above, had a clear 
view that the standard selection system for the Army officer was enough.    On the 
 
57 Molkentin, Centenary History pp.51-52.  No 2 AFC Squadron, with most of its pilots previously involved in Trench 
fighting, lost three flight commanders to ‘war neurosis’ which may have led to Birley’s report. …. 
58 Lt Col. M. Flack ‘The Selection of Candidates for Flying’, Medical Research Council, (1917)  No 6 The Medical 
Problems of Flying, pp.82-83. 
59 Jones, TWITA, Appendices Appendix XXXV; AP 125, pp.421-423. 
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other hand, with the establishment of the medical examination centres and extensive 
tests selection was more focussed on the right physical requirements of candidates for 
flying duties.   
It was not until 1917 that attention was paid to the psychological attributes required for 
aircrew service.   In that year the Medical Research Council, with the agreement of the 
Air Council, appointed an Air Medical Investigation Committee to prepare reports on 
the ‘Medical problems of Flying’. One of these reports by Major J L Birley (MO in 
Charge HQ RFC), stressed the additional qualities  required for this service, although 
he thought that ‘flying’ temperament was distinguished from fighting temperament he 
admitted that the exact requirements could not be defined.60      A further  report by  W 
H R Rivers and Squadron Leader T S Rippon considered whether it was possible to 
establish a mental aptitude for flying by interview.    They interviewed some 37 
students already under instruction, with the aim of assessing whether the subjects 
would or would not succeed as airmen.  This report, not surprisingly given the small 
numbers and the fact that the subjects were already flying, was inconclusive.  Although 
they did recommend candidates as satisfactory or not suitable. They accepted that the 
attitude of candidates already flying could not fairly be assessed.   Another difficulty 
was that three pupils were killed during the study, including two whom they rated very 
 
60 J. L. Birley, ‘Temperament and Service Flying’ Medical Research Council, The Medical Problems of Flying Report 
No 8 1917. 
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highly.       Rivers and Rippon did suggest that investigation designed to discover mental 
aptitude for flying should be undertaken before admission to a flying school.    It does 
not seem that any action was taken.61   
It is fair to note that although aircrew recruitment to the RFC/RNAS and later to the 
RAF remained haphazard, by 1917 the selection of aircrew had been extended beyond 
the public-school minority and the quality of recruits remained acceptable.   However, 
the lack of effective psychiatric input to the selection procedure was a serious weakness 
which meant that psychological failure in training continued to be a significant cause 
of wastage.  
Although at times the demand was very high, the glamour of the air, the extra pay, the 
chance of being commissioned and in some cases, avoiding conscription, meant that 
there were always enough volunteers, sometimes more than the training establishment 
could deal with.  
 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
61W R H Rivers & T S Rippon, ‘Mental Aptitude for Aviation’, Medical Research Council: The Medical Problems of 
Flying Report 12 1917. 
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                                                              Chapter Three 
                                               Training in RFC/RAF 1914-1918 
Training is a vital factor in the development of morale and fighting spirit. The 
importance effective training as a major factor in developing morale was recognised 
in the Report of the War Office Committee of Enquiry into ‘Shell Shock’: 
Training must be continuous.     The more a man is training the more skilful he becomes; 
the more his confidence increases.   If a man knows he can do a thing well, he develops 
confidence in himself.  If he knows that his comrades are equally skilful, he gains 
confidence in them.    His confidence is multiplied.  Confidence is both contagious and 
inspiring…Morale is confidence in one’s self and confidence in one’s comrades…It is the 
product of continuous and enthusiastic training’1      
 
In the RFC, the early attempts at pilot instruction were without any consistent plan, 
system or doctrine: but by 1917 the service had developed a relevant and efficient 
organisation with training units in England, Canada and the Middle East.  
This chapter examines the RFC training experience and the continuing and 
increasing pressure on training units caused by the wastage of aircrew in combat and 
within the training organisation itself.  As noted in the previous chapter, aircrew, 
received no psychological assessment before entering the training system.       
Additionally, the standard of instruction in the first three years of war, was at best, 
poor.   Instructors were appointed usually from newly qualified pilots or those who 
 
1 Cmd 1734 Report of the War Office Committee of Enquiry into ‘Shell Shock’ (HMSO, 1922) p.208. 
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had just returned from the front, often suffering psychological disorders. And even 
worse there was no training system for pilots or observers.      As this chapter shows 
these factors seriously affected training outcomes. 
 
Pilot Training 
Unfortunately, the Royal Flying Corps went to war with its pilots and observers 
trained only to fly the aeroplane and that not always too well.   Many writers, 
including some who served in the war, have criticized this situation which lasted 
until 1917, but without understanding that it was probably inevitable.2          Training 
of RFC aircrew in 1914 was inadequate and unsuitable  because aviation itself was 
still in its infancy and the use of aeroplanes by the military was only two or three 
years old, insufficient time for adequate teaching methods to have evolved.3       The 
RFC itself had only been in existence for two years.   
The first aviator’s (pilot) certificate to be granted by the Royal Aero Club of United 
Kingdom was to Mr J.T. C. Moore-Brabazon (later Lord Brabazon) in March 1910; 
this was the first official ‘qualification’ for pilots and for some years was all that was 
 
2 G. Norris, The Royal Flying Corps A History (London, 1982), pp 27-33;  I. Jones, Tiger Squadron (London,1954) 
pp.53-65; D. Winter, The First of the Few (London,1982) pp.28-36; D. Ginnell-Milne, Wind in the Wires (London, 
1937),  pp.10-20. 
3 M Paris, ‘The First Air Wars-North Africa and the Balkans 1911-13’ Journal of Contemporary History Vol 26 (1991) 
pp.97-109.  
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needed to become a military pilot.  The acceptance of this qualification was a major 
reason for the lack of any effective and co-ordinated training arrangements in the 
Royal Flying Corps. 
The Royal Aero Club test in 1911, essentially just a basic control of aircraft check, 
required the pilot to carry out, in the presence of an official observer, two five-
kilometre flights flown as five figures of eight around two posts set 500 metres apart.    
A further flight was required on which a height of at least 50 metres had to be 
achieved.   All three landings had to be made within 50 metres of a position 
nominated by the candidate.      By 1914 the only changes to these requirements 
specified that the height reached now had to be 100 metres and, at 100 metres, the 
engine was to be switched off and the descent and landing made without engine.4  
There were several flying schools which taught pilots to a standard to pass the 
certificate, the standard charge being £75.00.        Army candidates wishing to qualify 
had to pay the cost themselves, but if accepted by the Air Battalion, the cost would 
be reimbursed.     Although the Air Battalion was established to operate both balloons 
and aeroplanes, the interest in aeroplanes was such that in the summer of 1911 there 
were 40 applicants for vacancies to fly aeroplanes and none for balloons.5 
 
4 These requirements were in metres and kilometres because the authority for international standards was the Swiss 
based Federation Aeronautique International, although the tests were administered by the Royal Aero Club. 
5 C F Snowden-Gamble., The Air Weapon Volume 1 (Oxford, 1931), p.128. 
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The need for training new pilots was recognised in the Royal Flying Corps 
organisation, which included a Central Flying School where it was planned, all 
future service pilots would be trained.          In practice, as with the Air Battalion, all 
candidates for RFC commissions would first have to learn to fly and obtain the 
RAeC certificate.      As before the candidate would have to meet the expenses of 
obtaining the certificate, but if he was granted a commission these would be 
refunded.6  Unfortunately, as already noted, the requirements of the RAeC certificate 
were in no way related to needs of military flying and even the basic handling of the 
aircraft was inadequate for military operations and it soon became clear that further 
training for pilots would be required.     Accordingly, all RFC Pilots were attached 
to the Central Flying School at Upavon on Salisbury Plain for a four-month course.      
The first course started on 17th April 1912 and included instruction in the theory of 
flight, the internal combustion engine, reconnaissance, and troop formations.  The 
practical side of the course included flying, map reading, engines and signalling.7     
The flying experience needed to obtain the flying certificates was set out in the 
formal syllabus which included the matters noted above and the flying tests which 
had to be passed.   They were basic: an adequate number of hours had to be flown 
 
6  Army Order 347 11th November 1911. 
7 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, pp.11-12. 
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(a vague and unquantifiable requirement).   The navigation test was equally vague: 
to fly at least 40 miles from base and return.8  
The number of hours flown rose from an average of about ten on No 4 course to 27 
on No 6, (August 1914) when this course was interrupted and its many of its aircraft 
and most of its pilots were sent to France.9 
At the end of the course pilots were awarded their Flying Certificate.   Obviously, 
in-flight training and actual time in the air is vital, but in the first year of the war a 
shortage of aircraft meant that even the relatively few pilots in the system did not 
receive enough flight time.  Even when they did get into the air the instruction given 
was generally both unscientific and unsatisfactory.  In some aircraft there was no 
dual provision and the instructor would fly the aircraft with the pupil, standing or 
siting in any available space.   In those aircraft which did provide dual seating, the 
instructors, aware of the danger in teaching incompetent and inexperienced pilots, 
were sometimes reluctant to allow the student to have control but felt safer by 
demonstrating the procedures and shouting explanations.10   The result was that the 
instructors did most of the flying and students received little training.    When the 
 
8 AP 125 The Royal Air Force   p.11; G. C. Jefford, Observers and Navigators, (London, 2014), pp.44-45. 
9 AP 125 The Royal Air Force   p.34-35. 
10 G Taylor, The Sky Beyond (London,1966) pp.12-13. Sir Gordon Taylor, afterwards a noted Pacific Ocean flyer, 
experienced this problem and had to demand further instruction. He later discovered that his first instructor had been 
returned from France after suffering Flying Sickness.   
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instructor felt the student was ready, he was sent solo to carry out a set of required 
tasks. Where possible these tasks were monitored from the ground.11       The almost 
inevitable result of such a method is illustrated by 2/Lt Christopher Binley’s 
experience: 
My instructor was a chap whom I am quite certain had had a bad shaking up and thoroughly 
lost his nerve because I virtually never touched the controls when I was supposed to be 
having dual.   With the result that when I did go solo, I got off the ground all right, but I 
did a mighty bounce on landing and squashed the undercarriage.’12 
 
The War Office was notified when a pilot qualified and shortly afterwards he would 
be informed that he had been gazetted as a ‘Flying Officer’, which was an 
employment grade not a rank, and once he had been gazetted, he was entitled to wear 
a flying badge.  When the course was completed the pilot was awarded his flying 
badge and a report card was completed grading the pilot as poor, fair, good or very 
good having been assessed in four aspects of piloting; aircraft handling, cross 
country flying (navigation), mechanical proficiency and officer quantities.13 
Although routine orders published the regulations regarding wearing of ‘wings’ 
(with frequent reminders), it seems to have been the practice to pilots to sew on their 
 
11 J. Sweetman, Cavalry of the Clouds (Stroud, 2010), pp.55-56; J. Hamilton-Preston, Marked for Death (London, 
2015) pp.127-130. 
12 N. Steel & P. Hart, Tumult in the Clouds (London, 1997) p.84, quoting Lt C Bilney RFC. 
13 Jefford, Observers and Navigators   pp.44-47.   
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wings as soon as they knew that they were qualified.     This practice was encouraged 
by the fact that, any newly qualified pilot who was selected to act as an instructor, 
perhaps because he was the best pilot on the course, was given local dispensation to 
wear ‘wings’ before being gazetted: probably to give him credibility as an 
instructor.14  This was truly a case of the blind leading the blind as the experience of 
an observer (E Lubbock) who later qualified as a pilot showed.    He was immediately 
made an instructor and assigned six students.   Within a day, he was sending one 
solo, but after only ten days experience as an instructor he sent a 2/Lt Ferme solo 
who lost control and crashed.15    In 1916, 2/Lt   S C O’Grady was made an instructor 
after 33 hours solo flying and before he had graduated.   A noteworthy if extreme 
case is that of the then flight Sergeant James McCudden (later Major, VC. DSO. 
MC. MM.) who whilst still on the pilot’s course and with only eight hours solo:  
When I got to the CFS I was made an assistant instructor and took my first pupil up when 
I had a total ‘solo’ time myself of eight hours.  He did not seem to mind.16 
 
McCudden noted on the same page that, “a pilot has 24 hours actual flying to his 
credit before he is considered a competent aviator.”   Another unusual point about 
McCudden’s account is that his own instructor is named as a ‘Sergeant-Major 
 
14 For this note and for general information regarding RFC training I am indebted to Wg Cdr Geoff Jefford  MBE, 
author of Observers and Navigators  (London, 2001) and expert on World War One aircrew. 
15  C G Jefford Personal Communication. 
16 J. T. B. McCudden, Flying Fury, (London, 1919,1968), pp.94-95. 
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Power’ an NCO instructor, which is an indication that NCO pilots may have been 
more employed than has been realised. 
Inadequate instruction was obviously one of the reasons for the horrifying accident 
rate in pilot training which did not slacken until the introduction of the Smith-Barry 
system (see below).   It should also be remembered that at this early period, there 
was little understanding of the ‘theory of flight’ the importance of not overloading 
aircraft, the effect of ‘drag’, or the importance of the correct construction and rigging 
of aeroplanes.  Many accidents were caused by low level stalling, often following 
engine failure, when early aircraft, very light and with many wires and struts, quickly 
lost flying speed unless at once put into a dive.17    There were few attitude or engine 
instruments to help the pilot and in the early aircraft  airspeed had to be judged by 
the sound of the slipstream through the wing struts.    One writer has given a graphic 
description of training in early aircraft:    
At the beginning of the war flying the usual military aeroplane may best compared may 
best compared with riding a rather dilapidated motorcycle with balding and wrongly 
inflated tyres over a trails course in freezing fog and a gale, refreshing yourself with 
draughts of neat caster oil.   Just getting off the ground and flying in the right direction was 
difficult, being shot at can have added only marginally to the anxiety.18 
 
 
17 D. H. Robinson. The Dangerous Sky (Oxford. 1973), pp.66-67. 
18 J James The Paladins (London, 1990), p.50. 
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An early indication of the wastage which would become common in RFC training 
was the three fatal accidents in six months at the Central Flying School in 1913/14.       
In October 1913, Major C G Merrick was killed in a Short Biplane, in March 1914 
Captain C P Downer was killed in a BE Biplane and in the same month Lieutenant 
H F Treeby died in an accident in a Maurice Farman.19  Each accident was in a 
different type of aircraft, almost certainly a result of the lack of a suitable training 
aeroplane.  The aircraft usually used was the French aircraft the Maurice Farman 
MF11.  The MF11 was a pusher (engine behind the pilot) aircraft, powered by an 
80-horsepower Renault which gave the aircraft a maximum speed of about 60 mph.   
Although the French used this aircraft in several roles including bombing and contact 
patrols, the RFC thought the MF11 ‘unsuitable for fighting’.20      It was a two-seater 
biplane with twin curved wooden skids projecting in front of the wheels, an earlier 
model had long skids, and so the MF11 was commonly known as the ‘Shorthorn’         
A student flying the MF11 found that the Shorthorn was: 
A queer sort of bus like an assembly of birdcages.  You climbed with great difficulty 
through a network of wires into the nacelle, and sat parked up there, adorned with a helmet, 
very much exposed to the wondering gaze of men.    There did not seen to be any a priori 
reason why this structure should leave the ground, but after dashing across the aerodrome 
at 40 miles an hour for some time the thing did imperceptibly and gradually climb into the 
 
19 W. Raleigh and HA Jones, Official History of the Great War: The War in The Air Vol 1 (1922-37) (henceforth 
TWITA), pp.237-238. 
20 J. W. R. Taylor, Jane’s Fighting Aircraft of World War One (London. 1919,1990) p.113; AP 125 The Royal Air 
Force, p.393. 
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air.  It was very like a ride on top of an omnibus.    The flight was a quiet up to three 
hundred feet and down again.21   
 
Another student’s experience of instruction (in 1916) illustrates the inadequacy of 
the training system well into the war: 
 
He (the Instructor) opened up the engine, took off, climbed to 300 feet, tapped me and 
yelled ‘take her over’.     I was petrified I had no idea what to do.  I gazed at the control, a 
sort of cycle handlebar with looped ends, known as the spectacles, set on a central column.  
Below was a rudder bar for my feet.      I timidly rested my hands on the loops and let my 
toes gently touch the rudder.    For a minute the plane kept on a straight course, then the 
right wing started to drop, the looped bar followed, and she began to slip side-ways.    I 
was fascinated, waiting for something to happen.       ‘Straighten her up, What the f----g 
hell are you trying to do, you bleeding idiot? Came the bellow.    In a panic I pushed the 
handlebar away from me.  The Rumpety (MF11) dipped her nose indignantly, shuddered, 
and banked suddenly over.   Then the controls were snatched from my feeble hands, and 
during a full unbroken minute of bellowing in my ear I learned what a wonderful flow of 
expletives a Flying Corps instructor could possess.’ you bloody fool’ came a bellow in my 
ear.  Desperately, I pressed the bar down further to the right.    The right wing dropped 
steeper and went on dropping.22 
 
Student pilots started training on the Farman and when considered proficient, usually 
after going solo and completing several cross-country flights, transferred to a more 
advanced aircraft, typically the BE2.    The BE2b, was a two-seater tractor aircraft 
(engine in front of pilot), with the two seats in tandem.   It was powered by a 70 hp 
Renault V-8 which gave a top speed of 74 mph at sea level, with a three-hour 
 
21 V. M. Yeates, Winged Victory (London, 1934, 2010), pp.83-84.  Yeates was a World War One Pilot who served on 
the Western Front.  Although this work is a novel, it is generally accepted that it is both autobiographical and factual 
in its depiction of flying and operational matters. 
22 A. G. Lee, Open Cockpit (London,1969), pp 23-24. Lee survived this instruction and the war to become an Air-
Vice Marshal in the RAF. 
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endurance.23      Most training sorties were necessarily carried out at low level as it 
took some thirty minutes for the BE2b to climb to 6000 feet.   This had the extra 
problem that the first experience pilots had of high altitude and the effects of anoxia 
and cold came when they arrived on a squadron.  It was only with the introduction 
of the Avro 504 and the instructional methods of Smith-Barry that realistic training 
started.24   This included the final flight test; a cross country flight, at the end of 
which upon returning to base the pilot had to switch off the engine at 3000 feet and 
glide to a safe landing. 
The Royal Navy had maintained its own pilot training establishment at Eastchurch 
since 1913 despite the formation of the RFC in 1912 and the arrangement that pilots 
for both services would be trained at the Central Flying School at Upavon.   This 
school continued after the outbreak of war as the main naval flying school when the 
Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) was officially recognized.25        Students received 
similar but arguably better training than RFC students.   Training started on the 
Maurice Farman and progressed to an Avro 504, an aircraft with similar performance 
and handling qualities to the aircraft used operationally.     It had a maximum speed 
at ground level of 95 mph, could climb to 10,000 feet in sixteen minutes and could 
 
23 P. R. Hare, The Royal Aircraft Factory, (London, 1990), pp.140-147 
24 D. Winter, The First of The Few (London, 1982) pp.30-31. 
25 Jones, TWITA Vol V   pp.438-439; R.D.B. Davis, (Vice-Admiral) Sailor in the Air, (London, 1967) pp.70-74.     
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stay airborne for over four hours.26   In 1916 RNAS Qualifications were formalised, 
candidates were posted to the preliminary training schools at Eastchurch, Eastborne, 
Chinford or Redcar and received 20 to 24 hours basic training.  They then passed to 
Cranwell for advanced training in cross- country flying, navigation, engines, aerial 
gunnery bombing and wireless telegraphy. The total time spent on this course was 
almost twice that required for a military trainee.  If recommend by the commanding 
officer, the candidate was then commissioned as a Flight Sub-Lieutenant.27   Not 
unreasonably, given that naval pilots could expect to spend a lot of time flying over 
the sea, time was spent studying compasses, including the causes of variation and 
deviation and the means of obtaining wind speeds at height.28    The RNAS training 
policy was subjected to the same rigours testing and analysis which was given to 
operational tactics and aircraft development and training methods revised as 
necessary.   Training units were required to submit regular reports which were 
compared to those submitted by operational squadrons.      If squadron requirements 
were not met, training methods would be changed.29 
 
26 J. W. R. Taylor, Janes Fighting Aircraft, p.50. 
27 Davies, Sailor in the Air p.72; Jones, TWITA, Vol V, pp.440-443. 
28 Davis, Sailor in the Air, pp.76-77. 
29 C. J. M. Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive, (London,1995), pp.22-23. 
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At the beginning of the war, the War Office assumed that the conflict would be of 
short duration.   An unfortunate outcome of this policy was that initially there was 
no consideration given to establishing a reserve force.    As already noted, the Central 
Flying School was severely denuded both of aeroplanes and instructors to establish 
the squadrons sent to France.30        However, the error was recognised, and action 
taken by the RFC to meet the need for trained pilots and within days of the 
declaration of war a Reserve Aeroplane Squadron was formed at Farnborough, 
which became No 1 Reserve Squadron when Brooklands aerodrome was taken over 
as No 2.    Additionally, another military flying school was set up at Nethearvon, 
which in turn moved to Shoreham as No 3 school and in turn other schools were 
formed to meet the ever-increasing need for aircrew.  The same system was used in 
each case, by a flight of a squadron being detached and becoming the basis of another 
squadron.   An example of this process was when a flight of No 3 Squadron (Major 
H R Brooke -Popham) was hived off to become the basis of No 5 Squadron (Major 
J F Higgins) 31 
Although the training organisation had been greatly expanded with the coming of 
war it had not yet produced instructors with specialised training in instruction, which 
 
30 Raleigh & Jones, TWITA Volume V, (London,1937), p.285.  
31 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, pp.34-35. 
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was a major reason why pilots not prepared or trained for operational flying were 
sent to squadrons.     One pilot (afterwards a successful fighter pilot), complained: 
Pupils could honestly claim that they had learned to fly in spite of their instructors, who 
came and went almost as often as their students crashed.  During eight and a half hours 
flying instruction I had no less than twelve instructors.   To this circumstance, coupled with 
the poor quality of the teaching, I always attributed the weakness of my aerodrome flying.32 
 
As late as 1916 an Australian pilot trained in the United Kingdom was sent to the 
front with a total of ten hours’ practice and ‘no real idea of flying’.33   
The supply difficulties were exacerbated by Haig’s request that the RFC squadron 
strength in France be increased to fifty-six by Spring 1917.  This request was finally 
approved on 15th November 1916.  Immediately,  the Director of Air Organisation 
(Brig-Gen W S Brancker) pointed out that the training programme was 10,200 
aircrew short and that new requirement would need a further 13,560 men, and that 
it had only just been possible to replace the ‘wastage’ of pilots  and Observers during 
the Somme battle.34     Trenchard’s demand  for a continuously aggressive offensive 
in the air and for squadrons to be maintained at full strength, meant that the resultant 
heavy losses were often replaced by inadequately trained pilots, some of whom had 
 
32 I. Jones, Tiger Squadron, The Story of No 54 Squadron (London, 1954), p.57. 
33 M. Molkentin, Centenary History of Australia and the War in the Air (Oxford, 2014), p.54.  
34 Raleigh &. Jones, TWITA Vol II p.291. 
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to be sent home for further training.35    As seen later in this study this situation had 
predictable effects on both individual and squadron morale.   
Notwithstanding the lack of adequate instructors, the RFC Reserve Aeroplane 
Squadrons (RAS) were intended to function as elementary flying schools, to train 
pilots to RAeC Certificate standard and provide theoretical and technical ground 
instruction.   The original expectation was that the pilot would then proceed to the 
CFS.  However, the numbers of pilots involved soon exceeded the CFS’s capacity 
and it was decided the Service (operational) Squadrons would have to take up the 
slack, and act as advanced flying training schools as well as preparing for operations.  
It was intended that the trainee pilots would send two months flying the type of 
aircraft which he would fly on operations.  It had been anticipated and accepted that 
imposing a major training commitment upon active squadrons would stretch their 
resources to the limit.36        One effect of this policy, certainly unforeseen, which 
badly affected pilot training was the impact on Home Defence squadrons whose anti-
Zeppelin operations took place at night.  The Commander of the London Defence 
Wing (No 18), reporting that No 39 Squadron had been forced to abandon pilot 
training said: 
 
35 Trenchard was appointed commander of the RFC in France in October 1915. 
36 Raleigh & Jones, TWITA Vol III p.293. 
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officers under instructions ill-treated the engines and upset the true-ing of the machines so 
that it was impossible to expect pilots to fly at night in the machines which had been used 
for instructional purposes by day, even though they were still serviceable.’ 37   
 
This dual role of the home defence squadrons did not enhance morale, particularly 
as they had been flying many sorties in their operations against the Zeppelins, but 
without success    In 1915 only two pilots had intercepted Zeppelins and the RFC 
had experienced three fatalities in night landing accidents.38    
There were other problems with tasking operational squadrons to act as training 
units. Although it did increase the flow of new pilots, the ‘part-time’ and interrupted 
training meant that quality suffered.    This problem was exacerbated with the 
introduction of new types of more advanced aircraft and fighting techniques which 
meant there was more for a pilot to learn, but which he was not being taught.   As 
noted above, this situation led to pilots arriving in France inadequately trained, with 
the result that some Commanding Officers returned them to England for further 
training.    In fact, by early 1916 Trenchard was making ‘serious complaints’ to the 
War Office about the insufficient training of some replacement pilots.39   One of 
several complaints made he made on 1st January concerned:    
 
37 C.Cole & E. F. Cheeseman, The Air Defence of Great Britain 1914-1918 (London, 1984), pp.448-449. 
38 Raleigh & Jones, TWITA Vol III Appendix III: German Raids on Great Britain p.65; D Robinson, The Zeppelin in 
Combat (London, 1962) pp.103-109.   
39 Jefford, Observers & Navigators, p. 45; A. Boyle, Trenchard (London,1962), pp. 172-173. 
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five pilots of 29 Squadron who have been sent out during the last three days, one has 
wrecked his machine on landing at St Omer and two others have done the same on landing 
at their own squadron aerodrome. It seems that pilots require more practice before they are 
fit to fly DH Scout machines in this country.40 
 
In fact, 29 squadron had a total of eleven accidents in France in 1916, with six pilots 
killed and five injured badly enough to be hospitalised.  One unfortunate pilot was 
injured in a crash on 3rd of July and killed in another on 24th August.41        Seven of 
those accidents were either on take-off or landing and it is probable that inadequate 
training was a contributing factor in these accidents.       
In fact, attempts were being made to address some of the outstanding problems of 
inadequate RFC training outcomes.    One important improvement was the beginning 
of instruction in aerial fighting.    This development was a response to a War Office 
letter to the Officer in command of II Brigade (Brig-Gen J F Higgins): 
   
That as the number of combats in the air is constantly increasing it has been decided that 
pilots and observers under instruction at home should be trained, as far as practicable in 
fighting in the air………. Graduated pilots, should be instructed by being opposed to an 
experienced flight commander.’42    
                                          
 
40 TNA Air 1/131/15/40/218 (pilots sent to Expeditionary Force with insufficient training) 
41 T. Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield, (London, 2014) pp.359-360. The unfortunate pilot was Lt W Stobart, RAFM 
CC / Incident 24 August 1916. 
42 Raleigh& Jones, TWITA Vol III p.294. 
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Shortly after Brigadier Higgins letter, fighting training was given, initially to 
selected officers.  Another major improvement to the training system was the 
establishment in 1915, of four RFC Cadet Battalions to undertake military training 
of direct entry pilots and observers and commissioning RFC NCOs and other ranks 
(later the Cadet Battalions were designated as Wings) 43  
Unless they were already commissioned, (most Observers volunteering for pilot 
training were) all pilots began as Cadets and spent 8-10 weeks, with drill, military 
law, service organisation, and psychical training before moving on to six or seven 
weeks of aeronautical studies, including engines, navigation, photography, and 
artillery co-operation.      The student would then move on to an armament school to 
study machine guns and bombing.   Satisfactory completion of the course resulted 
in advancement to Flight Cadet and posting to a Training depot for twelve weeks 
flying training: learning to fly Avro 504s. 
In March 1916, following the recall of Lt Col John Salmond from France to take 
over home based training, the requirements for the pilot’s certificate were updated.      
From March 1916, to qualify for his certificate a pilot had to have: 
a) Flown solo for a minimum of 20 hours; 
b) Flown a ‘service’ (as distinct from a training) aeroplane satisfactorily; 
c)  Made a cross county flight of at least 60 miles; 
 
43 AP 125 The Royal Air Force pp.247-249. 
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d) Climbed to 8000 feet and remained there for at least 15 minutes then landing with engine 
switched off, landing within a circle of 50 feet diameter; 
e) Landing twice at night with the assistance of flares. 44 
 
On average the number of pilots sent to France was about ten a week, barely enough 
to cover casualties.   However, the competence of pilots although generally 
improved, was still below and the standard required, and squadron commanders 
continued to complain about the standard of pilots being sent to France.45  
One result was that pilots were sent back from the front for further training and had 
to be replaced thus aggravating the shortage of pilots at the front.  This problem 
caused the Deputy Director of Military Aeronautics, Major D Powell to write to 
the Officer Commanding 5 Brigade in February 1916: 
It is not understood how an officer who is reported to be fit for overseas duty should on 
arrival in France, be found to be so completely unsuited for the duties of a pilot, unless the 
officers who were responsible for his training and graduation made a very grave error of 
judgement.46 
 
It is likely that a major cause of this situation was the incompetence of instructors.   
Apart from their inexperience, many were unmotivated: having volunteered to fly in 
the war they were asked to carry out a dangerous job (as it was) without getting into 
 
44 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p.154. 
45 Boyle, Trenchard, p.172.                            
46 Jones, TWITA Volume II appendix IV.  
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the war.  On the other hand, many instructors had returned from the France and felt 
instructing was not a rest but just exchanging one dangerous job for another. 
Powell’s comments were reflected in Trenchard’s complaints about the unsuitability 
of pilots sent to France and in one case, the Director of Air Organisation, Major-
General W S Brancker responded: 
Second Lieutenant M A Mills, Royal Irish Regiment and RFC was posted to the 
Expeditionary force on 24th January 1916 as a BE2c pilot.   The Officer Commanding his 
squadron reports that he was not fit to take his place in the squadron as a pilot   Accordingly, 
he was sent to HQ for further practice. 
He shews but little sign of improvement and appears to have no judgement. 
I recommend, therefore, that he be employed as an Observer and pending approval……. 
He has been posted to a squadron in the field as an Observer.”47 
 
This was one of many examples of unsatisfactory training standards even after two 
years of war, but at least in these cases action was taken to prevent the unsatisfactory 
pilot concerned from flying on operations. but many did get as far as the squadrons.   
In one letter Trenchard complained ‘A reserve pilot has just smashed his fourth 
machine, so I’m sending him back for further training’.48       Boyle also noted that 
Trenchard complained to the War Office in April 1916 about the standard of pilot 
training  49  
 
47  D.J. Jordan, ‘The Army Co-operation Missions of the RFC/RAF 1914-1918’ (PhD Thesis, University of 
Birmingham 1997), pp.63-64. 
48 Boyle, Trenchard p.172. 
49 Boyle, Trenchard pp.173-174 
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However, many poorly trained and/or incompetent pilots did get to fly operationally.   
From January 1916 to December 1917, there were 619 accidents on operational 
squadrons in France, 136 (22%) were the result of poor handling or judgement by 
pilots, including, stalling on take-off, flying into trees or other obstacles whilst 
taking off or landing, losing control in the air and misjudging landings and 
destroying the aircraft.  These 136 accidents cost the lives of eighty-six pilots and 
observers, with many others injured.50      
By the beginning of 1917 many of the shortcomings of the system had been accepted 
and the system re-organised.         Civilians and those other ranks volunteering from 
the Army went first to the Cadet Wings as cadets and were given a grounding in 
military knowledge, including drill and discipline, care of arms, use of machine gun, 
topography and military law.   They then passed on to a School of Military 
Aeronautics, where they were taught, theory of flight, aeroplane rigging, aero 
engines, artillery observation, map-reading, photography, and signalling.  This 
course was intended to last two months, but such was the urgency of the demand for 
replacements in France it was often reduced to five or six weeks.51  
 
50 Henshaw, The Sky Their, Accidents Addendum, pp .357-378. 
51 AP 125 Royal Air Force, p.242. The RNAS had similar system in place in 1916, Goulter p.22.   
118 
 
On passing this course the cadets were gazetted as 2nd Lieutenants and posted to a 
training squadron for elementary flying instruction, usually on Maurice Farman 
aircraft.    When they were judged to be competent, usually after about four hours, 
they were sent on to the advanced training squadrons to fly service aircraft.52  During 
this period of advanced training they also completed an advanced gunnery course.   
Pilots were then qualified to receive their Flying Badge (wings) gazetted as Flying 
Officers (2/Lt) of the Royal Flying Corps.53        Officers transferring from other 
regiments to the RFC, did the same course except for the Cadet Wing Training as 
they had already completed military training.        Although the changes noted above, 
and the improvements to the training system, did improve the standard of pilot 
training, it was not until the introduction of the of the Smith-Barry system that the 
RFC could be confident that pilots would arrive on the operational squadrons 
proficient for the several roles required.   
Major Robert Raymond Smith-Barry originally went to France with 5 Squadron in 
1914, as a squadron pilot; he seems at that time to have been a somewhat eccentric 
character who did not  take flying too seriously.54    On 18th August 1914 he crashed 
in an RE8, his observer was killed and Smith-Barry was taken to hospital with two 
 
52 Molkentin, Centenary History, p.53.    
53 Molkentin, Centenary History, p.54; AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p.242. 
54 G. Norris, The Royal Flying Corps (London, 1965), p.51. 
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broken legs and smashed knee caps.  Although he was not expected to fly again, 
eventually, after several applications, he did get accepted on another flying course 
and  returned to the front as Commanding Officer of 60 Squadron, in time for the 
start of the Battle of the Somme.55  In common with other Squadron Commanding 
Officers at the front Smith-Barry became concerned by the lack of flying skills 
shown by replacement pilots.   He believed that ill trained and incompetent pilots 
were no use to the squadrons and easy targets for German fighters.      Unlike others 
however, he did not just accept the problem and send back for further training those 
who failed to meet the standard required; instead he analysed their failings and used 
his results to develop a training philosophy based on the use of an aeroplane with 
the appropriate handling qualities and with dual control.    He also evolved a 
comprehensive syllabus, to be taught by experienced pilots who had been taught to 
teach.56   Although such an approach today is self-evident, in 1916 in was a 
revolutionary approach and in order to obtain the necessary support for his ideas, 
Smith-Barry, writing officially as Officer Commanding of 60 Squadron, produced 
two papers one setting out a new pilot training scheme and a second suggesting the 
 
55  Jones, TWITA Vol V pp 429-435; Norris, pp.205-206.   
56 C.G. Jefford, Observers and Navigators (London, 2014), pp.88-90. 
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establishment of a training school for instructors.57      When  Trenchard, (who as we 
have seen, had also been concerned about the low standard of replacements) received 
the papers he consulted the officer commanding the home training organisation, 
Brigadier-General J Salmond, and quickly arranged for Smith-Barry to be sent home 
to test his theories as OC No 1 Reserve Squadron at Gosport58            
Until the Smith-Barry revolution, pilot’s minds were full of strange ideas about how 
aeroplanes flew.   For the student and often for the instructor, flight was unnatural 
and unbalanced and any deviation from the laid down procedures could bring 
disaster.     Even experienced pilots whilst acquiring better skills did not always 
increase their understanding of the theory and practice of flying.        Smith-Barry’s 
approach was to encourage instructors and students to fly to the limits of the 
aircraft’s capacity and thus build up knowledge and skill.   He wrote: 
The object has been not to prevent flyers from getting into difficulties of dangers, but to 
show them how to get out of them satisfactorily, and having done so, to make them go and 
repeat the process alone.   If the pupil considers this dangerous let him find some other 
employment, as, whatever risk I ask him to run here, he will have to run a hundred times 
as much when he gets to France.    How can a young officer be expected to do much in 
France, if, during the whole of his training in England he has been told of nothing but what 
is considered dangerous to do in flying?   As most of the supposed dangers are not 
dangerous at all, but both easy and pleasant, it would seem a simple matter to be taught, 
chiefly by example, to be frightened of nothing connected with flying on this side of the 
lines’ 59    
 
57  Raleigh & Jones, TWITA Volume V pp.429-434; S F Wise, The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force 
Volume One Canadian Airmen and the First World War (Toronto, 1980) pp.104-105.  
58 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, pp.246-247. 
59 Raleigth & Jones, TWITA Volume V, pp.432-434.                                       
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The Smith-Barry philosophy of teaching was bolstered by the fact that by 1917 pilots 
had discovered the answer to the ‘spin’ which had been, because its cause and cure 
were unknown, of great concern to inexperienced pilots.    By late 1916 several pilots 
had discovered that by pushing the control stick forward and applying opposite 
rudder, control could be recovered.   This discovery enabled Smith-Barry to 
incorporate ‘spin recovery’ into his teaching with a consequent increase in 
credibility.60  One of Smith-Barry’s instructors wrote: 
The gospel he preached was that the aeroplane was a nice tempered, reasonable machine 
that always obeys a simple code of rules  and in any weather. And by shedding a flood of 
light on the mysteries of its control he drove away the fear and real; danger that existed for 
those who were flying aeroplanes in the blackest ignorance of first principles’61 
 
Smith-Barry’s other major development was to ensure that communication between 
pilots and instructors was always possible in an aircraft by means of what came to 
be called the ’Gosport’ tube between pilot positions in two seat aircraft.          Several 
other general improvements to pilot training were introduced in 1917; firstly, and 
 
60  Several pilots had discovered by ‘accident ‘that spin recovery was possible, they include Major J E Chamier, Lt W 
Park RN, and Captain R Balcome-Brown, a New Zealander, who visited Smith -Barry to explain how he did it.  
Systematic investigation into spinning began in Summer of 1917, with experiments by F A Lindemamm (later Lord 
Cherwell), who made a series of deliberate spins in a FB2a. The recovery technique was established: Full opposite 
Rudder, stick forward, recover from dive, was passed to flying schools.  B J Brinkworth, ‘The early History of 
Spinning and Spin Research in the UK’ 1909-1929’ Journal of Aeronautical History (2014) 3, pp.106-110. 
61 Raleigh & Jones, TWITA Volume V p.430. 
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most importantly a reasonably high-performance training aircraft (Avro 504) was 
produced with performance similar, to the aircraft which pilots would fly in France.     
Secondly, unlike the previous system of sending a pilot solo and then letting him get 
on with it, now instructors had to check pilots throughout their training to ensure bad 
habits were not developed.    Thirdly, flight commanders were required to accept 
responsibility if a pilot under instruction crashed due to ignorance of a problem 
which should have been covered during his training.       Perhaps even more radically, 
if a crash proved to be the result of pilot’s fundamental lack of ability, the flight 
commander would have to explain why that pilot had not been removed from the 
course.           
As early as February 1917, the War Office had been considering a re-structuring of 
the pilot training organisation and in July, impressed by the success of the Smith-
Barry system, Major General Salmond directed that seven new ‘all-through’ training 
units (called Training Depot Stations) would be set up and provided with trained 
instructors, one aim being to remove the operational squadrons from the training 
system.62  The TDS proved to be a success and by the end of the War there were 72 
 
62 AP125 The Royal Air Force, p.241. 
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TDSs in operation.      By the end of 1917, the notional training   programme for 
pilots was: 
Cadet Wing                                                       8-10  weeks 
School of Aeronautics                                       6-7  weeks 
Armament School                                               4    weeks 
Training Depot (basic Avro 504)                      12  weeks 
Training Deport (advanced DH 9)                    4-8  weeks 
Fighting School                                                  3    weeks  
School of Navigation and Bomb Dropping      4-5  weeks63 
 
At the end of the course the pilot would be awarded his flying badge.  Pilots were 
graded as poor, fair, good very good or excellent, and given a report card, which was 
passed to the pilot’s squadron.     It was misleading information on these forms which 
caused many of the complaints about the ability of the pilot.  For instance, Lt F A 
Garlick graduated in January 1916, his report card indicated that his cross-country 
flying was ‘fair’: in fact as he said in a sworn statement, he had never made any cross 
country flights.64  Other discrepancies included crediting pilots with more hours than 
they had flown.  It not surprising that these shortcomings would be discovered 
quickly by the Squadron Commander as it was common practice for replacement 
pilots to be checked as soon as they arrived.    
 
63 Table extracted from J Jefford ‘The Training of Royal Air Force Pilots 1912-1918’ Royal Air force Historical 
Society Journal Vol 70 (2018) pp.15-45 & p.34. 
64  RAF Museum CC  F A Garlick 20th February 1916, Garlick and his Observer, Captain W Knox were killed in an 
air combat that day; Henshaw, The Sky Their, p.3.        
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Assuming no waiting time or leave, training would take about eleven months, the 
pupil having amassed between 60-70 hours flying.       Although quality was much 
improved, (and there was never any shortage of volunteers) the extended training 
time was one of the reasons there was difficulty in finding replacements during the 
intensive operations in late 1917 and 1918.       The formation of the Independent 
Force in June 1918 put further pressure on the training system. 
The training regime for students in Canada matched the 1917 scheme in England but 
having been designed after the errors and changes of the first two years of war, the 
schools could design a coherent and effective system from the start.65  
After swearing in and a medical examination the candidate passed on the Cadet 
School for three weeks, where he was ‘trained as a soldier’.    The cadet then went 
on to a School of Military Aeronautics.  Here he received instruction in engines, map 
reading, cross country flying and theory and of flight.    He was also required to be 
able to read Morse code at twelve words a minute.    On successful completion of 
the course the cadet then passed to a Training Squadron for initial flight training.   
An American naval volunteer wrote about the Canadian system, noting his first 
flight: 
 
65  Jones, TWITA Vol V pp.460-463. 
125 
 
after taking off and climbing well above the field the RFC pilots would make a few sharp 
banks, standing the ship first on one wing and then the other, then turn back to the 
aerodrome, coming in for a landing in a steep dive.   It was almost over before we knew it 
had happened.  I staggered away toward the hanger a little dizzy after my flight!66 
 
After five or six hours, solo flying, including thirty or forty landings, a successful 
student moves to a Higher Training Squadron for advanced training in cross country 
flying, wireless telegraphy, photography, bombing, artillery observing and aerial 
gunnery.  After a minimum of thirty hours solo flying with this unit and again, if 
successful, finally he passes to a School of Gunnery and air fighting.   Upon 
completion, he is commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant and given his Flying Badge 
(wings) and sent overseas.67      
An interesting aspect of the Canadian training system was its combination of strict 
discipline contrasting with a lenient attitude towards failure.   One the one hand 
cadets were disciplined for such minor faults as not standing to attention when 
speaking to an officer or not saluting properly, which entailed a loss of credits and 
sometimes involved receiving a penalty such as confinement.   On the other hand, 
failure in examinations or tests was treated with leniency, allowing repeated chances 
to pass; so, that the failure rate at Canadian flight schools was only 4.9%, which was 
 
66 J. Sterling Halstead, ‘Trained by the Royal Flying Corps’ in US Naval Institute Proceedings February 1917, p.26. 
67 Wise, Canadian Airmen, pp.98. 
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in stark contrast to the rate in the World War Two Empire Air Training Scheme, 
where the wastage rate was 33 per cent.68   Halstead, quoted above, also noted an 
attitude towards flying discipline at the flight school  which may well have helped 
to encourage the attitudes sometimes shown by Canadian trained pilots flying in 
France: 
There was always a shortage of aeroplanes owing to crashes which in many cases did not 
injure the pilot but always put the aeroplane out of use for minimum of several hours.   This 
shortage was aggravated by the fact that after soloing, student pilots were allowed to 
wander all over eastern Canada and sometimes landed so far away from camp that it took 
several days to truck the aeroplane back.69 
 
Unfortunately, although the morale of pilots under instruction everywhere was 
improved because training methods were put on a logical and effective system, the 
accident rate in training remained high.       It took some time for the ‘Smith-Barry’ 
system to be introduced in the many flying schools existing in 1917, including the 
CFS and the various schools of gunnery and air fighting and the training 
establishments in Egypt and Canada.     It also took some time for a cadre of 
competent instructors to be recruited and sent to the schools.   However, although 
there was some reduction in accidents, even the improvements in training methods 
could not eliminate the dangers inherent in operating the aeroplanes of the first real 
 
68 Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.107; S. Dunmore & W. Carter, Reap The Whirlwind (London, 1992) pp.43-45.   
69 Halstead, Trained by the RFC, p.27. 
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war in the air, nor the fact that in war some shortcuts would always be taken, and 
risks accepted.   
Accidents and deaths in training were common in all training units and Australian 
pilots training in England had their share of fatalities.70      During its fourteen 
months’ period of training in Gloucestershire, the Australian Flying Corps buried 17 
trainee pilots in Leighterton cemetery and a further seven elsewhere in England.71  
Number 23 Training Wing had suffered 35 deaths a month before the introduction 
of the Smith-Barry method which was  largely responsible for a reduction  to about 
sixteen a month thereafter.72   Those students who had transferred from the trenches 
seemed most affected by the high accident rate.  This seems to confirm the doubts 
of Major Birley about the incidence of breakdown by veteran volunteers73.           
Australian pilot Lt Lewis wrote that he was ‘a little afraid ‘of flight training and 
another noted, ‘seven crashes in three days, it’s a disgrace no doctor is here.’74   The 
initially high morale of these trainees was affected by the losses in training accidents.     
Other writers have commented on the effect of the high accident rate in training, one 
referring to the’ constant haemorrhage of accidental death’ and suggesting that the 
 
70 Australian pilots received their basic training in Australia, but all advanced training took place in England. 
71 M. W, J.  Molkentin Culture, Class and Experience in The Australian Flying Corps  unpublished BA(Hons) Thesis 
(University of Wollongong, 2004) pp.33-35. 
72 D. Winter, The First of The Few, p. 37-38. 
73 See above Chapter Two.  
74 Molkentin, Culture, Class, p.34. 
128 
 
fear of death in training was so pervasive that few memoirs mention its existence.75     
In fact several memoirs do address the frequency and results of training accidents.     
Generally, they confirm the bad effects on morale of this wastage.    Arthur Gould 
Lee, (training before spin recovery was understood) writes: 
Of course, nobody tried a spin for this would have been a suicidal act.   Nobody knew how 
to get out of one and anyway, this was too reliable a way of being killed accidently, which 
was of the unsettling things at Filton,………….Filton saw fatal crashes every few days, 
and usually through mysterious spins into the ground when taking off.    Flat spins we 
called them, and they happened on BEs, sometimes right in front of our eyes as we lounged 
around the tarmac………… The instructors put these crashes down to sheer clumsy 
piloting, and so there it was, practically an act of God.76 
 
As late as June 1918, out of a total of 173 fatalities, 93 (54%) died while flying with 
training units.   
By the end of 1917, the new instructional system had become effective and fatalities 
among students reduced from one every 790 flying hours to one every 1340 flying 
hours.77   Nevertheless, the Australian Official History records that in 1918, some 
20% of Australian pupils (all trained by the RFC) were killed in training, together 
with 16% 0f their instructors.78    
 
75 D. Winter, The First of the Few, p. 36. 
76 A. Gould Lee, Open Cockpit (London, 1969, 2014), p.30. 
77 M. Molkentin, Centenary History, p.54. 
78 M Moltken, p.55. 
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In July 1917, in part because of German daylight raids on London, it was decided to 
increase the number of service squadrons to 106.        This extra demand highlighted 
a serious shortfall in both pilots and observers.   This was due to a combination of 
the high casualty rate, plus the time required to train pilots, added to a pilot’s short 
period of effective service.  After his eleven months’ training the estimated effective 
operational period of a pilot on the Western Front was two and a half months for a 
scout (fighter) pilot, to four months for a pilot or observer in a reconnaissance, 
artillery, or Home Defence squadron.79  
During the discussions which took place before the decision to increase the number 
of service squadrons a departmental memorandum stated that the number of pilots 
under training in June 1917 was 5,841 and it would be eight months before they were 
available.80   This number would in any cases be reduced by what was described as 
‘normal wastage’ (killed, injured, sick, found unsuited for flying) and it was 
expected that 4,650 would actually qualify as pilots.81         Additionally, to meet the 
needs of the new squadrons some 3,252 pilots would be required by the end of 1917 
and a further 2,199 from January to March 1918, a total of 5,451, shortfall of 801 
 
79 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p.244.   
80  Jones, TWITA Vol V, pp.425-427. 
81  Jones, TWITA Vol V, p.425. 
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pilots.82  To meet this deficiency additional training wings were formed in the UK 
and schools of Military Aeronautics were formed in Canada and Egypt.83 It is worth 
noting that by July 1917, approximately 30% of RFC aircrew were Canadians, 
Australians or South Africans.84  
The pilot requirements of the RFC for the period July 1917. To December 1918 are 
set out in the table below:  
                          PILOTS REQUIRED   RFC  1917-1917 85   
To complete establishment of squadrons       1917                   1918 
                                                                   (July-Dec)    (to 31st March)  (April-Dec) 
In France (to fill establishment)                   460                  400                 1580 
Home Defence                                               Nil                   Nil                    99 
To replace wastage, France                           2693               1749                 9752 
To replace wastage, Home Defence                99                   50                   216   
 
Grand total of pilots required, 17,089.     The requirement for April-December 1918 
was overtaken by the ending of the war, but these figures illustrate the continuing 
high wastage rates up to the last days of fighting.    Added to those aircrews killed 
in action, there were another 484 pilots and 178 observers killed in flying accidents 
 
82 Raleigh & Jones, TWITA Vol V p.426. 
83  Wise, Canadian Airmen   p.84; M. Mokentin, Centenary History, p.145. 
84 Wise, Canadian Airmen   p. 448-449; Molkentin, Centenary History, p. 26. 
85 Table extracted from Jones, TWITA Vol V, p.427. 
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on the western front, which themselves should be added to the approximately 3,000 
aircrew, killed in training accidents.86      
As Anderson points out the number of crashes he sees, or experiences influences the 
usually high initial morale of student pilots.87   Similarly, the number of accidents 
on front line squadrons influenced aircrew, particularly those newly arrived.      An 
additional aspect of flying accidents was the fact, that as errors of judgement were 
the most common cause of accidents it was often the case that being involved in 
even a minor accident affected a pilot’s confidence and morale.  
 
Observer Training 
At the time the Air Battalion came into existence in 1911, the possibility of training 
officers of the General Staff as aerial observers was under consideration, but as the 
instruction was to have been in balloons and as none were available at that time, the 
scheme was abandoned.88  However, although these tentative plans to train personnel 
in ‘observing’ had been discarded, it was demonstrated in the Army’s 1913 
manoeuvres that reconnaissance could be successfully conducted by aeroplanes,89      
 
86 T. Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield, p.344. 
87 H.G.Anderson, The Medical and Surgical Aspects of Aviation, (London, 1919, 2010), pp.74-75. 
88 C. F. Snowden-Gamble, The Air Weapon, pp.128-129. 
89 H. ST. G. Saunders, Per Ardua, The Rise of British Air Power 1911-1939 (London, 1944), pp. 24-26; AP125 The 
Royal Air Force,  p.15.  
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The concept of an ‘observer’ as a separate crew member had been accepted by the 
then commander of the RFC’s Military Wing (Lt Col F H Sykes) when, in February 
1913, he produced a Training Manual for the corps. He wrote: 
In order that the best results may be obtained from aerial reconnaissance, it is essential that 
the same pilot and observer should always work together as far as possible, at all events in 
the case of aeroplanes.  Mutual confidence is of the utmost importance.  
It is inadvisable to lay down hard and fast rules as to the respective duties of pilots and 
observers, as it must depend largely upon the personality of the individuals.     As soon as 
the orders have been received, the pilot and observer should consult together with the aid 
of a map as to the best manner of carrying out their task and the route to be followed.90 
 
However, nothing was said as to who these observers would be and where they 
would be found.    In fact, in the 1913 ‘war games’, apart from three students from 
the current staff college course, all the officers who flew as observers were pilots.   
One of those pilots, who flew as both pilot and observer during the manoeuvres felt 
pilots should not undertake the role of observers. He said: 
pilots made poor observers as they disliked flying as passengers and tended to become 
preoccupied with monitoring the efforts of the man driving the aeroplane.  
The ideal observer would be an experienced ground-based officer, preferably possessing 
some technical skill which might be of value in the event of mechanical failure. 91 
 
 
90 WO 2483 Training Manual, Royal Flying Corps Part II (1915); Jefford, Observers and Navigators p. 2; E. Ash  Sir 
Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution 1912-1918  (London, 1999)  pp.42-44.  Sykes referred to this training plan in 
Aviation in Peace And War (London, 1922) the published version of his Leese-Knole lectures at Cambridge University 
in February/march 1921.    
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By 1914, the War Office realising the need for specialized observers decided to set 
up a course to ensure that trained observers would be available in case of war.   
Accordingly, ten officers were posted to Netheravon for a month’s instruction.     
An important factor in this initiative was that on completion of the course the 
‘trained’ observer would be able to draw flying pay at 5 shillings per day.  (a pilot 
received 8 shillings a day).       In the event with an imminent threat of war, the 
course was terminated on 3rd August and all officers instructed to return to their 
units.          
These decisions left the RFC not only without trained observers, but with no certain 
source of replacements for the inevitable ‘wastage’ on operations.    In the event, 
recruitment was mostly from volunteer infantry and gunnery officers already 
serving with their regiments.  (opportunities to transfer to the RFC were 
advertised).      Some officers used this chance as a way of getting away from the 
trenches, although at least one man who transferred thought that being ‘shelled’ 
(anti-aircraft fire) in the air was just as bad and more personal.92  
 
 
92 R.Barker, The Royal Flying Corps in World War 1, p.353, quoting Captain Leslie Horridge . 
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Notwithstanding the influx of (untrained) volunteers, some directly from the 
trenches, the shortage of observers meant that pilots had to be used instead.              
This included earmarking several the pilots sent out to France as replacement pilots 
as observers, some of whom had already been noted as ‘indifferent pilots’, who may 
be useful as observers.93  However, if an inexperienced pilot did become a combatant 
observer, whilst serving in that role he was unavailable as a pilot.     Additionally, it 
was clearly uneconomic to risk losing two pilots with each aircraft loss.    In any 
event, by early 1915 it was clear that these makeshift arrangements would no longer 
meet the increasing demand of the operational squadrons.   Accordingly, and after 
some rethinking HQ RFC (Lt Col Sykes) recommended to GHQ there should be, on 
each squadron:  
a) Eight highly trained observers attached permanently to the squadron. 
b) Two further observers undergoing training. 
c) A further group who when fully trained would return to parent units but be 
available for recall as a reserve for the RFC. 
 
This proposal was accepted, but this left open the question as to how these observers 
would be trained.94  
 
93 Jefford, Observers & Navigators, p.7. 
94 AP 125 The Royal Air Force p.74. 
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Initially, it was accepted that observers would learn their work in the field, that is 
flying with a squadron on operations. What this ‘on the job’ training meant is 
described by some of those involved.  R R Money had volunteered to serve as an 
observer because the waiting list to become a pilot was too long.      He received a 
three-week introduction to signalling and reconnaissance and was then posted to No 
12 Squadron in France. He wrote: 
I went for my first trip over the lines with Spratt (his flight commander).  We were to do a 
reconnaissance from the Ypres Salient’ via Lille, to Lens.      It took me all my time to 
recognise Ypres, but when Archie began to burst round us, I gathered that we had crossed 
the lines.   I did not at first realise that the bursts of Archie were aimed at us, and even 
when they got nearer it seemed much more interesting than dangerous,     I was pleased 
when we got to Lille…………where I could see signs of life.  I counted up the rolling-
stock in the railway sidings, and of lorry and car traffic.95 
 
Another example of the results of this ad-hoc training system was 2/Lt FA Portal 
who had been in France since the start of the war as a Motor Cyclist Officer, who 
reported to No 3 Squadron on 5th July 1915: 
I had never been in an aeroplane before, nor had I seen a Lewis gun.  I knew the Morse 
Code well and was fairly competent to read a map and find my way round on the ground.  
I had only the vaguest idea what my new duties would be, I had seen aeroplanes signalling 
with coloured lights and lamps to the artillery and I had seen a Morane blown up on the 
ground by the bombs it was going to drop on the lines.  I had a vague idea of the uses of 
reconnaissance.96  
 
 
95 R. R. Money, Flying and Soldiering, (London, 1936), pp.23-24. 
96 D. Richards, Portal of Hungerford; The Life of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Portal of Hungerford 
(London, 1977), pp.41-42. 
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Adding to Portal’s difficulties was the fact that when introduced to Captain Hubbard, 
who was to be his pilot, Hubbard told Portal that he had never flown over the lines.        
Obviously, this was an unsatisfactory and for inexperienced aircrew, a dangerous 
system.  
But by the time of Portal’s flight in July 1915, it was becoming clear that some 
specific core skills and knowledge was required by observers for them to be accepted 
as qualified for operational flying.    This was recognised by HQ RFC, and in August 
1915, the qualifications for an officer to be graded as a trained observer were laid 
down by GOC RFC as:   
  1. Thorough knowledge of the Lewis gun 
  2. Skilled in the use of the RFC camera 
  3. Sending and receiving by wireless at a rate of six words a minute with 98% 
accuracy   
  4. Thorough knowledge of method of co-operation between aeroplane and 
artillery 
  5. Has carried out two reconnaissance or flights or has ranged batteries 
successfully on two occasions.97 
 
The acceptance of the vital role observers played in the work of the RFC, recognised 
by these requirements, did not entirely overcome the feeling in parts of the RFC 
 
97 AP 125 The Royal Air Force p.74. 
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(including some pilots), that observers were in some way less important.     Money 
in his memoirs sets out the position as it was in 1915: 
 
Observers were of no account in those days--indeed, I do not think that they have ever 
attained to a measure of their pilots except in the Fleet Air Arm.   This was not the official 
view, of course—merely the more important social one.    Observers were ballast, useless 
heavy impediments, ullage who must be sat upon and squashed………. as practically every 
observer booked forward with longing to the day when he would himself become a pilot, 
this attitude seemed quite natural to him.”98 
 
However, on 23rd August 1915, the proper status of observers was at last recognised 
by the introduction of a flying badge, the observer’s ‘wings’ or to be accurate ‘half 
wing’.  This was rightly recognised as a huge step towards equality with pilots.99 
Trenchard was not happy, in December 1916 writing from France he said that too 
much time was spent by squadrons teaching newly joined observers and that because 
many had come directly from the trenches without taking leave they were not in a 
condition to take up the physically demanding role of operational aircrew.    He 
proposed that all probationary observers joining the RFC in the field should be sent 
home for a one-month course and then sent back to France.   This proposal was 
accepted and from 1st January 1917 probationary observers were sent to a School for 
 
98 Money, Flying and Soldiering, p.13. 
99  It is right to note here that ‘equality’ with pilots for ‘rear’ crew members was not achieved until the ‘cold war’ in 
the 1960s, particularly with respect to command and staff appointments.   
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Military Aeronautics, to be taught, artillery work, wireless, machine guns, 
photography, and map reading.100 
 
There was a question as to whether NCOs who had already been flying as observers 
should receive the flying badge.  This was raised when Sgt Major F C Lewis, who 
had been flying since 1912, applied to wear the wing and after some discussion and 
delay, his application was approved.         Shortly afterwards it was suggested that 
all personal who had been flying on photographic duties should be considered 
qualified.    The Director of Military Aeronautics ruled that the only personal entitled 
to wear observers ‘wings’ were those considered to be fully qualified and fully 
employed on ‘artillery work or reconnaissance or machine gunnery’ (by mid-1916 
this included NCO gunners) and that any of these would be able to operate a 
camera.101 
The training arrangements started in 1915 did not include any training in wireless 
and therefore from early 1916 observer trainees were sent to an observer’s section 
at the Wireless School at Brooklands.102     
 
100  Jones, TWITA Vol V pp.435-436. 
101 Jefford, Observers & Navigators, p.19. 
102 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p.155. 
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Despite these enhancements of the observer’s status, officers were not coming 
forward in enough numbers to meet the demands of the squadrons, one reason being 
that even if an observer had completed all necessary courses of instruction it was not 
until he had carried out several operational sorties could he receive his observers’ 
badge.   Pilots on the other band were awarded their flying badges as soon as flying 
training was completed and kept them even if they had to be returned from the front 
for further training.       It was even more difficult for an observer posted to a Home 
Defence squadron to qualify as operations against Zeppelins, even though they 
entailed dangerous night flying, did not come within the definition of ‘operational 
sortie’.  
Another serous disincentive to volunteering for observer duties was the lack of 
promotion above the rank of lieutenant.   The only opportunity for aircrew to be 
appointed Captain (and later Major) was to be a squadron flight commander, who 
were all pilots.   This was one of the reasons that many observers volunteered for 
pilot training if they could, thus further exacerbating the shortage of observers.   And 
of course, as already noted, pilots received eight shillings a day flying pay and 
observers five.103           
 
103 Jefford, Observers & Navigators, pp. 57-59. 
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Early in 1917 the quality of observers and their training arrangements became a 
matter of concern to Trenchard, partly because on regular visits to front line 
squadrons, he had become aware of squadron commanders concern about inadequate 
observer  training.104    On one visit Trenchard discovered that an observer had been 
with the squadron as a probationer observer for ten weeks as had not accumulated 
enough operational hours to qualify.     Trenchard then discovered that this was not 
an isolated case, one outcome being that although many squadrons had an ample 
number of unqualified observers, they did not have their establishment of twelve 
qualified observers.     A further indication that all was not well with observers 
training arrangements came from the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, whose 
squadrons were so critical of the low professionalism of observers sent to it that MEF 
had initiated its own training programme.105 
By early 1917 the aircraft flown by the RFC had improved considerably from the 
underpowered and inadequately armed aircraft used in 1915-1916.    The newer 
aircraft had been designed incorporating combat experience and the specialised 
requirements of photography, artillery spotting and contact patrols.   One result of 
different aircraft being used for specific tasks was that there was an increasing 
 
104 M. Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters 1914-1918, (London,1920,1985), pp.203-206. 
105 Y Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914-1918, (London, 1998), pp.187-188. 
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demand for specialised role-related training.   This had already been recognised by 
Trenchard, who in February 1917 suggested that the role of ‘aerial gunner’ was 
formally identified and in July any gunner who had passed the Hythe course and 
flown eight operations overseas was granted an observers badge.106       Additionally, 
observers were to be categorised as corps observers, for those employed on 
reconnaissance squadrons or army observers, for those on fighter or bomber 
squadrons.107    
Because of the different roles required, the training system had already begun to act.  
Of the 37 observers produced by the Schools of Military Aeronautics at Oxford and 
Reading each week, ten were to be sent to Hythe to become Army observers, while 
the other twenty-seven went to Brooklands Wireless and observers’ school to 
become Corps observers. 
As noted above, to ensure a continuous flow of observers to the squadrons it had 
been the practice to accept volunteers from  the trenches  who (in spite of 
Trenchard’s direction)  were not usually given leave before posting to a squadron, it 
had been found that they were often not in a fit condition to take up the role of 
 
106 The requirement that operations ‘overseas’ were needed to qualify meant that observers employed on the Home 
Defence Squadrons could not qualify, and it was necessary to exchange some observers with qualified combat aircrew 
who already had been awarded their badge. 
107 Jefford, Observers & Navigators, p. 63. 
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observer which demanded absolute mental and physical fitness.   This unsatisfactory 
situation was finally addressed in late 1917 when Trenchard realising that squadrons 
wasted much time training these men, decided that all officers who joined the RFC 
in the field would be returned to the Home Establishment for a formal course before 
being employed as observers.108   
By 1917 the RFC had expanded to some 106 operational squadrons and 97 reserve 
or training squadrons.  The expansion of the RFC with the continuing heavy demand 
for aircrew was responsible for the last major change in the training system, when, 
apart from the utilisation of the Schools in Canada and Egypt, the Training Brigade 
(Major General J M Salmond) was decentralised into three Group Commands 
(Northern, London and Southern) responsible for all aircrew training in their defined 
area.109 
As already noted, realistic and effective training undoubtedly has a positive effect 
upon morale.   Pilots and Observers entering the RFC were mostly young volunteers 
attracted to flying as part of the public enthusiasm for this new exiting aerial activity, 
which in 1914 was only a decade old.   When the call came in 1914 it was natural 
that many would chose this option to serve.110     In the early years of the war pilot 
 
108 Jones, TWITA Vol V p.435. 
109 Jones TWITA Vol V p.425.   
110 C. Lewis, Sagittarius Rising (London, 1936,1994), pp.7-9. 
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training was neither effective or safe with an accident rate which undoubtedly 
affected morale111    However, by 1917 in part due to the introduction of the Smith-
Barry system, both the effectiveness of training and the accident rate improved, 
although it was still high both in training and on operational squadrons. 
Apart from the wastage caused be death and injury, accidents in training were also 
at least part of the reason that a significant number of pilots were withdrawn from 
flying for psychological or nervous reasons.   A study of 600 pilots in training by  O 
H Gotch,  (Physician to RAF in the First World War)  found that about 10% gave up 
or were asked to withdraw suffering from neurosis,  Apart from those who found out 
for themselves, or were identified by instructors to be temperamentally united for 
flying, a significant  number were affected, psychologically either from being 
involved in one or more accidents, or in few cases after seeing an accident (usually 
a serious one)112  
On the other hand, observers, whose morale also suffered from the horrendous 
accident rate in training, were subjected to several additional factors which affected 
their attitude.  Unlike pilots, observers were not presented with their wings upon 
completion of training but had to serve on an operational squadron before they were 
 
111 Molkentin Centenary History, pp.53-59. 
112 O H Gotch, ‘The Aero-Neurosis of Flying Pupils’, H G Anderson, M Flack, O H Gotch, (eds.) The Medical and 
Aviation Surgical Aspects of Aviation, (London, 1919), pp.103-115. 
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presented.   Pilots received eight shillings a day flying pay, observers five.     
Observers were subject to restrictions on rank and promotion, which meant that 
observers were barred from any command role in the RFC, and of course there was 
always the fact that if involved in aircraft accidents they were not in control of their 
own destiny.   These factors may well have been a major reason why many (perhaps 
most) observers applied for pilot training as soon as possible. 
This chapter has demonstrated the vital importance of training, both in instilling and 
sustaining morale and effectiveness.    It has also shown that the lack of an effective 
method and competent instructors in the first three years of the war was responsible 
for low training standards.     Accidents in training was a serious problem throughout 
the war, and as noted in chapter four some 10% of pilot candidates failed training 
courses for psychological reasons. 
By 1918 pilot training had evolved into an effective system largely due to the Smith-
Barry methods of instruction, which revolutionised pilot training.   But within 
months of the benefit of this arriving at the front, the heavy casualties in late 1917 
into 1918, caused training times to be cut and replacements to be sent to France with 
inadequate training,   The shortfall in training times made it even more difficult for 
pilots to master combat flying, and  exacerbated the natural anxiety felt when 
expecting combat.   As is shown in later chapters, many inexperienced aircrew 
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suffered from flying sickness and were removed from flying.   It is arguable that 
inadequate training was in many cases at least partly responsible.    A further effect 
of untrained aircrew arriving at the front was a drop in the morale of squadrons, as 
in Nos 99 and 55 during the Independent Force’s bombing campaign in 1918. (see 
chapter seven).  
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Chapter Four 
Combat Stress and Aircrew 
Many writers have examined the causes, effect and treatment of Shell Shock 
suffered by thousands of men fighting in the trenches in the First World War.  
Part of that examination has addressed the question of whether each major war 
produces its own conflict and post-conflict disorders are defined by symptoms 
related to current military and medical technology, or whether such disorders are 
essentially the same.    This thesis examines one aspect of that debate, which has 
not been adequately addressed, that of psychological disorders suffered by First 
World War aircrew.    The incidence of such disorders will be established, and 
comparison made with aircrew of the Second World War.       
This chapter examines the causes and conditions leading to the diagnosis of 
‘Flying Sickness’ used in the First World War when removing aircrew from 
flying duties because of a psychological or psychiatric response to combat stress.    
Additionally, it analyses the medical treatment of aircrew suffering from Neurosis 
in this period.    
 
History of War Neurosis 
A psychological reaction to combat by soldiers has been recognised as a disabling 
condition from at least the seventeenth century and has been known by many 
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names.1        In Wellington’s Army during the Peninsular war, ‘war weariness’ 
and reluctance to fight was given the name ‘melancholia’ or ‘nostalgia’, perhaps 
referring to the symptoms of homesickness and sometimes despair  shown by 
soldiers during these wars which was most noticeable among inexperienced 
troops.2   In the Napoleonic wars there were cases of ‘wind contusions’ giving 
symptoms of tingling, twitching and sometimes paralysis: for which Napoleon’s 
chief surgeon prescribed exercise and music.3 
In the American Civil War, symptoms such as breathlessness, palpitations, 
fatigue and nervousness were identified as ‘soldier’s heart’ by Dr Jacob M Da 
Costa who gave an account of  this condition (‘Disordered action of the heart’ 
(DAH) also  known as ‘effort syndrome’) among combatants in the Civil War.4   
Civil war soldiers with these symptoms, which included  palpitations, high blood 
pressure, dizziness, headaches and fatigue were treated at a military hospital in 
Philadelphia for ‘neurasthenia’ and ‘irritable heart’.5 
In Britain, following service in the Crimean War, many soldiers were recorded as 
suffering from ‘chronic fatigue syndrome’ also called ‘neurasthenia’, symptoms 
of which included exhaustion, weakness, tremors, and visual difficulties.   Some 
of the soldiers affected had previously served in India where the severe conditions 
 
1 A Stokes & K Kite,  Flight Stress, Fatigue and Performance in Aviation (Aldershot, 1994) pp.213-215. 
2 E. Jones, ‘Historical Approaches to post combat disorders’, Philosophical Transitions; Biological Sciences  
Volume 361 No 1486 (2006)  pp.533-542 & p.535. 
3 M F Poster, ‘Thoughts on war trauma and the need for diplomacy’, International Forum of Psychoanalysis 
Volume 23 No 1 (2014) pp.55-63 & p.57. 
4 O. Paul, ‘Da Costa’s Syndrome or Neurocirculatory Asthenia’, British Heart Journal Vol 58 1987,  pp.306-315;    
P Wood, ‘Aetiology of Da Costa’s Syndrome’ The British Medical Journal 7 June 1941, pp.845-851.   
5 M.F.Poster,  ‘Thoughts on war, pp. 57-58. 
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of service, including the impact of heat stroke were said to contribute to their 
disability.6      The difficulty of diagnosing medical conditions presented by these 
unexplained and sometimes vague symptoms is highlighted by the clinical 
histories outlined by Jones & Wessley in their study of 4000 pensions files 
(mostly from the Boer War).  This difficulty is highlighted by the case of a 
Sergeant Dawes, who served six months in the Crimea before being posted to 
India, where he remined for six and a half years.     He returned to the United 
Kingdom in 1864, suffering from fatigue: weakness, tremors, imperfect vision 
and pains in arms and legs.     Although these symptoms could mimic those of 
DAH, when examined he was found to have no abnormalities of the heart.   His 
record showed that he was not a malingerer.        Jones and wessely point out that 
if Dawes had presented in 1915, he may have been classified with DAH and in 
1973, the diagnosis would be ‘Post Traumatic Stress Disorder’.7       
In the years, immediately following the Crimean War there was considerable 
concern in the British Army about the number of discharges because of ‘diseases 
of the circularity system’, ‘De Costas Syndrome, neurocirculatory asthenia and 
‘DAH’.8 
 
6 E. Jones & S. Wessely ‘Cases of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome After Crimean War and Indian Mutiny’ British 
Medical Journal l Vol 319 7225 (1999), p.1645. 
7  E Jones & S Wessley, p.1645.       Following the Blackman Case, it is likely that the diagnosis would now be 
‘adjustment disorder’ R v Blackman {2017} EWCA Crim 190 Court Martial Appeal Court 7 -8 Feb 2017   
judgement pp 70-7. 
8 E. Jones, ‘Historical approaches to post-combat disorders’ in Transactions of The Royal Society B (2006) pp.535-
561 & p.535. 
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Many of these breakdowns took place not during war service, but during training 
or because of previous service in India or the Crimea.       In 1867 an investigation 
carried out by Dr Maclean, Professor of Military Medicine at the Army Medical 
School on 5000 soldiers who had served abroad between 1863 and 1866 found 
that 8% had ben invalided from the service with what appeared to be heart 
disease.    Additionally, he estimated that soldiers serving in the UK had a 15% 
discharge rate due to heart disease, which he attributed to the webbing supporting 
the soldiers backpack constricting the blood vessels supplying the heart.9     In 
1865 following an investigation by a War Office Committee  the War Office 
recommended a redesign of the backpack and straps, but in 1876, when despite   
the new designs cases of DAH continued, it was now attributed to faulty 
equipment and the effects of  serving in inhospitable climates.  The symptoms 
were not at that time considered to be a result of psychological stress.10    
However, during the South African and Boer Wars, DAH was a major course of 
hospitalization with some 3631 soldiers affected.   Of those, 40% were sent home 
to UK.    It was noticed that once a soldier had suffered DAH, going into action 
again caused a recurrence of the symptoms.11       Despite these figures and the 
seemingly obvious evidence that the condition was combat related, there was still 
a reluctance to attribute the symptoms to the effect of combat.   This was at least 
 
9 Jones, Historical Approaches, p. 536.  
10 E. Jones & E Palmer, ‘War pensions (1900-1945); changing models of psychological understanding’, British 
Journal of Psychiatry Vol 180 2002, pp.274-275. 
11 Jones, Historical Approaches,  p.536. 
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partly due to the fact because sufferers were moved from the front and symptoms 
could easily be fabricated, there was always the possibility of malingering.    
In the First World War DAH continued to be diagnosed in the British Army 
although it was sometimes included under the wider term ‘nervous disorder’ or 
as Da Costa’s syndrome.   During and after the retreat from Mons in 1914, which 
involved rapid marching for several days with no sleep, there were many cases of 
chest pains, shortness of breath and heart palpitations.       Many of these soldiers 
were diagnosed as DAH/ Da Costa’s syndrome and by 1918 some 35,000 soldiers 
and sailors had been discharged for heart disorders in most cases without any 
physical or organic cause being found.12        Dr Paul Wood after investigating 
some 200 military cases and a survey of previous work on the subject of Da 
Costa’s syndrome concluded that the evidence showed that:  
The symptoms and signs of Da Costa’s syndrome more closely resemble those of 
emotion especially fear than those of effort in the normal subject.13 
Early in the First World War soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) 
in France were arriving traumatized at medical centres and presenting medical 
officers with difficulties in understanding and treating their condition.       Because 
several of the early casualties had experienced shelling and suffered concussion, 
Major Charles Myers, consultant to the BEF, inappropriately called the condition 
‘Shell Shock’.14  Some doctors assessing cases in the context of trench warfare, 
 
12 B. Shephard, A War of Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914-1994 (London, 2002),  pp.65-67;  Paul Wood,   ‘Da 
Costa’s Syndrome’  (ref 4 above) at  p.312 gives a figure of 41,699 soldiers discharged by 1918. 
13 P Wood, ‘Da Costa’s Syndrome (or effort syndrome)’ British Medical Journal Volume 2 (1941)  pp.767-72,  
pp.805-51,  pp.845-851, in particular summary at p.850. 
14 C S Meyers, Shell Shock in France 1914-1918 (London, 1940) pp.25-26 
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produced a psychological interpretation of the soldier’s condition.  Captain 
Harold Wiltshire, No. 12 General Hospital Rouen noted: 
Gradual psychic exhaustion from continued fear is an important disposing cause of shell 
shock, particularly in men of neuropathic disposition.  In such subjects it may suffice to 
cause shell shock per se……In the vast majority of cases of shell shock, the exciting 
cause is some special psychic shock.   Horrible sights are the most frequent and potent 
factor in the production this shock.  Losses and the fright of being buried are also 
important in this respect.15 
 
However, this basic underlying cause of these disorders, all arising from the stress 
of battle, was not identified and fully accepted until many studies of combat 
stress/battle exhaustion in and after World War Two established that the conflict 
between fear and duty was the catalectic factor, and it is generally accepted that 
the higher the killed and wounded rate, and thus lower chance of survival, the 
greater risk of combat related psychological breakdown.16 
  In 1943 C F Symonds an RAF psychiatrist after extensive case studies of aircrew 
breakdown concluded that that the most important element of flying stress is 
exposure to danger.   He recommended that in the prevention of neurosis in 
aircrew serious consideration should be given to the subject of fear; noting that 
fear within limits is not only a natural emotion, sharpening attention and evoking 
maximal effort.17  However, fear, useful in ‘lessor degrees’ becomes harmful as 
soon as it exceeds a certain limit.     Similarly,  Doctor D Reid, Former Royal Air 
 
15 H Wiltshire, Lancet 1 (1916) p.1212. 
16  E Jones & S Wessely, ‘Psychiatric Battle Casualties: an intra inter-war comparison’ British Journal of 
Psychiatry Volume 178 (2001) pp.243-245; P Wagner, ‘Psychiatric activities during the Normandy Offensive  
June 20th to  August 20th 1944’, Psychiatry,  Volume 9, pp.348 -356. 
17 C P Symonds, ‘The Human response To Flying Stress’ British Medical Journal Volume 2 No 4327, (1943),  
pp.740-744. 
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Force Director-General of Medical Services, concluded in a 1948 study that 
‘anxiety’ had serious effects on the performance of aircrew, the anxiety increasing 
with the length of time over enemy territory.18        In their clinical study of 
neurosis brought on by flying duties Symonds and Wilson  explained the 
psychiatrist’s approach to aircrew anxiety: 
These men are obviously suffering from a state of fear, the difficult question to decide 
is whether their fear is exaggerated or unjustified or within normal limits… Undue 
persistence of fear reactions after danger has passed, and recurrence with inadequate 
stimulus were considered evidence of a pathological state.    We believe that in fact there 
is no stable line of distinction between anxiety neurosis and normal emotional reaction, 
but that in the interests of morale, a line must always be drawn. 19       
 
 
They also pointed out, as had the War Office Committee of Enquiry into shell 
shock, that whether the ‘persistent fear reaction’ is neurosis, depends upon 
whether the man has tried hard enough to satisfy group standards. 
These studies clearly identify the psychological basis of the symptoms of combat 
stress: the conflict between duty and survival, together with the cumulative effect 
of fear, arising in large part due to the individual’s knowledge that the longer he 
stays in the battle the less chance he will survive.20    
Psychological Disorders in the RFC/RAF 
Almost from the start of the First World War, it became apparent that flying 
personnel could show inefficiency or loss of confidence in the air without 
 
18 D D Reid, ‘Sickness and Stress in Operational flying’ British Journal of Social Medicine Volume 2 No 4 (1948) 
pp.121-131. 
19 C P Symonds & D J Williams, ‘Clinical And Statistical Study Of Neurosis Precipitated By Flying Duties’ 
Reports from Flying Personnel Research Committee 1939-1948  Report 547 August 1943, p.34.   
20 R R Grinkler & J P Spiegel, Men Under Stress (New York, 1945), p.32. 
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evidence of any known physical disease to account for the condition.21    The 
problem of aircrew wastage, both in training and operations, from this cause 
became serious enough for investigation into the nature and causes of this 
condition.    Lieutenant Colonel M Flack (afterwards Director of Medical 
Research to the Royal Air |Force) devised ‘Tests for Flying Efficiency and Flying 
strain’.   He reported that although psychological factors might be evident, they 
were considered only in so far as they might have caused or contributed to a state 
of nervous exhaustion, other factors being effects of altitude and physical fatigue.    
All these factors taken together were summed up as ‘flying strain’.    Thus Flack 
reported cases both as ‘broken down through flying stress’ and ‘flying stress has 
markedly supervened’   A report by  Major J L Birley RAMC,  (medical adviser 
to C-in-C France) ‘Temperament and Service Flying’ indicated that and the term 
‘temperamental unfitness’ was already in use to describe both those who lost 
confidence without any crash or unpleasant experience and those who became 
inefficient or lost confidence after  such an experience  or after a long period of  
operational flying. 22         Birley felt that temperamental and physical unfitness 
were closely allied and that in the temperamentally unfit the failure was largely 
due to an undue susceptibility to mental shock.   Both Birley and Flack were 
looking at the causes of flying stress and its effects upon the aviator.     
 
21 AP 3139 Psychological Disorders in Flying Personnel of the Royal Air Force investigated 1939-1945. (HMSO, 
1947) Chap II. p.18. 
22 J L Birley, ‘Temperament and Service Flying’ Medical Research Council Medical Problems of Flying (HMSO, 
1920) paper No 8, (1917) pp.142-144. 
154 
 
Unfortunately, the distinction between cause and effect was ignored and the use 
of the term ‘flying stress’ to describe the load which the aviator had to bear was 
also used to describe the state of ill-heath which resulted when the load became 
too heavy.   Flying stress, in fact became a clinical diagnosis.23   
Several other terms were used in the early days of flying and air warfare to 
describe the effects on aircrew of operating in the sky.    Anderson used the terms 
‘aviation neurasthenia’ and later ‘areo-neurosis’ to describe any type of 
functional disorder brought on by flying.24      It was not hard for the medical 
profession to accept that the new and dramatic occupation of flying would cause 
previously unknown conditions.    This was not only because the occupation itself 
was so new, but it was also the case that the effects of anoxia and cold in the air 
were unknown.  In fact, Flack (a pioneer in aviation medicine) felt that lack of 
oxygen itself caused nervousness, insomnia, lack of confidence and reluctance to 
fly.25     On the other hand Birley, relying on his experience in the field, felt that 
‘flying fatigue’ was the problem and arranged that all cases of ‘flying fatigue’  
should be sent to 24th General Hospital for rest and treatment.26    In fact as early 
as summer 1916,  RFC  medical records show that the diagnosis ‘Flying Sickness’ 
or ‘Neurasthenia’ was used to classify  admissions for aircrew showing 
psychiatric symptoms.27 
 
23 C. P. Symonds (AVM Sir) ‘The Human Response to Flying Stress’ British Medical Journal,  5 Dec 1943 
p.4326. 
24 H. G. Anderson, The Medical and Surgical Aspects of Aviation (London, 1919) Chap V p.96 onwards. 
25 Anderson, Chapter IV (written by LT Col M B Flack) p.41. 
26 D. H. Robinson, The Dangerous Sky A History of Aviation Medicine, (Henley-on-Thames, 1973), p.101. 
27 RAF Museum-Vault – Casualty Cards. 
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It is clear that all the terms used during the First World War to describe the 
physical and psychological symptoms suffered by aircrew, are misleading, and as 
Symonds (writing in 1942) pointed out there is no more reason to use ‘flying 
stress’, ‘aeroneurosis’  or ‘aviator’s neurasthenia’ as a diagnosis than there was 
‘shell shock’.    Symonds also made the point that these terms are founded on 
error and might well, as ‘shell shock’ did, become a danger to morale.28 
In a further article he noted the tendency to invent new terms for neurosis in flying 
personnel, which he attributed to the desire for executive officers to avoid 
classifying aircrew, who may have given of their best, as neurotic.29  He points 
out that by 1942, the classification of all mental disorder in terms of reaction types 
allows psychiatrists to give a name to any psychological disorder of the kind 
which might be included under flying stress, areo-neurosis, neurasthenia, or even 
‘shell-shock.’30         Accordingly, in the Second World War, the RAF used the 
following classifications to identify psychological disorder in aircrew; Anxiety, 
Depression. Elation. Fatigue Syndrome. Hysteria, Obsessional Schizophrenia, 
Organic acute and Organic Chronic.   This classification of mental disorder 
allowed for effective diagnosis without the use of the term neurotic.    
In this work to ensure conciseness and clarity the term ‘combat stress’ is used to 
describe the strain or stress which aircrew flying in a training or war environment 
 
28 Symonds The Human Response to Flying Stress p.4326. 
29  C.P. Symonds, Use and Abuse of The Term ‘Flying Stress’ AP 3139 Psychological Disorders in Flying 
Personnel Of The Royal Air Force (HMSO,1947) Chapter Two, p.18. 
30  Symonds AP 3139 Chapter Two p.20. 
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environment experience: that is the load which aircrews must carry.   Combat 
stress is what happens to a man.    The psychological result of that stress is what 
happens in him: in this study the ‘war neurosis’ arising from operational or 
training flying will generally be described as ‘flying sickness’ (the term adopted 
by the RFC) accepting the fact that a modern clinical diagnosis would probably 
come under one of the classifications set out above.  
Although the Army Medical Authorities had had considerable experience of war 
neurosis/DAH and/or Da Costa’s Syndrome before the outbreak of war in 1914, 
the British Army had no policy or organisation in 1914 to deal with any of these 
conditions.  
As Dr (Captain RAMC) W H R Rivers, who during the war was appointed 
consultant to the RFC and treated many Pilots and Observers who suffered 
breakdown, pointed out: 
the medical administration of our own and other armies was wholly unprepared for the 
vast extent and varied forms in which modern warfare is able to upset the higher functions 
of the nervous system and the mental activity of those called upon to take part in it.  
Moreover, before the war, the psycho-neuroses had interested few practitioners of 
medicine.    Common as these disorders are in civil life, there are left almost without 
notice in medical education, while those who had paid special attention to the subject 
were torn asunder by fierce differences of opinion, not only concerning the nature of these 
disturbances of nervous and mental function, but also in regard to the practical measures 
by which they may be treated or prevented.   The outbreak of the war found the medical 
profession with no such common body of principles and measures as those which enabled 
Medicine and Surgery to deal so successfully with the more material effects of warfare 
on the human organism. 
A succinct confirmation of River’s statement is provided by the Official 
Australian Medical History which states: 
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The whole history of medical and military practice and policy in the matter of mental 
disorder on the Western Front reads indeed like the Battle of the Cards in Alice in 
Wonderland’31 
 
 The British authorities were aware early in the war that the many cases of 
psychoneurosis in the French Army had resulted in medical responses, including 
the sending of experts to investigate the problem and the setting up of forward 
reception units to deal with war neurosis.     In fact, it was French neurologists 
and psychiatrists who  were among the first to fully and accurately describe the 
psycho-neurosis of war.32     In spite of this knowledge  it was not until August 
1915 that the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) appointed a Consulting 
Psychologist and a Consulting Neurologist.33          The problem of ‘wastage’ of 
manpower due to cases of ‘nervous disorders’  did not become serious until July 
1916, when during the first battle of the Somme several thousand soldiers had to 
be evacuated, many of whom were sent back to England.34     Although the Army 
authorities understood from the experience of previous wars  that not all wounds 
suffered in war were to the body,  they were now faced with a bewildering set of 
symptoms both physical and psychological.       There was an initial reluctance to 
recognise or to accept the psychological aspects of these cases partly because of 
a concern about malingering but also, there was considerable concern about the 
 
31 Butler, A. G., Official History of the Australian Army, Medical Services 1914-1918 (AWM 1943)   Vol III Chap 
II p. 4. 
 32  Macpherson, Maj-Gen, Sir, W. G., History of The Great War, Medical Services, Diseases of the War 
(HMSO,1923) Vol II Chap 1, pp 8-9. 
33  R. A. Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in The British Army In The Second World War, (London, 1958), p.55.  
34  Ahrenfeldt, p.5. 
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large number of psychiatric casualties and how they should be treated.35    The  
wide range of symptoms presented by patients suffering from combat related 
complaints was described in a recent study where some 94 separate symptoms of 
‘war neurosis’ were identified, the first ten in order of frequency being;  difficulty 
in performing tasks, fatigue, shortness of breath, persistent anxiety, weakness, 
irregular heartbeat, headaches, difficulty in sleeping, tremors, dizziness or 
giddiness.36   During the extensive operations over the battle of the Somme, 
fifteen RFC officers had been diagnosed as suffering from psychological 
disorders.  One was diagnosed with ‘shell shock’, but most were felt to be 
suffering from neurasthenia.   In fact, the symptoms shown were like those shown 
by ground forces.    However, one difference between the RFC and ground forces 
was noted.  In his evidence to the War Office Committee, RAF Medical Officer, 
F A Hampton said: 
In the Infantry a man breaks down through an explosion or otherwise and develops the 
thing suddenly, but in the Flying Corps they get more and more nervous until somebody 
sends them on leave or until they crash.37 
 
 The Official History of Medical Services describes the almost immediate effect 
of this plethora of symptoms: 
A complex terminology was evolved, and special treatments were manufactured in 
bewildering profusion.    Some patients with hysterical symptoms were psycho-analysed, 
 
35 E. Jones & S. Wessely, ‘Battle for the mind: World War 1 and the birth of military psychiatry’ Lancet Vol 348 
November 2014, pp.1708-14. 
36 E. Jones, R. Hodgins-Vermaas, H. McCartney, et al ‘Post-combat syndromes from the Boer War to the Gulf 
War; a cluster analysis of their nature and attribution’, British Medical Journal Vol 324, 9 Feb 2002 pp.321-324. 
37 Cmd 1734, Report of War Office Committee of Enquiry Into “Shell-Shock” (HMSO, 1922) p.59. 
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others with mental conflicts were hypnotized; whilst nearly all were treated on lines which 
could not fail to impress on the soldier’s mind the mysteriousness of his malady.’38 
 
With the broad range of symptoms presented, it is not surprising that some senior 
officers felt that there was little difference between psychoneurosis and 
malingering and that any special treatment for non-physical symptoms would 
open the way to easy evasion of duty.     The position was more confused when 
the BEF’s appointed neurologist  Lt Col Charles Myers who was sent to France 
in August 1916, noticed that initially all the’ battle shock’ cases he saw had been 
near to an exploding shell and described the patient as suffering from  ‘shell 
shock’ thus leading to a number of erroneous explanations for war 
neurosis/combat stress, which confused both diagnosis and treatment.39     The 
difficulty of diagnosing these patients was noted in a 1916 editorial in the Lancet 
which pointed out that ‘the many healthy young males who had suddenly begun 
to experience neurasthenia, should not be treated as ‘sane or insane, but as a no-
man’s land which defied definition’.40    The acceptance of the undoubted fact that 
war neurosis could easily be confused with malingering or even cowardice, led 
to a widespread post-war fear that some of the 346 men whom had been executed 
during the war may have been in fact suffering from war neurosis and had 
therefore been unjustly sentenced.41     In fact most of those soldiers sentenced to 
 
38 Macpherson, Medical Services   Vol II Chap 1 p.9 
39  C. S. Meters., Shell Shock in France 1914-1918 (London, 1940) p.12;  C. Corns & J. Hughes-Wilson,  Blindfold 
and Alone (London, 2001), p.73. 
40 The Lancet, 18th March 1916, editorial. 
41 T. Bogacz, ‘War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England 1914-22; The Work of the War Office Committee 
off Enquiry into ‘Shell-Shock’ ‘Journal of Contemporary History Vol 24 (1989) pp.227- 256 & p.227.  
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death were given a medical board after sentence, which may be at least part of 
the reason that only about 10% of death  sentences  were carried out.42    
 Nevertheless, malingering was a serious concern for the British Army in France 
throughout the war and military doctors were warned to lookout for soldiers 
falsifying their symptoms.    Doctors were sometimes put in a difficult position 
having to decide whether the symptoms presented indicated war neurosis or an 
attempt to evade duty.         As one medical officer pointed out, ‘a decision made 
to exclude neurosis is ‘sometimes to the temporary hurt of an individual, but 
justice to all the other men as well as discipline demands it’.43    Sufferers from 
mental shock could be divided into those who showed objective symptoms, such 
as blindness or paralysis and those with subjective signs of war neurasthenia such 
as sleeplessness or anxiety states.    The difficulty medical officers had to face 
when making a diagnosis, was increased by the fact that, in the opinion of many 
senior officers, men suffering the subjective symptoms (such as tics, tremors, 
fatigue or anxiety) were in many cases in no worse state than men who had not 
been taken from the front and indeed many officers in the trenches were showing 
the same symptoms.44 
 
 
 
42 Corns & Hughes-Wilson, Blindfold and Alone, p.99-100. 
43 J. C. Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew (London, 1994), p.76. 
44 Corns & Hughes-Wilson, Blindfold and Alone, p.78. 
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Causes of war neurosis 
The causes of these reactions to combat are complex but clearly apply both to the 
men in the trenches and to the aircrews operating over the battlefields.  The 
Official Medical History of the War describes the aetiology of psychoneurosis in 
an ‘average soldier’.    He starts his active service with what is described as 
average physical and mental development and having a normal motive of ‘seeing 
his country through’ and is able for some time to sustain both the rigors of modern 
warfare and military discipline.  However, sooner or later the physical and 
emotional stress tells, and he needs a rest, often this is not possible, and the soldier 
is required to continue at the front and consequently he may reach breaking point: 
particularly if he is unfortunate enough to see friends killed.      The Medical 
History emphasised the mainly psychological basis of breakdown, pointing out 
that only 2.5% of soldiers having symptoms of war neurosis showed injury to the 
nervous system.45   
It is submitted that a similar process applies to RFC aircrew, albeit in a different 
fighting environment.   Grinker and Spiegel in their major study of World War 
Two aircrew have provided a convincing rationale for the manifestation of 
combat stress. They point out that the emotional stress caused by combat comes 
from four main sources.  First is the threat of immediate death or personal injury, 
secondly the death of friends and colleagues, with sometimes traumatic effects 
 
45 Macpherson, Medical Services Diseases Vol II Chap 1, pp.18-19. 
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on unit coherence, and consequent effects on morale.   Third, the necessity of 
taking part in hostile and destructive flying and fighting, with the unexpected 
trauma of the disjunction between the chivalrous image of air combat and the 
subjective reality, the and lastly the inevitable cumulative effect of all the 
emotional stress on an individual’s motivation to stay in com.46     Additionally, 
there is the fundamental clash between a man’s concept of duty and his impulse 
for self-preservation.47        
Dr Wood’s research (noted above) which shows that the major cause of combat 
stress, in all its guises, is fear, is confirmed for aircrew breakdown by a major 
study carried out 1943.       In August 1943 Air-Vice Marshal Sir Charles Symonds 
and Wing Commander Denis Williams, both psychiatrists, analysed the 
psychiatric reports of 2919 cases of psychological disorder arising from flying 
duties seen by neuro-psychiatrists for the year ending 9 February 1943.48      After 
examining the variation in the incidence of flying and combat stress in the various 
commands and by crew position, the causes of neurosis were considered.    The 
most important finding was that the major cause in almost all cases (99.6%), the 
cause was psychological.    There was very little evidence that physical factors 
were the cause of neurosis, although some acted as contributory causes.    
 
46 R. R. Ginker & J. P. Spiegel, Men Under Stress (New York, 1945/1963), pp.54-56; J, Bourke,  ‘The Experience 
of Killing’ P, Little  J, Bourne  I, Whitehead (eds.),  The Great World War 1914-1945 (London, 2000) 
Chapter 16 p.296.     
47 M. K. Wells, Courage and Air Warfare (London, 1995), p.100. 
48 AVM Sir Charles Symonds & Wg Cdr D. J. Williams, ‘Clinical and Statistical Study of Neurosis Precipitated 
By Flying Duties’, FPRC Report 547, in Aircrew Stress in Wartime Operations (Academic Press, 1979), Chap II 
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Altitude, including the effects of anoxia (lack of oxygen) was not found to be 
significant except in the rare instance of those (few) individuals who have a 
specific irrational fear of heights.       This syndrome may have applied to those 
pilots reported by Anderson in his study who did well during low level training 
but who showed signs of stress when flying at greater heights.49   Physical injury 
was sometimes a factor (18%) and often operated after the flyer had been 
involved in a crash, particularly if hospitalized with time to reflect on his 
experience.  This especially applied to those who suffered from burns, which was 
a major concern of aircrew.    A further effect of hospitalization was often a 
prolonged absence from flying which itself could lead to loss of confidence.  
Lastly the injury itself may provide the foundation for symptoms of neurosis.         
Physical Illness was noted in some (10%) cases, with the sometimes-prolonged 
absence from flying causing a loss of confidence.       Airsickness may be a cause 
or a symptom of neurosis (2.4%) of cases. The usual pattern showed someone 
who had suffered airsickness early in training and experienced a recurrence when 
stressed.    Pilots are less vulnerable than other aircrew members.     Exhaustion 
appeared in few cases (2%) as a factor in combat stress, usually after a period of 
intense operational activity.       But as noted above fear is the governing factor 
as the cause of both flying and combat stress.   
 
49 H G Anderson, The Medical and Surgical Aspects of Aviation (London, 1919.2000), pp.64-66. 
164 
 
 One factor considered by Symonds and Williams was the incidence of 
‘predisposition’, that is evidence of a previous individual or family history of 
nervous instability.   They found that 73% of the cases seen showed evidence of 
constitutional liability to breakdown and 19% were so heavily predisposed that it 
would have been reasonable to reject them on entry.50      
In practice the symptoms described by sufferers of combat stress, battle 
exhaustion, shell shock or war neurosis were often like those fabricated by 
malingers hoping to avoid duty and therefore could easily be confused.  This may 
be the reason that there was a tendency by doctors to add further symptoms or 
conditions attributed to ‘combat stress’.        Many of the most common symptoms 
including; ‘tremor, paresis, fatigue, contractures, headache, difficulty sleeping, 
nightmares, memory loss and fatigue have been commonly observed have been 
commonly observed in pilots and observers of the RFC, in most cases after 
considerable exposure to the stress of flying and combat.   
An observer may face greater strain because he faces extra pressure.        First, he 
relies on the pilot’s confidence in the air and any lack of confidence on the pilot’s 
part gives him an extra anxiety.  Secondly, in any action irrespective of his own 
duties his life is in somebody else’s hands, and if involved in a crash he is usually 
 
50 Symonds & Williams, Clinical and Statistical Study, p.30. A pre-disposition to breakdown, although often 
apparent in combatants suffering from neurosis, does not necessarily prevent long and effective service before 
breakdown. See E Miller, The Neurosis in War (New York, 1943) p .viii. 
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helpless.51     This is strikingly confirmed by a pilot who for operational reasons 
was required to fly as an observer.  Having described some close shaves, 
including alighting in the sea and several forced landings he wrote: 
It is interesting to note that flying as an observer is more trying to the nerves than flying 
as a pilot.    This at any rate was my experience, because after my several months in 
Gallipoli, during which I had flown about 200 hundred hours, I felt more jumpy than at 
any time during the two years or more that I flew as a pilot in France.’52 
 
Describing the early symptoms of combat stress, Captain Dudley Corbett an 
RAMC doctor treating RFC patients at the General Hospital at Etaples, reported: 
A man notices that he is beginning to feel generally tired and that he has lost some of his 
original keenness.  His sleep does not refresh him.  He gets occasional headaches.  Later 
he does not sleep so well his sleep is troubled by nightmares of all kinds.       He may 
notice that he is getting irritable, and can’t stand the company of friends….he has to force 
himself to go up.53 
 
Other writers have emphasised the point that combat stress is manifested by a 
group of symptoms or conditions which may vary in individual cases.   The 
symptoms shown by aircrew very closely resemble those shown by soldiers in 
battle.   In combat stress cases affecting aircrew there may be a separate issue, 
fear of flying, underlying the combat stress indicators.   A fear of flying, even 
without combat, can give rise in aircrew to a loss of appetite, headaches, weight 
 
51 H. G. Anderson, The Medical and Surgical Aspects of Aviation; With Chapters on Applied Physiology Of 
Aviation (London, 1919), p. 61. 
52 A. A. Walser., (Sqn Ldr MC DFC) ‘Memories of Gallipoli’ Cross & Cockade Volume 45 (4) 2014 p.241. 
53 D Corbett, RAMC, ‘Report to US Air Service Jan 1918’, Air Service Medical (US War Department, 1919) 
Chapter VI pp.115-117. 
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loss, insomnia, trembling, paralysis and even temporary blindness.  Other 
common indictors of flying stress include apathy, depression, and irritability.54  
A contemporary account of combat stress in pilots and observers in the First 
World War is that by Henry Graeme Anderson.55     Anderson was a doctor who 
before the war worked for several flying clubs.   During the war, he worked with 
the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) and with the RFC.    He qualified as a pilot 
in 1916 and later became an instructor.   Anderson used the term Aero-Neurosis 
to cover the various types of nervous breakdown which could occur to flyers.   He 
noted the many other terms which were used, including, flying stress, flying 
sickness, and aviator’s neurasthenia.     He described many cases of breakdown 
during training, before any question of combat arose, when even in the very first 
days some pilots found that they did not have the temperament for flying, in 
which case they would usually be removed from training.    More often a pilot 
would show signs of stress, after a reasonable number of hours and whilst wanting 
to continue with training would show symptoms, such as visible tremors of limbs 
or lips, functional paralysis and bad dreams (particularly about accidents).56  As 
many volunteers would know little or nothing about flying before starting training 
and because they had volunteered, they would often be reluctant to admit their 
fears until those fears became obvious by their reactions to flying.    Anderson 
 
54 A. Stokes & K Kite, Flight Stress,  pp.213-14 
55 H. G. Anderson, The Medical and Surgical Aspects of Aviation. The chapter on Applied Physiology (p 58- 71) 
is by Cdr G H Gotch, a Royal Navy Surgeon who treated some 200 officers who ‘broke down’ whist on war 
service.    
56 Anderson, The Medical and Surgical, p. 55. 
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noted that some pilots would complete about fifty hours flying before showing 
signs of neurosis.  In these cases, Anderson felt it was worth trying with advice 
and rest to allow him to complete the course.    He recorded that in many cases of 
failure during training the pupil concerned has either been involved in an 
accident, often without sustaining any injury, or has witnessed one.57    He felt 
that in most cases if a pilot or observer successfully completes training it can be 
accepted that ‘flying’ itself does not cause any difficulty. 
The incidence of breakdowns by pilots and observers during operational flying is 
not surprisingly, greater than during training.     Anderson also notes some of the 
additional causes of anxiety which often contributed to the onset of neurosis.  
Some of these factors were especially prevalent in 1914-1918, because aircraft 
were still primitive and unreliable, and the general dangers of flying were not 
always understood.      Lack of oxygen and its effects on aircrew were unfamiliar 
and the cause of fatigue, headaches (in the air and after flying), giddiness, and 
errors of judgement.   The heights which aircraft operated (15000ft-20000ft) and 
the effects of slipstream on exposed extremities also affected pilots and observers.  
Many of these factors would not have applied during training; not only would 
they be flying be at low level, but the aircraft used, particularly in the first two 
years of war, would be slow, basic, and proven types.58 
 
57 Anderson, p.53-54. 
58 C. Lewis, Sagittarius Rising  (London, 1936), pp.22-25. 
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The term’ flying stress’ was used by Dr James Birley in 1920 in a series of 
lectures when he described his work as an RFC neurologist in the First World 
War.   Birley was one of the first to study the unknown stresses of flying, and the 
effects of these stresses on the aircrew.   Birley, in his capacity as RFC 
neurologist, became uneasy when he noted Flying Stress being used as a 
diagnosis in cases where in his opinion the cause of the nervous disorder was, not 
the stress of flying, but ‘undue susceptibility to mental shock’.       This view was 
consistent with his view that some individuals were temperamentally unsuited for 
flying, often because of a previous ‘nervous’ occurrence either to themselves of 
near family and in his 1920 report Temperament and Service Flying he suggested 
that some conditions called flying stress, could better be described as ‘flying 
distress’59   
As noted elsewhere in this study, the procedures for the recruitment of RFC 
aircrew involved a basic medical examination, which did not examine the 
psychological background of the candidate, or his temperamental fitness for 
training to fly or fight.   Nevertheless, during the Air War in France in 1914-1918, 
the temperamental unfitness of some aircrew had been recognised by Birley and 
in a study by Captain N S Gilcrest.60       It was felt at that time that these failures 
 
59 C. P. Symonds (AVM, Sir) ‘Use & Abuse of the term ‘Flying Stress’ AP 3139 Chapter II  (HMSO, 1947), pp.  
24-24 quoting Birley’s report Medical Problems of Flying, MRC (1920). 
60 A Captain RAMC attached to RFC who analysed the causes of breakdown in flying noted below. 
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were almost certainly the result of the casual and haphazard recruitment 
procedures.   
Despite this knowledge and  ‘improved’ inter-war selection methods the RAF 
were still surprised and disturbed in 1939, at the beginning of the Second World 
War, by the many crew members who broke down with symptoms of combat 
stress after the first few bombing operations (up to 50%) and the immediate effect 
these breakdowns had on morale.61     One possible contributory factor to the high 
breakdown figure with these crews was the fact that a high proportion of those 
involved were not full time aircrew at all and the gunners and wireless operators 
taking part in these operations were ground tradesmen who had volunteered to fly 
as part time crew members 62          
The only recognised aircrew categories at that time were Pilot and Observer and 
it was 1940 before the aircrew categories of Air Gunner and Wireless Operator 
were introduced (and trained as aircrew).     Later Navigator and Flight Engineer 
specialisations were added.63      
These aircrew failures surprised the service because it had been expected that 
flying/combat stress would not be a factor in early operations as it was believed 
that trained aircrew would be able to bear considerable exposure before suffering 
 
61 D. D. Reid, ‘The Historical Background Wartime Research in Psychology in The Royal Air Force’ in Aircrew 
Stress in Wartime Operations (London, 1948), pp.3-5. 
62  Webster & Frankland Vol I pp.195-197.  NB These volunteers were not given proper credit for their 
contribution, as shown when Fairy Battle crew Fg Officer Garland and Sgt Gray were awarded (posthumous) VCs 
for a gallant attack on a bridge but their Gunner Leading Aircraftman L R Reynolds was ignored. 
63 Jefford, Observers and Navigators, p.185-190. 
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disabling combat stress.64      It seems that the RAF selection procedures in the 
second war still missed those ‘predisposed’ to breakdown.   Confirmation came 
in a 1943 study of aircrew who were removed from operations for psychological 
reasons.  It found that 75% of the cases showed some previous family or personal 
history of neuropathy: 
These men are vulnerable to stress, and the severely predisposed often breakdown over 
lying duties without being exposed to any stress as judged by average experience.  At the 
other extreme stress, may be severe enough to cause a breakdown in men with no 
disposition.65  
 
In fact, several studies have shown that attempts to evolve selection procedures 
which identify those candidates who are psychologically unfitted for service, are 
of limited effectiveness.    Firstly, it cannot be known at the time of selection what 
effect the key factors of leadership, training, morale group cohesion and 
equipment will have on the individual.  Secondly the intensity or duration of 
combat is also unknown.66    With regard to pre-disposition, perhaps the most 
compelling reason for failure to anticipate breakdown during selection 
procedures, is that given by the most experienced RAF psychiatrist: 
it must be admitted that persistent enquiry in most people will reveal some imperfection 
in the family or personal history of a kind which may be regarded as a possible factor in 
the causation of breakdown. Such a discovery does not necessarily mean that the 
imperfections revealed have acted casually in the breakdown which has occurred, for 
 
64 Symonds, The Human Response, pp.703-706; N.S. Gilcrest,  ‘An Analysis OF Causes Of Breakdown In Flying’, 
British Medical Journal Vol 2 ( 3015) (1918)  pp  401-404;  S. Wessely, ‘Twentieth-Century Theories on Combat 
Motivation and Breakdown’  Journal of Contemporary  History  Vol 4 (2) 2006, pp.269-286;  F. Dillon, ‘Neurosis 
Among Combatant Troops In The Great War’  British Medical Journal Vol 2 No 4096 (1939), pp.63-66 & p.63.  
See also Chapter One of this work. 
65 C. P. Symonds (AVM Sir) & D, J. Williams ‘Clinical and Statistical study of Neurosis Precipitated by Flying 
Duties’ Aircrew Stress in Flying Operations (London, 1979), chapter II (FPRC Report 547 1943, p.40. 
66  E Jones & S Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD (London, 2005), pp.112-113.   
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there is a great variety in pre-disposing factors and an equal variety in the factors of 
external stress. 67    
 
There is also the fact that in many cases, sometimes with evidence of pre-
disposition, before the breakdown the sufferer will have done credit to himself 
and his unit.68       
 As already seen, it is evident that the main factor in causing flying and/or combat 
stress is fear, a result of exposure to danger.          This fear is often recognised 
by aircrew both in themselves and others and may be camouflaged by being 
referred to in a jocular fashion, hence ‘wind up’ in the First World War and having 
‘the twitch’ in 1939-1945, (and after).  
One additional important factor affecting the onset of combat stress is the amount 
of’ non-flying’ stress evidenced by individual aircrew, for example it was noted 
by both Symonds and Gilcrest that married men had a higher incidence of stress 
than single men.  It has not been possible to obtain the numbers of RFC aircrew 
who were married, but it is likely to have been very few bearing in mind both 
social conditions in the early twentieth Century and the age of most recruits to 
that service. 
 
67  C P Symonds (AVM Sir), ‘A Series of Cases with Psychological Disorder Examined in Relation to the 
Problems of Selection of Flying Persona’   AP 3139 (HMSO,1947) Chapter III, p.28.  
68  E Miller, The Neurosis in War, (New York, 1943), p viii, p. 9; L A Pattinson, 99 Squadron History (London, 
1920) p.53.   He notes two pilots and an observer, admitted to hospital with ‘flying sickness’ who had been unwell 
for several weeks but had continued to fly.   See also RAFM CC V A Beecroft, W Walker and E Taylor.   N S 
Gilcrest, ‘An Analysis of Cause of Breakdown in Flying’ The British Medical Journal 12 Oct 1918 p.402. 
172 
 
In both World Wars, the high command of the RFC and the RAF, avoided the use 
of the word’s ‘fear’ or ‘cowardice’ in administrative and medical records when 
documenting the treatment or disposal of aircrew in cases of combat stress.69   In 
these cases, the term ‘loss of confidence’ was used, which recognises the 
importance of confidence to all aircrew and accepts that lack of confidence is a 
factor in flying accidents, operational failure and psychological breakdown, but 
at the same time avoiding any implication of cowardice.70 
 
Treatment and Disposal 
The treatment of aircrew who were removed from operational duty for medical 
reasons because of combat stress was in the main similar to that proscribed for 
soldiers diagnosed as suffering from shell shock.         Until 1917, all aircrew who 
were removed from flying duties were sent directly back to the UK. 
However, by early 1917, all aircrew suffering from fatigue or stress related 
conditions were initially sent to the 24th Central Hospital at Etaples, (where a wing 
for the RFC had been established) for assessment and if necessary, similar 
treatment to that outlined below.71   
 
69 See Chapter 1. 
70 S. C. Rexford-Welch, Medical History Of The Second World War; The Royal Air Force Medical Services Vol 
II Commands pp.122-140; E. Jones,’ LMF: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force in the Second 
World War’ The Journal of Military History Vol 70 (2006) pp.439-458; A. D. English, ‘A Predisposition to 
Cowardice? Aviation Psychology and the Genesis of ‘lack of Moral Fibre’ in War & Society, Vol 13 No 1 
(1995) pp.15-33. 
71 D. H. Robinson, The Dangerous Sky, p.73. 
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During the first six months of warfare on the western front arrangements for 
treating soldiers suffering from shell shock or other war neurosis were haphazard 
and inconsistent.  Most patients were evacuated back to the UK without any 
diagnosis having been made as to their condition and very few returned to front 
line service.     A further complication was what the Army medic al authorities 
called ‘misguided’ public opinion which had raised the psychoneurosis to the 
dignity of a new war disease, before which doctors were helpless, but which 
demanded immediate action.     However, it was the increasing wastage of 
manpower from psycho-neuroses, which started in the autumn of 1915 with the 
battle of Loos and continued with the even greater losses at the Somme which 
made the problem of treatment urgent and in May 1916 the consulting neurologist 
(Lt Col G Holmes) and consulting psychologist (Lt Col C S Myers) were 
responsible for the setting up of four specialist centres, at a safe distance from the 
front, for rapid diagnosis and treatment.72  These centres called ‘not yet diagnosed 
nervous’ (NYDN) were based on a French model of forward neurology centres.   
As early as May 1915 the French Army Authorities were concerned by the 
numbers of functional and psychological cases being referred to base hospitals.    
The neurologist to the Sixth army (Georges Guillain) argued that these disorders 
could be cured if treated early and in the militarized zone.  A system of forward 
neuropsychiatric centres was set up.   By December 1916, the head of the Second 
 
72  Macpherson, Medical Services, Diseases of the War Vol II Chap 1, pp.10-11.    
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Army’s unit (Andre Leri) reported that 91% of patients had been successfully 
treated and claimed that some 600 had been sent back to the front in a few days.73 
The BEF command encouraged this ‘forward psychiatry’ system partly because 
of the French claims of a high return to duty rate. but also, because as noted above, 
once a soldier had been returned to UK it was unlikely that he would return to the 
front.74 
These centres soon proved their usefulness, with some units claiming a return to 
duty rate of 80%.75   Any confirmed psychoneuroses cases were evacuated to 
special neurological hospitals.  Several disciplinary safeguards were imposed, of 
which the most important was the Adjutant-General’s order which laid down that 
no patient ‘who, without any visible wound, became non-effective from the 
effects of British or enemy weapons in action’ was to be evacuated unless to the 
special centre.76 
 The military authorities had not only accepted that psychoneuroses had to be 
recognised and that some cases required specialist medical care but just as 
importantly had realised: 
the subject is, however, so bound up with up with the maintenance of moral in the army 
that every soldier who is not effective owing to nervous breakdown must be the subject 
of careful enquiry.    In no case is he to be evacuated to the base unless his condition 
warrants such a procedure. 77 
 
73 E. Jones & S. Wessely, ‘Forward Psychiatry in the Military; Its origins and Effectiveness’ Journal of Traumatic 
Stress Vol 16 No 4 (2003) pp.411-419.  
74 Jones & Wessely, Battle for The Mind, p.1708. 
75 Jones & Wessely, Forward Psychiatry, p.412.  
76 Macpherson, Medical Services Diseases of the War, Vol II Chap 1, p.11. 
77 Ibid., p.12. 
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The centres were situated some ten or twelve miles behind the front line, if 
possible, on a main road and near a railway siding.  Patients arrived by ambulance 
in small groups of six or twelve, although occasionally when fighting was intense 
in convoys of ambulances bringing as many as forty to fifty.   As it was important 
to ensure the separation of one type of case from another, on arrival all patients 
were sent to an admission block where they were divided into groups.78 
Each group was then kept in separate wards and as recovery took place were 
passed into a convalescent block, which was itself divided into two sections, early 
convalescence and final convalescence.     The routine in the in the convalescent 
block was relaxed but disciplined, with exercise and games arranged and a 
lending library available.    There was originally some concern that as the centres 
were within the sound of gunfire some patients might be adversely affected, but 
in the event, it was considered that for most patients staying in the forward area 
during recuperation helped their recovery.79   Those patients who did not improve 
within ten days and those who became worse were sent back to the special base 
hospitals.      
At the start of the war, medical provision for the RFC was minimal, there was no 
provision for medical officers with RFC units and the only medical coverage was 
 
78Copied from A G Butler, The Official History of the Australian Army, Medical Services Vol III Chapter II p.123.                                                                               
79 Macpherson, Medical Service: Diseases Vol II Chapter 1, pp.13-14. 
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the establishment of one medical orderly to each squadron80.          However, by 
1917 the RFC had grown to over 100,000 personnel with an organisation for 
Home defence as well as more than fifty squadrons (the AOB showed 93 
squadrons in  August 1918) in France organised in ten wings and many air parks 
and airfields on the western front alone and the need for medical support was 
recognised.    At that time most Squadrons had an establishment of 18 aircraft and 
up to  36 officers and from 200 to 250 other personnel.       To meet the undoubted 
need for medical cover, it was decided that each wing would have a medical 
officer whose duty would be to keep in touch with the flying personal of the wing 
and see all sick officers and each airfield would be provided with a Crossely 
ambulance.81   Non-flying personnel were treated in the ordinary field hospital; 
their ultimate disposal being decided by an RFC medical officer.  The importance 
of medical support to the RFC in France is indicated by the fact that about 15% 
of RFC aircrew sent to France were returned to Home Establishment, some after 
a noticeably short time at the front.    This figure does not include those sent home 
for illness (non-psychiatric) or following an accident.     Although the Squadron 
Commander could send back to UK a pilot or observer with whom he was 
dissatisfied, and some did for operational reasons, (lack of piloting skill or 
inadequate training), more were sent home with a medical diagnosis of flying 
 
80 Macpherson, Medical History, General Services Vol II Chapter IV p.112.  
81 Macpherson. Medical History p.113. 
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stress, nerves, neurasthenia, or what came to be the standard diagnosis for 
neurosis; Flying Sickness.82 
For those patients both Army and RFC, who were returned to the UK, the 
treatment they received, usually some form of psycho-therapy, was dependent 
upon the hospital they were sent to and the psychiatrist or neurologist in 
attendance.   
Neurology in 1914-1918 was still in what could be considered an early 
developmental stage.  It had progressed from knowledge of the internal structure 
of the brain, spinal cord and nerves to the consideration of the syndromes that are 
the outward sign of neural injury or degeneration.     These disorders, because 
they seemed to have no base of pathological anatomy, were called ‘functional’ 
and included ill-defined syndromes such as ‘neurasthenia’, hysteria’, and ‘anxiety 
state’.   A significant development, which predicted the way in which neurology 
would develop, was the naming by Herbert Page of St Mary’s Hospital London 
as “traumatic neurosis” the symptoms of ‘railway spine’, which was the term 
applied to the mysterious symptoms following the shock of railway accidents, 
particularly when the question of compensation arose (perhaps the origin of 
‘whiplash’).      Page claimed that the symptoms of’ railway spine were largely 
and sometimes entirely mental.  The event of ‘shell shock’ casualties in 1915 not 
only confirmed Page’s theory but led to neurologists to begin thinking along 
 
82 P Dye,’ The Aviator as Superhero’ Air Power Vol 7 (3)  2004,  pp.65-72. 
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psychological lines about neurological conditions.  Today, we would describe the 
work of the neurologists as psychiatry.83 
Psychiatry, the study of neurosis and insanity, had, by the early 20th Century 
developed along three lines of research, (i) experimental psychology, which 
showed that common sensation could be analysed into visceral and muscular 
components and separated from tactile sensations.    (ii) Comparative psychology, 
the attempt to define and categorise the motives and mechanisms which lay 
behind behaviour and conduct.  (iii) Morbid psychology, the study of the mind 
from the study of its disorders; the psycho-analytic school.     Some neurologists 
treating patients with disorders which fell between sanity and madness and for 
which no physical cause could be found, divided them into categories of ‘hysteria 
and neurasthenia depending upon their mental state as ether emotional or 
depressed.84 
By 1913, mainly influenced by foreign neurologist’s psychoanalysis was 
becoming a common procedure.    Sigmund Freud was an early practitioner of 
psychoanalysis; although trained in physical neurology, he developed an 
alternative view of the mind.    He argued that Hysteria was produced by the 
suppression of emotions, memories and experiences.85   The memories were 
repressed to avoid the mental conflict their presence in the conscious would 
 
83 I. Palmer, ‘Battle stress and its Treatment’ RUSI Journal Vol 143 No 1 (1998), p.65. 
84 B. Shepard, A War of Nerves, pp.8-9. 
85 R. Slobodin, W.H.R Rivers (London, 1997), pp.74-75 setting out where Rivers disagreed with Freud. 
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produce.     In some cases, this repression would result in physical symptoms and 
only by bringing these repressed memories to the surface through ‘abreaction’ 
(free expression) could a cure be achieved. 
Professor W H R Rivers was a supporter of psychoanalysis and the theory of 
repression, although he disagreed with Freud about the theory of ‘universal sexual 
significance’ of dream symbolism.86       He felt that although Freud was wrong 
about the underlying cause of conflict of the mind, nevertheless, Freud’s theory 
of the unconscious was of direct practical use in diagnosis and treatment.87  
In 1916 Rivers was commissioned as a Captain in the RAMC and appointed to 
Craiglockhart Hospital for Officers: most of the officers he treated were from 
RFC/RAF but, as senior psychiatrist, he treated Siegfried Sassoon, who as an act 
of wilful defiance of military authority had thrown his Military Cross into the 
Mersey and was threatened with a court-martial.   Some influential friends and 
the testimony of Robert Graves at a medical board resulted in him being sent to 
Craiglockhart where Rivers (and others) were developing new treatment 
methods. 88   In the event, Rivers treatment was in large part responsible for 
Sassoon’s return to duty.       
Despite the developments in diagnosis and treatments noted above, the cause of 
the great increase in casualties suffering from nervous and mental shock was still 
 
86 R. Slobodin, W. H. R. Rivers,  (Stroud, 1978,1997), pp.77-78. 
87  Shepard, A War of Nerves, pp.86-87. 
88 Slobodin, W H R Rivers, pp.62-6. 
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controversial.    Myers had used the term shell shock because of the apparent co-
relation between the symptoms and shell fire when it had seemed reasonable to 
think that there had been a physical cause and this term had become (particularly  
by the public in England) as synonymous with trench warfare.     On the other 
hand, one noted neurologist, Dr F W Nott, who at first felt shell shock had a 
physical origin, possibly a form of concussion caused by blast, later accepted a 
psychological explanation. 89      Army commanders somewhat reluctantly 
accepted a psychological cause for shell shock mainly because it offered a 
possibility of a cure and a return to active duty.  This acceptance overrode their  
concern that a diagnosis of ‘shell shock’ provided a credible way out of front line 
service.90     In the event, by 1915 it had become apparent that shell shock, war 
neurosis, hysteria or neurasthenia (in other words ‘combat stress’) was a 
psychological disorder and that psychotherapeutic techniques could be used to 
treat patients.91     Craiglockhart Hospital is probably the best known of the 
hospitals dealing with the psychological casualties of the Western Front,       What 
happened at the hospital during its 28 months’ existence is an example of the way 
treatment methods developed in that time.92    The hospital was opened in October 
 
89 E. Jones & S. Wessely, ‘Battle for the Mind’, pp.1708-14 
90  Ibid, p.1709. 
91 T, L, Loughran, ‘Shell Shock in the First World War Britain; An Intellectual and Medical History (Unpublished 
Thesis, University of London, 2006), chap 5, pp.124-125; E. Wittower & J. P. Spillane,  ‘Neurosis in War’, The 
British Medical Journal,  Feb 10 1940, p.225. 
92 T. E. F. Webb, ‘Dottyville-Craiglockhart War Hospital and shell shock treatment in the first World War’  
Journal of The  Royal Society of Medicine Vol 99 (July 2006), pp.342-346.    This is an account of the hospital 
drawn from hospital records, the admission and discharge records.  The hospital is the best known of psychiatric 
hospitals used in the war, in part due to Sassoon, Owen and A G Mcdonnell being patients there, but is was also 
where Rivers introduced his own ‘abreaction’ treatment regime. 
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1916 in order to help cope with the vast increase of (Officer) psychological 
casualties from the battles of the Somme.    From 1917, RFC officers were also 
sent there. 
The first Commanding Officer was a local doctor with some experience in 
treating neurasthenia, Major William Bryce, who believed in firm and sometimes 
harsh treatment of patients.    However, in October 1917, a War Office inspection 
resulted in the replacement of Bryce with Colonel Balfour-Graham.    
Notwithstanding the change the hospital regime remained unsympathetic with 
strict discipline and little recreation being allowed to the patients.   At that time, 
the attitude of some senior officers in the RAMC was that shell shock sufferers 
were ‘lead-swingers’ and malingers.   At Craiglockhart, possibly due to 
unsatisfactory results, a further inspection resulted in the appointment of a new 
commander, Professor William Brown, who with Arthur Brock an Edinburgh 
clinician and later with Rivers, instituted a system of ‘cognitive therapy with in 
an environmental and behavioural approach’ Which meant in practice helping the 
patient to help himself.  This was done by a programme of activities, often based 
on sporting and entertainment facilities available and additionally by arranging 
temporary teaching jobs and assistance to local farmers.    
In his practice Rivers relied principally on what he called Autonosis and re-
education.  The subject learns to know himself and the process brings to light and 
discussion of long-past traumatic experiences, Rivers said: 
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…of more importance is the process by which the patient is led to understand how the 
disorder has developed….If the patient learns that his disease is only the expression of an 
exaggeration of a wide-spread trend of feeling, thought, or action, his condition will no 
longer appear mysterious, terrifying, or horrible, but will assume proportions which can 
be faced rationally and dispassionately.93 
 
Despite the change of regime, the records of the hospital show a reluctance to 
admit that the patients were suffering from a psychological disorder, although 
‘neurasthenia’ was routinely entered as a diagnosis it was often subordinated to 
physical complaints, often trivial.94     Nevertheless, the treatment regime did have 
some success.       Between October 1916 and March 1919 some 1736 patients 
with shell shock were treated at the hospital; a total of 758 were noted as having 
been returned to duty, 89 were recorded as returned to home (administrative) duty 
and 78 were discharged to light duties.     On the other hand, 735 patients were 
discharged as medically unfit and 141 were transferred to other units for further 
treatment, probably for long term rehabilitation.95      The results of treatment at 
Craiglockhart may not be representative of other hospitals, (especially as only 
Officers were treated) but in any event should be seen in the context of total 
casualties for shell shock / war neurosis.    The History of the Great War Medical 
Services estimates that by the end of the war ‘about 80,000’ patients had been 
admitted as psychological battle casualties in France.96 
 
93 W. H. R. Rivers, The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics Vol 10 (1918) p.437   quoted in R. Slobodin  W H 
R Rivers  (London, 1978) p.66. This was the basis for River’s use of Abreaction, or ‘recall and understand’ as 
treatment for war neurosis, including ’Flying Sickness’  see  W H R Rivers, ‘The Repression of War Experience, 
The Lancet  Feb 2 1918  (an address to Royal Society of Medicine 14th Dec 1917).   
94 Webb, Dotyville, p.344. 
95 Webb, pp. 344-345. 
96 Macpherson, Medical Services, Diseases, Vol II chap 1, p.7. 
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From early 1917, RFC casualties increased dramatically and with this increase 
came many psychological patients.   The RFC hospital at Hampstead Heath was, 
with Craiglockhart, an allocated treatment centre for RFC aircrew (including 
Balloon Observers) and in December 1917 Rivers was appointed Consultant 
Psychologist to the RFC.    To prepare himself for this appointment Rivers studied 
flying and flew often including being flown on aerobatic flights in order to 
understand the mental qualities required in military aviation.   This flying 
experience enabled Rivers to understand some of the reasons for aircrew suffering 
from neurosis (flying sickness).    He also discovered and noted that aircrew’s 
symptoms were somewhat different to soldiers and balloon observers suffering 
with shell-shock.     Rivers believed that a major reason was that unlike ground 
troops, a pilot had a great deal of influence over what happened to him.   He had 
the option to retreat if he wished or, at his own discretion, could avoid action 
altogether.   This was not the case with balloon observers who were still in the 
front line when the balloons were on the ground and subjected to the same 
conditions as the infantry.      Aircraft observers also had less control of their fate, 
being dependent upon the pilot for the way the flight was conducted and his 
competence as an aviator.      
In his evidence to the War Office Enquiry on Shell Shock, Rivers objected to the 
use of the term shell-shock, stating that in his view ‘stress’ was the cause of war 
neurosis and the shell-shock element was in most cases the last straw.  He 
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distinguished between two varieties of cases.  The first being that of an Officer 
who breaks down soon after going into action because he is unfitted for the 
position in which he finds himself. Rivers felt that these cases ought not to be 
considered as cases of neurosis, in his experience such cases were generally not 
very severe and soon recovered. 
The second class of cases, those who break down after ‘long and continued strain’ 
officers who despite early stressful experiences, continued to carry out their duty 
until they finally collapsed.    He pointed out that cases of this kind displayed 
more severe symptoms and could develop a real neurosis.  He emphasized that 
stress was a wide term including, sleeplessness, anxiety, fatigue and 
responsibility.     Rivers referred to the RFC/RAF where there were three different 
situations, the pilot, the observer and the balloon observer.      
He said the pilots frequently had severe concussions and were much more 
‘knocked about’ than the other two groups, but such neurosis as they had been 
slight, sometimes trivial compared with army cases: 
                   ‘All they wanted was talk to get rid of the repression and then go for a holiday. 
97 
  On the other hand, observers had more severe symptoms, and the balloon section 
suffered the worst cases of psycho-neurosis he had seen.  
 
97 Cmd 1734 Report of War Office Committee int Shell-Shock  - Dr W H R Rivers,  ‘Evidence’, pp.54-56 & p.56.  
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Explaining these differences in the reaction to danger of these cases he referred 
to man’s normal reaction to danger, what he called: manipulative activity.  Every 
animal has a reaction to danger perhaps more than one. 
A pilot has the most options and when he is in danger his mind is occupied with 
flying the aircraft.  On the other hand, the observer is occupied only some of the 
time, he is not in charge and there are times when he may suffer considerable stress, 
for example on take-off or landing. Referring to balloons Rivers said:                                                                                                                                               
The balloon man has a certain amount of observation to do, but most of the time he has no 
activity whatever and is sitting in the middle of a target.    I believe it was the absence of 
manipulative activity that led to his more frequent and severe breakdown.98      
 
Rivers stressed that he did not use Neurasthenia as a clinical term, he called the 
neurosis caused by combat stress ‘anxiety neurosis’ and those who were 
repressing were using a normal mechanism in a cause for which it was not 
suitable.  The things which men were trying to put out their mind were too 
powerful.99  
As noted above, Rivers believed that ‘repression’ was in large part responsible 
for producing war neurosis and was tightly bound up with its treatment.       He 
defines Repression as: 
the process whereby a person endeavours to thrust out of his memory some part of his 
mental content, and it is also used for the state which ensues when, either through this 
 
98 Cmd 1734, p.57. 
99 Cmd 1734,  p.58. 
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process or by some other means, part of the mental content has become inaccessible to 
manifest consciousness.100 
 
He points out that repression is not harmful but may be under conditions in which 
it fails to adapt the individual to his environment.         He notes that the process 
of repression does not end when the soldier is removed from the combat scene 
and sometimes new symptoms arise when in a safe environment. 
His approach was intended first to help patient to recover the stressful memory 
or incidents (accepting the natural inclination to repress such memories) and then 
to see whether it is possible to make them tolerable, or even pleasant companions 
instead of evil influences.  
His treatment generally consisted of one to one ‘talking sessions’ in which the 
patient told the history of his illness and Rivers attempted to show why the 
memory could be borne and become in some way positive.    In his lecture to the 
Royal Society of Medicine he gave an example of an officer who had been first 
buried by a shell explosion but remained on duty for more than two months, 
despite suffering nightmares about that experience.  He then collapsed completely 
after an incident when he had searched for a missing officer and found him blown 
to pieces with head and limbs lying separated.    Following that incident, he had 
recurring nightmares and dreaded to go to sleep.    Rivers felt that the problem in 
 
100 W. H. R. Rivers, ‘The Repression of War Experience’,  An address to the Royal Society of Medicine 17th 
December 1917, p.1. 
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this case was to find some aspect of the experience which would enable the patient 
to deflect his thoughts from the horror of the incident.  He said: 
‘The aspect to which I drew his attention was that the mangled state of the body of his 
friend was conclusive evidence that he had been killed outright and had been spared the 
long and lingering suffering which is often the fate of those who suffer mortal wounds.    
He brightened at once and said that this aspect of the case had never occurred to him, nor 
had it been suggested by any of those to whom he had previously related his story.   He 
saw at once that was an aspect of his experience upon which he could allow his thought to 
dwell.’101   
 
Rivers noted other cases which had similar positive results but cautioned that long 
continued repression could become a habit which would not always respond to 
his treatment of ‘Abreaction’ (free expression and consequent release of 
previously repressed emotions).  
The above outline of the treatment methods applied by Rivers was followed by 
many of the psychiatrists working in the RFC hospitals at Craiglockhart (Major 
W H Bryce) and Royal Hospital, Hampstead Heath, including Arthur Brock and 
Professor William Brown.  
The only previous study of First World War aircrew breakdown was an analysis 
carried out by Captain N S Gilchrest RAMC, in 1918.   He considered 33 qualified 
pilots, 61 pupil pilots, 1 qualified observer and 2 pupil observers all of whom had 
been under review by the Royal Air Force Special Medical Board.102     He classed 
as failure those patients who were considered permanently unfit to return to duty.     
 
101 Rivers, ‘The Repression of War Experience’, p.4. 
102 N. D. Gilcrest. ‘An Analysis of Causes of Breakdown in Flying’, British Medical Journal Vol 2 no 3015 (1918) 
pp. 401-403.  
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Of the above 97 patients, 67 were considered failures due to ‘Psychological or 
subjective ‘nerves’, loss of confidence or general nervous breakdown.   Another 
four failed because of epilepsy and fainting fits and eleven for nausea or vomiting 
in the air.    Gilcrest also found that of the 67 ‘psychological’ failures, 45 had a 
nervous personal or family history and 20 had suffered a previous nervous 
breakdown.  In his analysis of these breakdowns’ Dr Gilcrest emphasised the 
importance of the relation between breakdown and some previous individual or 
family history of nervous breakdown: 
it is very certain that unstable nervous temperament is hereditary, and, though this alone is 
not very important, its existence should call for the further history to be carefully 
sifted…nothing I know of will more surely lead to failure in air work   (especially piloting) 
than the previous history of a serious nervous breakdown.103 
 
This analysis by Gilcrest’s of the causes of breakdown is useful in a number of 
ways; it points to the importance of nervous stability in aircrew, it suggest that 
the failure rate in aircrew under training could be significant and also suggests 
that if a pilot or observer is able to deal with stress for two hundred hours flying 
on operations his selection and training would have been justified.104  Of course 
his analysis tells us little about the actual incidence as all his subjects had been 
already removed from duty and referred to the Royal Air Force Special Board. 
 
 
103 Ibid, p.402. 
104 Ibid, p.403.  
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The above account of the symptoms and causes of combat stress establishes 
without doubt that the major factor in the onset of combat stress is fear, often 
described as ‘anxiety neurosis’.     In combat, and sometimes in flying without 
combat situations, most airmen experience at some time the conflict between the 
entirely natural and reasonable instinct for self-preservation and the knowledge 
that at any moment their life is threatened.   This personal conflict affects some 
individuals more quickly and more strongly and, in many cases, is responsible for 
an early breakdown, sometimes even in training.  
Several the studies noted above especially those of Gilcrest, Williams and 
Symonds, Birley and Grinkler and Spiegel have emphasised the major influence 
of ‘predisposition’ to nervous complaints, (not generally discovered by induction 
medical tests) as a factor in the onset of combat stress, but as already noted it is 
probably  impossible to eliminate those who will  fail as the conditions of  combat 
are unpredictable. 
The next three chapters in this work will examine RFC/RAF operations on the 
western front from 1914-1918, including the operations of the Independent Force 
noting casualty and accident rates and the consequent effects on squadron morale 
and aircrew breakdown   
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                                                        Chapter Five 
                                            War in the Air 1914-1916  
This chapter and the two following will examine the operations of the RFC/RAF 
over the Western Front to analyse adverse psychological reactions to combat 
stress and the importance of countervailing factors including high morale and 
sound leadership 
In August 1914, the commander of the RFC, Brigadier-General Sir David 
Henderson, like everyone else, believed the war would be short.     Accordingly, 
he sent all the available squadrons to France, to support the BEF. 
The first tasks of the RFC in support of the army consisted of reconnaissance 
flights which in most cases were not opposed by enemy aircraft.   However, by 
early 1915 and the development of trench warfare the Germans had introduced 
anti-aircraft guns to the front line, and many aircraft came back from flights over 
the lines with damage from shell splinters.1    Enemy gunfire and the development 
of air to air combat meant that by the end of the period covered by this chapter, 
the number of casualties incurred by the RFC had increased from a handful, easily 
bearable, in 1915 to over 800 (including 55 killed in flying accidents) in 1916.       
 
1 H A Jones, The War in the Air, Volume II, (HMSO, 1922), pp.169-170. (henceforth TWITA)     
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In May 1915 the first cases of aircrew removed from flying duties because of 
psychological disorder occurred.    By December 1916, cases of Neurasthenia, 
debility, DAH and NYDN (not yet diagnosed Nervous) had been diagnosed.2 
The table below sets out the position at the end of the first two years of major air 
operations, followed by an examination and analysis of the air war in that period. 
                            Casualties/Flying sickness-1915-1916 3                     
                 KIA          WIA          POW          KIFA          WIFA         Fly/S 
1915          47              45               65                20                 14              5 
1916         292            147             203               55                 27             20 4 
 
On August 13th, 1914 the first aircraft of numbers 2,3,4 and 5 squadrons of the of 
Royal Flying Corps set out to cross the English Channel to take up their position 
as the Air Element of the British Expeditionary Force in France. 
At that time, the total strength of the RFC was one hundred and seventy-nine 
aircraft, only forty of which were considered capable of flying the twenty odd 
miles of open sea to France.       The four squadrons which went to France took a 
total of 87 pilots, there were no observers, and a few more qualified pilots were 
among those travelling with the Royal Flying Corps Headquarters when it made 
 
2 Neurasthenia, a general term used for those suffering from a combination of anxiety, fatigue, sleeplessness, 
irritability and emotional turmoil.   Psychological, relating to or arising from the mind (psychiatric, arising from 
mental disease)   
3 KIA, killed in action, includes died of wounds, died as POW immediately after capture.  WIA wounded in 
action (not noted if slight), POW Prisoner of War.  if wounded and captured noted under POW, KIFA killed in 
flying accident in France on operational squadrons   WIFA injured in flying accident on operational squadron in 
France; FS  includes earlier use of Neurasthenia, DAH and NYD-N. The figures above include 19 RNAS 
aircrew KIA/KIFA and 13 POW.  
 
4 Casualty figures from T. Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield (Grub Street Books, 2014), pp.3-46; Jones, 
TWITA, Volume VI   Appendix XXXVII; E R Hooton, War Over The Trenches (London, 2010), pp.90-126, 
‘The Somme’. For FS numbers RAFM Casualty Cards.  
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its way to France.  These pilots with the 130 pilots of the RNAS, were all that 
were immediately available.5  The pilots and aircraft who were to undertake this 
crossing were ordered to assemble at Dover on 12th August; the pilots were 
briefed to carry a revolver, field glasses, a spare pair of goggles, a water- bottle, 
a small stove, biscuits cold meat and a piece of chocolate.     Pilots were also 
provided with maps of France and Belgium and perhaps more immediately 
useful, a tyre inner tube for use as a life jacket.6  
For these flights, each pilot had as passenger, a ground crew air mechanic, (AM) 
who it was thought would be more useful than another pilot if the aircraft had to 
make a forced landing, either on the way to Dover, or in France.   One result of 
this arrangement was that the first casualties suffered by the RFC in the war were 
a Pilot and an Air Mechanic.  Lieutenant R Skene of No 3 Squadron, with Air 
Mechanic R K Barlow as his passenger, crashed on take-off at Netheravon; both 
pilot and passenger were killed.7   
The RFC went to France with a somewhat heterogeneous collection of aircraft.  
Nos 2 and 4 squadrons were equipped with BE2s, No 3 squadron had a mix of 
Bleriot’s and Henri Farmans and No 5 Squadron had a mix of Henri Farmans 
Avros and BE8s.  The total number of aircraft arriving in France was 63, 
 
5 Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield, p.3; Jones, TWITA Vol 1 pp 288-289 
6 Hillary St George Saunders, Per Ardua The Rise of British Air Power 1911-1939 (London, 1944) p.31-32.    R. 
Barker, The Royal Flying Corps in World War 1 (London, 1995) p.23. 
7  Jones TWITA Vol 1 p.286.  This accident was witnessed by James McCudden who later became the fourth 
highest scoring British pilot with 57 victories.  J T McCudden, Flying Fury (London,1918, 1973), pp.23-24.      
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consisting of 37 BEs, 12 Henri Farmans, 7 Bleriots, 3 Avros and 4 Sopwith 
Tabloid.      
None of these aircraft was suitable for fighting.  The only weapons carried were 
the service revolvers of the pilots, intended for use if landing in enemy territory.  
Although the BE2 Biplane had been found suitable as a stable reconnaissance 
aeroplane, its lack of manoeuvrability was a significant disadvantage.  The Henri 
Farman was tiring to fly, and too slow.    The operational performance of these 
aircraft, (the BE2 top speed 73 MPH and taking nine minutes to get to 3,000 feet, 
was the best) was generally poor, but perhaps the most noticeable and most 
important problem was engine reliability.      Engine failure is very rare in light 
aircraft today, but in 1914 and for the rest of the war it was an ever-present danger.   
Throughout the war there were many crashes both in training and on operational 
squadrons, many due to engine failure and there are frequent accounts of pilots 
having to attempt the glide home over the lines following engine or fuel problems.  
Some of course did not make it and landed on the German side and became 
prisoners of war.  
Notwithstanding the inadequate aircraft they used and the inevitable confusion 
and frequent changes in location after their arrival in France (all four squadrons 
moved no fewer than ten times before the end of September 1914),8 the morale 
of the RFC remained high.     They were of course all volunteers and members of 
 
8 Raleigh, TWITA Vol 1 p.305. 
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elite units, who had joined the RFC for flying and adventure, which was now 
beginning and they (like everybody else) thought that the war would be short.    
According to a non-flying officer who saw the pre-flight preparations at Dover, 
he had never seen ’such exuberance of spirit.’9      Another observer of the aircrew 
of the RFC in those early days in France was Maurice Baring, who as a member 
of the RFC Command Staff, moved with the squadrons in August/September 
1914 and who described their stay at Le Cateau, one of the many airfields they 
stayed for short periods following the BEF’s moves during the retreat from Mons: 
we slept, and when I say we, I mean dozens of pilots fully dressed, in a barn on the top of 
and underneath an enormous load of straw.   We spent an expectant morning at Le Cateau, 
everybody was quite cheerful, especially the pilots.10 
 
Morale was certainly helped by the fact that the French treated RFC officers as 
honoured guests and when possible, they were billeted at the best hotels. 
However, it was not long before the first accident happened; on 16th August Lt E 
Perry and his mechanic H Parfitt flying a No 3 Squadron BE8, crashed on the 
aerodrome at Amiens and both were killed.        Two days later another BE8 flown 
by 2/Lt R R Smith-Barry with Corporal F Geard crashed at Perrone,      Smith-
Barry survived with broken legs, but Cpl  Geard was killed.11          These  were 
the first of some 8,000 accidents throughout the war which  added hundreds of 
pilot and observer casualties  to the  losses caused by enemy action.12     
 
9 R.Barker, The Royal Flying Corps In World War One (London, 2002)  pp.22-23 
10 M Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters 1914-1918 (London, 1920, 1985) pp.23-25.   
11 Raleigh, TWITA, Vol 1, p.294; Henshaw, The Sky Their, p.359. 
12 Henshaw, The Sky, p.358.   Many accidents were minor, but 17% were the cause of injury or death to crew 
members. D. Winter., The First of the Few, (London, 1982), pp.156-157.  Smith-Barry returned to flying as CO 
of 60 squadron and was later to revolutionise flying training in the RAF. 
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Prior to the outbreak of war, it was understood that the predominant use of aircraft 
would be for reconnaissance and the first operational use of aircraft in this way 
was on 19th August, when the first reconnaissance’ flights of the war were flown.    
Captain P B Joubert de la Ferté of No 3 Squadron and Lieutenant G W 
Mapplebeck of No 4 Squadron were briefed to reconnoitre Nivelles-Genappe and 
Gemdloux.     Neither of these flights was successful.      Both aircraft got lost, 
Joubert landed at Tourni to get information regarding the whereabouts of the 
Germans, got none, took off, got lost again and landed at Courtrai for directions, 
before returning to base: (Maubeuge)   Mapplebeck also got lost and after some 
wanderings he landed at Le Cateuu before finding his way back to base.13       This 
was not a very auspicious start to the RFC’s war.    These flights had been made 
without observers, for the very good reason that there were few observers 
available.    For the first few months it was usually necessary to use pilots when 
‘observers’ were needed for reconnaissance duties.    As a result, the first 
‘observer’ to be killed in action was actually a pilot, Lieutenant C G C  Bayly, 
shot down by ground fire when flying as an observer with 2/Lt  V Waterfall (No 
5 Sqn) on 22nd August 1914.14     Earlier the same day one of the few observers 
in France became the first RFC casualty in action when Sergeant-Major D S 
 
13WITA Vol I pp.299-300; Barker  p.34. 
14 C, G. Jefford, Observers and Navigators (London, 2001)   p.7;  Henshaw,  The Sky, p.3;   Barker  The Royal 
Flying Corps in World War 1 states on  p.61 that Waterfall survived to become a POW, but  Casualty Card  
notes death accepted for both on 16th September.  RAF Museum Casualty Cards C G C Bayly & V Waterfall. 
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Billings of No 2 Squadron, was wounded in the leg by a rifle bullet, when flying 
as an observer with Lieutenant M W Noel.15  
 In the first six months of war, there was a small but constant wastage of both 
aircraft and aircrew through enemy action (ground fire) and accidents, but there 
were at first few acts of aggressive or hostile action between of the RFC and the 
German Air Force.     The first such act by the RFC was on 22nd August, when a 
two-seater German Albatros was spotted over the RFC airfield at Maubeuge.         
Three RFC aircraft took off to chase it, two BE2s and a Farman; none got near it, 
but Lt Strange in the Farman carried an unofficially mounted Lewis Machine gun, 
which his observer used to fire a few rounds after the German aircraft.16     The 
next action, this time successful, was a few days later the 25th August when Lts 
Wilson and Rabagliati flying on a reconnaissance flight saw a German Taube.       
Wilson immediately gave chase, while Rabagliali stood up in the rear cockpit and 
fired his rifle at the German.  The German pilot although not hit, immediately 
landed beside a British Army column. 17    Later the same day a Number 4 
Squadron crew forced down a second German aircraft.   
 As noted, the Army’s retreat from Mons was the cause of a series of moves by 
the RFC, from one makeshift landing ground to another, including stops 
sometimes for a few hours only, at St Quentin, La Fere, Compiegne. Senlis, Jilly, 
 
15 Raleigh, TWITA Vol I pp.301-303. 
16 Raleigh, TWITA Volume 1 pp. 310-312; Henshaw, The Sky, p. 3. 
17 G. Norris, The Royal Flying Corps A History (London,1965),  p.58;  Barker, p.9.  
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Serris and Melun.18   The work of the ground crews in keeping aircraft serviceable 
to fly under these conditions was remarkable, indicating high morale on the 
ground as well as with the aircrew.       The threat from German aircraft was 
minimal and the only concern of the pilots and observers was that some reports 
by aircraft of enemy positions had been disbelieved by GHQ.     That situation 
changed during the retreat from Mons.  The British first division had been 
marching towards Mons intending to launch an offensive, unaware that the 
French on their right flank were withdrawing.  This fact had been reported to 
GHQ by aircraft but was disbelieved.     Fortunately, a further series of aircraft 
messages reporting the advance of the German second corps westward and 
showing British forces moving into a trap were accepted and the planned 
offensive cancelled.19          
 
From Mons to the end of 1914, reconnaissance flights were continually requested 
by GHQ and as confidence in results grew there was increased pressure on 
squadrons to fly despite bad weather and a greater risk of accident.                With 
the growing importance of aircraft reconnaissance, particularly with the 
introduction of photographic coverage, it was realised by both sides that the 
enemy must be prevented from interfering with friendly operations and stopped 
from conducting its own reconnaissance. As the trench lines became established, 
aircraft co-operation with the Artillery became important and throughout 1915 
 
18 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, pp 26-27; Henshaw, The Sky, pp.4-5. 
19 Raleigh, TWITA Vol I, pp.316-320 ;  Winter, The First, p.55.      
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and early 1916, methods of working with the guns were developed.20        The 
development of trench lines and static warfare meant that aircraft had to 
continually cross the lines, sometimes at lower levels, which meant coming under 
heavy ground fire: often from both sides.    The loss of an RFC aircraft to ‘friendly 
fire’ was the catalyst for the introduction of a roundel of red, white and blue, used 
by the RAF ever since.21           The somewhat primitive, but ever more determined, 
attempts by both sides to attack enemy aircraft had made it obvious that the better 
protected an aircraft was, the less chance it could be prevented from carrying out 
its task.         This was recognised after only one month of fighting by the RFC 
commander in France Maj-Gen Henderson, who wrote to Lt Col Brankner, 
Director-General of Military Ordinance:  
There are no aeroplanes with the Royal Flying Corps really suitable for carrying machine 
guns; grenades and bombs are, therefore at present more suitable.    If suitable aeroplanes 
are available, machine guns are better undoubtedly.   Request you endeavour to supply 
efficient fighting machines as soon as possible.22 
 
It was understood, that to be effective, the gun should be so placed as to fire 
forward and that meant that a ‘pusher’ type aeroplane (where engine and propeller 
were behind pilot and observer) was best suited for arming.     The only available 
aircraft in 1914 which met these requirements was the Maurice Farman II which, 
as already noted, had not been considered suitable for operational work.   
 
20 Jones, TWITA Vol II, pp.84-87.  
21 Henshaw, The Sky, p. 6.  On 12th October Lt Hoskings and Capt Cream were shot down and killed even 
though there was a British ensign painted on the wings of their aircraft.   It seems the ensign looked not unlike a 
German black cross.  Raleigh, TWITA Vol I p.48. 
 22 Raleigh, TWITA Vol I p.412;   E Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution 1912-1918  (London, 1999) 
p.58; Norris, The Royal, p. 63. 
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Nevertheless, the first aircraft to arrive in France adapted for air fighting, were 
Maurice Farman pushers of No 4 Squadron flown to France in September 1914.23   
These aircraft, with a Lewis Gun fitted to the front cockpit, were involved in a 
few combat actions, but were too slow and cumbersome to achieve any success.24 
By the summer of 1915 some aircrew were beginning to feel the strain of 
operational flying even though combat in the air was still comparatively rare.  On 
the other hand, with the front stabilised and anti-aircraft fire getting better 
organised and with heavier calibre guns, flying over or near the front line was 
getting ever more dangerous, especially at low level.  Lt William Read of No 3 
Squadron one of the pilots who went to France in August 1914, wrote:  
I wonder how long my nerves will stand this almost daily bombardment by ‘archie’, I notice 
several people’s nerves are not so strong as they used to be, and I am sure ‘archie’ is 
responsible for a good deal.   I would not mind so quite so much if I were in a machine that 
was fast and that would climb a bit more willingly.    Today we both had a good dressing 
down by ‘archibald’ and some of the shells burst much too near and I could hear the pieces 
of shell whistling past—and they have to burst very close for one to be able to hear the 
shrieking of loose bits of shell above the noise of one’s engine.       Well, well I suppose the 
end will be pretty sharp and quick if one of archie’s physic-balls catches one.    I think I 
would rather it caught me than crumple up Henri, because one would have too long to think 
when falling from 4,000 feet.25 
 
 
Other aircrew were also showing the effects of continuous operational flying.     
2/Lt Louis Strange, one of the original No 5 Squadron Pilots, wrote: 
After a long day flying you feel you have had enough and don’t ever want to go up again, 
but after a day’s rest you are as keen as ever.26 
 
23 Jones, TWITA Volume II p.136; J. W. Taylor, Jane’s Fighting Aircraft of World War One (London, 1919, 
1990) pp.111-113. 
24 Jones, TWITA Vol II p.136. 
25 N.  Steel & P.  Hart, Tumult in the Clouds; The War In The Air 1914-1918 (London, 1997) pp. 55-56.    
‘Archibald’ was the RFC nickname for German Anti-Aircraft fire, seemingly after a popular music hall song of 
the time.   It was in May 1915 that the first RFC aircrew were diagnosed with Neurasthenia,  RAFM CC ,F 
Dunn, A Ferris, E R Manning.  F J Gilbertson 
26 R Barker, The Royal Flying Corps in World War 1 (London, 1995) p.53. 
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When and how aircrew should be rested was decided by squadron commanders, 
who until 1918, were barred from flying on operations themselves, although some 
ignored this order.      This rule meant in practice that it was the flight commander 
who was more able to judge a pilot or observers’ condition.  He was usually a 
captain, he led the operational flights and was most aware of the performance of 
pilots and observers in the air and who knew when crews turned back early from 
a flight, if there was a genuine reason (eg engine problems) or not.      
After six mouths of service in France and almost continual flying there were 
undoubtedly aircrew who were showing signs of combat stress, but unlike Read 
and Strange did not admit or perhaps even recognise the fact.      Arrangements 
for rest and leave were haphazard and unless a man reported sick, he continued 
to fly.   To report sick, he had to report to a brigade Medical Officer.  The medical 
establishment for RFC units was for wings, one sergeant and seven privates 
RAMC, for Wing Headquarters, one Corporal and one private and for squadrons, 
one private.  It was not until 1918 that a medical officer and an ambulance was 
provided at each wing.27  
  Read noted that he had flown 14½ Hours in five days and needed a rest, but it 
was not up to him to decide.   It was not only ‘Archie’ which caused anxiety, but 
unreliable engines, bad weather and the effects of continual exposure to wind and 
 
27  W. G. Macpherson, Official History of the Great War, Medical Services General History: Volume II - 
Medical Services on Western Front 1914-1915 (HMSO, 1923)  pp.111-113. 
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rain in the open cockpits of their still primitive aircraft and when aircraft became 
capable of high-altitude flight, the effects of lack of oxygen.28     All these factors, 
often added to by ‘pilot error’ by still inexperienced and often inadequately 
trained pilots, contributed to a very high accident rate.    Between August 1914 
and December 1915, there were 43 serious accidents, killing 20 aircrew and 
injuring 14 more.29   All this added to the stress of operations as did increasing 
losses to anti-aircraft fire and air combat.    
In 1915 the first case of a pilot removed from flying suffering psychiatric 
symptoms, was Captain F J Gilbertson, who had transferred from the Durham 
Light Infantry to the RFC.   On 26th May he was diagnosed with Neurasthenia, 
but after two weeks rest, he was discharged ‘back to duty’.   He continued flying 
until June 1916 when he went into hospital at Etaples (24 General Hospital) with 
Pyrexia (fever): again he was discharged back to duty, but in Feb 1917, he was 
again in Hospital ‘Not Yet Diagnosed Nervous’ and was not finally discharged 
until October 1917, and did not return to the front. 30   Psychiatric and 
psychological symptoms arising from ‘combat stress’ in air operations were new 
to the army medical services and both diagnosis and treatment was uncertain.       
Lt A Ferris, of the Irish Rifles, attached to the RFC, was sent to the London 
Hospital at Millbank suffering from Debility on 17th June 1915, but within a few 
 
28 Barker, The Royal Flying Corps, p.50. The effects of lack of oxygen on aircrew performance are described in 
Chapter Eight below. 
29 Henshaw, The Sky Their, pp.359-363.   
30 RAF Museum Vault, Casualty Card-Personal F J Gilbertson (hereafter noted as RAFM Casualty Card)  
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days he was returned to duty as fit to fly.   However, on 27th October 1916 he 
was sent back to England suffering from Neurasthenia.   This time he was noted 
as a ‘serious’ case and was not finally discharged from hospital until 1921.31      
The outcome of the case of Lt Edye Rolleston Manning, formerly of the 15th 
Hussars, now with 23 Squadron RFC, admitted to No 4 General Hospital on 17th 
August 1915, suffering from Neurasthenia and debility, was very different.        
After a few days rest he was discharged to duty on 30th.        Although he was 
wounded in June 1916, he went on to win the Military Cross in 1917, survived 
the war and was granted a permanent commission in the RAF.  In 1928 as 
Commanding Officer of No 6 Squadron, involved in the evacuation of the British 
High Commissioner from Suliemanich in Kurdistan, he was awarded the 
Distinguished Service Order.   In 1941, he Commanded No 221 Group in Burma 
and in 1945 he retired as an Air Commodore having been awarded the CBE.32     
Manning’s subsequent career shows that he was if anything a stronger character 
than average and yet he suffered a war neurosis after a few months service at a 
time when casualties were light and contacts with enemy aircraft few.   
Although there were few examples of aircrew breakdown in 1915 (5), they were 
an early indication that aircrew were feeling the stress of the increased level of 
operations even though morale on the squadrons was still high, casualties were 
not excessive and one positive factor was the knowledge that the work on the 
 
31 RAFM Casualty Card A Ferris 
32 RAFM Casualty Card  E R Manning;  London Gazette Supplement 7237, 17th July 1917 & 37124 8th June 
1945;  J Grehan & M Martin, Far East Air Operations 1942-1945 (London, 2014) pp.1-4. 
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RFC was appreciated.      This was confirmed by a dispatch from the BEF 
Commander Sir John French, on 29th November 1914, stating ‘The work being 
performed by the RFC has continued to prove of the utmost value to the success 
of operations.’ 33   
At about the time of this dispatch, the RFC’s Commander Maj-Gen Henderson, 
was appointed to command 1st Division of the BEF, leaving Lt Col Frederick 
Sykes (Chief of Staff) in temporary command.  Henderson was soon restored to 
the RFC command on Kitchener’s instructions and he then offered the post of 
Chief of Staff to Trenchard, at that time Commanding No 1 Wing.      Trenchard 
had refused that offer but when Henderson promoted to Lt-General, left for the 
second time to concentrate on his role as Director of Military Aeronautics, and 
Sykes was posted to the Admiralty to organise RNAS operations at Gallipoli.   
Trenchard was then offered and accepted the appointment of Commander of the 
RFC in France and he took up this post on 15th August 1915.34 
His immediate introduction of an all-out offensive policy was what he had already 
advocated as No 1 Wing Commander in France and what he felt to be the answer 
(notwithstanding inevitable casualties) to the introduction by the German Air 
Force in August 1915, of the Fokker monoplane.    This aircraft was fitted with a 
machine gun, which by means of an interrupter device could fire through the 
 
33 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p.32. 
34  Jones, TWITA Volume II p.124;  Boyle, Trenchard p.141;  E Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution 
1912-1918 (London, 1999) pp.66-67; M. Cooper., ‘A House Divided, Policy, rivalry and administration in 
Britain’s Military Air Command 1914-1918’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 1980. 3 (2) pp.178-202, p.185.       
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propeller, giving it a significant advantage over the current RFC aircraft.             
The interrupter device simplified the great problem of air fighting, that of 
allowing for deflection.   With the gun synchroniser fitted, essentially all the pilot 
had to do, was point his aircraft at his target and get close enough for his gun(s) 
to take effect. 
The influence of the Fokker fighter began to take effect towards the end of the 
battle of Loos in October 1915.    The introduction of this aircraft coincided with 
the appearance of two exceptional German fighter pilots, (Max Immelmann and 
Oswald Boelke) who revolutionised air fighting.     The Official History vividly 
describes how the aircraft/pilot combination worked: 
The Fokker pilot would cruise at great heights over the German lines and await the passing 
of suitable victims.  He would then swoop down from behind, coming when possible out 
of the sun so that his opponent might have no warning before he was startled by the rattle 
of a machine-gun.  One long burst of fire came from the Fokker as it dived past, the dive 
being continued well out of range.  If the British machine was not shot down and persisted 
in its work, the German pilot would climb again and repeat his swift diving attack.     Then 
came the famous manoeuvre, introduced by Lieutenant Max Immelmann, which made it 
possible for the Fokker pilot to strike again and again without loss of time.     In the 
Immelmann turn the aircraft rears up as if to loop, turns sideways over the vertical, and then 
comes out in the opposite direction.    This manoeuvre, in which height is gained at the 
same time as direction is changed, took the British pilots by surprise and added to the losses 
which the Fokker inflicted.35       
 
The increase in RFC casualties which followed the introduction of the Fokker, 
with its superiority over any RFC aircraft, was exacerbated by the offensive 
policy of Trenchard.       His guiding principle was that the RFC was part of the 
 
35 Jones, TWITA Vol II p.150 (Jones had been an RFC pilot in the First World War which may have helped this 
convincing account) 
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British Army and no call from that Army must ever find the RFC wanting.36      
Even more significant, was his insistence that the RFC should attack the GAF on 
the German side of the lines, as, firstly, this would prevent effective 
reconnaissance by the Germans, but equally importantly, would establish air 
superiority.    For the rest of the war the British air service maintained the doctrine 
of offence, designed to ensure that the RFC’s army co-operation aircraft could 
operate without enemy interference.37  
This should be achieved as soon as possible and then retained at any cost.     The 
inevitable cost of this policy was an increase in casualties: the still ill-equipped 
RFC aircraft (although some BE2s were fitted with Lewis machine guns) were 
no match for the Fokker and losses increased.      Trenchard’s ‘offensive at all 
times’ policy resulted in an additional (not always recognised) problem for RFC 
aircrews.    The prevailing wind over northern France is westerly, in the winter 
sometimes reaching 60/80 mph.  In these conditions fighting over or beyond the 
German lines meant that RFC aircrew suffering engine failure or battle damage 
found that it was sometimes impossible to glide far enough against the wind to 
reach British or French lines.    This wind factor was one reason why many RFC 
aircrew became Prisoners of War, even though they could survive a forced 
landing.       In any event, bearing in mind that few aircraft could exceed 100 mph, 
 
36 Jones, TWITA, Volume II, p.24,     Barker, p.187; S. F. Wise, Canadian Airmen in the First World War. The 
Official History of The Canadian Air Force, Vol 1, p.351. 
37 D. Jordan, ‘War in The Air: The fighter Pilot’, P Liddle, J Bourne and I Whitehead (eds.), The Great World 
War 1914-1945 (London, 2000), p.81. 
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drifting to the east during any combat even without any battle damage, often 
meant a sometimes lengthy and worrying return flight.38 
The increased casualties caused by the introduction of the Fokker and the early 
results of Trenchard’s policy were undoubtedly responsible for a lowering of in 
morale, as casualties increased steadily, although Jones argues that the Fokker’s 
effect on RFC morale was greater than its actual results justified.39   Nevertheless, 
the losses to the Fokker were significant and continually increasing. 
In June 1915, the casualty figure (killed or missing) was six, in July when the first 
‘new’ Fokker appeared fifteen, in August ten, in September fourteen and in 
October twelve.   In November and December bad weather much reduced the 
number of sorties carried out by all RFC squadrons, but despite this the casualty 
figures increased to sixteen and seventeen respectively.40    In January 1916, when 
the ‘Fokker Scourge’ was at its height thirty aircrew were lost and Headquarters 
RFC became concerned an apparent lack of aggression by pilots.   Trenchard 
personally expressed his concern, having seen four combat reports which showed 
pilots breaking off combat and retiring, often an indication of loss of confidence 
and morale.41     He also noted ‘pilots are not good at describing their combats’.  
Although the number of RFC squadrons in France had grown to 26, the Fokkers 
maintained their supremacy and the German Aces Boelcke and Immelmann were 
 
38 Jones, TWITA, Vol II pp.153-154.   
39 Jones, TWITA Vol II, p.150. 
40 Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield, appendix 3, p.347; Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.355. 
41 Wise, Canadian Airmen, pp.355-6; Jones, TWITA Vol II pp.456-9, casualty summary; Boyle, Trenchard  
p.156;    M K Wells, Courage in Air Warfare (London, 1995), pp.104-105; Henshaw, The Sky Their, app 3,  
gives the casualty figure as twenty seven.   
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able to extract the greatest potential from the aircraft and as already noted above 
develop new tactics.  All this was accomplished with a total of only 50 Fokker 
Monoplanes on the Western Front.42 
By January 1916, long reconnaissance by RFC aircraft was becoming impossible.           
This was confirmed by the events of 12th January 1916. On this day attempts were 
made to complete several reconnaissance’s requested by the Army.    Results were 
disastrous; a GHQ Morane flight to Ghent failed, the escorting aircraft being shot 
down.    A Vickers fighter sent out to escort a reconnoitring aircraft to Cambrai, 
failed to return.43           Obviously a change of tactics was required and on 14th 
January 1916, the following order was issued: 
Until the Royal Flying Corps are in possession of a machine as good as or better that the 
German Fokker it seems that a change in the tactics employed becomes necessary.  It is 
hoped shortly to obtain a machine which will be able to successfully engage the Fokkers at 
present in use by the Germans.    In the meantime, it must be laid down as a hard and fast 
rule that a machine proceeding on reconnaissance must be escorted by at least three other 
machines.  These machines must fly in close formation and a reconnaissance should not be 
continued if any of the machines become detached.      This should apply to both long and 
short and distant reconnaissance’s’   Aeroplanes proceeding on photographic duty any 
considerable distance east of the line should be similarly     escorted.    From recent 
experience, it seems that the Germans are now employing their aeroplanes in groups of 
three or four and these numbers are frequently encountered by our aeroplanes.    Flying in 
close formation must be practised by all pilots.44 
  
This order obviously emphasised the problem of ‘the Fokker Scourge’, a 
description first used during a House of Commons speech, very critical of the 
Government’s handling of the air war by Noel Pemberton-Billing, a former 
successful RNAS pilot, who had resigned his commission to stand for and be 
 
42 J. Morrow., The Great War in the Air (London, 1993) pp. 106-106. 
43 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p.113. 
44 AP 125 Royal Air Force, p.114; Boyle, Trenchard p.162. 
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elected to parliament, and who was recognised as an expert on air matters.45   
The phrase had been taken up by the press and used in conjunction with 
Pemberton-Billing’s  accusation that  “Britain’s gallant air officers were being 
murdered” because the RFC was operating outdated aircraft with inadequately 
trained pilots.46 
The deleterious effect on morale of the heavy casualty rate was confirmed by 
pilots operating over the front.  Cecil Lewis noted, referring to the Fokker: 
Early in 1916 the Fokker was the menace of the RFC.    Hearsay and a few lucky encounters 
had made the machine respected, not to say dreaded, by the slow, unwieldly machines then 
used by us……………..Few having been attacked by it came back to tell the 
tale;………..In short our morale needed bucking up.47 
 
Ira Jones confirms Lewis’s view, he said: 
The Fokker had superiority over the BE.  With its synchronised gun gear, it was a fast, good 
climbing, strong structured, highly manoeuvrable aeroplane-all essential qualities of an 
efficient fighting machine.  When flown by such masterly determined pilots as Boelke and 
Immelmann, it was almost invincible.48 
 
Although RFC morale was badly affected in the winter of 1915-1916, it had 
recovered somewhat by the early summer of 1916.    The Fokker supremacy had 
lasted only until the introduction of three new aircraft by the Allies.  The French 
produced the Nieuport Fighter, which had a better performance than any 
contemporary aircraft.   It could reach 10,000 feet in ten and a half minutes and 
 
45 He had planned and carried out a brilliant raid on Zeppelin sheds.  
46 Morrow, The Great War p.177-8; Barker, The Royal Flying Corps. P.144, notes that in fact Pemberton-
Billings principal complaint was the ordering of too many BE2s. 
47 C. Lewis.  Sagittarius Rising (London, 1936, 1993) p.53. 
48 I. Jones, Tiger Squadron (London, 1954) p.41. 
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was ten miles an hour faster than any RFC aeroplane.49       By early 1916 Nieuport 
Fighters were being flown by Nos 1 and 11 Squadrons of the RFC      At about 
the same time (February 1916) the RFC introduced two new aircraft types, the 
De Haviland Scout (DH2) a single seat fighter and the FE2b a two-seater fighting 
reconnaissance aircraft.  The first DH2 squadron was No 24 and FE2b’s were 
allocated to Nos 20 and 25 Squadrons.   The consequent improvement in the 
RFC’s fortunes over France was summed up by General Sir Henry Rawlinson, 
Commanding Fourth Army on 23rd May 191: 
For the moment at any rate, we have command of the air by day on the Fourth Army front.   
I cannot speak too highly of the work of these young pilots, most of whom have recently 
come out from England, and the de Haviland machine has unquestionably proved itself 
superior to the Fokker in speed, manoeuvre, climbing and general fighting efficiency.50    
 
The fighting strength of the RFC in France was further enhanced with the arrival 
on 24th May of No 70’s first flight of Sopwith Fighters, (fitted with interrupter 
gear, enabling guns to be fired through propellers, in addition to the Observer’s 
Lewis Gun.)  All three-aircraft proved to be able to outfight the Fokker.     The 
result of these changes vastly enhanced fighting ability and morale, just in time 
for the battle of the Somme. 
However, even before the Somme battle with its great increase in workload and 
casualties, the stress of air warfare on the RFC crews was showing.  Some were 
finding it difficult to sleep or would have nightmares, or become irritable, more 
 
49 Jones, TWITA, Vol II p.161;  Jane’s Fighting Aircraft, p.119. 
50 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, pp.114-115. 
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seriously many would be careless in the air risking even more accidents. 51   
Another sign of combat stress was the increase consumption of alcohol by 
aircrew, it was alleged that some pilots could no longer fly sober.52  A  common 
experience was having nightmares, often involving burning aircraft.  Ira Jones, a 
successful pilot, wrote: 
Had a terrible nightmare last night.  Jumped out of bed eleven times though I tried to stop 
myself by tying my pyjama strings to the bed ... It was the usual old business, chiefly of 
being shot down in flames and jumping out of my plane.53 
 
During the first six months of 1916 seven aircrew were diagnosed with war 
related psychiatric conditions, including one serving in the United Kingdom and 
one in the Middle East.     Of the five serving in France, Captain P G Marr of No 
22 Squadron was diagnosed on 29th May 1916 as suffering from debility due to 
flying and sent to hospital in UK.54    He was the first of thirteen officers of this 
squadron to be removed from operations following psychological disorders 
psbetween February 1916 and November 1918.       Marr’s squadron No 22, had 
arrived in France on 1st April 1916 and had been incorporated into 14th( (Army) 
wing on 4th April.55    It had been engaged in offensive patrols protecting the 
army corps operating between Douchy and Miraumont but up the time of Marr’s 
diagnosis  there had been no casualties on the  squadron.56     
 
51 Barker, pp.196-197;  V M Yeates, Winged Victory (London, 1934, 2004) p.120. 
52 J. Hamilton-Patterson, Marked for Death (London, 2015) p.165. Quoting W E Johns, the author of ‘Biggles’ 
books who was a First World War pilot in France. 
53  Ira Jones, Tiger Squadron (London, 1954) p.161.  
54 RAFM Casualty Card P G Marr.  He did not return to operations, but did fly again in 1918 (when he was 
injured in an accident) 
55 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p.120; C, G. Jefford, RAF Squadrons p.34. 
56 Henshaw, The Sky Their, pp.35-41. 
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Another officer admitted to hospital in early 1916 was Captain B E Baker, No 28 
Squadron.       As in the case of Lt Eyde Manning, noted earlier, he gave very 
good service before finally breaking down.   On 8th February 1916, he was 
admitted to La Treport Hospital apparently suffering from jaundice.   By 19th 
March, he was diagnosed with Neurasthenia and sent home, where he was 
admitted to No 8 London Hospital.        However, he recovered and was returned 
to duty and by 1917 was back in action with No 48 Squadron.          On 17th July, 
No. 48 Squadron were ordered to intercept a formation of Gothas returning from 
a raid on England.   They caught the Gothas over the sea off Ostend and during 
the action Captain Baker and Lt G R Spencer shot one down, which crashed into 
the sea,57    On 24th July 1917, Captain Baker’s Observer was wounded by anti-
aircraft fire in a reconnaissance flight and on 27th July they shot down a German 
aircraft (Albatros).  By this date Baker had been awarded the Military Cross.58     
Sadly, on 11th February, Baker was admitted to No 24 General Hospital, Etaples, 
suffering from Debility.     He was not able to return to duty before the end of the 
War. 
Baker’s experience emphasises the point that many of those who did breakdown 
served as well and sometimes better than the average flyer.   As one army 
psychiatrist wrote: 
...There is official evidence to show that in a very large proportion of cases, before the 
breakdown, the man has done credit to himself and his unit.    Against overwhelming mental 
forces calling him to abandon his to fight on, he has frequently carried on.    In fact, the 
 
57 Royal Flying Corps Communique No 98, 21-27 July 1917. 
58 RAFM CC B. E. Baker;     Henshaw, The Sky Their, pp.104-105 
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proportion of men with neurosis who received decorations for valour showed little 
difference from the proportion of other soldiers who received decorations.59   
 
By March 1916 there were twenty-seven RFC squadrons in France, some 
equipped with newer generation aircraft such as Moranes (60 Sqn), Martinsyde 
Scouts (27 Sqn) and Vickers Fighter (18 Sqn).60  Concurrent with this increase of 
strength and partly because of the experience of 15 months of operations, on 29th 
of November 1915 the RFC squadrons were decentralized into Wings, with the 
1st Wing allocated to Haig’s First Army and 2nd Wing to Smith-Dorrien’s Second 
Army.     Each Wing consisted of two to four squadrons with the RFC 
Headquarters at St Omer retaining No 4 squadron with its wireless flight. 
However, the expansion of the RFC and the recognition that the needs of the army 
could be divided by function into main kinds of work, led to further changes.   The 
armies required, artillery co-operation, photographic work and tactical 
reconnaissance on the immediate front of each army corps and additionally, air 
fighting, distant reconnaissance and bombing beyond the area covered by the 
corps.        This led to a further reorganisation of the wings in 1916.61    They were 
recognised as either Corps wings or Army wings and grouped to form Brigades 
one for each Army.    Each brigade consisted of a headquarters, an aircraft park, 
a balloon wing, an army wing of two to four squadrons, and a corps wing of two 
to five squadrons. 
 
59 E. Miller, The Neurosis in War, (London, 1940), pp.13-15. 
60 Jones, TWITA Vol II p.147. 
61  Jones, TWITA Vol II p.111.  
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General Sir Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, which was to deliver the main 
attack in the Somme offensive was supported by IV Brigade (Brig-Gen E B 
Ashmore), consisting of 3rd (Corps) Wing and 14th (Army)Wing, making a total 
of eight squadrons plus No 1 Kite Balloon Squadron (Nos 1 & 2 Sections) 62       At 
RFC headquarters, there was an additional wing to provide reconnaissance for 
GHQ.63  
This, the last major change in the RFC organisation started on 30th January 1916, 
was completed in time for the Battle of the Somme.64   
The Somme offensive was intended to end the stalemate in the trenches and was 
to achieve a decisive breakthrough.     Additional objectives were to relive the 
pressure of the German attack at Verdun and to prevent further transfers of troops 
from the Western Front to Russia.  Considerable difficulties had been experienced 
in agreeing with the French the final objectives of the Somme campaign, but one 
common aim was the that in the longer term, as part of the overall policy of 
attrition, the battle was to contribute to the wearing down of the enemy’s 
strength.65 
Following the introduction of the higher performance aircraft the RFC had 
gradually overcome the Fokker and regained at least a temporary air supremacy. 
This together with the changes in organisation and the increase in squadron 
 
62 For work of Kite Balloons, and effects on crews see below, appendix to this Chapter 
63 S. F. Wise, The Official History of the Canadian Air Force Vol I Canadian Airmen in the First World War, 
p.349 
64 Jones, TWITA Vol II, pp 148-149; AP 125 The Royal Air Force, pp.111-112. 
65 A. Watson, Ring of Steel (London, 2014) pp,310-326; W. Philpott, Bloody Victory, (London, 2009) Chap 3 
p.89; AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p. 122; Barker, The Royal Flying Corps p.141.  
 
  
214 
 
aircraft strengths from 12 to 18 aircraft (from March 1916) had been responsible 
for a considerable improvement in morale.66  Additionally. RFC morale was 
certainly improved when Immelmann was killed on the 18th June.67   
The Somme offensive would depend upon air superiority, which as Philpott 
points out was a new tactical concept. 68     This concept was implicit in 
Trenchard’s ‘offensive policy’ which had been in place since October 1915.  
However, during the Somme offensive the implementation of this policy needed 
to be extended beyond the protection of |British air space and fighting the GAF 
over German lines.69   In the event, not only did the RFC protect their own aircraft 
carrying out reconnaissance and artillery spotting but carried aggressive fighting 
patrols to engage enemy fighters and RFC aircraft bombed targets well behind 
the enemy lines and used aircraft to attack the German trench lines.   This last 
activity grew out the use of ‘contact patrols’ flown at low levels over the trench 
lines and beyond, intended to keep the command in touch with the movement of 
their own troops during a battle.   This was first used in the battle of Neuve 
Chapelle in March 1915, when an aircraft of No 3 Squadron was sent to locate 
the line of battle.70  By the time of the Somme, procedures for identification of 
Army units had evolved   (infantry signalling positions with flares or lamps, and 
 
 66 AP 125, The Royal Air Force, p.120. 
67 Jones, TWITA Vol II p.202. 
68  W. Philpott, Bloody Victory (London, 2009) p.268. 
69 A German account of the battle notes the British ‘airman above the battle…have exactly located every one of 
our batteries and …. smashed them up’ in R. B. Asprey, The German High Command At War (London, 1993), 
pp.245-247.   
70 Jones, TWITA Volume II p.97. 
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aircraft reporting by wireless).71   It was a natural progression from reporting to 
attacking the enemy: however, casualties in these operations were very high 
sometimes as many as 30% of aircraft dispatched.72      
The RFC started the battle with some 167 aircraft supporting Fourth Army (with 
possibly 210 French aircraft operating over the French sector) and some 129 
German aircraft were available to the Germans.73    In the event these figures were 
constantly changing.   Losses on both sides required continuous reinforcement 
and replacement of aircraft and aircrew.    Then RFC’s battlefield reconnaissance 
performance at the start of the battle was poor, partly due to the complexity of the 
fighting, but also because of the inexperience of the crews, but by the end of the 
campaign the RFC had with experience, and RFC mastery of the air, had become 
efficient and useful.74  Nevertheless, air supremacy had come at great cost in 
aircrew.    Trenchard understood the likely adverse reaction of aircrew to heavy 
casualties and instituted an ‘unbreakable rule’ that casualties should be replaced 
on the very day a pilot or observer failed to return.  He described this as a policy 
of ‘no empty chairs in the mess’75   To meet this objective, Trenchard kept a 
reserve of pilots at St Omer, (Observers are not mentioned) which seems to have 
worked for the Somme battle, but in the intensive air  war of 1917/1918, and 
 
71 Jones, TWITA Volume II pp.179-8. 
72 Jones, TWITA Volume II p 239.  J. Hamilton-Paterson, Marked For Death, (London, 2015) pp.102-105; 
Barker, p.223; F M Cutlack. The Australian Flying Corps volume VIII, The Official History of Australia in The 
War of 1914-1918 (AWM, 1923,1984) pp.294-295; G.  Norris, The Royal Flying Corps (London, 1965) pp.165-
167.      
73 Jones, TWITA Volume II pp.200-201; A Watson, Ring of Steel, p.313. 
74 Wise, Canadian Airmen pp.372-373. 
75 Boyle, Trenchard (London,1962) p.190. 
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consequent very large casualty numbers, it took three/four days to get 
replacements to squadrons.76 
Trenchard’s offensive tactics had increased the intensity of air fighting to a new 
level which was costly in casualties for both sides; for the RFC, as most of the 
losses were beyond the German line POWs made up a significant part of the 
losses.77    
The battle of the Somme opened on 1st July 1916.   At the start of the battle the 
RFC enjoyed air superiority.   The role of the fighter squadrons of the 14th (Army) 
wing was to protect the corps aircraft of 3rd (Corps) Wing as they carried out their 
tasks of artillery co-operation. Reconnaissance, photography and bombing.   The 
corps squadrons were also engaged in contact patrols, intended to keep GHQ in 
tough with the progress of the advance.  
On this first day a crew of No 9 Squadron, carried out a notable contact patrol. 
Captain J T Whittaker and 2/Lt  T E Gordon-Scaife (Obs), operating over XIII 
corps attacked and shot up a machine gun post, they then attacked German troops 
nearby and then flew along the lines waving and reviving return waves from the 
advancing troops.78 It was also on this day that Major L W Rees, Commanding 
Officer of No 32 Squadron (disregarding orders not to fly) was awarded the 
 
76 Jones, TWITA Volume V pp.424-430.   
77 T. Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield (London, 2014) pp.46-52.  In August 1916, RFC aircrew  casualties 
were 27 KIA, 22 WIA and 18 POW, there is a little overlap as some POW afterward died in captivity, and  some 
WIA in France later died of wounds.  
78 Henshaw, The Sky, p.41. 
 
  
217 
 
Victoria Cross, when although wounded attacked four enemy  aircraft, destroying 
three.79   
By the end of the first phase of the battle on 17th July, the RFC had delivered on 
all its tasks and had learnt some important lessons.     On 3rd July, 13 Squadron 
lost two BE2cs flying without escort, two other squadrons also lost aircraft on un-
escorted bombing raids.   The Commanding Office of 13 Squadron, Major E W 
Powell, wrote: 
Experience has shown that that hostile machines avoid Allied machines flying in formation 
and attack isolated machines.   This increases the likelihood of being attacked when the 
patrol is not at hand.80   
 
 
This warning seems to have been heeded as by the end of the first phase of the 
battle (17th July), only three corps aircraft were lost to air fighting whilst carrying 
out reconnaissance or co-operational duties.       Total RFC casualties at the end 
the of first phase were 40 killed in action, 38 wounded and a further 26 became 
prisoners of war.81   
The second phase of the battle began on 23rd of July with a general British attack 
after two days of artillery bombardment along the whole front.   Bad weather 
prevented full RFC co-operation with the ground forces although reconnaissance 
by No 4 Squadron could report on some new German entrenchments.    Although 
the weather caused only a temporary interference to air operations the new attack 
 
79 Jones, TWITA Vol II p.332.  Trenchard had decreed that RFC Squadron Commanders should not fly over 
enemy lines, for the good reason that losing a Squadron CO would involve great loss of experience, which 
certainly could not easily be replaced ;N. Franks, Dog Fight, Aerial Tactics of WW1 (London, 2003)  pp.87-88.       
80 Jones, TWITA Vol II Appx II; Henshaw, The Sky, p.43. 
81 Henshaw, The Sky, pp.42-45. 
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coincided with a major change in the air situation.        The RFC had been 
strengthened on the 15th July, when No 34 Squadron (CO Major J E Chamier), 
equipped with BE2e arrived to join IV Brigade supporting Fourth Army.82         
At this time, on the German side, General Von Bellow’s First Army was 
reinforced by no fewer than six new and improved air units.   They consisted of 
the new reconnaissance flights of six aircraft each, on artillery flight of four 
aircraft, one fighter squadron of 36 aircraft, and one bomber flight of eight 
aircraft.       Additionally, transferred from the German Second Army were two 
reconnaissance flights of 15 aircraft, two artillery flights of eight aircraft and a 
bomber/fighter squadron of 48 aircraft.   And on the 19th another fighter squadron 
was formed from with aircraft drawn from other units with 12 aircraft.83  
The arrival of these reinforcements was a serious challenge to the RFC, which 
became more dangerous with a German change in tactics.   With the added 
aircraft, the GAF could maintain patrolling with large formations (sometimes up 
to 30 aircraft), which would attack RFC Reconnaissance or spotting aircraft and 
aim to overwhelm any escort.    It was this tactic which led to the mass air fights 
often reported.      From the end of July until the close of major ground operations 
in November, the RFC fought a gruelling, sometimes desperate battle to gain and 
the maintain air superiority.    The morale of the squadrons was continually 
 
82 Jones, TWITA Volume II p.238n; pp.298-299.    Of the seventeen observers attached to this squadron, fourteen 
were trained artillery officers, and its pilots had received extra training.  
83 E. R. Hooton, War Over The Trenches, Air Power and the Western Front (Ian Allan, 2010) pp.103-106; 
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219 
 
threatened by high casualty rates and sometimes by the actions of their own 
commanding Officers.    As already noted, CO’s were commanded not to fly 
themselves, although many did, but their role as leaders was crucial to morale.     
By showing administrative competence and personal support, the Commanding 
Officer could be (as he should) a positive factor in a squadron’s morale.      As 
one No. 5 squadron pilot pointed out during the Somme battle: 
When I first joined 5 squadron, there was a very efficient Squadron Commander called 
Major Hearson.   He was a regular Engineer officer and he wasn’t a very good 
pilot……………But he was very efficient indeed- very particular about the way we entered 
up our logbooks and report sheets when we came back from every flight.  He saw to it that 
the morale of the men was good, that the maintenance of the aircraft and engines was well 
looked after.  He was a very good squadron Commander and was eventually promoted and 
became a Wing Commander when he left us.     Then we had another man who wasn’t 
nearly so good.  He was an ex-gunner and fonder of the drink-rather more lackadaisical and 
slipshod leaving things to his flight commanders rather than seeing to it himself.  He was 
not nearly so particular about the way that pilots and observers wrote up their reports when 
they came back from operations……………Pilots and observers weren’t so punctual to 
their machines when it was time to take off and there were delays.   It might be a question 
of bad weather coming up and getting the job done before it deteriorated, so it was very 
important that a Squadron should see that his men are punctual.    Another way was how 
people dressed themselves………...whether their hair was long or the had taken the trouble 
to dress properly for the different meals.  These are little things, but they all add up……… 
and had an effect on the slackness of all the personnel in the squadron, right the way down 
from the pilots and observers down to the airmen themselves.  I think it is most important 
that the Squadron Commander should be 100% efficient.84   
 
This statement emphasises the importance of the attitudes and actions of 
Squadron Commanders in fostering and maintaining morale on squadrons.    If 
he flew with his crews, it boosted morale and contributed to the avoidance of 
psychiatric failures.    The Official History of World War Two Medical Services 
 
84 Lt Alan Jackson P. Hart, No.5 Squadron, quoted in Somme Success (London, 2012) pp.66-67; N. Steel & P. 
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made this point (following a major investigation into Bomber Command 
Operations): 
Inspired by the personal example of commanding officers, a good esprit de corps was 
shared by flying and ground personnel alike.     Good leadership contributed greatly to 
morale, discipline and confidence.       A squadron commander who would take his turn of 
operational regardless of the hazard or otherwise of the target was one with his crews, and 
in such a squadron psychological illness or “lack of moral fibre” was practically non-
existent.85 
 
Of course, in the First World War Squadron Commanders who were not permitted 
to fly on operations and yet had to order others to do so, sometimes in very bad 
weather, were in an invidious situation.       Not only did their reputation suffer, 
(unless like Major Lanoe Hawker VC, it had already been established) but they 
had less chance to learn about the war in the air themselves.86 
These two factors, added in most cases to undoubted courage, were the reasons 
why many squadron commanders ignored Trenchard’s instruction.   He does not 
seem to have taken any action to enforce this order. 
Although the Somme campaign is generally remembered as a disaster: from the 
RFC’s perspective it was a success.    In the first two months of the campaign it 
had firstly gained and then kept command of the air not only over the lines but 
well beyond.     But this came at a cost in casualties.   Of course, the casualties 
sustained by the RFC were infinitesimal compared to the tens of thousands 
suffered by the BEF in the trenches, but as the total number of pilots and observers 
serving over the front in 1916 at any one time was less than 2,000, the total of 
 
85 S. C. Rexford-Welch, History of The Second World War: The Royal Air Force Medical Services Vol II 
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86 This problem also arose in the Second World War, see General Curtis Le May’s remarks in Chapter Three. 
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545 casualties (292 killed in action and 203 PoW) and many wounded) in the year 
was both significant and very well known to the crews.   And in addition, there 
was the continuous stream of accidents, resulting in a further 55 deaths and many 
injuries.87 
Although success in the air helped to maintain morale on most squadrons   despite 
heavy losses, some flyers were unable to cope.   An example being 2/Lt E F Allen 
following a particularly difficult flight when he saw his observer killed in front 
of him.  His flight commander Captain Harold Wyllie of 23 Squadron, reported:  
Unfortunately, Allen completely lost his nerve, and told me today that he could not go 
flying.    It was a terrible time for him as besides the fact of the engine gradually going 
worse and worse and finally stopping over the lines, the machine was in a dreadful state, 
covered with blood.88 
 
As there is no record of Allen as a casualty, it is probable that his case was dealt 
with administratively.        Another case of a pilot being dealt with at least initially, 
administratively, was that of Lieutenant F L Barnard, No 18 squadron, who with 
his observer Lieutenant F S Rankin was involved in a series of dog-fights (air 
combats) in the last of which the observer was killed, he reported: 
We turned for home but found one more HA on our tail.  The observer put one drum into 
one which was passing straight over our heads at very close range and this machine 
immediately became out of control, the tail and back of the fuselage being on fire.    It went 
down in spin.   The remaining two HA were now firing from behind and the observer stood 
up to take a shot at them, one more HA was seen to go down in a nose-dive with smoke 
from its engine.    The observer was still firing when he was hit in the head and fell sideways 
over the side of the nacelle.   I managed to catch his coat as he was falling and by getting 
on the front seat pulled him back.     I then got back in the pilot’s seat.    The engine and 
 
87 It has been estimated that 499 of the total 586 casualties suffered by the RFC in 1916, some 499 were over the 
Somme,    See  Hart,  p.223,   Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.376,   For RFC casualties generally,   TNA 
AIR1/844/204/5/369, TNA  Air 1/845/204/5/376 and Jones, TWITA Vol VI  Appendix XXXVII. 
88  Jones, TWITA Volume II pp.256-257; Henshaw, The Sky Their, p.38;  Hart, p.70.     Harold Wyllie, who had 
served in the Boer War and later commanded RFC squadrons in France and England, survived the war and 
became a noted marine artist.  
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most of the controls had been shot but I managed to get the machine over our lines and 
landed 200 yards behind our front lines.89 
 
Barnard was very shocked by this experience, so much so that his commanding 
officer Major George Carmichael, felt he had to be sent home.       He wrote: 
Lieutenant F L Barnard was in combat when his observer Lieutenant F S Rankin who was 
standing up to fire back over the top plane was hit and would have fallen out had not 
Barnard seized his coat and dragged him into the cockpit.    He actually held him there until 
with almost superhuman strength and skill he brought his machine to our landing area.    The 
observer, Rankin, unfortunately did not survive.      Lieutenant Barnard was so affected by 
his experience that I had to arrange for his posting home, and his nerves were so badly 
affected that I do not think he was able to return to the Western Front.90 
 
 
Major Carmichael was right, Barnard was still in hospital in London in 1919.91 
 
On 15th September 1916, when The Fourth Army attacked the German’s third 
defensive line, employing for the first time an entirely new weapon, the Tank,92  
the German Air Force introduced to the battle over France a new aircraft ‘which 
outclassed every contemporary British aeroplane opposed to them’93   The new 
Albatross D II, together with a considerable increase in the numbers of German 
aircraft at the front (formed into special  fighter squadrons) immediately  caused 
a significant increase in the RFC losses.94     In fact, RFC casualties for 1916 were 
so significant that Cecil Lewis going on leave in September, noted that he had 
flown some three hundred and fifty hours on operations in eight months 
 
89  Hart, Somme Success, p.202; Henshaw, The Sky Their, p.58. 
90 Hart, p.202. 
91 RAFM CC F L Barnard 1919; Hart, p.202. 
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(including the Battle of the Somme) and was still alive, at a time when a pilot 
lasted an average of three weeks.95 
In fact, aircrew losses on the western front immediately before and during the 
Somme campaign, showed that of the total of 586 casualties, (killed, wounded or 
PoW) 499 occurred over the Somme. The table below sets out the monthly totals, 
showing clearly the effect of the increase in German aircraft and change of tactics.  
Month.                KIA.             WIA.           PoW.            Total 
April              6            10           8            24 
May              11              5                 7             23 
June              11           16             7             34 
July               40           38            26                104 
August          33           25            24           82 
September     63           34            40                137 
October         50           27            27                104 
November     36           27            15            78 
Total                    250        162              154               58696 
 
During the Somme battle it seems that Trenchard began to appreciate that the full 
out offensive policy had a downside.    As early as the first week in July after a 
few days of fighting he wrote to Brancker:  
I have as you know, lost eight machines at low bombing.  I am afraid that some of the 
pilots are getting a bit rattled and it’s not popular.  I have put in for two 
VCs…………..We have done 1200 hours flying a day which makes you think a bit 
as a lot of the pilots have to do five or six hours day after day,   It’s a bit of a strain  
with so many hostile machines and anti-aircraft guns.97 
 
 
 
95 C Lewis, Sagittarius Rising (London, 1936) p.154. 
96  Sources, E R Hooton, War Over The Trenches (Ian Allan Publishing, 2010) pp.100-101; Henshaw, The Sky 
Their Battlefield pp.41-60; T G Bradbeer, The British Air Campaign During The Battle Of The Somme 1916 
(Unpublished Thesis  - University of Kansas 1999) pp.401-402.        
97 A Boyle, Trenchard (London, 1962) p.183; Jones, TWITA Volume II pp.296-297 
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There were also complaints from the front.  In the first three weeks of July 9th 
Wing, commanded by Lt Col Dowding had lost fifteen aircraft.   One of its 
Squadrons (No 60) had lost six aircraft and 11 aircrew, including its squadron 
commander and two flight commanders.  Some of its replacement pilots had only 
about seven to ten hours flying time.   The new squadron commander (Major 
Smith-Barry) refused to send such inexperienced pilots into battle and he was 
supported by Dowding.  He requested that 60 squadron be returned to England 
for more training.98  Trenchard reluctantly agreed but was irritated by Dowdings 
request and made sure he was posted home at the end of the Somme Campaign.99  
It is noteworthy that Trenchard felt it necessary in September before the attack 
on the 15th to gather all 9th wing aircrew together and brief them himself about 
the ‘big offensive’ starting next day and their part in it.  Later, on 17th September 
he instructed Baring to visit 70 squadron (which had lost four aircraft on 15th) 
‘and take out to lunch anyone who wanted a rest for a day’.100 
By the end the Somme campaign in November, nineteen more aircrew had been 
diagnosed as suffering from psychiatric illness and in most cases sent back to the 
UK.  Second Lieutenant J E H Bibby flew over the Somme battlefield, with No. 
23 squadron.    In November 1916, he was admitted to a field hospital at Boulogne 
and was initially diagnosed as DAH (disordered action of the heart), still a very 
 
98 See chapter two, Training, for notes as to further service of Smith-Barry. 
99 Hooton, War Over, p.102; Boyle, Trenchard, p.184.   Trenchard apparently thought Dowding a ‘dismal 
Jimmy’, although it is right to add that Dowding, when commander of No 16 Squadron, flew on operations, 
although squadron commanders were at the time banned from operations. 
100 M Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters 1914-1918 (London, 1920)  pp.174-176. 
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common diagnosis in soldiers until generally overtaken by ‘shell-shock’   After a 
few days he was sent to England on the Hospital Ship St. David and admitted to 
No 2 General Hospital in London on 22nd of November.101    A member of No 22 
Squadron Lt G H Walker, was admitted to No 8 General Hospital Rouen in 
October having been diagnosed with Neurasthenia, he was transferred to England 
and admitted to Hospital.     Walker recovered, and he went back to France to 
serve with No 45 Squadron.   Unfortunately, on 28th July 1917 he and his observer 
2Lt B G Beatty, were one of three 45 Squadron crews lost that day.102      Second 
Lieutenant V W Harrison of 25 squadron, was another pilot who was taken off 
flying during the Somme battle.  On 27th September, he was escorting a 
reconnaissance aircraft when it was attacked by two German aircraft.  Harrison 
was shot down but he and his observer (Sgt L S Court) were unhurt.   He returned 
to action, but on 19th October, was diagnosed with Neurasthenia and sent back to 
England where he was admitted to London Hospital.   He did not return to 
France.103   
As the battle continued and air fighting continued, with a large increase in both 
defensive and reconnaissance patrols.  The importance of having effective fighter 
aircraft to defend reconnaissance aircraft was emphasised with the introduction 
 
 101 DAH was first used in the Boer War to classify soldiers suffering from symptoms like those of shell shock 
of neurasthenia.   In WW1, some 35.000 soldiers were diagnosed with DAH, in addition to the 80,000 or so 
Shell-shocked cases: RAFM CC Bibby, J E H  
102 RAFM CC Walker, G H; Henshaw the Sky Their, p.105 & p.339. 
103 RAFM CC Harrison, V W; Henshaw, The Sky Their, p.55. 
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by the German Air Force of new Albatross fighters in September, operating in 
large formations led by the inspiring and successful Captain Oswald Boelcke.104   
On 28th September, Trenchard informed the War Office that he was asking Sir 
Douglas Haig (C-in-C France) to demand that the number of fighting squadrons 
with each army from four to eight.        The next day Haig wrote to the War Office: 
I have the honour to request that the immediate attention of the Army Council may be given 
to the urgent necessity for a very large increase in the numbers and efficiency of the fighting 
aeroplanes at my disposal.   Throughout the last three months the Royal Flying Corps in 
France has maintained such a measure of superiority over the enemy in the air that it has 
been enabled to render services of incalculable value.   The result is that the enemy has 
made extraordinary efforts to increase the number, and develop the speed and power, of his 
fighting machines.       He has unfortunately succeeded in doing so and it  is necessary to 
realise clearly, and at once that we shall undoubtedly lose our superiority  in the air if I am 
not provided at an early withy improved means of retaining it.        Within the last few days 
the enemy has brought into action on the Somme front a considerable number of fighting 
aeroplanes which are faster, handier and capable of attaining a greater height than any at 
my disposal with the exception of one squadron of single seat “Nieuports”, one of  “ FE 
Rolls Royce”, and one of “Sopwiths”…The result of the advent of the enemy’s improved  
machines has been a marked increase in the casualties suffered by the Royal Flying Corps, 
and though I do not anticipate losing our present predominance in the air for the next three 
or four months, the situation after that threatens to be very serious unless adequate steps to 
deal with it are taken at once. 105      
 
Sir Douglas Haig’s letter was discussed by the War Committee on 17th of October 
and it decided to send a Naval squadron made up from Royal Naval Air Service 
(RNAS) units at Dunkirk.  Accordingly, Naval Squadron No 8 (later numbered 
208) was formed flying Nieuport and Sopwith aircraft.       The squadron was sent 
to the front at once (Vert Garland aerodrome) and carried out its first patrol on 3rd 
of November.106   This squadron, added to the four new squadrons transferred 
 
104 Jones, TWITA Volume II p.283. 
105 Jones, TWITA  Volume II pp.296-297; Boyle, Trenchard, pp.194-195. 
106 Jones, TWITA Volume II, p.314.  For an account of operational and morale difficulties with the Naval 
Squadrons see next chapter. 
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from England did help the RFC to retain the initiative,  the extra squadrons 
considerably increased the number of aircrew required to maintain operations.   
Although Trenchard noted the increase in casualties, he did not mention the 
increasing difficulty of the training squadrons in England to produce enough 
properly trained pilots and observers to replace those lost in action.  
The table above (p-203) setting out the RFC casualty figures for the Somme 
offensive (July-November), show that 222 aircrew were killed in action, 132 
became prisoners of war and 151 were wounded.    During the same period, there 
were 82 aircraft accidents with 31 aircrew killed.     
During the period of the Somme campaign fourteen pilots and observers broke 
down and were removed from flying.    
        
 
 
Kite Balloon Observers  
It is appropriate to note the contribution of another group of aviators wearing an 
observer’s badge who suffered heavy losses and some of whom became 
psychiatric casualties: Kite Balloon crews.       Balloon observers needed a sound 
knowledge of artillery procedures and in early 1915, of the thirty-two officers 
serving in the Kite Balloon squadrons, ten were army officers, three were RFC 
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officers and the rest were naval officers (with experience of naval gunnery).107    
Kite Balloons, as aircraft, were part of the RFC, and with that recognition came 
the question of a distinguishing badge for observers.  After some discussion GHQ 
RFC was empowered to train and award the observers badge to successful 
trainees.108 
Training was short and basic.  Potential observers were sent to one of the RFC 
balloons schools at Lydd or Rolleston, where they carried out six free balloon 
flights, four with instructors.  During training if they wished they could make a 
parachute descent.  Final training was a three-hour flight in a Drachen balloon: if 
the trainee suffered from airsickness and asked to come down, he failed.109  An 
indication of the value of balloon observers was the fact that on completion of 
training they immediately received their Observer’s badge and ‘flying pay’ of 
eight shillings a day, the same as pilots and like pilots before any having any               
operational experience. (It will be recalled that aeroplane observers had to have 
operational flying experience before receiving their flying badge: and received 
five shillings a day flying pay).     Balloon observers, who were entitled to wear 
the Observer’s badge, took the same risks as aircraft observers including the very 
real possibility of being shot down in flames.110         Additionally, balloon crews 
did not return to a safe environment at the end of an operational flight as flyers 
 
107 C G Jefford, Observers and Navigators (London, 2014) p.75. 
108  Jefford, pp.77-78. 
109 P C Ford, ‘The Practical Training of Kite Balloon Observers’ Cross & Cockade Volume 35 (1) 2004 pp.13-
21. 
110 Barker, The Royal Flying Corps pp.88-90. 
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did but were subject to shelling and the other dangers of front-line soldiers.    This 
point was made by a balloon observer in 1915: 
Being so near the front there were no cosy safe billets as the aeroplane flyers had, 
instead we found ourselves camping in dugouts 111 in the mud………. often blasted 
out by shellfire.112 
 
In 1916, there were forty balloon sections on the Western Front located parallel 
with the front line, but slightly behind it.     Each section had an establishment of 
four observers.   At the end of the Somme campaign several lessons regarding 
balloons had been learnt, including the realisation that more balloon observers 
were needed.  Following discussion at GHQ regarding the possible incorporation 
of Balloons sections into the Royal Artillery (which did not happen) it was 
decided to attach an artillery officer to each section and at the same time an RFC 
officer from each section was sent home to assist with the formation and training 
of new sections.113 
The British Kite Balloon complemented the work of aircraft ‘spotting’ for 
Artillery batteries.    The observers went up to note enemy gun positions, trench 
changes, movements behind the lines, indeed anything which might or could 
become a target, or which would be of note to Army Intelligence.  
 Operations with balloons, were simple but dangerous.       Balloon units came 
with their own crew, transport and engine operated winch and were fully mobile, 
 
 
112 Barker, The Royal Flying Corps p.90. 
113 Jones, TWITA Vol II pp.309-310. 
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although once established on site they generally remained in one place until the 
whole front line moved.  
Balloon observers, usually working in pairs operated from a basket attached to a 
captive balloon, which would be winched to a height between 1,000 to 5,000 feet.   
They took with them target information and had direct telephone contact with the 
battery they were to work with.  Balloons used the same method of shot correcting 
as aircraft of the corps squadrons.    Their training, in addition to balloon work 
included instruction in aerial observation and photography and because of 
frequent, sometimes daily ascents, soon got to know their area in detail.  The 
usual method of working was to use the morning, when the sun, rising in the east, 
would be in their eyes, to confer with artillery liaison officers and establish 
operational details.   In the afternoon, with the sun overhead or in the West, 
balloons would be flown, and one round would be fired, and the observer would 
report its fall. 
From then on targets would be attacked with the observer correcting fire as 
required.114        
However, the actual business of spotting and photography was subject to three 
especial factors which made the observer’s work particularly dangerous.   Firstly, 
they were in the path of shells sometimes their own, but more often the enemy 
who were sometimes able to elevate guns sufficiently to aim directly at balloons.       
 
114 P. C. Ford, ‘The Practical Training of Kite Balloon Observers’ Cross & Cockade Vol 35 (1) 2004, pp.13-21. 
 
  
231 
 
Secondly, Balloons on both sides, (filled with highly inflammable Hydrogen) 
became prime targets for fighter aircraft and there was always the possibility of 
being shot down in flames if the balloon could not be winched down in time.    
Lastly, the wind was a natural enemy: 
1t acted on the balloon capriciously, spinning it round on itself like a polo pony, 
always choosing the most inconvenient moment.    Worse still was the bending of the 
cable in a gusting wind which might yank the balloon down by a hundred feet or so.     
Then, when it eased, the balloon shot up again.       All these disturbances could 
happen suddenly and speedily, with disastrous effects on the balloontics stomach.115  
 
The wind could also be a problem if the balloon suffered a cable break, unless the 
crew bailed out (see below) they might be carried on the prevailing westerly wind 
over the German lines.   An advantage which balloon crews had which aircraft 
crews did not, was the chance to leave the balloon by parachute if attacked. The 
Air Board explained the rationale of given balloon crews, but not aircraft crews, 
parachutes:  
 It is the opinion of this board that the present form of parachutes is not suitable for 
use in aeroplanes and should only be used by balloon observers, 
It is also the opinion of the board that the presence of such an apparatus might impair 
the fighting spirit of pilots and cause them to abandon machines which might 
otherwise be capable of returning to base for repair. 116   
 
 
Although the first paragraph of the Boards opinion makes sense, because current 
parachutes were bulky and heavy and most aircraft in France at the time had no 
capacity for any extra weight, the second is nonsense.   German aircraft carried 
parachutes from 1917 and there was no dilution of fighting spirit.117   
 
115 Barker, The Royal Flying Corps p.90. 
116 Barker, p.313; Steel & Hart, pp.254-255. 
117 It should also be noted that no aircrew, would be in any hurry to leave an aircraft that could still fly. 
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Although balloon observers were recruited in the same way as other RFC aircrew, 
a significant number were failed pilot candidates, they seem to have been a 
relatively unflamboyant group often somewhat older than squadron aircrew.    By 
1917, the requirement for balloon observers was substantial, not only were 40 
men needed to meet the current expansion plan, but a further 150 were needed to 
replace ‘wastage’ at the front.118     It is difficult to obtain an accurate number of 
balloon observers employed at the front, but a reasonable estimate, collating 
several sources, (and including overseas units) is that some 700 in total served 
including, six Lt-Colonels, seven Majors and at least 27 Captains.  By the 31st 
January 1917, there were 89 balloon sections in France, suggesting at least 360 
observers at the front.119    
The qualities required of a Balloon observer included, strength of vision, a strong 
stomach and clear head.  A German writer describing the work of German balloon 
observers (who had the same role as British observers) noted: 
Only extraordinary will-power, self-control, strong-nerves and a stout heart enabled 
him to go up again after his descent.120 
 
Casualties were very heavy in the kite balloon units and many observers suffered 
from combat stress.  One stress factor applying particularly to balloon observers 
was the long exposure to danger during a tour.     A typical aircraft crew member 
 
118 C. G. Jefford, Observers & Navigators (London, 2014) p.78. 
119 Army List, February 1917; Jefford, Observers & Navigators, pp.78-79; Ford, ‘The Practical Training of Kite 
Balloon Observers’, p.15. 
120 G. P. Neumann, The German Air Force in The Great War, (London, 1920) pp.100-101. Neumann was a 
Major in the German Air Force in the First World War. 
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would be taken out operations after about six months with about 200 hours 
combat flying, some balloon observers, often completing 10 or 12 hours aloft in 
a duty period, achieved more than 1500 hours flying duty in a similar time.  All 
this was in addition to being exposed to the usual dangers of trench warfare during 
non-flying periods.  
One balloon observer Captain G D Machin, awarded a Distinguished Flying 
Cross (DFC) after long service at the front, stammered badly and suffered from 
shell-shock.121      
In fact, some thirty or so balloon observers suffered from psychiatric illness and 
diagnosis included Shell Shock, neurasthenia, DAH and of course Flying 
Sickness.         One of the earliest to suffer because of his service at the front was 
2/Lt P B Moxon.    He was admitted to No 24 General Hospital Etaples on 28th 
June 1916 suffering from Shell Shock and immediately transferred to London 
where he was admitted to No 4 London Hospital.    He did not return to the 
front.122   Another who became a long-term casualty of the air war Lt R S Jameson 
of No 23 KB section, he was diagnosed with Flying Sickness on 15th September 
1918 and was transferred to the RAF psychiatric hospital in London, he was still 
a patient at Eaton Square in late 1919.123         One who was luckier was 2/Lt H 
W Ingram who having been slightly wounded in Salonica, (one of ten balloon 
 
121 Ford, ‘The Practical Training of Kite Balloon Observers’, p.20. 
122 RAFM Casualty Card P B Moxon 
123 RAFM Casualty Card R S Jameson 
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observers in that theatre) in May 1917, was admitted to hospital with 
Neurasthenia in June but was discharged to duty in early June.124   
As noted above the hazards of balloon service was recognised in the RFC by 
providing balloon observers with parachutes. 
 These parachutes were far from perfect, but they did save many lives.  One 
Observer, 2/Lt S Jolley, made five jumps during 97 hours in the air.  Between 
June 1916 and June 1917, 106 jumps were made by 2nd (Balloon) Wing.125 
In the first two years of operations in France aircraft developed from a sometimes-
useful reconnaissance tool into an essential part of an army’s operational 
equipment.      As well as reconnaissance (including photographic) and artillery 
spotting, aircraft were used to attack the enemy, both by interfering with German 
air operations and by direct attacks on ground forces including targets bombed 
far beyond the trench line. 
There was a heavy cost in casualties, during 1916 some 842 RFC aircrew became 
casualties, including those killed in flying accidents.  The ‘Fokker scourge’ in late 
1915 and the first months of 1916 followed by the intensive air activity during 
the Somme offensive and the consequent heavy casualties not only adversely 
affected morale but resulted in the first significant numbers of aircrew suffering 
from ‘Flying Sickness’.     In the first six months of 1916 there were seven cases 
and by the end of the year a further fourteen aircrew had been withdrawn from 
 
124 RAFM Casualty Card H W Ingram. 
125 C. G. Jefford, Observers & Navigators (London, 2014) pp.76-77.  
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flying for this cause. As already noted, there were few cases in 1915, but by 
November 1916 the  total was twenty-five, the precursors to the hundreds who 
would suffer in the last two years of the war. 
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                                                     Chapter Six                            
                                         War in the Air 1917-1918 
During the winter of 1916-1917, a period of bad weather caused a significant 
reduction of operations.    This pause was used by both the GAF and the RFC to 
strengthen their positions.  The German Air Force used the lull in operations to 
reorganise their aircraft into large groups (staffels) which could be directed to 
points of pressure.1      For the RFC,  the Somme campaign had clearly shown the 
value of  air power: especially the vital role of the air fighter to establish air 
superiority so that the other vital roles of the RFC over the front could be carried 
out.    In January 1917, the RFC had 39 squadrons in France.   By March they had 
been reinforced by a further 12 RFC and four Naval squadrons.2 
Despite these additions: in the first months of 1917 the German staffel operations 
established an ascendancy over the RFC.     In the six weeks of the Arras Battle 
alone the RFC lost some twenty per cent of its aircrew strength.3   However, by 
June (helped by the introduction of improved aircraft) the RFC had regained air 
supremacy, although the fighting continued at very high intensity: with heavy 
losses on both sides, for the remainder of the War in France.      Casualties of the 
RFC/RAF during these last two years of the war were markedly increased from 
 
1 G. P. Neuman (translated J E Gurdon) Over the Front: The German Air Force in the Great War (London, 
1920) p.226. 
2 AP 125  The Royal Air Force In The Great War (Air Historical Branch,1936), pp. 188-191; S. F. Wise, The 
Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force,  Volume 1  Canadian Airmen in the First World War 
(Toronto, 1980)  pp.393-395; T Henshaw,  The Sky Their Battlefield (Fetubi Books, 2014)  p.65. 
3  W Raleigh and HA Jones, The War in the Air (London, HMSO, 1922-1937), Six Volumes (hereafter TWITA) - 
Volume III pp.335-336; D. E. Winter, The First Of The Few (London, 1982)   pp.155-156.  
237 
 
those suffered up to the end of 1916.   There was also a great increase in the 
number of aircrew removed from flying with Flying Sickness.      
The table below shows losses from January 1917 to 11 November 1918. 
                              Casualties/Flying Sickness   1917-19184 
                    KIA          WIA          POW          KIFA          WIFA          Fly/S 
1917           1092            343            495              245                99                46 
1918           1338             471            754              354             129              6025    
 
 
These figures do not include the casualties suffered by the Independent Force 
which are examined in the next chapter.  Despite the arrival of the extra 
squadrons, Trenchard demanded, with Haig’s support, more squadrons for the 
RFC, he wanted a total of 106 operational and 95 reserve squadrons. 6                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
These demands (although never fully implemented) involved significant 
increases in manpower requirements as new squadrons needed not only new 
aircraft, but many more skilled mechanics and fitters, effective means of supply 
to the aircraft parks (including ferry pilots) and of course trained pilots and 
observers.       These demands came at a time when all services were fully 
stretched and the demand for manpower, especially skilled manpower was at its 
greatest.      
 
4 These figures include RNAS aircrew, 55 KIA &25 POW KIA, includes died of wounds, and died as POW 
immediately after capture. WIA, not noted if slight. POW, if wounded and captured, noted under this heading  
KIFA, killed in flying accident on operational squadron in France. 
5 Casualty figures from Jones, TWITA Vol VI Appendix XXXVII; Henshaw, The Sky Their, pp.65-271, p347,  
pp.56-394; E. R. Hooton, War Over The Trenches  (London, 2010)  p.168. 
6  Boyle, Trenchard pp.208-209; H, St George Saunders, Per Ardua The Rise Of British Air Power 1911-1939 
(London, 1944) p.109.   At the same time, 21sJune 1917, the number of aircraft established on Scout (fighter) 
squadrons was increased from 18 to 24, which increased the demand for pilots.  AP 125, The Royal Air Force, 
pp.130-131.   
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The GAF’s ascendency over the RFC was achieved, partly by the introduction of 
new and better aircraft, but also by new tactics, using ‘Jagdstaffen’ (Jastas, 
formations, led by experienced pilots) to attack ‘en masse.’   Trenchard had 
already informed Haig that RFC aircraft would be inferior to the Germans, at least 
until the new fighters (Bristol Fighter, SE5, and Camel) arrived.     Meanwhile, 
he would maintain his offensive policy.7   
Although he was aware of the RFC’s weakness Haig did not question Trenchard’s 
policy.      Nor did anyone else, although some Second World War Royal Air 
Force senior officers retrospectively claimed that it had been questioned at the 
time.8  and one RFC brigade commander later wrote: 
But the main reason why this offensive policy was a stubborn stupidity is inherent in the 
difference which exists between a planned attack on a well-defined objective and a ‘nosing 
about’ on the lookout for trouble.    Once assured that we were to be found throughout all 
the hours of daylight trespassing over their side of the line, dangling like bait in the sky, the 
Germans were not slow to devise means for turning the situation to their advantage. 9 
 
 
Charlton also pointed out the disadvantage RFC crews suffered from the 
persistently westerly wind, which he felt was ignored by RFC planners.       
Criticized or not, one obvious result of Trenchard’s policy of continual offense 
and RFC expansion was a constant shortage of aircrew and aircraft as the training 
squadrons and aircraft manufacturers struggled to keep up with demand.  
 
 
7 Jones, TWITA Vol III p.339; Boyle, Trenchard p.162. 
8 See below Ref 36. 
9 L. Charlton., War From The Air, (London,1935), pp.56-57. 
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The Battle of Arras, which commenced on the 4th of April, was the beginning of 
what turned out to be the worst month of the war for the RFC.    This was despite 
the RFC having a considerable numerical advantage.   To oppose the German 
Sixth Army which had 195 aircraft, the total strength of the RFC along the front 
of the First and Third Armies was twenty-five squadrons comprising 365 aircraft 
a third of which were single seat fighters.10 
Already during March in the lead up to the battle, the RFC had lost 143 aircrew 
(killed and missing) and the intensive fighting confirmed that control of the air 
was equally important to the German Air Force.    In fact, despite suffering heavy 
casualties the British and French air operations during the German withdrawal to 
the Hindenburg line (Operation Alberich) had been ineffective in both disrupting 
the German move or in providing any useful intelligence: it was not until 25th 
February that irrefutable evidence that the withdrawal had taken place was 
provided by scout aircraft of No 56 Squadron.11   
Despite being outnumbered at the beginning of the April offensives, the Jastas, 
using the latest fighters (Albatros D-111s) had gained and maintained control of 
the air.     The most successful unit was Jasta 11 led by Manfred von Richthofen, 
destined to become the wars highest scoring fighter pilot.     Many of his victories 
were achieved during early 1917, including the RFC’s worst time ‘Bloody April 
 
10 Jones, TWITA Vol III p.334.  Taking the front of the four British Armies in April 1917, the superiority in 
numbers was even more marked 754 as against 264 German; E R Hooton, War Over The Trenches (London, 
2010) pp.129-134. 
11 Barker, The Royal Flying Corps in World War 1 (London, 2002), p.234. 
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1917’.12        A clear indication of German superiority during this period was the 
number of RFC aircraft shot down which crashed into or behind British lines; 
illustrating a failure of the offensive policy which was designed to keep enemy 
aircraft away from British lines.13       
The new Bristol Fighter of which much was expected, finally came into action in 
April.        However, even this aircraft experienced a disastrous introduction to 
the war on the 5th when a patrol of six No 48 Squadron aircraft met Jasta 11 led 
by Richthofen and was destroyed, losing five aircraft.14       A few days later on 
the 7th another crew was lost and on the 11th three more, making ten for the 
week.15   These losses of the Bristol Fighter did at least result in a beneficial 
change in of tactics by its crews.     At first the pilots had tried to maneuverer the 
aircraft so that the observer could bring his gun to bear, but it was realised that 
the high performance of the aircraft could be more effectively used by the pilot 
taking advantage of its flying qualities by bringing its front gun into use.      It 
was this change of tactics which enabled this aircraft to become one of the best 
fighting aircraft on the Western Front.16   
Another factor contributing to both the heavy losses (and fall in morale, noted 
below) suffered by the RFC in April was the introduction of the RE8, an aircraft 
 
12 P. Kilduff, The Red Baron, (London, 1994) pp.87-107. 
13 Jones, TWITA Vol III p.235. 
14  Henshaw, The Sky Their, p.76.   The patrol leader was Captain Leefe-Robinson VC, who shot down the SL 
Zeppelin.  He became a PoW and survived the war to die of influenza in 1919.   
15  Henshaw, The Sky Their, p.79. 
16  Air1/1/1223/204/5/2634    48 Squadron Combat reports June 1918; Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First, pp. 
414-415. 
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with a bad reputation.   The RE8 was a replacement for the obsolete BE2c which 
was still in use with 17 squadrons in 1917.      Unfortunately, the RE8 had been 
shown to have many serious shortcomings.          Major J A Chamier on the staff 
of Third (Corps) Wing, who after some test flights, prepared notes for pilots 
pointed out: 
The chief thing to remember is that the machine gives very little indication of losing its 
speed until it shows an uncontrollable tendency to dive which cannot be corrected in time 
if you are near the ground…….. You will find that the rudder control in every case of 
spinning or swinging tail will become very stiff, and you may not get it very central but you 
should (without putting on sufficient pressure to break anything) try to do this. 
With the engine off the only thing is to avoid gliding too slowly …….at 65mph or below, 
when gliding, the machine suddenly loses speed.   This is particularly the case when 
making a turn to enter the aerodrome as the extra resistance caused by the rudder is 
sufficient to bring down the pace………. One more point as regards losing speed.   
Observers must be cautioned that when an aeroplane is gliding down from work the lines 
they must not stand up in order to look over the pilot’s shoulder for the fun of the thing, as 
the extra head resistance caused may lead to aeroplane falling below its critical gliding 
speed, and so bring about an accident. 17   
 
 
As if that were not enough the fuel tanks were situated directly behind the engine 
and in the event of a crash, fuel from the tanks invariably burst into flames after 
contact with the hot engine.       Finally, the aircraft was thought to be too stable 
and thus became an easy target for German fighters.18      This last characteristic 
was at least partly responsible for the severe losses by No 59 Squadron on 13th 
April.  On that day, the RE8s had been engaged in a patrol in the Arras area.   It 
had been thought that the patrol would be adequately protected by offensive 
patrols by the 9th Wing and the 13th Wing timed to cover the area.  In the event 
 
17 P. R. Hare, The Royal Aircraft Factory (London, 1990), p.262. 
18 Wise, Canadian Airmen, p. 400. 
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the 9th Wing patrol was flown late and the 13th Wing did not see the RE8s.  
Number 59 Squadron lost  six RE8s in ten minutes to Jasta 11 led by Richthofen, 
with ten pilots and observers killed.19  Additionally, also in April, two scout 
(fighter) squadrons, No 29 and No 60 both flying Nieuwpoort’s from  Izel le 
Hemeau, lost 105% of their pilots in April with 27 pilots killed or missing and 
four wounded during the month.20    The continued success of  Richthofen’s  jasta 
was  another factor adversely  affecting RFC morale, but as success always does, 
boosting German morale.   
Although concerned by the high wastage of pilots and observers: 316 aircrew 
were lost, (killed or missing) in April and nine more killed in accidents, Trenchard 
did not change his ‘offensive’ policy.21        The practical effect of this very high 
wastage rate was that the life expectancy of aircrew on the Western Front was 
short and getting shorter.          In June1917 it was calculated that reconnaissance 
bomber pilots and observers would survive for three and a half months and a scout 
(fighter) pilot just two and a half.22     With the increase in the number of ‘contact 
patrols’(low level) with their high casualty rates these survival rates were to 
become even shorter.     The War Office was using the wastage rates below to 
calculate the requirements for training aircrew in 1917 (months of operational 
life) 
 
19 Jones, TWITA Vol III pp.350-351; Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.400; Henshaw, The Sky Their, p. 80. 
20 A J Scott, History 60 Squadron (e-Book, 1920,2014) Appendix II Battle Casualties.; J H Morrow, The Great 
War in the Air, p.234; Wise, Canadian Airmen, pp.407-408. 
21 Jones, TWITA Vol III Appendix XXXVII p.160.  As always there are differences in casualty figures from 
different sources.  Henshaw, The Sky, p.347 gives 319 killed or missing, with a further 103 wounded 
22 Morrow, The Great War In the Air, p.236; Barker, The Royal Flying Corps, p.237.       
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Type of Squadron                 Pilots              Observers23 
Corps                                     4                           4 
Night Flying                          4                           4 
Fighter Reconnaissance        3.5                        3.5 
Bombing                               3.5                        3.5 
Single seat Fighter                2.5    
 
 
Combat reports clearly show that in 1917 and again in mid-1918 the actual 
wastage rate from combat and accidents showed these estimates to be optimistic.      
In fact, the demand for replacement aircrew was so great that training time had to 
be curtailed and the flying experience minima disregarded, resulting in 
inadequately trained replacements arriving on squadrons; some pilots arrived 
with only 20/25 hours experience, many of whom soon became casualties.24     
One pilot in his post war memoir suggested that during 1917, the life expectancy 
of a pilot was only three to four weeks.25   It was during this period that Lt Mick 
Mannock (later VC. DSO.** MC.*) first mentioned feeling the strain of air 
fighting.  He had arrived in France in March and posted to No. 40 Squadron on 
5th April.    He had been involved in one accident (on 8th) and four operational 
flights by 20th and was already suffering from stress: 
Over the lines today in Parry’s bus.  Engine cut three times.  Wind up.   Now I understand 
what a tremendous strain active service flying is.  However cool a man may be there must 
always be more or less tension on the nerves under such trying conditions.  When it is 
considered that seven out of ten forced landings are practically ‘write offs’, and 50 per 
cent are cases where the pilot is injured, one can quite understand the strain of the whole 
business.26 
 
23   TNA Air 1/683/21/13/2234 RFC Training. Winter, The First of The Few, p.152; J. Hamilton-Paterson, 
Marked For Death The First War In The Air, (London, 2015) pp.137-138.   
24 Barker, The Royal Flying Corps, p.235-6.   By comparison in the Second World War pilots were given 
between 80 and 100 hours before being sent to an Advanced training unit and then to squadrons.  
25 A. Gould Lee, Open Cockpit (London, 1969), p.67-69. 
26 M Mannock, The Personal Diary of ‘Mick’ Mannock (annotated F Oughton) (London,1966), pp.49-49. 
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It is not surprising that RFC morale suffered during this period, as casualties and 
lack of faith in fighting equipment (aircraft) are major factors affecting morale.  
In fact, in April 1917, RFC morale was probably lower than at any time in the 
war and remained critical for the rest of the year.    Indeed, casualties increased 
again in August when ‘ground support’ missions (contact patrols) were added to 
Trenchard’s offensive patrols.27 . As already noted, Trenchard was continually 
asking for more resources and in response to a plea for more fighters, in April 
1917 four Royal Naval Air service (RNAS) squadrons arrived in France.          
Unfortunately, the performance of these squadrons was below expectations and 
led to a serious problem with discipline and morale.         On 12th July, the RFC 
opened a major air offensive preceding the ground attack by the British Fifth and 
Second Armies in Flanders.     Before the ground attack commenced Trenchard 
had complimented his brigade commanders, noting that he expected that ‘all units 
keep up the greatest amount of energy in this wearing down process.’28    This 
memo was passed to the Commanding Officer of the Naval Wing, Captain C L 
Lamb and he relayed this message to his Squadron commanders but added words 
to the effect that once the battle had started the aerial offensive could be eased up 
(perhaps to encourage the crews).      Captain Lamb had already had some concern 
 
27  Jones, TWITA Volume IV pp.161-165 & Appendices - Appendix XXXVII p.161; Morrow, The Great War, 
pp.236-237; Henshaw, The Sky Their, p.347  & pp.106-104. In that month casualties were: KIA 141, WIA 92, 
PoW 49.  
28  Wise, Canadian Airmen in the Great War, p.174; AP 125 The Royal Air Force, pp.274-275. 
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about morale and fighting spirit and in a previous report to his Air Commander, 
Vice-Admiral Bacon, he had mentioned aircrew shortages ‘owing to many 
casualties and that many pilots- who had been serving for a considerable period-
had been breaking down.’       Bacon had replied, telling him to make the 
protection of the Army his prime concern, and Lamb responded with a memo 
with outlined his problem:      
Of late there have been rather a large proportion of pilots who state they are unable to fly 
over the enemy lines for various causes.     In view of the great shortage of pilots for the 
forthcoming operations it is essential, as far as possible, that every endeavour is made to 
eliminate these cases, and I think that the squadron commanders can assist very largely if 
they make every effort to do so.    Many of these cases are genuine, and these I will 
recommend for seaplanes, but I am convinced that a large proportion of the officers prefer 
the comfortable surroundings of an aerodrome situated near London to the glamour and 
glory of the battlefield.   Wing Commanders and Squadron Commanders must make every 
endeavour to combat this idea.29 
 
 
This was not the only difficulty with morale.           On September 30th, Naval 
squadron No 10 (supported by No. 23 and 70 squadrons) had been ordered to 
bomb and strafe Rumbeke airfield at low level.30     Naval 10 carried out this 
operation from 3000 feet and were ordered to repeat the raid.  The squadron 
commander reported that the squadron were ‘not up for it’.31  The RFC Wing 
Commander (Lt-Col F V Holt) pointed out to the Squadron Commander, R F 
Redpath, the seriousness of his statement.   Later Redpath rang Holt and said he 
had a counter suggestion.   Holt visited the squadron to hear Redpath’s 
 
29  Wise, Canadian Airmen in the Great War, pp.174-175.      
30  No, 70 squadron lost one aircraft this day, pilot killed, and one aircraft damaged.   Henshaw, The Sky Their 
p.122. 
31 In September 10 (N) had flown 14 operations, mostly at 9,000-12,000 feet, but two at 2000 feet possibly two 
EA claimed, and two pilots KIA and three made PoW.  Henshaw, The Sky Their, pp .14-122.  
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suggestion, which was that the bombing attack should be carried out with DH4s 
instead of Sopwith Camels (the aircraft used by Redpath’s squadron).    To which 
Holt replied: 
I explained that if an Infantry Battalion, when told to attack, suggested that the operation 
would be better performed by cavalry, it would be a similar suggestion to his.  I asked him 
if he was quite sure that he was fairly representing his pilots and asked why they had behaved 
in such an extraordinary way.      He replied that they did not consider that the probable 
results were worth the risk to machines and pilots.      I pointed out that one could not run a 
war on those lines and that the orders were very carefully considered before being issued. 32 
 
 
Holt did not order the operation to be carried out, fearing a refusal, ‘which would 
have led to a very serious situation’ but passed the matter via V Brigade to GHQ.           
Strangely, although Trenchard was known as a firm disciplinarian, he took no 
direct action against Redpath or any other squadron pilot.       It is suggested that 
there were probably two cogent reason for his seemingly uncharacteristic 
response.     Firstly, formal action a Board of Inquiry, possibly followed by a 
Court Martial and consequent publicity would bring attention to the state of 
morale in RFC (and RNAS) at a time when the air war was continually 
intensifying.   Secondly, Redpath was Canadian and was at the time only acting 
Commanding Officer.     He was one of the large numbers of Canadian aircrew 
being produced by the Canadian Training schools and joining the RFC/RNAS, 
(200 pilots each month).33  Trenchard may well have felt that this was not the 
time to do anything to discourage them.       The action, which was taken, was to 
 
32  TNA Air1/770/204 /4/258 Annex to V Brigade summery October 1917; Wise, Canadian Airmen pp.432-433.                                                          
33 Jones, TWITA Vol V p.467. 
247 
 
immediately transfer the squadron to IV Brigade and soon after, out of the RFC 
to 4 Wing RNAS Dunkirk.34       
RFC casualties remained high throughout the summer; in the 50 days between 
31st July to 19th September 434 aircrew were lost.  There were also indications 
that Trenchard’s policy of nothing but offense, especially the emphasis on 
‘forward’, that is, over the German side of the lines, did not find favour with all 
aircrew.     A pilot with No 46 Squadron, Arthur Lee Gould expressed his concerns 
about role of Distant Offensive Patrols (DOPs) behind German lines: 
The futility of such wasteful losses was the deeper because if a DOP were weak in numbers, 
as we were now, it could easily be overwhelmed, but if the patrol were strong, the Germans 
could, and frequently did, ignore it leaving us with a debit of  force-landed aeroplanes, 
wasted engines and wasted petrol. 
Had there been a specific objective in our deep penetration, such as covering a bomber raid 
or a photographic reconnaissance, we would have thought nothing of it, but we could see no 
rational purpose in our coat-trailing DOPs.   We could not see what was achieved by this so 
called carrying the offensive into enemy territory.   Was it to impress the French or to 
discourage German troops?    But they could hardly see us at 15,000 feet up.   Was it to 
lower the morale of the German Air Forces?      This notion we found laughable for it was 
our morale that suffered.35  
 
He went on to point out that the result of exposing aircrew to unnecessary risks 
on tasks which experience showed were pointless, was to build up a deep 
resentment.    There is no doubt that heavy casualties, concerns about some of the 
aircraft they flew and doubts about Distant Offensive Patrols, engendered on 
some squadrons a lack of confidence in Trenchard’s general policy of relentless 
offence.       Although Trenchard did make visits to squadrons in the field it is not 
 
34  Jones, TWITA Volume IV p.93;  AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p.188 fn; Morrow, The Great War,  p.237.       
Naval 10 returned to the front in March 1918, 
35 Gould Lee, Open Cockpit (London, 1969) pp.113-114. Gould Lee survived the war to become an Air Vice 
Marshal in the RAF. 
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clear that he realised that there was a morale problem in the RFC.   Maurice 
Barings (Trenchard’s secretary, who accompanied him on these visits) noted 
some conversations which should have indicated that all was not well with 
aircrew morale.        On 24th April 1917 they visited Canadas, Baring notes:  
At Canadas I saw a pilot who told me he was “fed up with Flying” he had done 500 hrs, he 
had had enough. He was sick to death of it.  He didn’t care.  Then he paused and said “but 
the General’s a dam fine man to serve under”.36 
 
Baring gives no indication that he was concerned about the pilot’s attitude, or that 
he told Trenchard about his conversations.      On other visits he notes many 
complaints, usually about shortcomings of aircraft, which he did report, but never 
seems to appreciate the effect these problems with aircraft could or did have on 
aircrew, although he did note the ‘gloom’ which the loss of Albert Ball cast over 
the RFC,37      
Although, as already noted, the heavy casualty rate was the major reason for low 
morale, there were other contributing factors.     In some cases, there was 
dissatisfaction with aircraft and as we have seen, some squadron commanders 
were inadequate leaders.        Another problem which unfortunately affected most 
those squadrons with the most casualties was that of inexperienced replacements. 
 No 84 Squadron Commander, Sholto Douglas, who became C-in-C Fighter 
Command in the Second World War, explains:  
 
36 Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters,  p.218.          
37 Baring, pp. 222- 223, 231 etc.  Trenchard seems to have taken a different approach when he commanded the 
Independent Force.  When a squadron in that force suffered serve losses, he made a point of making a morale 
boosting visit. (see chapter seven) 
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The Battle of Arras in 1917 and the heavy casualties it cost the Royal Flying Corps provided 
me with the most anxious period that I was to know during the whole of my life in the Air 
Force…….The severity of our losses early 1917 was not entirely due to the superiority of 
the German fighters.      The continued demand for an increase in the numerical strength of 
the Royal Flying Corps was still leading to new pilots being sent to the front with far from 
enough training, or even with sufficient   hours of bare experience in the air, and it was in 
addition to the need for replacements for the squadrons already in the thick of the fighting.      
Because of what I found then as one of the squadron commanders who had to accept these 
raw replacements, I came to feel very strongly about what I considered was a very short-
sighted policy, and I have been given no reason to change that view.  
I am quite sure that Boom Trenchard was admitting as early as the beginning of 1916 that 
the pilots coming out to the front were insufficiently trained, and also that his complaint did 
lead to an improvement in the system of training at home.  But his insistence that there 
should be at the same time a rapid formation of more and more squadrons for service at the 
front went a long way towards undermining that system; and that magnificent eagerness of 
Trenchard’s to use the air for offence against the enemy led him quite unintentionally to 
make greater demands on the new pilots than were justified.    In the spring of 1917 the 
squadrons of the RFC outnumbered the Germans by two to one; but numbers alone do not 
spell superiority………we would have been better off if we had greater experience and 
quite a few of us who served on the Western Front … felt the same way about Trenchard’s 
policy of driving hard almost regardless of cost.38 
 
Major Sholto Douglas, following a tour commanding No 43 Squadron in 1916, 
was appointed Commanding Officer of No 84 squadron in September 1917, 
equipped with SE 5A fighters.     Apart from Douglas himself, only his flight 
commanders had any experience of air fighting and in the squadron’s first sixteen 
days in action lost nine pilots, either killed or POW.    He said: 
It was a hard school for a new and untried squadron and at first, owing to the inexperience 
of the pilots, we suffered casualties.  But bitter experience is a quick teacher… A lesson we 
soon learnt was that there are occasions when it is wrong to accept battle, that one must 
always strive to take the enemy at a disadvantage.     Equally, one must not be taken at a 
disadvantage oneself and this often entails a deliberate refusal of battle and a retirement so 
that the enemy’s advantage may be nullified.  If for instance that advantage is height, then 
one should retreat, climb hard and go back and seek out the enemy at his own height or 
higher.  Of course, there are occasions when battle has to be accepted at a disadvantage---
if for instance, one sees another British squadron being overwhelmed by superior numbers, 
 
38  W. S.  Douglas, Years of Combat. Vol I   A Personal Story of the First War in the Air (London, 1963), 
pp.179-180. 
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then obviously whatever the odds one must accept battle.  But normally one should force 
the battle upon the enemy.39 
 
 
Douglas applied this policy to 84 squadron’s operations and took another lesson 
from the early losses: that tactics needed to change.    Accordingly, he spent 
considerable time in ensuring that his pilots were competent at formation flying, 
and when they were, the squadron acted always in formations of at least tree and 
if possible as many as nine.    He also ensured that all pilots were given time to 
be competent and confident flying the SE5A which had a reputation as a difficult 
aircraft to fly.40      The result was an efficient squadron with a casualty rate below 
average.  During the four months from December 1917, the squadron claimed 68 
enemy aircraft destroyed (almost certainly an overclaim) with only two squadron 
pilots lost during this period.   It was during January/February 2Lt A W 
Beauchamp Proctor an 84 Squadron pilot later to win the VC, shot down the first 
4 or 5 of his eventual 54 successes.41   
It is right to add that Douglas’s strict discipline was not to the liking of all his 
pilots, several, including one of his flight commanders a Canadian, who caused 
some disciplinary problems.    Some (Canadian) pilots on 84 Squadron were 
unhappy with what they saw as the inflexibility of Douglas’s rules about 
formation flying and particularly the order that attacks could only be instigated 
 
39 A. Price, Dogfight  (London, 1993, 2009)  pp.8-9 quoting  a post war report by Douglas. 
40 Hare, The Royal Aircraft Factor, pp.288-294.  The SE5a was a modified SE5 which had been subject to many 
complaints about its poor control at low speeds. 
41 Henshaw, The Sky Their, pp.140-169. 
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by the formation leader.  Captain Carl Falkenberg DFC was reprimanded by 
Douglas about his attitude.42  
By the end of January, Douglas’s system was beginning to be more widely 
adopted.  As the official history notes, the orders were for all fighter aircraft to 
operate by flights (normally six aircraft) 43     After this time most fighting 
squadrons flew as three formations of five aircraft led by the squadron 
commander.           Henceforth the Commanding Officer of an RFC/RAF squadron 
was expected to lead his squadron in the air, thus moving away from the previous 
mainly administrative role influencing morale from the squadron office.44  
Given the intensity of the fighting, heavy casualties and the number of 
inadequately trained replacements arriving on the squadrons, it is not surprising 
that there was a marked increase in the number of aircrew being removed from 
flying because of psychiatric illnesses.     Many pilots and observers noted in their 
post war memoirs the steady increase in signs of ‘nerves’ in both themselves and 
others.45        Symptoms of stress noted included sleeplessness, exhaustion, 
nightmares, shaking, irritability, and increased drinking.   Another aspect of the 
strain of flying was the effect of high-level flight on aircrew.   The new aircraft 
could reach 17/18000 feet and Oxygen was not yet generally available.     Lack 
of oxygen and cold not only affected crews in the air, but the resulting headaches 
 
42 S K Taylor, ‘Mums the Word’ Cross & Cockade Volume 37 (2) 2006 pp.116-119. Interview with Falkenberg 
43 Jones, TWITA, Vol IV p.288. 
44 Jones, TWITA Vol IV p.387. 
45 I Jones, Tiger Squadron (London, 1954)  pp.46-47.        
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and effects of cold lasted many hours after the flight.      Replacement aircrew 
found things especially difficult.     Apart from been inadequately trained: most 
had completed training at low level, usually below 4,000 feet because this was 
felt to be the maximum height for reconnaissance, but also because training 
aircraft lacked the performance of the latest front-line aircraft.          One such   
pilot, Harold Balfour, (later a prominent politician) wrote: 
The heat of the long summer days was terrific, and our flying hours were many.   All these 
facts assisted to play upon the temperaments of those who were flying in France for the first 
time and had not got confidence ether in their ability or in their aeroplanes.     I can remember 
my bedroom companions in the farmhouse in which we were billeted, felt as I did, and how 
each of us lay awake in the darkness, not telling the other that sleep would not come, 
listening to the roar of the guns and thinking of the dawn patrol next morning.     At last we 
could bear it no longer and calling out to each other admitted a mutual feeling of terror and 
foreboding.   We lit the candles to hide the dark, and after that felt a little better, and 
somehow got through that night as we had to get through the next day.46    
 
He was able continue flying until following a minor injury to his hand, his 
Commanding Officer (Smith-Barry) took the opportunity to send him back to 
England.   Balfour accepted the sense of this action: 
This sent me to hospital and kept me off flying for some days.  Smith-Barry took advantage 
of the opportunity and arranged that I should be sent back to |England………..There was no 
question of being sent home in official disgrace, but purely that at that time I was of no real 
use to the unit and therefore better out of the way.47 
 
 
Casualty rates remained high throughout 1917, culminating with the Battle of  
Cambrai which started on the 20th of November.  This battle was the first time 
that tanks had been used ‘en masse and to preserve the secrecy of the preparations 
 
46 H. H. Balfour, An Airman Marches (London,1933)  pp.46-47. 
47  Balfour, p.59; Balfour later returned to France and ended the war having shot down nine enemy aircraft and 
won the MC.   He was interviewed in the HTV(West) Documentary ‘The Cavalry of the Clouds (1987), 
accessed 10 Oct 2017, during which he referred to the responses to combat noted above. 
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most tank and troop movements were made at night and there was extensive use 
of camouflage.48      Additionally, to prevent daylight reconnaissance, the RFC 
maintained a series of daylight fighter patrols over the British lines.  There were 
no losses on these patrols.   
That situation changed dramatically on the first day of the battle, fought in mist 
and low clouds.   The air battle took place along the front line covering a five- 
mile advance by the tanks and infantry.     There were significant RFC losses, 
especially to those squadrons engaged in low level operations.                No 3 
Squadron had a terrible day.      Nine aircraft (Sopwith Camels) were tasked to 
attack (bomb and strafe) three German airfields, Estourmel, Carnirres and 
Cuadry.       The first Camels arriving over Estourmel at 0730 found twelve 
German fighters of Jasta 5 with pilots waiting ready in their cockpits; some of 
these got airborne and shot down one Camel, two more Camels crashed into trees 
in the mist.   A fourth aircraft was lost later attacking this airfield.  All the pilots 
involved in these attacks were killed.        Another squadron pilot was killed in a 
separate raid and a squadron aircraft crashed on take-off.49   It seems that the 
Germans had been warned to expect an attack about 0700 hrs, which was why 
they were on standby in their aircraft.   Ironically, the German’s thought that the 
weather was too bad for flying, until they were attacked.50 
 
48  G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory (London, 2001)  p.218. 
49 Henshaw, The Sky their, p.133. 
50 Jones, TWITA Volume IV  pp. 233-234;       Neumann,  The German Air  Force, p.244. 
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For the rest of the month fighting continued with the armies advance gradually 
slowing down and with RFC casualties remaining heavy.  Many of these losses 
were to aircraft engaged in ground attack sorties, one of which was described by 
Captain A S Gould Lee of No 46 Squadron: 
Low clouds and misty weather made flying difficult, but on the whole not unfavourable to 
the work.  In the battle area the smoke rose to the mist and formed a barrier not pleasant to 
penetrate at so low an altitude.  A few casualties occurred through pilots flying into the 
ground, but the majority were through ground fire.   Those of us who survived did so I 
consider, because we flew very close to the ground until our objective was reached… One 
retains vivid pictures of ludicrous expressions on the upturned faces of German troops as 
we passed a few feet above their heads.    As soon as the objective was reached it became 
necessary to rise in order to attack, and then of course one’s risk from ground fire became 
normal.51 
 
This was the type of ground attack which had an average loss rate of 30% of the 
aircraft involved.        Confirmation of that loss rate is found in the operations of 
23rd of November.        On that day aircraft of Nos 64 and 2 (Australian) Squadrons 
attacked troops and transport throughout the morning.52  Prisoner’s statements 
and visual evidence showed that these attacks increased the panic caused by the 
tanks.  However, nine of the aircraft failed to return, another four were wrecked 
and thirteen were so irreparably damaged they had to be sent from the front for 
reconstruction.53   The casualty rate for this operation was 35%.54 
Although in most cases these casualties can be numbered in single figures for 
each squadron and are infinitesimal compared to casualties in the battles on the 
 
51 Jones, TWITA Volume IV pp 236-237; A. Gould Lee, Open Cockpit, Chap 14 p .61. 
52 No 3 (Australian) Squadron was one of four Australian squadrons operating with the RFC. Although 
Australian manned and administered, they flew under RFC operational command. 
53 Jones, TWITA Vol IV pp.244-245; Henshaw, The Sky Their, pp.133-134.   64 Squadron lost six aircraft and 68 
Squadron three on that day.       
54 Jones, TWITA Vol IV p.239; F M Cutlack, Official History of Australia in the Great War 1914-1918 Volume 
VIII The Australian Flying Corps (AWM,1923, 1984; pp.188-189. 
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ground: it should be noted that the loss of nine pilots is 45% of the squadron’s 
establishment (20 pilots).    In March 1918 at its peak the RFC had ninety-three 
squadrons in France with about 2100 aircrew (pilots and observers, mostly 
officers but with some NCOs).   Between 1st March and 31st of July 1918 the 
average casualty rate (killed and missing) was 220 per month.55    
This wastage rate from late in 1917 and well into the summer of 1918 was at a 
time when, despite the influx of Canadians, there was great difficulty in finding 
trained replacements, especially for low level operations where of course the 
losses were greatest.   Between July and October 1918, an average Camel 
squadron required twelve pilots a month to maintain establishment strength. the 
training squadrons (Camels) produced 14 pilots per month, but as there was also 
a requirement for two instructors and some staff pilot posts, there was inevitably 
a shortfall in squadron replacements and of course those who did arrive were 
without experience.56    It is clear that the continuous turnover of aircrew on all 
squadrons, because of casualties in action, accidents and ‘returns’ to Home 
Establishment (for medical or further training reasons) was an important factor in 
the lowering of morale. 
In the year ending December 1917, some 90 cases of psychiatric illnesses had 
been diagnosed, including 46 cases of Flying Sickness, 15 cases of Neurasthenia, 
12 suffering from Debility(flying) and 17 cases of DAH.     
 
55 Jones, TWITA, Appendices, Appendix XXXVII. 
56 M. Molkentin, Centenary History of Australia And The Great War Volume 1, Australians And The War in the 
Air (Oxford, 2014), p. 59. 
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Not all removals were permanent: in the case of 2/Lt E J Smart (No 9 Squadron), 
he was admitted to No 7 General Hospital at St Omar in May 1917 with 
Neuralgia, in June he was categorised as NYD (N) (nervous).  Finally, on 11th 
July he was diagnosed as Shell Shock and transferred to London Hospital.    He  
returned to duty and in the first Royal Air Force List on 1st April 1918, he was 
gazetted Lieutenant and later in November 1918, appears again on his casualty 
card with a minor foot injury.57          Another member of No 9 Squadron was also 
a psychiatric casualty in 1917,  Lt R E Thomas was admitted to No 7 General 
Hospital St Omar on 20th June 1917, classified NYDN, on 28th diagnosed as 
suffering from Neurasthenia and on 3rd July transferred to No 4 London 
Hospital.58    He did not return to duty.     
It was an Observer from No 9 squadron who had an unusual, but not unknown 
response to flying stress: that of suicide.  The RFC/RAF casualty cards show a 
number of cases of suicide, but it is not always clear whether the officer 
concerned is aircrew or not, this writer’s estimate of the number during the air 
war is 12.   On the face of it suicide seems an irrational response to flying stress, 
but it is not unheard of for aircrew suffering from depression sometimes a result 
of flying or combat stress, to take their own life.59   Although the Casualty Card 
raised for Lieutenant R B Cameron shows him to have been killed in an accident, 
 
57  RAFM Casualty Card, E J Smart.  (Royal Air Force List 1918) 
58 RAFM Casualty Card Lt R E Thomas. 
59 R. R. Grinker & J. P. Spiegal Men Under Stress, (New York, 1963) pp.110-113. 
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it does not tell the whole story.60    In fact, Lt Cameron deliberately jumped to his 
death from 1000 feet above the British trench line.61   According to the personal 
diary of Cameron’s flight commander for 7th Jan 1918: 
I had put Cameron down for a practice contact patrol, as he was in bed I strafed him and 
sent him up.   He committed suicide by jumping out of the machine.  I then went up with 
Lt Robson to do the practice contact.62 
 
 
That terse (and seemingly callous) statement by Captain Cripps which  may be 
explained by the fact that he had seen over 50 squadron aircrew killed in his six 
months on the squadron goes no way to explain Cameron’s action, but Cameron’s 
experiences since arriving in France do show that he may have been exposed to 
more than the admittedly great stress suffered by all aircrew.    Cameron was a 
medical student who joined the RFC in 1917.    After training he went to No 9 
Squadron as an observer flying RE8s.      By October he had been awarded his 
observers badge.   However, apart from being attacked on three occasions whilst 
on patrol: he was also involved in no fewer than four aircraft accidents, two in 
September and two in October-all in RE8s.63      As an Observer, it is likely that 
he had little or no control over the accidents, which can only have increased the 
trauma.      It seems clear that Lt Cameron was severely affected by his 
experiences on No 9 squadron and perhaps he was unfortunate that his fragile 
 
60 RAFM Casualty Card (Incident) R B Cameron 7th January 1918. 
61 P. Dye.  (Air Vice Marshal) ‘The Aviator as Superhero’ Air Power Review, Vol 7 (3) 2004 pp.65-72. 
62 Dye p.67.  . 
63  Dye, ‘The Aviator’, pp.70 -74; Henshaw, The Sky Their, pp.364-365. The accidents concerned illustrate the 
extra stress on observers as they were all completely beyond his control, three were the result of bad landings 
(three different pilots) and one a failed take off due to engine failure.  Added to that another Observer on 9 
Squadron was involved in a fatal accident on 14th September.   
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state of mind was not recognised and acted upon.   It is rare to find any reference 
to aircrew suicide in the Casualty Cards and it is not always clear that the Officer 
concerned is aircrew, it is estimated that the number of suicides in RFC/RAF was 
12.  One other case of suicide is recorded by Captain H H Balfour, who returning 
to France as a flight commander on No 43 squadron, tells of a Captain F, an 
officer who had shown a reluctance to act as flight commander and lead the flight.  
He refused to fly and was informed that this refusal of duty would lead to a court 
martial.   He was ordered to go to RFC HQ: the next day he was found in the 
officers’ latrines, having used his service revolver to shoot himself.64 
In fact, No.9 Squadron Commanding Officers in 1918 did act in several cases.     
Between Cameron’s suicide in January and the end of fighting in November, eight 
officers were removed from flying and admitted to hospital, five with Flying 
Sickness (sent to England), one with DAH and two with neurasthenia.    None of 
these officers returned to duty before the end of the war.65  Of the 300 aircrew 
who served with No 9 Squadron between December 1915 and November 1918 
some 32% served less than a month.66  Of course, the main reason for this wastage 
was the casualty rate, but during this period 14% of the squadron aircrew were 
returned to England.      It appears that apart from aircrew returned for further 
training a significant number were given the same sympathetic treatment given 
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to Balfour.          An official post-war study established that the overall monthly 
wastage rate for pilots on all squadrons on the Western Front was 32%.67    
As happened with the death of Lt Max Immelmann in 1916 and Verner Voss in 
September 1917, RFC morale was lifted by the shooting down on 12th April 1918 
of Captain Baron Von Richthofen, the leading German ‘Ace’ whose leadership 
of the massed Jastas had been in large part responsible for the success of the GAF 
in 1917 and early 1918.       His was undoubtedly the premier Ace of the War with 
80 victories and he was buried with full military honours at Bertangles.      His 
importance to the air war is exemplified by the British Official History’s taking 
no fewer than eight pages to cover his career and death.68   It has been said that 
his record of success had to some extent neutralized the psychological advantage 
given to the RFC by the aggressive fighting spirit engendered by Trenchard’s 
offensive policy.69     
However, it should be noted that a great part of the impact made by Richthofen 
and other successful German pilots was the result of a policy of publicity and 
propaganda adopted the German Air Force with respect to individual victories in 
the air war.  
The creation of so-called ‘Aces’ began with the French Air Force early in 1915 
with the promotion by the press of Adolphe Pegoud, using five victories as the 
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yardstick to identify an Ace.70      In Germany the process began with the inclusion 
of a pilot’s name in the official war communiques after his fourth victory.   
Additional victories were also reported and after eight victories the pilot was 
awarded Germany’s highest military decoration ‘The Ordre Pour le Meritre’.    As 
the war progressed the number of victories needed to qualify for the award was 
increased until by late 1918 it was thirty.71       In both France and Germany 
considerable publicity was given to aerial victories.      The first German Ace, 
Immelmann, was officially filmed and his aircraft put on display in Berlin.  He is 
said to have received some 40 letters a day from admirers.72   The German policy 
of maximum publicity meant that not only were the Aces heroes in Germany, but 
also well known to the RFC and perhaps as important, to the public and press in 
England. 
The British Army (and from 1918, the RAF) took a quite different view about 
publicising the victories of the RFC.   There was a professional reticence in the 
British Army about all forms of publicity.     Sir Douglas Haig said in September 
1917 ‘I feel sure that the officers of the RFC are proud of being anonymous like 
their comrades in other branches of the British Army’. 73   This attitude almost 
certainly had a deleterious effect on morale.     It is fair to add that Trenchard’s 
position was also based on a concept of ‘fairness’ as he felt that the ‘aces’ system 
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entailed a measure of injustice as it implied that those who obtained Ace status 
had a monopoly of courage and skill.    Not everybody had the opportunities of 
the fighter pilots.    In fact, at the end of the war only some 38% of RAF units 
were Scout (fighter) units.74    Another measure of the unrepresentative nature of 
the ‘Aces preoccupation’ of press and public (in both World Wars) lies in the 
percentages of squadron pilots credited with victories.  In No 2 (AFC) Squadron, 
(flying SE5a) less than 7% of the pilots accounted for 42% of claimed victories 
and in No 4 (AFC) Squadron (Sopwith Camel) the figures were, 5% claiming 
46% of victories.75    These differences between the Aces and other squadron 
pilots are even more pronounced in the cases of very high scoring pilots such as 
Ball and Bishop.  
However, on the other hand, giving due publicity to successful operations and the 
award of decorations invariably enhances morale.     As Admiral Karl Donitz, an 
outstanding leader of submarines in the Second World War said: 
 Where decorations were concerned, there was no correspondence and no red tape in U-
Boat Command … I regard this practice of immediate awards to those engaged upon 
operations as psychologically important.76   
 
     
Support for that attitude comes from one of those most concerned, the RFC 
aircrew, Arthur Gould Lee who survived the war to become an Air Vice- Marshal 
in the post war RAF, wrote: 
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What Trenchard and those who thought like him failed to realise was that human beings 
need heroes, indeed crave for them especially in wartime.     The fighting troops, both in 
the air and on the ground, need heroes to set the standards, to lead in aggressive action… 
especially during the black year of 1917, when disaster threatened us at sea and a future of 
future massacre on land.       The names and achievements of our warriors of the air, the 
aces whom everybody could salute as heroes, should have been blazoned throughout the 
Empire and America…We should have built up our heroes as national assets, as did our 
enemies and allies.77 
 
 
One result of these contrasting policies was that German Aces were well known 
(and sometimes feared) by RFC aircrew and the public, whereas successful 
British pilots generally remained virtually unknown.  
 There were some exceptions to the ‘no publicity’ rule of the RFC, as considerable 
publicity was given to the RFC pilots who were awarded the Victoria Cross.  By 
the end of the war there were seventeen RFC/RAF VCs.  
In fact, as Molkenten points out the term ‘Ace’ is anachronistic, it is not and has 
never been an official description in any service.    It is almost always linked to a 
figure of five victories, which is depicted a marker of success in the air war.   
The total of ‘Kills’ attributed to an individual pilot is based upon subjective 
criteria, often the pilots own combat report.  These reports are usually entered 
squadron war diaries and claims made to wing or brigade.    Often these higher 
authorities amend the claims and more confusingly sometimes ‘share’ victories 
between pilots.  This is a difficulty with French And American claims which give 
a full credit to each pilot involved.  If two pilots contribute to one victory both 
get the credit.    These Air Services also awarded victories to both pilot and 
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observer/gunner in two-seater aircraft.      Thus, there is often a variation between 
numbers of victories attributed to individuals. 
There is also the problem of ‘over-claiming.        All air services over-claimed to 
some degree’.   In September 1918, the RAF claimed three times as many German 
aircraft destroyed as were lost.78   Some over-claiming is due to a reasonable wish 
to boost individual and squadron scores, more perhaps to the inevitable confusion 
of air fighting, especially in the last months of 1918 when perhaps dozens of 
aircraft could be involved.          Another factor affecting claims was the improved 
performance of aircraft.         By 1918 aircraft could fly three times as high as in 
1915, achieve speeds of over 150 mph and firepower was more than doubled.        
In these circumstances it is likely that any pilot who tried to follow his opponent 
down or even watched what happened to him would be attacked himself. 79       
The over-claiming considered above can reasonably be considered an inevitable 
consequence of the realities of air fighting. 
The Germans credited some six or seven aces with more than 35 victories and 
there is little doubt about most of these victories as many of the shot down aircraft 
came down in German territory (often with the British crew captured) because of 
the RFC’s offensive policy.    On the British side there were thirteen pilots who 
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claimed 40 or more victories and another ten claiming more than 30.80    It is right 
to say that most of these pilot’s claims were accepted under the RFC system of 
requiring corroboration by other pilots or from the ground or if possible the actual 
downed aircraft.  But a few RFC pilots (due to their reputation or a helpful 
Squadron Commander) could fly on individual sorties into German air space on 
hunting forays.           Albert Ball and Billy Bishop were two, but not the only 
two, who claimed victories which by their very nature could not be corroborated.   
However, while there has been little question regarding most of Ball’s victories, 
the position is quite different in the case of Bishop.     Bishop’s case is 
controversial both for its facts and because questioning the record of Canada’ s 
premier airmen and a VC holder is difficult.    The first person to question 
Bishop’s veracity was a fellow No 60 squadron pilot, William Fry (MC).  On the 
4th May 1917, he was tasked to fly with Bishop, his flight commander, to chase 
away an enemy reconnaissance aircraft.     They got airborne but failed to catch 
the aircraft and having fired a few shots in its direction they returned to base.    
After the flight Bishop asked Fry if he had seen the aircraft ‘go down’ Fry had 
not seen this happen, but Bishop was allowed his victory.81     Fry was also with 
60 Squadron on 2nd June. when Bishop carried out his attack on a German airfield 
(alone) when he claimed to have destroyed three German aircraft.  Bishop said 
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that he got lost on the way back and landed to ask the way.   This was the flight 
for which Bishop was awarded the Victoria Cross.82     Fry with others, including 
ground personnel, inspected Bishop’s aircraft and suspected that the bullet holes 
in Bishops aircraft had been inflicted from very close range (Bishop claimed that 
damage meant that he had to throw away his aircraft machine gun on his way 
back).83        Fry points out that there was some concern on the squadron, 
particularly about the Commanding Officer seemingly easily accepting Bishop’s 
story.     The Victoria Cross regulations in force at the time called for ‘conclusive 
proof as far as the circumstances will allow, and attestation of the act’.84     In this 
case Major Scott No 60 Squadron Commanding Officer went direct to 3rd Army 
Commander (General Allenby) with Bishop’s combat report and shortly 
afterwards in August 1917 the VC was awarded. 
 In fact, Bishop may have been the beneficiary of several factors including Scott’s 
ambition, pressure by well-known persons in England and faulty administration 
by Army Command and perhaps, the state of RFC morale.85         
 At that time, the summer of 1917, RFC morale was in almost the same parlous 
state as it had been in ‘Bloody April’, fearsome casualties were being replaced 
with novice pilots and observers, many of whom did not last long, aircrew 
themselves were questioning the rational of their sacrifice: 
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There was hardly an evening when the same people gathered in the mess.    It was here that 
a certain amount of frank and free comment on our casualty rate could be heard………. our 
commanding officer discouraged it, but it continues. 
This feeling, although officially looked on as defeatist was prevalent among operational 
pilots ……. Officers of the higher command, from Major General Hugh Trenchard down 
to the commanders of wings, according to the critics were throwing away aircraft and lives 
for no discernible purpose.86   
 
 
 An award of a VC would: as it had done before, give a boost to morale, 
especially the replacements arriving at the front.  Because there was no 
Canadian Air Force in the First World War Canadians enlisted directly into the 
RFC/RAF and it is estimated that in the last two years of the war some 25% of 
RFC/RAF aircrew were Canadian.87    Additionally, some 11% of RFC/RAF 
casualties throughout the war, were Canadian88.      In these circumstances it 
does not seem unreasonable to believe the War Office and the Government 
would take the chance to award of the highest gallantry decoration to a 
Canadian. 
 
Following Russia’s defeat in the east and the Treaty of Brest-Litovest, which 
ceded to Germany huge amounts of territory, 50 million inhabitants and 
substantial economic resources, the Germans began the transfer of some 1 million 
troops to the western front.89    Both the French and British Commands were 
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expecting a German Offensive in early 1918 and Haig and Trenchard were 
concerned to gain and maintain the RFC’s air superiority.  
 The RFC’s latest aircraft, the Sopwith Camel, SE5a, Bristol Fighter and the DH4 
and the use of new tactics such as the larger formations and low-level ground 
attacks had at least some temporary superiority in the air 90      Nevertheless, even 
though increasing numbers of aircrew were being produced by the training 
organisation and the Canadian schools were producing significant numbers of 
aircrew; casualties and wastage from accidents continued to be a serious concern 
for the RFC.     To add to the difficulties, there were conflicts between the RNAS 
and RFC regarding resources (men and materials).       The RNAS, sourced its 
aircraft and engines from aircraft and engine manufacturers of its choice.  On the 
other had the Army (RFC) depended almost entirely on aircraft designed and 
produced by the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough, (established 1905) but 
as its official role was to design and test aircraft, the actual manufacture of aircraft 
and engines was often contracted out.91   
This situation caused considerable disquiet, partly because of the Royal Aircraft 
Factory’s monopoly of aircraft for the RFC, but also because the performance of 
aircraft produced by the factory was often below that of civil manufacturers.    The 
‘Fokker scourge’ of 1916 and the continuing serious losses of 1917 brought the 
matter to a head.      At first a Committee was set up to ensure co-ordination and 
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control of aircraft supply.  It lasted two months.    Next an Air Board was formed, 
with Army and Admiralty representatives included.     This body found itself in 
conflict with the newly created Ministry of Munitions, which demanded absolute 
priority for machine tools which were used for aircraft construction.       
At this point there was a change of Government Asquith being replaced as Prime 
Minister by David Lloyd George and a small War Cabinet was formed.       The 
powers of the Air Board were increased, but crucially the responsibility for supply 
of aircraft and aero engines was transferred from the Admiralty and War Office 
to the Ministry of Munitions.92      This Ministry at once laid down a programme 
to supply 2000 aero engines per month by autumn 1917, but was unable to make 
a similar advance in aircraft production.   It was to help cover this shortfall in 
aircraft production that some naval fighter squadrons were temporarily 
transferred to the RFC.93      Even with the naval squadrons, the RFC was still 
short of the number of squadrons needed in France at the time, 50 as against 57.      
The general shortage of aircraft, especially fighters, came to the governments, 
and public’s, attention dramatically with the first German bomber raids on 
London.   The first attempt was made on 17th May 1917: but owing to bad 
visibility, the 21 Gotha twin engine Gothas turned south and bombed Folkstone, 
95 people were killed and 195 injured.  The UK defences both anti-aircraft and 
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fighters were confused and completely ineffective.94     The next attack took place 
on 13th June when fourteen Gothas bombed the East End and 160 people were 
killed and 414 injured.    This time no fewer than 95 sorties were flown by British 
Fighters, but no damage was caused to the raiders.95 
The Commander of the German No 3 squadron which led the attack, exposed the 
failure of the British defence: 
London was reached by seventeen aeroplanes.  The visibility was exceptionally good.  With 
perfect clearness, the Thames Bridge, the railway stations, the city, even the bank of 
England, could be recognised.    The anti-aircraft fire over London was not particularly 
strong and was badly directed.      Many fighting aeroplanes had, meanwhile nearly the 
height of the squadron.  In all, sixteen enemy aircraft which flew independently, were 
counted.   The number which ascended may rightly be estimated was about thirty.   Only 
one of them attacked.  Our aircraft circled round and dropped their bombs with no hurry or 
trouble.    According to our observation, a station in the city, and a Thames Bridge, probably 
Tower were hit.96 
 
Following an urgent Cabinet meeting it was decided that the strength of the flying 
services should be doubled.  Trenchard was consulted about the feasibility of 
standing fighter patrols and he pointed out that these would be very costly in 
aircraft and pilots.  The question was then raised of using squadrons from France 
to boost the defences.    Trenchard reluctantly agreed with this proposal, 
stipulating that squadrons should be returned to France by 5th July. 97       
Accordingly, Nos 56 and 66 Squadrons were allocated for Home Defence duties 
on 21st June.  As agreed the two squadrons returned to their bases in France on 
 
94 C. Cole & E. F. Cheeseman., The Air Defence of Great Britain 1914-1918  (London, 1984)  p.213;  Jones, 
TWITA Vol V pp.18-40;  Henshaw, The Sky Their, pp.261-265. 
95 Cole & Cheeseman, The Air Defence, p.213. 
96 G. P. Neuman., (trans J. E. Gurdon) The German Air Force in The Great War, (London,1920)  pp.164-165;      
Jones,  TWITA Volume V  pp.27-28. 
97 Jones TWITA Volume V   pp.213-214. 
270 
 
the 5th and 6th of July and with what one writer described as an ‘uncanny sense of 
timing’, on the morning of 7th July the Germans launched their second London 
raid with twenty-one Gothas.98 Although some thirty RFC aircraft contacted the 
Gothas only one was shot down.  Two RFC aircraft were lost with their crews 
killed.    Public indignation reached new heights at the way the enemy could still 
raid the heart of London in broad daylight, even though this time casualties were 
less, mainly because many people took cover.     The Cabinet responded 
immediately by again recalling squadrons from France, but also, and more 
important in the longer term, set up a committee under the chairmanship of 
Lieutenant-General J C Smuts to hold an investigation into the last two raids and 
favour the War Cabinet with his views ‘as to the provision for the civil population 
in the future, and his proposals as to carrying the air war into Germany at the 
earliest possible moment’.99       Smuts in fact produced two reports, the first 
which presented on the 19th July dealt comprehensively with all aspect of air 
defence and its organization and which was accepted by the Government.100   
The second report produced on 17th August 1917, about which the Official history 
of the service states: ‘It is the most important paper in the history of the creation 
of the Royal Air Force’, set out (after a long account of the operations and 
command and control of the RFC and RNAS) eight recommendations, of which 
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the three most important were  (1) That an Air Ministry be instituted as soon as 
possible … to control and administer all matters in connexion with aerial warfare.       
(2)  That an Air Staff be instituted on the lines of the Imperial General Staff, 
responsible for War Plans, Operations, Intelligence, and training.  (3) The Air 
Staff and the Air Ministry arrange as soon as possible, the amalgamation the of 
the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps and to prepare the 
necessary draft legislation for its constitution and discipline.101   The government 
accepted all Smut’s recommendations and an Air Force Bill was introduced into 
parliament and received Royal assent on 29th November.    On 2nd January 1918 
the Air council was formed with Trenchard named as Chief of the Air Staff and 
he was relieved of his command in France to take up this post.102        Trenchard 
agreed to serve although he was against the proposal for a unified air service (as 
was Haig) and had never attended staff college or served on the General Staff.103        
The amalgamated service ‘The Royal Air Force’ came into existence on 1st April 
1918.    
 
Before he left, Trenchard prepared a memorandum ‘The Employment of the 
Royal Flying Corps in Defence’ which was issued in January 1918.  The first duty 
of the RFC was to detect through reconnaissance the enemy’s logistical build-up 
before battle and then to hamper it through bombing.    Once an offensive had 
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begun the principal duty of the RFC was to ‘render our artillery fire effective’.    
Beyond that the RFC was to attack enemy reinforcements, road transport, artillery 
positions and finally (partly for its effect upon enemy morale) to carry out low 
level attacks on advanced troops,104        Trenchard’s successor as RFC/RAF 
Commander. Major-General J M Salmond, accepted both the memorandum and 
significantly, Trenchard’s offensive philosophy: 
This can only be done by attacking and defeating the enemy’s air forces.  The action of the 
Royal Flying Corps must, therefore, always remain essentially offensive.105  
 
The new commander of the Royal Air Force was faced with the immediate 
problem of aircrew wastage.     It had been realised that despite the RFC/RAF 
having superior numbers, the German pilots were more experienced and more 
successful.    They had been carefully selected and had often been given special 
courses of training at fighter schools.   By comparison, RAF aircrews were often 
inexperienced, in large part due to the unexpected wastage rate which had caused 
training times to be reduced.106  As early as July 1917, Henderson had told the 
War Cabinet: 
The actual requirements of pilots are very largely governed by the casualties.  Wastage from 
all causes has hitherto been so great that, although we have succeeded in increasing the 
strength considerably, yet we have never been able to give pilots as much training as would 
be desirable.107  
 
There had been some improvement in pilot training; the average flight time of 
pilots arriving in France had increased from 15.5 hours instruction in April to 
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48.5 hours per pilot by November, but the size of the replacement problem was 
emphasized by the wastage rate of pilots, which in 1917 and 1918 was 600% per 
annum.108     
In late February and early March 1918, intelligence assessments indicated that 
the Germans were preparing for a new offensive.    RFC reconnaissance and 
photographic flights added to the flow of information and on 18th of March a 
captured German pilot revealed that the attack would begin on the 21st March.109  
At the opening of the German Offense on that day the RFC had 31 squadrons on 
the British Third and Fifth Armies front, a total of 579 aircraft of which 261 were 
single seat fighters.      German aircraft operating with the three German Armies 
involved totalled 730, of which 326 were single seat fighters.110  
This was the first time in the war that German air strength was greater than British 
on the Western Front.   The RFC plan for operations during the expected German 
attack was that all corps aircraft would be engaged on artillery patrols, 
photography, harassment of enemy troops and if possible, night bombing.  The 
Army squadrons would concentrate on escort and protection of the corps aircraft 
and would also carry out low level attacks on enemy troops and low-level 
bombing.     One squadron (No 48) was to be held back for long range 
reconnaissance.             As was to be expected, events overturned this orderly 
plan and in the event most squadrons were tasked at some time with low level 
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operations to assist British troops when attacked by large numbers of German 
Aircraft.111         The German Air Force had been preparing for the offensive with 
a programme of expansion and had also reorganised their air service by doubling 
the fighter flights to from forty to eighty and for low level attack units to be 
protected, the so called Battle Flights were reorganised.   The strengths of these 
flights were increased to; 14 Fighters, 6 Reconnaissance, 9 Artillery spotting, 6 
Bombers and 6 photographic reconnaissance aircraft.     In March 1918 there were 
38 battle flights on the western front (eight transferred from Russian front).112     
This emphasis on low level operations was partly in response to German army 
complaints about the effect upon the morale of German troops of seemingly 
unopposed   RFC ground attack aircraft.113  
The RFC’s (soon to be RAF) last battle started at 0445 hrs on 21st March 1918 
along the front line of Britain’s Fifth Army and extending to the adjacent Third 
Army, when forward and battle zones, lines of communication, head-quarters and 
positions to a depth of twenty miles behind the lines, were suddenly subjected to 
a prolonged and fierce bombardment.   This was followed at about 0800hrs by 
the advance of German infantry led by specially trained  ‘sturmtruppen’  (storm 
troopers), supported by 730 German aircraft. 114   The initial attack behind a 
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1998) RFC HQ weekly Communique 132 19-25th March 1918; G Norris, The Royal Flying Corps: A History 
(London, 1965) pp.234-235. 
112 Jones, TWITA Vol IV   p.275. 
113 R. B. Asprey, The German High Command At War (London, 1994) p.385 & p.407. 
114 P. J. Daybell., ‘The March Retreat of 1918; The Last Battle of the Royal Flying Corps’ Journal of The Royal 
Air Force Historical Society l 22  (2000)  pp.107-126; Sheffield, Forgotten Victory p.225;  Jones, TWITA, Vol 
IV  p.293; Avery, The German High, p.382.   
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‘creeping barrage’ was very successful aided by the dense fog which covered the 
battle field and prevented RFC aircraft, airborne despite the fog, making any 
impact on the battle until the weather improved later in the day,    Air fighting 
was intense in the afternoon and evening as the weather cleared and German 
aircraft began to appear in large numbers over their advancing armies.     By mid-
afternoon, the Corps Squadrons were reporting the German advance and in the 
Third Army area the RE8s of No 59 Squadron were reporting heavy damage to 
both the line and wire.    The spotting aircraft repeatedly tried to call down 
artillery fire on the advancing enemy troops clearly seen moving towards the 
front, but without response.115  The Official History explains why the aircraft 
were ignored, explaining the chaos and confusion at this time: 
The chief causes of failure were the severance of telephone communication and the 
breakdown of the artillery wireless organisation; batteries were continually on the move; 
much telephone and wireless equipment was lost or damaged; and when batteries halted 
they did not always erect their wireless masts.  The majority of calls sent down in the first 
days of the battle were not answered whilst the observers were waiting to observe the fire 
effect.116 
 
The covering fighters were soon in action and on the first day of the battle some 
thirty-nine combat actions took place in V Brigade, supporting British Fifth Army 
and thirty-two in III Brigade supporting British Third Army.    In fact, this day 
was an example of the propensity of pilots in all services to ‘overclaim’ victories 
 
115 Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.491. 
116 Jones, TWITA Vol IV p.294; Wise, p.491; Daybell, p.117. 
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in combat.      On the 21st British pilots claimed twenty-five enemy aircraft 
destroyed and the Germans nineteen; the actual figures were eight and two.117   
By the second day of the battle almost all the RFC squadrons on these Brigades 
were spending a large part of the operational effort on close support, ie low level 
ground attacks on the advancing Germans.      On the 27th March low level strikes 
on the still advancing Germans began at dawn.    Although, as we have seen, 
casualties in these attacks were high there was considerable variation in the loss 
rates between squadrons.   This was due in part to how ground defences differed 
in some sectors; but there was also a discrepancy in skill and experience between 
pilots and leadership of Squadron and flight commanders.      For example, No 84 
Squadron (led by Sholto Douglas) escaped lightly, but in No 70 Squadron 
casualties were high.     Even though pilots would arrive with forty hours solo 
experience (pitifully small by today’s standards, but double 1916 standards) there 
was no time to give them squadron training, but were sent straight into the line.118        
The number of casualties due to flying sickness in 1918 in these squadrons 
reflected their casualty rates, six in No 70 and Three in No 84.119         An example 
of the stress engendered by low level work, is that of  Arthur Cobby the 24 year 
old highest  scoring Australian pilot  who said that once he got involved in troop 
strafing he could no longer eat because of overstrain, nervousness, and a mixture 
 
117 Henshaw, The Sky Their, p.151; Wise, Canadian Airman, p.492; Jones, TWITA Volume IV p.298; Daybell, 
p.114. 
118 Barker, The Royal Flying Corps, p.452. 
119 RAFM Casualty Cards for 84 and 70 squadrons. 70 Sqdn, RAFM CC Copp, Dawson, Jones.  Linford 
Petsculer Todd,Wood.   84 Sqdn RAFMCC Grosvenor, Highwood, Lason. 
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of fear and hypertension.  He lived on champagne and brandy and the occasional 
biscuit.   Yet air combat never worried him, he achieved 29 victories and survived 
the war.120       
Added to the strain of casualties and exhaustion the crews of the RFC had an 
additional worry.    On 22nd March, the seriousness of the situation caused the 
RFC to pull back from threatened airfields.  All seventeen squadrons supporting 
Fifth Army and five in support of Third Army, evacuated their airfields.     As 
noted by the Australian Official History: 
So quickly did these evacuation orders come, that many British pilots who flew on a patrol 
in the morning would return a few hours later to find the whole of their squadrons’ 
personnel gone to some unknown destination—in some cases without their stores and 
equipment---and the aerodrome being shelled by the enemy.  This naturally disorganised 
those squadrons.   The pilot would avoid landing if the aerodrome was being shelled and 
fly on to a place of safety—perhaps choosing, as he thought, a flat quiet field.     He was 
often handicapped by shortage of petrol and in some cases, he had to remain with his 
machine for several days before he could get petrol or make communication with his 
squadron again.121 
  
After being slowed temporarily the Germans launched the second phase of their 
offensive on 9th April, and the war in the air again intensified and at times the sky 
was described as ‘full of aircraft’ as each side strove for air and battlefield 
supremacy.       From the start of this second phase of the offensive, until the end 
of June when it was finally halted, the (now) RAF casualties were 695 killed or 
missing in action and 99 killed in accidents.  A further 120 aircrew were wounded 
in action.122     The total of 1114 aircrew from the approximately 1760 aircrew 
 
120  E M Cutluck, Official History of Australia In The War Of 1914-1918 Volume VIII, The Australian Flying 
Corps (AWM, 1923)   pp.292-293; Barker, The Royal Flying Corps, p.452  
121 F. M. Cutlack, The Australian Flying Corps, pp.233-234. 
122 Jones TWITA, Appendix XXXVII; Henshaw, The Sky Their, pp.163-186. 
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serving at the front is a wastage rate of approximately 65%,  all of whom required 
instant replacement; which explains both the strain on the training organisation 
in  the Home Establishment and why the loss rate remained so high among new 
and inexperienced replacements, who have little chance of living long enough to 
get experienced.    The great increase of ground attack operations during the 
German offensive with their high loss rate had a significant impact on these 
figures.    However, the efforts of the RFC /RAF did make a valuable contribution 
as noted by the Australian Official History: 
A thorough examination of the action of the Allied air forces at this critical time before 
Amiens, in the closing days of March, makes it almost certain that,  while it was the heroic 
infantry of outnumbered British and French divisions which held up the enemy advance---
and the Australian divisions played a glorious part in the later stages----it was principally 
the untiring exertions of the airmen in delaying, damaging, and disheartening the enemy’s 
reserves, and throwing his whole transport system out of gear, which enabled the Allied 
infantry to succeed.123  
 
Although all squadrons whatever their role at some time took part in ground 
attacks, No 46 Squadron was the only fighting squadron on the Third Army front 
to be used solely for ground attacks during the German offensive.   In those first 
weeks the squadron suffered six pilots killed in action/ PoW and several wounded 
and in the period, April to June, three pilots were removed from duty suffering 
from Flying Sickness.124   
 
123 Cutlack, The Australian Flying Corps, p.237. 
124  Henshaw, The Sky Their, pp.152-184; RAFM Casualty Cards, C H Cahill, F H Cave, D W Foreshaw. Cahill 
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The Germans were to carry out further offensives in May and June, but these were 
less powerful, and their advance was finally halted at the end of June.   In August 
the Allies were able to undertake a counter offensive which proved finally to win 
the war.  In the final three months the fighting in the air and especially ground 
attack actions in support of the now advancing British Armies was the most 
intense of the war.    In August 1918, after another adjustment to the RAF 
organisation in France, there were 93 Squadrons in the order of Battle plus two 
independent flights and 43 Kite Balloon sections.    The number of aircraft 
available was 1,782, including those of the Independent Force.125      
In late July arrangements were made between General HQ and Major General 
Salmond for the employment of the RAF in the planned offensive.      One 
important aspect of the plans was the extensive use of bombers and ground attack 
aircraft particularly against German Airfields.     The British Air strength available 
in the proposed battle area was 800 aircraft, over five brigades, comprising 41 
squadrons.  Of these aircraft 376 were fighters, 110 were corps aircraft, 342-day 
bombers, 144 were night bombers and 140 were fighter reconnaissance.  
Additionally, the French were to support the offensive (involving French First 
Army) with 1,104 aircraft giving a total British and French to of 1904, which was 
vastly superior to the German available aircraft in the battle area of about 365.  
 
125  Jones, TWITA Appendices, - Appendix XXIV pp.116-125.  
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(However, also available was another 850 aircraft in Champagne with the 
German Sixth and Seventh Armies)126  
 One very unusual action before the offensive was a memorandum from 
Brigadier-General L E O Charlton, commanding V Brigade to be communicated 
‘to all pilots and Observers’ on the afternoon before the opening of the offensive, 
because: 
each pilot and observer should be fully informed of the general plan in regard to the 
preliminary operations, such knowledge helping him to a wider appreciation of course of 
events as they unfold and rendering more valuable in consequence his action and reports.127  
 
 
This seems to be the only time that a Brigade commander felt it necessary to 
approach aircrew directly to inform or encourage them.      Charlton was one of 
the original pilots went to France in 1914 and had previously shown himself to 
especially aware of the welfare of aircrew.      In 1917, when serving in the 
Directorate of Military Aeronautics, he made it a positive requirement that no 
pilot should be sent to France unless they could satisfy his department of their 
competence.   He was overruled by Henderson, presumably because of pressure 
from France.128      As noted above Charlton was critical of the ‘all-out’ offence 
policy.129 
 
126 Jones, TWITA Vol VI pp.435-436; Wise, Canadian Airmen, pp.522-523. 
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Another reason for Charlton’s memorandum may have been his concern about 
the command arrangements for the air support of the offensive. There was no 
overall commander in the air.       Charlton was directly under command of the 
Fourth Army, while Brigadier-General Salmond, RAF Commander, was 
responsible for IX Brigade and the support from 1, III, and X brigades, and was 
given authority to deal directly with General Rawlinson.   It seems probable that 
Charlton wanted to ensure that at least his brigade aircrew were informed of their 
objectives (he emphasised the importance of attacking anti-tank guns to support 
the tanks) and to give them his personal encouragement.     In fact, like other 
commanders Charlton assumed that the attack had limited objectives and had 
planned for a one-day battle.130              
For the RAF, the 8th August was the most important and complex day of fighting 
so far.      The RAF’s main role was to support the ground assault through contact 
patrols (low level) and low-level attacks in support of troops and tanks.     Many 
attacks on enemy airfields had been planned and most were carried out, but were 
not entirely successful and the GAF continued its stiff opposition. 131   
Additionally, bad weather, (mist and fog) the unexpected quick advance of the 
Army, (seven miles on first day) and most of all the changes to the air plans by 
the ordering of a new offensive against the Somme bridges, caused considerable 
confusion.     There were eleven Somme bridges, thought to be an escape route 
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for retreating German troops, which were to be bombed ‘as long as weather and 
light permits’ 132  and this plan almost certainly led to the 8th August being the 
worst day of the war for the RAF, there is no other day when casualties come 
anywhere near those suffered on this day.133        All the bridges were within easy 
distance of German airfields and most of the attacks were carried out at low level 
and apart from the exposure to ground fire all the aircraft which would have 
protected attackers form GAF fighters were themselves engaged on ground attack 
operations. The RAF lost 45 aircraft during the day (40 aircrew KIA/PoW) and 
another 52 aircraft had to be struck off as to badly damaged for further use), a 
wastage rate of 13%, for one day.134  The Germans claimed that on that day 85 
British aircraft had crashed behind their lines135   The bridges were not destroyed, 
and the German Army continued to use them.    The Official History, unusually, 
examined ‘whether the sacrifice was as essential as appeared at the time’ the 
conclusion was that it was not.136  The RAF could probably not have destroyed 
the bridges, even without German opposition as the weapons (bombs) were not 
big enough and aiming was too difficult as a direct hit or hits were needed to 
destroy a bridge.137     However, it was not only the RAF which suffered in the 
battle over and around the bridges.   The GAF was forced to fight whatever its 
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losses as it was vital to protect the Army’s vital communications and in fact the 
German losses were such both in aircraft and more importantly experienced 
aircrew, (48 German aircrew were lost on that day) that in future the use of very 
large formations was ended and from then on German aircraft generally flew in 
groups of eight to ten aircraft at low level (about 4,000feet).    
From September until the Armistice, the Allied Armies were in continuous 
advance.       On the 30th, the Hindenburg line was attacked and the last campaign 
in Flanders began on 28th.        With the successes of these offensives, it was clear 
that German defeat was only a few weeks away.   In fact on 5th September RAF 
HQ issued instructions curtailing RAF operations; instructing Squadron 
Commanders, that unless the enemy adopt an aggressive policy, the RAF policy 
of seeking out and destroying enemy aircraft ‘will be less actively pursued’  and 
asking Brigadiers to reduce the number of squadrons working over the line to a 
minimum each day and to take individual squadron off this work for a day or 
more at a time.138   
Notwithstanding that instruction, the air battle continued causing heavy casualties 
on both sides.  The scale of air fighting during this period is shown by the casualty 
figures. Between 1st and 30th September, the RAF ‘wastage’ in operations 
supporting the Allies advance was killed in action 232: PoW 190., wounded in 
action 12.     Additionally, killed in flying accidents 26, injured in flying accidents 
 
138 Wise, Canadian Airmen,  p.557; Jones TWITA Vol VI p.500. 
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18. and interned 17. (15 in Holland and two in Luxembourg).139    The total 
number of aircrew serving in the 96 RAF Squadrons in France was approximately 
2400, the losses being 20/25% of the force in one month.    
 The closing days of October saw some of the heaviest fighting of the entire war, 
some of the enemy formations containing up to fifty aircraft as the German air 
force made desperate efforts to protect its Army from the RAF bombers and 
strafing aircraft.140      On the 30th, the heaviest single days fighting of the entire 
war took place, some 67 enemy air craft were destroyed, and 47 RAF aircrew 
were lost, resulting in 12 aircrew killed in action, four who died of wounds, and 
10 becoming POWs.141  
  It was as well that the end was near as the RAF was having considerable 
difficulty in finding replacement aircraft for those lost in France, the main 
problem being a shortage of engines.      The shortage of aircraft resulted in some 
squadrons operating with less than the established number of aircraft thus 
reducing operational sorties, especially low-level attacks which were very 
expensive in both aircrew and aircraft loss or damage.142   The last great air battle 
of the war took place on 4th November, the German Air Force made a last 
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desperate effort mitigate the losses of the German Army.  Losses on both sides 
were heavy, RAF casualties were 25 killed in action and 15 POW.  Fighting 
continued until the end and possibly the last RAF aircrew to be killed died 
because of a collision between two 46 Squadron aircraft on 10th November.   
Shortly after 0900 hrs two Camels of No 46 flown by 2Lt G E Dowler DFC, a 
Canadian and 2Lt W G Coulthurst were engaged on strafing operations when they 
collided killing both pilots.        It is appropriate to quote from a witness to that 
collision, who gives a sobering description of the results of strafing and bombing 
the retreating German Army   Lt Richmond Viall said: 
We went out on a squadron sweep of trench strafing, and I might say that trench strafing 
was about the bloodiest work we had to do.  We found a long straight road filled with 
retreating German supply trains.   We saw horse-drawn artillery, motor trucks, infantry and 
other military equipment of one kind and another.   We formed a big circle and dropped 
our 25 lb bombs.    When we got through with that road it was one unbelievable scene of 
chaos, with dead horses, lorries and dead soldiers all over the road.    As I went down the 
last time to use up the last of my ammunition and bombs, the two planes in front of me 
collided.   In one of them was a chap by the name of Dowler, who had been a schoolteacher 
in Calgary.   We had joined up on the same day in Canada, but he came to the squadron 
later than I did.  He was a dammed good pilot.143  
 
Notwithstanding the heavy losses, morale seems to have been high during the last 
few months of the war.  Firstly, the increase in aircrew confidence with the 
introduction of the Sopwith Camels, SE5s, Bristol Fighters and later the Sopwith 
Dolphins.   Perhaps also, despite the heavy casualties, there was a realisation that 
finally success and the end of the war was near.144   
 
 
143 Interview with Lieutenant Richmond Viall, No 46 Squadron Cross & Cockade Vol 11 (1961) pp.248 -249.  
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The total of RFC/RAF casualties on the Western Front in the period 1914-1918 
was 7221, comprising, 2954 KIA, 1837 PoW  and 2216 WIA, with  a further 802 
aircrew killed in accidents. 145  Among those casualties were some 162 NCO 
aircrew killed and 89 who became POWs; several NCOs were treated for 
psychiatric or psychological conditions.    
Some 672 Aircrew in all were removed from flying either temporarily or 
permanently for ‘Flying sickness’ (including 51 aircrew of The Independent 
Force and thirty balloon observers).   Compared with the many thousands of 
soldiers taken out of the line suffering from shell shock, the numbers are 
infinitesimal.   But as the aircrew strength of the RAF on the western front at any 
time in 1918 was a little over 3000, the casualty figures (2446 a rate of 76%) for 
that year were close to being unsustainable.     The further loss in 1918, of over 
6oo (18%) aircrew for psychological or nervous conditions was clearly a 
significant factor in aircrew wastage in late 1918, when the training and 
replacement of aircrew was fallen behind requirements.146     
Chapter eight examines the work of the Independent Force formed to carry out 
the strategic bombing of German cities.  The operations of the IF were a 
development of the early bombing raids of the RFC and the RNAS, but the flight 
times were longer, at greater heights and often at night.   Although the force 
operated for only the last five months of the war, cases of flying sickness on those 
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four squadron which operated for five months were above the average for other 
RAF fighter and reconnaissance units. 
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                                                  Chapter Seven                               
                               Bombing and the Independent Force 
 This chapter will examine the operations of the Independent Force, (IF) formed 
in June 1918 to undertake long range bombing attacks on German industrial 
targets.            The raids flown by the Independent Force were of a different nature 
to previous RFC/RAF operations with greatly extended flying times at high level, 
often in bad weather.  The day bombing squadrons faced continuous German 
fighter attacks with consequent heavy casualties.           At first the night bombers 
faced only ground fire, but in the later months of the campaign following German 
reorganisation fighters were also encountered. 
The IF carried out day raids with Numbers 55, 99 and 104 Squadrons and 
numbers, 97, 100, 115, 215 and 216 operated by night.1    Numbers 99 and 104 
squadrons operated DH9 Bombers and 55 flew DH4s.  All three squadrons 
experienced heavy casualties (causing the withdrawal of 99 and 104 squadrons 
from operations for short periods) which together with the large influx of 
untrained aircrew replacements, as well as the effect on operational efficiency, 
affected morale on all squadrons.   Night bombing raids were carried out mainly 
by Handley Page 0/100 twin engine aircraft, except for number 97 Squadron, 
 
1 W Raleigh and HA Jones, The War in the Air – Six Volumes (London, 1922-38),  (hereafter TWITA), Volume 
VI p.143; C. G. Jefford, RAF Squadrons (London, 2001)  pp.46-58, p.74;  A Morris, First of Many The story of 
the Independent Force RAF (London, 1968)  pp.177-178.       
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which flew HP 0/400.  Both these aircraft types carried a crew of three. (all day 
bombers had a two-man crew)2 
The table below set out the casualties suffered by the Independent force for the 
five months it operated. 
Sqdn.     Joined      Sorties.    Returned    KIA    WIA    PoW/     KIFA    Fly/sick     
Day          IF          Flown       Early                                 Missing 
                                
No 55     (6/6/18)      544           67           43        14         17          6             7 
No 99     (6/6/18)      407           52           27        17         18          2           13 
No 104   (6/6/18)      366           45           35        21         33          -            10 
No 110   (16/9/18)      48           12           13         4          19          -              2 
Night 
No 97    (20/8/18)     103             8            2          3            9           6             3 
No 100  (6/6/18)       145           17            1          3            2           4             6 
No 115  (16/9/18)       58             9            0          1            3            -             -  
No 215  (19/8/18)       83             9            2          3          18           3             1 
No 216  (6/6/18)       285           22            0          3            6           1             3 
 
Totals =                  2039          232        123        69         125        22           453 
 
Squadrons engaged on night bombing generally suffered fewer casualties than 
day bombing units, due in part to the fact that two squadrons did not join the 
campaign until August and one in September and therefore flew fewer sorties: 
and it was not until the last few months of the war that night bombers faced 
German fighters.        . 
 
 
2 P. Lewis, The British Bomber Since 1914 (London, 1980) pp.50-60 p.89;  Jane’s Fighting Aircraft Of World 
War 1 (London, 1919)  pp.73-74. 
3 Figures taken from, Jones, TWITA  Appendix  XIII;  Air27/521, 55 squadron record book 6/6/18-10/11/18;   T. 
Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield (London, 2014),Appendix 3- Western Front losses 1914-1918;  A. Morris, 
The First Of Many (London, 1968) Appendix B  p.177; K Rennies, Independent Force (London, 2002) appendix 
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Although the operational priorities of the RFC/RAF were reconnaissance and 
artillery spotting, from the beginning air bombing was employed tactically.    
These early attacks were carried out without any bomb storage or dropping 
equipment or bombsights and usually involved the pilot or observer carrying the 
bombs and throwing them out of the aircraft.   Understandably, accuracy was not 
good and damage not great.   
Between 1st March and 20th June 1915 there were 141 attempts to disrupt enemy 
troop movements by bombing railway stations, bridges, and transport and 
assembly areas.    Using primitive bomb racks and without any form of 
bombsight, only three of these attacks were afterwards assessed as successful.4   
However, by November 1916, 298 targets had been attacked with 17600 bombs 
and a basic bombsight had been developed, invented by Lts R B Bourdillon and  
Strange, which was adopted by the RFC and the RNAS.    Additionally, the RFC 
had begun bombing at night with permission to attack targets up to six miles over 
the lines.5   
The Zeppelin raids on London in April and May 1915, incited a strong public 
demand for reprisal raids on Germany.       Indeed, in February 1916 it had been 
suggested in parliament (W Joyston-Hicks) that ‘a few bombers with the range to 
attack Essen,Cologne and the Rhine bridges would go a long way to winning the 
 
4  Henshaw, The Sky their……. p 9          Jones. TWITA Vol II p 94-98  
5 Jones, TWITA Vol II  p 183  The RFC’s first night flight was in April 1913.  The permission to bomb at night 
was initially restricted to two aircraft in one night.  
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war’.6        This idea was supported by Churchill and others but brought protests 
from Haig and Trenchard who were concerned about RFC strength in France.             
Nevertheless, No.3 (Naval) Wing, which had previously operated in the 
Dardanelles campaign, was reformed.      With French agreement the Wing would 
operate from airfields near Belfort and Nancy (principally Luxeuil).7    The Wing 
was set up in May 1916 but  took some time to become operational and spent the 
months July-September training on the Sopwith ½- Strutters and evolving co-
operative tactics with French Squadrons flying Breguet pusher aircraft (inferior 
and slower than the Sopwiths).8   The Wing existed from July 1916 until April 
1917 and during that time carried out 18 raids into German and German held 
territory dropping about 2,500 lbs of bombs on each raid.9  Most of the targets 
were selected by the French in accordance with their ‘bombing plan’ and most 
raids were on the steel industry with attacks  made on steel works in Obrandorf, 
Volklin and Dellinton.  
Casualties were generally light but on the raid on Freiberg 14th April, the Wing 
lost three escort fighters (Four crew KIA and two made POW).10    These flights 
were tiring and difficult.   Even if there was no enemy action from ground fire or 
fighters, most flights lasted three to four hours at heights of up to 15,000 feet 
 
6 Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.262. 
7 AP125 The Royal Air Force in the Great War (Air Ministry, 1936) p.380;   R. D. Layman, Naval Aviation in 
the First World War (London, 1996) pp.74-75. 
8 R. Bell Davies, Sailor in The Air, (London, 1967) pp.148-151. 
9 G. K. Williams., Biplanes And Bombsights, (AUP Alabama, 1999) pp.2-5.  
10 Jones, TWITA Vol VI p 121; Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.274 describes this raid as a reprisal for ‘a series of 
German atrocities’. 
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without oxygen (normally needed at 10,000 feet).  Flying often took place in 
marginal weather conditions and temperatures at altitude were often minus 30(F) 
and of course on most flights there was enemy action; usually from ground fire.11   
In fact, the Luxeuil Wing was never able to amass enough aircraft to be fully 
effective and Trenchard continued to insist that the RFC had priority.  The wing 
was disbanded in April 1917.   
Although enemy Zeppelin attacks tailed off by the end of 1916 enabling the 
Government to run down the air defences, it was but a few months before the 
surprise daylight German Gotha raids on London caused chaos and confusion, 
with not one interception by the RFC.12   Strong public reaction resulted in 
immediate government action.  As well as recalling some fighter squadrons from 
France to support Home Defence, Trenchard  was brought back from France for 
consultation regarding offensive operations against Germany. 13    Trenchard 
seems to have  made  no objection this time to the revival of  strategic  bombing  
raids from France, indeed he suggested that in addition to transferring Handley 
Page Bombers from Yorkshire ( flying on anti-Submarine patrols), twenty DH 4 
aircraft due to be delivered to Russia could be sent to the selected Bomber airfield 
in France.14 
 
11 Williams, Biplanes and, pp.7-8. 
12 Cole & Cheeseman, The Air Defence of Great Britain (London,1984) pp.207-208. Gotha raid of 25th May 
1917;    A Morris, First of the Many (London, 1968) p.17. 
13 Jones, TWITA Vol V   pp.90-91. 
14 A. Boyle, Trenchard (London,1962) p.240.  
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 These proposals were agreed and Trenchard was instructed to take immediate 
action against any German targets which could be reached from a bomber base in 
France.15      His response was to form a special unit, No 41st Wing Commanded 
by Lieutenant-Colonel C L N Newell consisting of No 55 (DH4s), No 100 
(FE2bs) and 216 (Handley Page O/100s) Squadrons, operating from 11th October 
1917 at Orchey.16        It is notable that Trenchard’s response to a French request 
to co-operate with the their campaign against the German steel industry, was to 
tell the French that the role of RFC bombers was: 
long range attacks on German commercial towns as reprisals for enemy air raids on Allied 
towns   While the British pilots are learning the country they will be able to co-operate in 
attacks in the Sarrebruck, but not in the Briey-Longwy area which lies outside the line of 
approach to their main objectives.17  
 
Indeed, at a conference at the French GHQ on 22nd December 1917 he made clear 
joint co-operation was not his main aim:   
At this meeting General Trenchard told that he had been ordered by his Government to 
establish a force of bombardment aviation in the vicinity of Germany, that whether or not 
the Allies intended to join with him in this work did not affect whether or not he continued 
such work, and that he intended to increase the size of his force and to push this work to the 
maximum extent in compliance with the orders of his Government.18 
 
 
Between October 1917 and June 1918, the wing (reconstituted  as VIII Brigade 
on 1st February 1918)19 carried out 142 raids, 57 of which were  against targets in 
Germany including Cologne, Stuttgart and Mainz.20 Although the stated intention 
 
15 Boyle, Trenchard pp.304-305. 
16  Jones, TWITA Vol VI pp.122-123; Wise, Canadian Airmen, pp.286-287; Barker, The Royal Air Force p.384. 
17 Jones, TWITA Vol VI p.125; Wise, Canadian Airmen, p. 288. 
18 Williams, Biplanes and Bombsights   pp.78-79;  Boyle, Trenchard  p.234-235. 
19 Reinforced by the addition of Nos 99 and 104 Squadrons. 
20 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p.382. 
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of at least one member of the Air Council (Sir Henry Norman) was the 
obliteration of German cities, it was clear that this was not possible, and certainly 
Trenchard felt that a more realistic aim was to do significant damage to some 
important German industries.21            The Wing’s first raid was on 17th October 
against steel works at Saarbruken-Burbach, when eleven DH4s inflicted some 
damage and killed five people.      No enemy aircraft interfered with that raid but 
on the next raid by No. 55 squadron the bombers were attacked by a formation of 
Albatross fighters and had one aircraft shot down.     The first night raid took 
place on 24th when nine HP 0/100s were to attack the Burbach works and sixteen 
FB2s (100 Squadron) the railyards at Falkenberg.    The HPs did not find the 
target and two were lost to enemy action.   No 100-squadron reported direct hits 
on the railyards, but also lost two aircraft.22   These raids were typical of the 
Brigades operation in its six months’ existence.  During this period some 719 
individual aircraft sorties were mounted, 95 aircraft returned early (most because 
of engine failure) and 23 were lost due to enemy action.23       
Mention has already been made of the stress placed upon aircrew involved in long 
range bombing.    Most 41 Wing (and later IF) raids were flown at levels above 
10,000 feet, at which height oxygen is required for efficient bodily functions and 
above 20,000 feet is needed, to survive. (in fact, to enable good night vision, 
 
21 Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.285. 
22  Wise, Canadian Airmen p. 291; Jones, TWITA Vol VI pp.126-128. 
23  Jones, TWITA Appendix XIII. Targets bombed by Squadrons of 41st Wing; Williams, Biplanes, Appendix, 
‘Operational Summary of Raids by British Long-Range Units 1917-1918’.   
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oxygen is required from about 4,000 feet).       Efforts were being made to provide 
an oxygen supply, but the equipment was inefficient and aircrew themselves were 
not fully aware of the dangers of lack of oxygen.   The oxygen supply was 
regulated by a switch on the aircraft instrument panel and breathed through a tube 
into a face mask.  The flow was erratic, and the amount of oxygen provided 
inadequate, especially as oxygen was not switched on until 16.000 feet.     An 
additional problem was the uncomfortable mask and many aircrews preferred to 
take oxygen direct from the tube, which method provided an inconsistent 
supply.24    For those crews flying on night raids, it does not seem to have been 
understood that oxygen deprivation results in degraded night vision.    The effects 
of Anoxia continue to be felt after landing with aircrew commonly suffering 
headaches, sickness and fatigue for up to 24 hrs.25   A significant additional factor 
at these heights is cold which especially affected the observers who spent much 
of the flight standing up in the cockpit and fully exposed to the slipstream.  They 
often returned with frostbitten cheeks.26  
A further difficulty for aircrew, rarely if ever mentioned in accounts of World 
War air operations was that of the necessity to equalize pressure in the middle ear 
during ascents and more importantly, during rapid descents.    The condition and 
 
24  TNA Air 27/521.  55 Squadron Record Book pp.59-60; A Morris, The First of the Many: The Story of the 
Independent Force (London, 1968) pp.20-121. Rexford-Welch The Royal Air Force Medical Services Vol II 
Commands pp 86-87     Night vision is impaired as low as 4,000 feet.  Between 8-10,000 feet, tiredness muscle 
aches & pains, at 10,000-14,000 feet, respiration increases, fatigue and sleepiness. At 20,00 feet, sometimes 
lower, unconsciousness without   warning. In RAF V-bombers and fast jets 100% oxygen was/is breathed under 
pressure from take-off.  
25 Morris, The First, p.122. 
26  TNA Air27/521.  55 Squadron Record Book p.63; J W Huston, (Maj Gen) The US Air Service in World War 
1  USAF Office of Air Force History, Vol III   pp.371-373. 
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the effects of failure to take appropriate action is concisely described by Dr M D 
Robinson: 
As an aircraft ascends, the excess air pressure within the middle ear cavity normally vents 
itself without conscious attention, but the Eustachian tubes leading from the middle ear to 
the throat terminate in a flap valve which will prevent to entrance of air during the descent.    
Only by voluntary action: swallowing, yawning, by holding the nose and blowing—can 
the flap valve be opened to permit the entrance of air.  
The greater the difference in pressure, the more difficult it becomes to vent the middle air 
during the descent.    Increasingly severe pain, with inflammation of the ear drum, will be 
present by the time the flyer reaches the ground--- a condition later designated as aero-otis 
media, signifying an inflammation of the ear caused by flying.27 
 
   
This condition was exacerbated if aircrew flew with a cold: as many did, having 
no medical advice to the contrary and not wanting to appear to be avoiding duty.   
Although affecting all aircrew the problem affected fighter pilots especially as 
the standard form of attack in the air was to get above the enemy and dive to the 
attack sometimes through several thousand feet, with little time to equalized ear 
pressure.    The problems of descending too quickly were later recognised in the 
bomber squadrons and they generally tried to maintain gentle descent rates when 
returning from raids.28 
A further cause of stress was difficulty with navigation, the aero compass was in 
its early development stage and although the gravity turning error had been 
reduced by ‘damping’, the compass was still often inaccurate and when above 
cloud, as the aircraft often were, navigation was necessarily by compass heading 
and ‘dead reckoning’.29       Apart from the difficulty with the aero compass, crews 
 
27 D H Robinson, The Dangerous Sky: A History of Aviation Medicine (London, 1973) pp.98-99. 
28 TNA Air 27/521. 55 Squadron record p.60.   
29 The Aero Compass was affected by gravity when the aircraft turned causing considerable in compass reading.   
(Northerly Turning Error) 
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suffered from a lack of suitable and up to date maps and of even basic 
navigational training which became apparent by the number of aircraft becoming 
lost if they had to operate above cloud.30 
 On most raids there was also enemy action, both anti-aircraft fire and fighter 
attacks. It is not surprising that both individual and squadron morale was affected, 
and that some aircrew suffered from psychological and psychiatric conditions. 
Even before No 55 Squadron became part of the Independent Force, an observer 
was removed from flying diagnosed as suffering from ‘flying sickness.   He   was 
Flying Officer C D Palmer, who was removed from flying duties on 6th June with 
flying sickness and exhaustion and having spent a few days in Le Treport Hospital 
was sent back to England and the RFC London Hospital and did not return to the 
squadron.31 
Morale had been poor on this squadron and had been adversely affected by 
several accidents.    A squadron diarist noted one particularly disturbing crash 
when: 
Poor Morse, who was barely nineteen years of age had been killed when while taking off.    
It turned out that that the engine had conked when he got to about 100feet and while trying 
to turn back to the aerodrome he got into a massive nosedive and crashed into the trees close 
to our hut.     He was killed almost at once and his observer Palmer……was sent to hospital 
with internal injuries.32  
 
 
30 C Goulter, ‘War in the air: the bomber crew’ J Bourne, P Liddle, I Whitehead Eds The Great World War 
Volume One (London,2000)  pp 105-105 
31 RAFM Casualty Card C D Palmer.  He also did not return to duty. On 29th May, Palmer’s pilot (LT Wild) had 
been wounded by AA, he was unhurt; Henshaw, The Sky Their, p. 177. 
32 O. L. Beater, ‘The Diaries of Captain O L Beater DFC 55 Squadron’ Cross & Cockade Vol 33 (1) & (2) 2002 
pp.3-18 & pp.69-80, p.3.  Beater, who had taken part in some 20 raids, was awarded the DFC in August 1918. 
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Beater noted that the crew involved had only been in France a month.  The 
accident was on 14th November 1917 and the observer was the same Palmer noted 
above, and who had returned to the squadron shortly before the formation of the 
Independent Force.33 Beater remarked that another pilot who had been involved 
in five crashes in a month was being sent home for a rest.   
This squadron (55) was also affected by a change of commander who as soon as 
he arrived, changed many long-standing arrangements relating to eating and 
messing and (perhaps to keep crews occupied) set aircrews to cleaning aircraft 
when not flying.  And, most resented of all, crews were roused every morning 
whether flying or not.34   It is not clear how long this trough in morale lasted but 
by May, Beater’s diary is more positive and cheerful.       One reason was the 
successful operational record in early 1918.      Another important boost to morale 
about this time was the issue of new properly designed flying clothing, the ‘Sidcut 
Suit’, a one piece, fur collared thick suit, which did away with the layers of silk, 
wool and leather which aircrew needed to protect themselves against cold.35    
The bombing campaigns by 41 Group (later VIIIth Brigade) did not achieve the 
results expected, nor satisfy French expectations of a combined bombing 
offensive.         However, on 13th May 1918, the Supreme War Council gave the 
newly formed Air Council approval to undertake a long-distance bombing 
campaign.      At about the same time and at least partly to provide an identity for 
 
33 RAF Museum, Incident Card C D Palmer, the accident was noted as ‘stalled in turn’. Pilot killed.  
34  Beater, pp.17-18.    Aircrew particularly disliked cleaning aircraft, and few COs would order this    . 
35  Additionally, helmets and gloves were improved.  Sidcot suits were still issued to aircrew cadets in the 1950s 
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the newly formed RAF it was decided to form an Independent Force (controlled 
by the Air Ministry and not BEF) for an extended and sustained offensive against 
German munition industries.36      The commander would be Major-General Hugh 
Trenchard (recently resigned from a short spell as Chief of the Air Staff)37 who 
took up his appointment on 6th June 1918.        Its initial force would be those 
squadrons which had formed the VIIth Brigade with the addition of three 
squadrons with Handley-Page Bombers (97, 215 and 115), 110 squadron with 
DH9s and 45 squadron with Sopwith camels.  This last squadron was a fighter 
squadron which was considered necessary to protect the bombers from the 
increasing threat from German defensive fighters.38   Thus the force was made up 
of three, day bombing squadrons (55, 104, 99) and five (110, 97, 100 ,215 and 
115) operating at night.   The IF was intended to grow to 24 squadrons by October 
1918, but in the event the squadrons noted above comprised the total force until 
the end of the war.39    In fact the original plan was for the IF to consist of one 
 
36 R. Overy, RAF: The Birth of the World’s First Air Force  (London, 2018)  pp.65-68.   For the period October 
1917-June 1918 the 4ist Wing dropped just 129 tons of bombs.  This with the loss of 13% of aircraft used.  
37 Trenchard had reluctantly accepted the new post of Chief of the Air Staff of the Royal Air Force, with Rear-
Admiral Kerr as Deputy under the new Air Minister Lord Rothermere with Sir David Henderson as Vice 
president of the Air Council. This arrangement lasted only a few weeks.  Trenchard could not work with 
Rothermere and resigned, Kerr disagreed with Trenchard and resigned, Major-General Frederick Sykes replaced 
Trenchard and Henderson resigned.  Rothermere then resigned.    Trenchard accepted the post of Commander 
Independent Force after the new Air Minister Sir William Weir had given him three options---or nothing.  See 
Wise pp.284-285; Williams, pp.143-146; Jones, TWITA Vol VI pp.1-27.  For Trenchard’s view of all this see 
Boyle, Trenchard pp.284-288. 
38 AP 125 The Royal Air Force, p.383. 
39 Overy, RAF p.68. 
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hundred squadrons, but a shortage of suitable engines and lack of trained aircrew 
caused these estimates to be reduced.40 
Upon taking up his new Command, Trenchard had to decide how he would use 
his force to achieve his objective; ‘the breakdown of the German Army in 
Germany and the crippling of its source of supply’.   He felt that he had two main 
alternatives: 
1 A sustained and continuous attack on one large centre after another until each centre 
was destroyed, and the industrial population largely dispersed to other towns; or 
2 To attack as many of the large industrial centres as it was possible to reach with the 
machines at my disposal.41 
 
 
He decided, that due to his limited forces, only option two was possible but that 
in any event by attacking as many centres as could be reached the morale effect 
would be greater.42 
In fact, from the perspective of the aircrew, the Independent Force just continued 
the work of 41 Group and VIII brigade.     Operations by the Independent Force 
began on 6th June 1918 with daylight raids on factories in Coblenz with a 
secondary target of railway sidings in Thoinville.     55 Squadron dispatched 
twelve aircraft and 99 squadron eleven but starting a pattern which was to hinder 
the DH9s for most of the IFs existence, no fewer than eight aircraft of 99 
Squadron returned early with engine trouble.   That same night the first night raids 
 
40 C Webster & N Frankland The Strategic Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945 Vol I  (HMSO.1961)  p.39;  
Boyle, Trenchard, p.302; E Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution 1912-1918 (London, 1999)  
pp.164-165. 
41  Jones, TWITA, Volume VI p.136  quoting from Trenchard’s Dispatch of 1st January 1919  It is interesting to 
note that point 1 of this dispatch was Harris’s plan in the Second World War. 
42  Jones, TWITA Volume VI p.137. 
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took place when seventeen aircraft of 100 and 216 Squadrons attacked Thoinville, 
with one aircraft returning early.   Results were minimal, on the night raids four 
people were reported killed and some bombs fell on railway workshops.43     
Trenchard after taking command of the Force seems to have changed his view 
and from being a most vigorous opponent of strategic bombing he accepted 
Command of the IF with its objective of damaging German industries.44   It’s fair 
to add that he sometimes used his power to arrange targeting to meet Army 
battlefield needs instead of attacking German industry.  The squadrons discussed 
in this chapter made some 31 attacks on airfields during the five months of the 
campaign and these attacks are omitted from the strategic targets attacked by the 
IF listed in the Appendix to the Official History.45  
In any event the Independent Force would never have enough aircraft to wage an 
effective campaign and several of the Squadrons making up the force were poorly 
equipped.   100 Squadron started with the campaign with the obsolescent FE2bs, 
which struggled to reach 9,000 feet in 30 minutes, had an endurance of three hours 
and could carry only three 112lb bombs.     It was September before this squadron 
received the Handley Page 0/100s, which although not much faster than the FB2b, 
carried at least three times the bomb load and had an endurance of eight hours46    
 
43 Jones, TWITA Appendix XIII p.52.     Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield pp.179-180. In TWITA Vol VI 
Jones (contradicting the Appendix) states that the Ind Force started Operations on 8th June, but all four 
squadrons attacked on 6th.   See   L. A. Pattinson, History of 99 Squadron (London, 1920) p.12; Wise, Canadian 
Airmen, p.299; K. Rennles, Independent Force (London, 2002) pp.14-15. 
44 Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.285-286. 
45 99 Squadron made thirteen airfield attacks, 104 Squadron eleven and 55 squadron seven.  99 Sqdn lost four 
aircraft in these attacks and 104 Sqdn ten. Rennles, Independent Force, pp.109-115.   Pattinson, The History of 
99, pp.51-53; Williams, Biplanes and Bombsights Appendix Operational Summary of IF Raids. 
46 Janes Fighting Aircraft of World War 1 (London, 1919,1990) pp. 72-73. 
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The recently formed 99 Squadron (based at Azelot) was equipped with the DH9, 
intended to be a longer-range replacement of the DH4.    The actual performance 
of the DH9 and especially the new engine (BHP)47 was inferior to the engine it 
was to replace and worse the ‘new’ engine was prone to failure.  One other DH9 
squadron served in the Independent Force, No.104 and as we shall see this unit 
suffered both bad luck and heavy casualties. 
Following the opening raids, the Force continued attacks on industrial targets 
such as Coblenz and Mannheim (chemical works) but notably as noted above, 
many attacks were carried out on Railway stations and aerodromes, raids which 
in his previous role Trenchard would have considered directly helped the Army 
in the field.    
At first casualties were light and the main operational difficulty was the large 
number of early returns, mostly for engine problems, but many sorties were 
also hindered by poor navigation, including one crew (104 Sqdn) inadvertently 
flying into Swiss airspace and being fired upon by Swiss AA defences crashed 
in Switzerland.48 
 
 
47 Beardmore-Halford-Pullinger intended to replace the 275 hp Rolls-Royce of the DC4.   Boyle, Trenchard, 
p.224    Trenchard suspected that the new engine would not meet this objective and in the event, he was proved 
right as the BHP was inferior to the RR and restricted the DH9 to a height of 15,000 feet.  These engines also 
had defective carburettors which resulted in heavy fuel consumption above 10,000 feet -  Wise, Canadian 
Airmen p.293; Morris, The First of the Many p.63; Williams, Biplanes and Bombsights p.190 notes that 
sometimes the radiator froze at high altitude with consequent engine failure. 
 
48 Jones, TWITA, Appendix X111 targets bombed by 41st wing and Independent Force  Oct 1917-Nov 1918  pp 
57-61 incident was on 26th June. 
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 but the strain of operations was becoming apparent in the number of operations 
returning for medical reasons (considered below).    Additionally, by the middle 
of July the German defences had been improved considerably and more 
German fighters had been allocated to air defence.     The first serious indication 
of this change in the German approach was on 31st July when twelve DH9s of 
99 Squadron set out to attack Mainz, three returned early with engine trouble, 
the remainder continued until they were near Saarbruken, where they were 
attacked by some 40 German Albatross and Fokker fighters.    The formation 
leader decided that as it was impossible to reach their original target, they would 
attack Saarbruken.       Before reaching this target, four DH9s were shot down 
and during the attack two more DH9s were lost, the two remaining aircraft were 
able to return to base.49   Fourteen aircrew were lost, five killed and nine became 
PoWs. These losses of aircraft and crews meant that 99 Squadron was unable 
to muster enough pilots and observers for operations until reinforcements had 
been trained and was taken off operations for several weeks.    Morale was 
badly affected; apart from the heavy casualties, the poor performance of the 
DH9, the aircraft was very difficult to fly and inexperienced pilots found it very 
hard to maintain formation, there were also many accidents especially when 
landing.    The Squadron Commander noted the “feeling of despondence” felt 
by the squadron following these losses.50      Baring notes Trenchard’s concern: 
 
49  Jones, TWITA Vol VI pp 141-142 Appendix XIII p 65.K Rennles, War Diaries of the Independent Force 
(London, 2002) pp.72-73.   
50 Pattinson,  99 Squadron   p.30. 
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This morning we had a gloomy piece of news.   No 99 Squadron lost seven machines on a 
raid. The General sent for me and told me the news. He was very much upset. We went out 
to the squadron at once.  The General spoke to the pilots and told them that where we had 
the advantage over the enemy was that our spirit was such that we could face and get over 
our losses and go on in spite of them, and that the enemy couldn’t.51    
 
 
Trenchard was clearly concerned about 99 Squadron’s morale, and his visit to the 
squadron on 31st, was meant to address that concern.  This visit and the decision 
of the Brigade Commander, Brigadier-General Newell and Wing Commander 
Baldwin, to stay on to have dinner with the squadron officers emphasised its 
seriousness.52      In fact Trenchard would often appear at aircrew briefings and 
wait to meet aircraft on their return.  Baring wrote: 
Of all the experiences we had in connection with aviation, there was none more trying, 
more harassing and harder to bear for those who were responsible, than waiting for these 
long-distance raids to return.      It was not a question of losing one or two machines.  One 
knew only two well that a change of weather might occur when the machines were at a 
great distance, and one might quite easily lose the whole formation.53 
 
During August some 20 new pilots and observers were posted to No. 99 squadron 
and additionally two American Pilots from the United States Aviation Service 
were attached to the squadron (by the end of the campaign a further six American 
aircrew had been attached).      Most of the month was spent training the new 
aircrew all of whom were according to the Squadron Commander:  
very ill trained in the work of a day bombing squadron, having been hurried through their 
training without adequate instruction in formation flying or map-reading.54 
 
 
51 M. Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters 1914-1918 (London, 1920, 1985) p.287 - visit to 99 Squadron.   
52 Pattinson, History of 99 Squadron pp.30-31 noted the squadron’s appreciation of the visit.   
53 Quoted in Boyle, Trenchard pp.306-306. 
54 Pattinson, History of 99 Squadron p.32. 
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Although some pilots were sent back to England for further training, in order to 
resume operations, it was necessary to carry out intensive formation training.55     
The squadron resumed operations on 13th September, carrying out several raids 
in the one day with loss of two crews.   Also, in September squadron morale was 
improved by the arrival of the first DH9a aircraft with the Liberty engine.   
Although the improved performance of this aircraft over the DH9 was marginal, 
120 Mph against 114, 19,000 feet ceiling against 18,000 feet and five and half 
hour’s endurance over four and a half, and the aircraft was easier to handle (very 
important for novice pilots), but the main gain and the new engines outstanding 
virtue was its much-improved reliability.56   
The squadron’s return to operations was uneventful until the 26th September when 
a short notice raid on Thionville was ordered.         This attack was disastrous, 
two aircraft returned early, and one got lost.  The formation was attacked by 30/40 
enemy aircraft and a DH9 was shot down.   The remaining six aircraft attacked 
Metz and four more were lost.57   The squadron lost eight aircrew KIA, two POW 
and two were wounded58     Of the seven DH9s which crossed the lines, only one 
piloted by Lieutenant West, returned to Azelot, carrying the body of the observer, 
 
55 Pattinson, History of 99 Squadron p.35. 
56 Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.309.   Jones, TWITA, Vol VI pp.51-53. The Liberty was an American engine in 
great demand and supplies to the Independent Force were made only at the rate of 175 in May, 225 in June and 
620 in July.   Due to the supply problem 99 Sqn had not received its full complement of DH9as by November.   
110 Squadron was the only completely equipped DH9a squadron. 
57 Jones, TWITA, Appendix XIII, p.75.    Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield p.226 notes seven 99 Squadron 
aircraft lost that day with seven aircrew KIA, Two POW, and one WIA rescued from aircraft which came down 
in Allied lines. 
58 Pattinson, History 99 Squadron, pp.55. 
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Lieutenant Howard who had been killed by a machine-gun bullet.    The next day 
Lt West was transferred to Home Establishment ‘for a change of duty’.59   
Because of these losses the squadron was left with only two serviceable aircraft 
and again short of crews, causing the CO to start another program of training 
replacement aircrew.   Poor results, inferior aircraft and casualties and therefore 
large numbers of replacements; were obvious reasons for the poor morale on this 
squadron, noted above, but despite this it seems that the Squadron Commander 
in this case was a positive influence and certainly led by example, he was awarded 
the MC and DFC whilst with the Squadron and later the DSO, and as soon as the 
order forbidding COs to fly on operations was rescinded, he began to lead the 
squadron on raids.   
 It was therefore particularly unfortunate for the squadron that it was at this 
difficult time that Pattinson was promoted away from the squadron to take over 
as Wing Commander of 41st Wing.  He was succeeded by Captain P E Welchman.   
Unfortunately, on the 26th September raid Captain Welchman, leading, was shot 
down and captured.     Thus, Captain W D Thorn became the third 99 Squadron 
Commander in a week.60  
Pattinson whilst CO was sympathetic to signs of battle stress in his aircrews and 
several officers were removed from flying and transferred to other duties or sent 
home, without medical intervention.   Lt Levy an observer, and Lts Purser and 
 
59 Pattinson, History 99 Squadron,  p.56;  Henshaw, The Sky Their, p.226 
60 Williams, pp.198-199. 
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West, pilots, were all sent back to Home Establishment after less than six months 
in France.  It seems that Purser did not complete any operations, but West 
completed at least 15 and Levy six.61    As on other squadrons on the IF, crews 
suffered from the effects of combat stress and there are indications of this early 
in the campaign.        In June apart from the continual early returns because of 
engine trouble, there were several aircraft returning early because of crew 
sickness.     On 8th Lt Garrity returned owing to ‘faintness in the air’ on 26th Lt 
Taylor, an observer, fainted in the air.      In the first week of July another three 
observers, were responsible for early returns and then removed from operations.   
Lt Munson, who was remustered to Squadron Recording Officer, Lt Whattam 
returned to England and 2/Lt Southcott went first to hospital and then back to 
England.   Two other aircrew, Lts Vick and Underwood were found to be unfit 
for further service flying.          Additionally, there were regular instance of pilots 
being returned to England requiring further training, something which Trenchard 
had complained about two years earlier in 1916.62         
From the formation of the Independent Force until the Armistice, 99 Squadron 
was involved in some 43 bombing attacks.63  In carrying out these attacks, 20 
aircraft had been lost due to enemy action.   Some twenty-one aircrew had been 
killed in action, nine had become prisoners of war and four were killed in flying 
accidents.  There were also nineteen wounded, about half of whom did not return 
 
61 Pattinson, pp.18-20;  Rennles, Crew lists;  See page 297 above 
62 Pattinson, History of 99, pp.28 & 40. 
63 Jones, TWITA, Vol VI, Chap IV & Appendix XIII. 
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to the squadron.    All these casualties needed replacements, but they were not the 
only aircrew losses to the squadron.  During the same period another twenty-five 
aircrew were hospitalised for non-flying related illnesses or injuries, including 
influenza and appendicitis.  Again, about half did not return to squadron duty.    In 
fact, in less than six months of war 99 squadron suffered 114 aircrew casualties, 
amounting to 316 % of the unit’s normal complement (42 pilots and observers).64    
These losses required replacements and 92 aircrew joined the squadron between 
June and November, and needed a continuous training effort as well as 
maintaining operations. These replacements often took at least four days to travel 
from England. They needed at least a fortnight practising formation flying and 
becoming familiar with the DH9. which they would not have trained on.  The 
numbers already on the squadron, (establishment 21 pilots and 21 observers) 
would be reduced by leave, sickness and wounds so that the number of effective 
crews was probably 12/14.65 
On 99 Squadron, apart from those aircrew sent home on the Commanding 
Officer’s authority, there were eleven cases of aircrew diagnosed with Flying 
Sickness.   In the cases of 2/Lts K L Turnbull,  P James,  W C Francis and 2/Lt 
W J Baldwin  they had served on the squadron for a matter of weeks.     Turnbull 
was removed from flying on 26th August, sent to No 14 General Hospital and 
there diagnosed with Neurasthenia.     James was sent to No 8 General Hospital 
 
 64 TNA Air 1/1972/204/273/1, Casualty Statistics June-November 1918. 
65 Morris, The First, pp.81-82. 
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on 3rd October, diagnosed with Flying Sickness.  Francis first reported sick with 
an inflamed nose on 4th August but was transferred to 14 General Hospital 
suffering from Flying Sickness and within a few days to the London Hospital.  In 
Baldwin’s case Pattinson notes curtly that on 21st September Baldwin was 
‘returned to Home Establishment’ and it only on his casualty card that we see that 
in fact he was diagnosed as suffering from Flying Sickness.66      None of these 
Officers returned to the squadron.67  It is also the case that none of these officers 
had flown on operations with 99 Squadron and it is probable that the intensive 
training flying, involving many accidents, carried out by this squadron because 
of the inadequate training of replacement aircrew contributed to these failures. 68  
  Three of the officers removed from flying duties deserve special mention.   The 
Squadron Commander (Pattinson) in one of his last notes in the Squadron history 
before he was promoted to take over 41st Wing said: 
Capt Beecroft and Lieuts Walker and Taylor were admitted to hospital sick, and finally 
transferred to the Home Establishment.       These officers had all been unwell for several 
weeks, but had continued their flying duties, and avoided the Medical Officer, till the 
younger pilots and observers had been trained to take their places.   As three of the original 
members, who had played a great part in forming the Squadron tradition, their loss was a 
heavy one.69   
 
 
All three were diagnosed with Flying Sickness and all spent some time in 
hospital, but their good service was recognised.70      Lieutenant W B Walker was 
awarded the DFC in September 1918, and Captain V Beecroft received the DFC 
 
66 Pattinson, History of 99, p.35; RAFM CC W J Baldwin. 
67 RAFM CC K L Turnbull, P James, W C Francis. 
68 Pattinson, The History of, p.33. 
69 Pattinson, The History of, p 53, dated 15/9/18. 
70 RAFM CCs, Captain V Beecroft, Lieutenant W B Taylor & W B Walker 
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in a post-war list in 1919.   All three had impressive operational records, Beecroft 
had flown on 24 Bombing raids, Walker (an observer) 29 and Taylor, (also an 
observer, who on one occasion had fainted in the air) on eighteen raids.71     
Number 104 Squadron also operated DH9s.    This squadron with many (about 
25%) Canadian aircrew, had arrived in France (Azelot) in May.    As Wise 
comments “this squadron’s service was marked by bad luck and heavy 
casualties” 72      The squadron’s ill luck began immediately.  Two aircraft arriving 
late and in darkness at Azelot, crashed on landing.  On 27 May another aircraft 
arriving from England, became lost did not arrive and was posted missing.73       
Although arriving in France on 21st May, the Squadron did not fly its first 
operation until 8th June, when ten aircraft attacked Mets-Sablon railways. Two 
aircraft returned early with engine problems, the first of many.74  The next sortie 
on the 9th of June was even less successful, five aircraft returned with engine 
problems and one with a sick observer.  Eight more raids were mounted in June, 
with some 21 aircraft returning early, one crashing on take-off and one crashing 
in Switzerland, (on 27th) but with only two losses due to enemy action.75   This 
somewhat undistinguished start to the squadron’s bombing campaign was to 
become worse.     In July in the course of eight raids, nine aircraft returned early, 
one crashed on take-off, two force landed in the allied lines and four were shot 
 
71 Rennles, The War Diaries of Bomber Squadrons of Independent Force, Chapters 3-7.   Pattinson refs in text.   
72 Wise, Canadian Airmen, p.294. 
73 Wise, Canadian Airmen,  p. 295 
74 Jones, TWITA Appendix XIII p.55. 
75 Jones, TWITA Appendix XIII pp.54-58; Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield p.184 & p.186. 
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down with the loss of eight aircrew.76  August was disastrous, twelve aircraft and 
twenty-four aircrew were lost to enemy action.  The worst day was on 22nd 
August.   On that day thirteen DH9s set out to bomb chemical works at 
Mannheim.   One aircraft was shot down by AA fire when crossing the German 
lines, the rest continued to the target area where the formations were attacked by 
15-20 Fokkers.  Although the squadron were able to drop 16 bombs and some 
damage was done, the squadron formation was broken up and the German fighters 
attacked from all directions.    Six more DH9s and crews were lost which, added 
to the earlier losses, caused the squadron to be destroyed as a fighting unit.77     
These heavy losses were 104 Squadron’s worst in the war and crew losses and  
the consequent replacement training meant the squadron flew no further 
operations until the 7th September and on that day three more crews were lost.78    
During the remainder of the IF’s campaign, 104 Squadron flew a further fourteen 
operations and although early returns were much reduced (104 squadron also 
received the Liberty engined DH9s)  five more aircraft and crews were lost to 
enemy action, three to forced landings and three to crashes.79    During the 
campaign, the squadron lost 28 aircraft to enemy action, nine to crash landings 
on the Allied side of the lines and two to accidents on the Airfield.         Aircrew 
lost totalled 57, of whom 34 became POW, 23 were KIA., that is 118% of 
 
76 Henshaw, The Sky, p.186 & p.189. 
77 Wise,  Canadian Airmen, pp.304-306. 
78 Henshaw, The Sky their, pp.217; Jones, TWITA Appendix XIII pp.64-69; Rennles, Independent Force, pp.94-
96. 
79 Jones, TWITA  Appendix XIII pp.71-83;  Rennles, Independent Force,  Chap 5-7. 
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squadron strength (40 aircrew, not including CO and ancillary officers).     
Another 20 were wounded, mostly with minor wounds.80 
As with other Squadrons some of 104 Squadron aircrew were so affected by stress   
that they had to be removed from flying.   Between June and October nine aircrew 
were diagnosed as suffering from flying stress.      The earliest to suffer was 2/Lt 
J E Belford, a Canadian Observer.81    On 17th June he was hospitalised at Le 
Treport General Hospital, on 7th July he was transferred to the Canadian hospital 
and diagnosed with Flying Sickness.     He was still being treated in November 
when his casualty card noted ‘now better but ordered to remain in hospital 
pending transfer.82      Belford had taken part in only two operations, on the eighth 
and ninth of June, on both his aircraft returned early with engine trouble without 
reaching the target.83     It is notable that of the nine officers removed from  
operations from this squadron, only two had flown on more than one operation.    
Lt R G Gibbs an Observer, who was admitted to hospital on 26th September and 
was immediately transferred to the RAF London Hospital with Flying Sickness, 
had been on four raids, two in July one in August and one in September.  On his 
last operation his aircraft had been attacked by six German fighters, forcing his 
pilot to make a forced landing in the allied lines.  This was the operation which 
cost 104 Squadron seven crews.84     Two of the 104 Squadron pilots removed 
 
80 Figures for aircrew losses extracted from Henshaw, The Sky Their, part 1, The Western Front. 
81 At this time about 30% of 104 Squadron’s aircrew were Canadians 
82 RAFM CC 2/Lt J E Belfort     
83 Rennles, Independent Force, p.17. 
84 Rennles, p.121; RAFM CC Lt R G Gibbs 
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from flying were Americans. Lt C L Startup was admitted to No 8 General 
Hospital on 3rd August, with symptoms of flying stress.  On 13th August he was 
sent back to England and the RAF Hospital Eaton Square.   He did not return to 
operations and was transferred to 30th Training Squadron.85    Startup flew on 
three operations, all in June, from the last of which he had returned early with 
engine trouble.86       Lt A E Turffrey, also American was admitted to 14 General 
Hospital at Etaples on 1st September and at once diagnosed with Flying Sickness.    
He had not flown on any operations   He remained in hospital until 18th when he 
was discharged but did not return to the squadron.87    
Of the remaining four aircrew removed from flying, Lt E C Edmund was admitted 
to hospital on 12th September with Flying Sickness but discharged to duty on 30th 
September.      Lt J J Phillips, admitted 11 September, discharged to duty on 14th, 
Lt JW Power, admitted 26 August with Flying Sickness and did not return to 
squadron and Lt J W Pope was admitted to the Canadian hospital with ‘muscular 
spasms’ later diagnosed as Flying Sickness.       Lastly, 2/Lt A C D Anderson who 
was admitted on 1st October with Flying Sickness, was given three weeks leave88. 
In fact, none of these officers flew with squadron again.  The cases of these nine 
officers demonstrate the wide variation of the impact of Flying Sickness on 
aircrew, and on treatment.    Some of these seem to have been considered 
 
85 RAFM CC Lt C L Startup. 
86 Rennles, Independent Force, crew lists. 
87 RAFM CC Lt A E Turffrey  
88 RAFM CCs 2/Lt A C D Anderson, Lt E C Edmund, Lt J J Phillips, Lt J W Pope, Lt J W Power. 
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(medically) to have been fit to return to operations but do not appear on the 
squadron crews list after their time in hospital.     Possibly, by the later months of 
the IF campaign enough replacements were arriving in time for training before 
being committed to action and it was not necessary to involve those returning 
from hospital.  
As noted above Number 55 Squadron was one of the original 41st Wing squadrons 
and had by the time of the IFs formation considerable experience of strategic 
bombing operations.     During its time with the IF, 55 Squadron carried out 47 
strategic bombing raids (not including those against airfields noted above).    
During these attacks the squadron lost 12 aircraft and crews to enemy action, 
another seven made forced landings in Allied territory, 95% of aircraft strength 
(20 aircraft).     Those losses were less than the other day bombing squadrons.      
The numbers of aircraft returning early with engine trouble were also fewer, 
probably due to use of the more reliable DH4.       On the other hand, three returned 
early with sick aircrew.89  Morale on 55 squadron as noted above, was affected 
by leadership changes even before joining the IF, but it probably improved with 
its next change of Commanding Officer (Major Gray).         Additionally, its 
aircrew’s greater experience of bombing operations certainly helped to ensure 
that its losses, although considerable, were less than the other day bombing 
squadrons.      Also, it operated DH4s, which had by 1918 established a good 
 
89 Lt B S Taylor an observer who came back sick was given a rest from flying duties.  On the next raid, his 
regular pilot with another observer, was shot down and killed.  Morris The First of The Many, p.80. 
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reputation for serviceability. These factors were certainly the reasons that 55 was 
the only day bombing squadron not to be withdrawn from operations during the 
IF campaign.     Nevertheless, four more officers were removed from flying with 
Flying Sickness between July and October.    One of them, 2/Lt A M Bryant, was 
admitted into No 8 General Hospital on 21st July suffering from Flying Sickness 
but was discharged to duty seven days later.   He did not return to the squadron, 
perhaps not surprisingly as he had flown on one operation and had returned early 
for unspecified reasons.90   2/Lt W R Pepper had seen some of the war before he 
joined the RFC, having seen service with the East Surrey Regiment.    On 14th 
October, he was admitted to No 14 General Hospital suffering from Flying 
Sickness and within a few days was transferred to the RAF London Hospital and 
later to the Grove Military Hospital and was still being treated there in 1920.91       
He does not appear on any 55 Squadron crew list during its IF service and would 
seem to have been diagnosed during his operational training period.      2/Lt H C 
Allen was taken off flying in late June.   As 55 Squadron crews list are not 
complete for that month we cannot know whether he completed any operational 
service with the squadron.   He was transferred to the RAF Eaton Square Hospital 
and was still there at the end of the war.92     The case of Lt G N Treeside, an 
observer, was different.  He had flown on at least five operations and on the 11th 
August following an attack by German fighters, the aircraft fuel tank was holed 
 
90 Rennles, p.62;  RAFM CC A M Bryant. 
91 RAFM CC W R Pepper. 
92 RAFM CC H C Allen. 
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and his pilot (Captain Bell) was soaked with petrol.  Consequently, neither 
Tressider or the pilot dared fire their guns and were lucky to evade the German 
fighters.93    Tressider flew several operations, but on 26th August he was admitted 
to No 14 Gen Hospital at Etaples and shortly afterwards transferred to London 
and the Prince of Wales Hospital.  He did not return to operations.94 
The performance of the Independent Force was disappointing, and the results 
almost certainly did not justify the casualties incurred.    Unreliable aircraft, 
inexperienced aircrew and bad weather, together with effective enemy defensive 
measures combined to frustrate this first attempt at strategic bombing.     A total 
of 537 tons of bombs were dropped (160-day, 377-night) more than half of that 
tonnage was dropped on railways or airfield targets in support of ground forces.    
The tonnage dropped of targets more than 85 miles from front line (strategic) was 
47, mostly on Mannheim and Koblenz. 95   
For the day bombing squadrons the loss rate was certainly enough to affect 
morale.  Total aircrew casualties for these squadrons for the five months they 
operated was 298 or 206%. 96   Each squadron’s aircraft establishment was 
eighteen, thus 36 aircrew, for the daylight force a total of 144 aircrew.    This 
wastage rate meant that a large reserve force to ensure that casualties are replaced 
at once, which in turn resulted a in large numbers of inexperienced pilots arriving 
 
93 Rennles, p.85. 
94 RAFM CC G N Tressider 
95 Overy, RAF pp.74-75. 
96 Casualty includes KIA, PoW, WIA, KIFA (at front) and FS.  
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at the front, not only caused a reduction in squadrons fighting efficiency, but also 
increased the number of accidents.97      
The day bombing squadrons flew operations for a total of 21 squadron- months 
during the existence of the IF.98    Aircrew lost to enemy action and accident 
amounted to 345 in the same period, enough to man ten squadrons.    This was a 
higher wastage rate than the RAF squadrons fighting over the front.       
 
This chapter completes the examination of air operations on the Western Front, 
from 1915-1918. A major objective of this thesis is to establish the incidence of 
aircrew removed from operational flying due to psychological disorder (flying 
sickness) and the causal factors influencing aircrew breakdown.   This work 
establishes that the most significant factor is the morale of a squadron, and the 
most important positive factor is the quality of leadership by squadron 
commanders.   On the other hand, the factor most adversely affecting morale was 
the heavy casualty rates.    Throughout the campaign on the western front numbers 
of aircrew affected by combat stress increased each year from 1915 to 1918.    The 
analysis indicates that the breakdown rates for RFC/RAF generally and the 
Independent Force differ, with the incidence somewhat greater in the 
Independence Force.  There is no clear reason for this, although the Independent 
 
97 H R Brooke-Popham, ‘The Air Force’  Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, February 1920,  p.49. 
Brook-Popham was Trenchard’s staff officer throughout his time as C in C and confirmed in this talk that 
Trenchard had maintained his policy of ‘all out offence’ during his time in command of RFC. 
98 Jones, TWITA Appendices Appendix XII p.41.   
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Force may have received a larger proportion of inadequately trained aircrew due 
to the general shortage for the last five months of war.   
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Conclusion 
The application of psychiatry to war is highly topical, a source of media and public 
interest and a legitimate subject for academic study.     Psychiatry in the period 
covered by this study was at an embryonic stage and some authorities consider 
that military psychiatry can be regarded as having begun in First World war1    
Clearly the necessity to treat thousands of troops suffering from unexplained 
somatic disorders, including disordered action of the heart (DAH), palpitations 
and neurasthenia, where the symptoms shown suggested a  psychological cause, 
meant that military psychiatry necessarily evolved to address the difficult 
questions of diagnosis and treatment.  
This thesis determines the extent of psychological disorders suffered by flying 
personnel during the First World War.  Additionally, it examines the effects of 
training and morale upon the incidence of such disorders.   Using medical sources 
recording the results of flying and combat stress in Royal Flying Corps and Royal 
Air Force aircrew, it has established the incidence of aircrew failure for 
psychological disorders and shown that such failures were a significant cause of 
wastage during the air war over France in 1914-1918.    
 
1  E Jones & S Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD (London, 2005), p. 1. 
320 
 
The results of this work have been compared with outcomes of psychological 
disorders in RAF aircrew of the Second World War.   This comparison has shown 
an equivalence in the incidence of these disorders in both wars.  
The maintenance of high morale in a unit has been shown to be a major factor in 
reducing psychological breakdown.     Moreover, the importance of good 
leadership, especially by squadron commanders, in promoting high morale has 
been confirmed  
As noted in chapter five of this thesis, the foundation of the military psychiatrist’s 
dilemma is the combatant’s conflict between carrying out his duty and risking his 
life.    Fear is the catalyst for the somatic symptoms, the anxiety state and 
eventually psychological breakdown of combatants including RFC/RAF aircrew.2        
The deterioration of pilots and observers as a result of the great stress of aerial 
warfare in 1917 and 1918 was described vividly by Major J L Birley (medical 
advisor to C in C France): 
Fatigue, uncertainty, fear and physical distress caused a decrease in his efficiency and 
his offensive spirit. The appearance of this deterioration depended on the quality of the 
man and the degree of stress with which he had to contend.   He traced the syndrome 
from its beginnings in a loss of zest for flying to a fully developed anxiety state…….  
although the men called it ‘wind up’ the condition is in fact an anxiety neurosis.3 
 
 
2 P Wood, ‘Da Costa’s Syndrome’ British Medical Journal 2 (1941), pp. 845-851. Summary at p. 850;     
C S Myers, Shell Shock in France 1014-1918 (London, 1940) pp. 25-26.   
3J L Birley, Goulstonian Lecture 1920 ‘The Principle of Medical Service as applied to Military Aviation’ 
Lancet 1920 I 1147, 1121 
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It was noted early in the First World War that soldiers of the BEF were arriving 
at medical centres traumatized and presenting medical officers with symptoms 
which they had difficulty understanding and treating.  As we have seen, their 
condition was inappropriately described as ‘shell shock’.  These soldiers 
presented an almost endless variety of symptoms. including tremors, headaches, 
nightmares, memory loss, speech loss, poor concentration and paresis.    In all 
cases no physical injury was suffered.    Similar symptoms were found in pilots 
and observers of the RFC/RAF after combat experience.   
This thesis is concerned with the responses of those pilots and observers to the 
stresses of flying and combat.  The reaction to this stress can produce 
psychological symptoms which indicate a nervous or psychiatric disorder, and 
which when diagnosed require that the patient be removed from flying duties.     
Any such diagnosis was recorded on the Officer’s casualty card.   These cards the 
prime medical source for this study and the base for all statistical medical 
information, were raised for all RFC/RAF causalities in the First World War, 
including, killed in action, wounded in action, killed in flying accident, wounded 
in flying accident and missing/pow.     For this study 27,000 RFC/RAF personal 
and incident cards were individuality accessed.     Personal cards show, the officers 
personal details usually including, squadron number, initial date of admission to 
reporting hospital, diagnosis, treatment and disposal, to the RFC/RAF wing in the 
military hospital at Etaples, or more often to one of the UK hospitals dealing with 
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psychiatric cases in the UK.     Incident cards include similar information, but with 
a short note of the incident reported.  
These cards were completed by doctors or medical staff who were often very busy. 
They are in manuscript (a few are typed) and sometimes difficult to read.    One 
further difficulty is the confusion caused by the failure to agree a common 
diagnosis for RFC/RAF aircrew suffering from combat induced nervous disorder 
until 1917, when ‘flying sickness’ was agreed.     
Notwithstanding these difficulties, it is submitted that the total number of aircrew 
noted in this thesis as suffering from nervous disorders is accurate to within 5%.       
What is perhaps not so accurate is the attribution of officers to squadrons, as the 
squadron or unit number is missing on about 10% of the casualty cards with Flying 
sickness diagnosis. (about 65 officers)     
 
Psychological Disorder in RFC/RAF 
A few months after the start of the First World War it was apparent that pilots and 
observers of the newly formed air service were subject to similar psychological 
somatic symptoms as soldiers at the front.    As with BEF doctors, there was some 
confusion and hesitation in diagnosing the nervous state of these psychological 
disorders.    The first four officers noted in the RAF Museum Casualty Cards 
(diagnosed between 5th May-19th June 1915) are shown as suffering from 
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Neurasthenia, the fifth (13th November) as Shell Shock.4    In 1916, three 
diagnoses to aircrew  of shell shock were made, one to a Kite Balloon observer.5, 
and two to officers who had previously served at the front.   Most of the other 
conditions in that year were shown as Neurasthenia, but two were for DAH.    By 
January 1917 there is considerable variation in diagnoses, there were five shell 
shocks (all officers who had not seen previous service), twelve cases of DAH, 
fourteen of Neurasthenia and ten noted as ‘debility’.  The BEF description of’ 
‘Not Yet Diagnosed-Nervous’ was introduced in November 1916 by BEF in 
forward centres (to avoid terms such as shell-shock, or war neurosis) and was also 
used by the RFC as an initial classification, with four aircrew being shown as 
NYDN.    However, in December 1917, the RFC medical authorities finally found 
a diagnosis which effectively covered both the psychiatric and psychological 
symptoms of aircrew psychological breakdown. This was ‘flying sickness’ the 
first diagnosis of which was for Lt R S Lewis of 100 squadron.     From this time 
the normal diagnoses of aircrew suffering from psychological disorder, was flying 
sickness.  However, the other conditions noted above were on occasion still used 
and, neurasthenia, perhaps to indicate a mild form of flying sickness, was seen up 
to the end of the war.  
 
4 Lt S F A Welsh, diagnosed with Shell Shock on 13th June 1915, was under pilot training at that time, but had 
previously served with the Sussex Regiment. It is possible that he was diagnosed early in his training suffering 
from his previous service.     
5  As we have seen, kite Balloon observers were in practice in virtually the same position as those in the trenches. 
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By early 1917, wastage from this cause was significant and recognition of its 
importance prompted an investigation.     However, Lt Col M Flack, Director of 
Medical Research having devised tests to evaluate efficiency and Flying Strain, 
reported that although psychological factors could be present the real cause of 
these symptoms was physical strain.    A report by Major J L Birley, medical 
adviser to C in C France, however, did conclude that ‘temperamental unfitness’ 
was a factor in the loss of confidence shown by some aircrew, without suffering a 
crash or other unpleasant experience.    He felt that temperamental and physical 
fitness were closely allied and that in the temperamentally unfit failure was largely 
due to mental shock.         
Notwithstanding this concern about the psychological suitability of those flying 
and fighting with the RFC, there is no indication that any of this concern was 
passed to the officers involved in recruiting aircrew.    As noted in chapter two, 
recruiting officers faced with the continually increasing demand for pilots, turned 
firstly to the many volunteers from army officers.    Subject to the possession of 
the Aviators Certificate’, (which would cost £75.00, refunded by the Army when 
accepted for RFC) the average army officer could easily meet the requirements of 
service and experience.  It seems that it was also assumed, if it was ever 
considered, that any serving officer was psychologically suitable. 
It soon became clear that with the great expansion of the RFC (and from early 
1915, increasing numbers of casualties) that service sources would not be able to 
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supply enough aircrew.   This realization that large numbers of aircrew would be 
needed, opened the way for volunteers.    Although there were always enough 
volunteers, both for the RFC and RNAS, the actual selection was arbitrary, 
unstructured and always with great emphasis placed on the interview with the 
candidate.   No evidence has been found which indicates that any consideration 
was given to the psychological fitness of candidates at the recruiting stage.      Of 
course, aviation was a new activity and there was little knowledge of the physical 
or the psychological effects of flying, or the reactions of pilots and observers in 
this new environment.     At that time, most flyers would have come from the army 
or the Royal Navy, so selecting recruits from applicants with the same background 
would have seemed reasonable.   By 1916 another important source of pilots, (with 
basic training completed), was the output from the Canadian flying schools.   
Selection in Canada was on a similar basis to that of the RFC in England, with the 
extra requirement ‘have the marks of a gentleman’.  By January 1918, recruits 
from Canadian Flying Schools were arriving in Britain at a rate of 230 a month.     
As with RFC aircrew no consideration had been given when recruiting to the 
candidate’s psychological fitness for flying.         
It was not until 1917 that any attention was given to the psychological attributes 
required for selection for aircrew service.  By December 1916, some 30 aircrew 
had been removed from flying on operational squadrons for psychological 
disorder (flying sickness).   In that year, the Air Council appointed an Air Medical 
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Investigation Committee, to prepare reports on the medical problems of flying.  
One report by Major Birley concluded that flying did require a ‘flying 
temperament’, but he was unable to define the exact requirements.6   A more 
useful attempt was made by Professor W H R Rivers, (Captain RAMC, Consultant 
to RFC) and Squadron Leader T S Rippon, who considered whether it would be 
possible to establish a mental aptitude for flying by interview.   They interviewed 
some 37 students who were already under instruction with the aim of assessing 
the subject’s likely success as airmen.  The results were inconclusive and two of 
their best students were killed in accidents.7    These tentative and unsuccessful 
attempts to investigate and ‘screen’ candidates for vulnerability although crude 
and unstructured, were precursors of later attempts which also failed.8 
Screening for psychological vulnerability to breakdown in the air is always likely 
to be unsuccessful.      On the one hand the screening procedure cannot consider 
those matters which greatly influence battle performance of the individual such 
as, leadership. training, unit coherence unit success: all of which influences the 
individual’s response to action.   On the other hand, it is also impossible to predict 
the intensity of operations and crucially, whether any individual will experience 
 
6 J L Birkey, ‘Temperament and Service Flying’ Medical Research Council: Medical Problems of Flying 
(HMSO, 1920) paper No 8 (1917) pp.142-144. 
7 W R H Rivers & T S Rippon, ‘Mental Aptitude for Aviation’ Medical Research Council: The Medical problems 
of Flying, Report No 12 (1917). 
8 D J Williams, ‘Predisposition to Psychological Disorder in Normal Flying Personnel’ Air Publication 3139: 
Psychological disorders in flying personnel of the Royal Air Force (HMSO, 1947), pp. 185-192.   
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an exceptionally high level of stress.      In fact, it has been found in several studies 
that those who do breakdown, even if it is later found that there was some nervous 
pre-disposition, have in many cases, served as long and as well as the average 
combatant.9   
This thesis confirms the impracticability of any attempt to screen potential aircrew 
by the elimination of candidates with a predisposition to neurotic breakdown.   
 
 
Training and Psychological Disorder  
This thesis has established that although effective training has a positive effect on 
confidence and morale, a significant number of aircrew failures in training are for 
psychological reasons.    The actual percentage of aircrew under training who fail 
for psychological reasons cannot be accurately measured, although Anderson’s 
10% is likely to be an underestimate.  It is probable that the figure quoted in an 
American report quoted in AP 3139 showing that 36% of pilots reclassified by 
advanced flying schools was for ‘fear or other personality, temperament or interest 
characteristics without mention of other deficiencies’ is accurate.10    
 
9 E Miller, The Neurosis In War (New York, 1943), pp. 13-15;    N S Gilchrist,  ’An Analysis of causes of 
Breakdown in Flying’ British Medical Journal  Volume 2 No 3015 (Oct 1918)   pp 401-403; and  Jones & Wessely,  
pp. 108-110. 
10 C P Symonds (AVM Sir) & D J Williams (Wg Cdr).’ Signs of Temperamental Unsuitability in Aircrew Under 
Training’    AP 3139 Chapter XV, pp. 193-198, quoting ‘Analysis of the duties of aircrew personnel’.  Bulletin No 
14 Air Surgeon’s Office HQ American Air Forces December 1942     
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An important contributing factor to psychological problems with aircrew in the 
First World War was that flying was a novel occupation.  Today, most of the 
population knows something about aviation and aeroplanes, many have flown 
albeit as a passenger.  In 1914, few people had seen an aircraft, fewer had flown 
and very few were qualified to fly.    The potential pilot was not aware that there 
would be many accidents, he did not know how fragile aircraft were, how 
turbulent the air could be or even how high is high?        Accounts of trainee pilots 
of the RFC highlight the apprehension, not to say fear of the student (and the 
incompetence of the instructor).11 The experiences of trainee pilots, Binley, Lee 
and Yeats (Chapter Three) in the first two years of the war, and the effects of the 
many training accidents certainly may help to explain why many pilots failed for 
psychological reasons.     
Thus in 1916 it is not surprising, as Anderson found, that many students struggled 
with the mental aspect of mastering this entirely new environment psychological 
unnerving, and either asked to leave the course or developed what Anderson called 
‘aero-neurosis’.   He notes that during his time as an instructor with the RNAS, 
600 students passed through his hands.12     He says that about 10% of students 
‘had to give up’ suffering from some type of neurosis.     Some were affected 
 
11 See p.106 and Lee, Open Cockpit p. 23. 
12 Anderson, pp. 1-3; pp 52-55.  Anderson originally joined the Royal Navy at the outbreak of the war as a medical 
consultant.    Later he learned to fly and was attached to the RNAS, where he became a flying instructor.    
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during the dual control instruction, but it was most common after a few solo flights 
and a few students were removed or asked to leave when they moved on to faster 
types of aircraft.    He attributes most of these failures to an ‘aero-neurosis, and 
notes that being in accident, sometimes minor, can affect confidence and induce 
anxiety.  He describes the response by one student who, having made a very erratic 
first solo flight followed by a bad landing, stepped out of the aircraft and 
announced, ‘nothing on earth would induce him ever to go up again’.13  
The Casualty Cards at the RAF Museum show some 20-aircrew removed from 
flying training units during the War for psychological reasons, but this is certainly 
an underestimate, probably by a large margin.          Many students were failed at 
an early stage for unspecified reasons, many were injured in accidents and did not 
return to flying and it is not known how many asked to be taken off flying duties.       
Anderson says that 10% failed suffering with aero-neurosis and it likely that his 
estimate is accurate for the early years.        However, with the introduction of the 
Smith-Barry system of instruction in 1917, instructors were encouraged to take 
account of the student’s mental state in training with the aim of eliminating the 
‘nervous’ pilot.  This was achieved in part by giving each applicant a test flight 
with an instructor.  This was undoubtably a crude method but was claimed to 
 
13 H G Anderson, The Medical and Surgical Aspects of Aviation (London,1919) p. 53.   Anderson also describes 
many of the symptoms of ‘Aero-Neurosis’ including headaches, insomnia, nightmares, irritability, tremors, and 
paralysis.  
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eliminate some 45% of applicants as unsatisfactory.14    Thus the numbers of 
candidates entering flying training who were not ‘temperamentally suitable’ was 
considerably reduced. 
Although it might seem to be a’ hit or miss assessment of the student’s chance of 
succeeding in flying training, a similar system was used in the Second World War 
to assess potential pilots as it was felt that flying instructors were in the best 
position to make early assessments of candidates.  The rational for such 
assessments is set out in AP 3139, in ‘Notes to Flying Instructors’ in June 1943:   
Before men are accepted for training they are interviewed by general officers and 
medical officers who reject any who seem unsuitable for flying duties.    It is impossible 
however, to eliminate all who are unsuitable by means of an interview. There are some 
signs of unsuitability which only appear during training.15 
A common method used to identify inadequate students, was stalling the aircraft 
and noting the student’s reaction: does he ‘stop talking, cling to the aircraft and 
stop looking out’ or just wait calmly for the instructor to recover the aircraft?  
When considering the incidence of breakdown in training, this thesis includes only 
aircrew breaking down whilst training which is noted in the RFC/RAF casualty 
cards.  The Official History quotes a failure (wastage) rate of 28% during pilot 
training, without any indication of the reasons for failure.16      For Canadian flying 
schools during the First World War the failure rate was worse, 9200 cadets were 
 
14 H A Jones, Official History The War In The Air (London, 1922-1937) Volume V pp. 431-433;    D Winter, 
The First Of The Few, (London, 1982) , p. 30.   
15 AP 3139 Psychological Disorders In Flying Personnel of the Royal Air Force 1939-1945 (HMSO, 1957)    
Chapter XV Appendix Notes for Flying Instructors on recognition of nervousness.  
16  Jones, TWITA Volume V pp. 425-426.            
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accepted  and 3135  completed pilot training, a wastage rate of 65%  which 
includes all reasons for failure, and again, it is not possible to establish the number 
of failures for medical reasons.  It is right to add that the Canadian schools 
improved markedly after the introduction of the Smooth-Barry instructional 
system.  The major improvement was the reduction in fatalities in Canada.17 
However, although there is undoubtedly a significant failure rate in aircrew 
training, for those who succeed, effective training is an invaluable morale 
enhancing factor.     Chapter five of this thesis considers the effect of training on 
morale: it creates unit cohesion, itself a positive factor, it enables trainees to 
master technologies and builds self-confidence.  It establishes that, although the 
only real training for war is war, realistic training engenders a positive attitude 
and high morale in a unit (squadron) which undoubtably reduces the rate of 
psychological breakdown. 
 
Morale and Leadership 
This study has confirmed that good leadership is the most important factor in 
maintaining morale and sustaining vulnerable combatants against psychological 
failure in the RFC/RAF in the First World War.    Evidence confirming this, 
perhaps bold assertion, includes statements by aircrew, commanders, and 
 
17 Wise, Canadian Airmen and The First World War: The Official History of the Canadian Air Force Volume 
One (University of Toronto, 1980), p. 117-118. 
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psychiatrists.     In chapter six, Lt Alan Jackson’s account of the effect of a change 
of squadron commander is illustrative of the importance of sound leadership.      
He describes the bad effect on morale of a squadron led by an inefficient and 
careless commander.18    Wells in his study of World War Two aircrew of the RAF 
and USAAF, quotes an RAF Bomber Command medical officer, making this 
point: 
Send a good leader to a squadron of low morale and in a short time he will build it up, 
put a bad leader into a squadron and, given time the standard will deteriorate.19 
 
Although all leaders are different there are several basic qualities required to lead 
aircrew which apply to all.  The first is courage: a squadron commander does have 
to lead; he must fly on operations.   In the First World War, initially squadron 
commanders were forbidden to fly over German lines, the rational being that the 
loss of experienced leaders could not be borne.    In fact, many squadron 
commanders ignored this order and no action was taken by Trenchard.  As pointed 
out earlier in this work, commanding officers were in a difficult position: if they 
did not fly on operations but had to order others go, sometimes in bad weather, or 
against strong opposition, their reputation and authority suffered (unless like 
Major Lanoe Hawker it had already been established; he won a VC before being 
appointed).  In the event the order was rescinded in 1917.  
 
18 See p 217 this thesis, Lt Alan Jackson No 5 Squadron    
19 See p 209 and M K Wells, Courage and Air warfare (London,1995), p. 137. 
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Secondly is competence.   Aircrew expected their leaders to be brave; they also 
expected competence.   The ability to fly well and fight well and to administer the 
squadron without fuss, earned respect.    A good squadron commander also went 
some way to ensuring the other major marker for good morale, successes in battle.     
Sound leadership almost certainly ensures good morale, but even under the best 
conditions some aircrew may suffer psychological breakdown.    The squadron 
commander has a further role in reducing the incidence of breakdown, that is by 
ensuring that crews are rested, get their leave on time or are, if necessary, removed 
from flying duties.    This study has noted several examples of such removals.   
Including that of Lt F L Rankin of No 18 Squadron who was sent home after an 
extremely stressful operation, during which his observer was killed, even though 
Rankin had saved him from falling out of the aircraft.     Rankin did not return to 
duty.20      Harold Balfour, afterwards a prominent politician says in his memoirs 
he was sent home with a very minor injury by his commanding officer in April 
1917, so that he could be rested. He admits that he was showing signs of strain.   
He returned to France in November to shoot down nine aircraft and win the MC, 
but in April 1918 was returned to England again as a possible case of DAH.21 
 
20 T Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield (London,2014) p. 58; Peter Hart, Somme Success (London, 2012), p. 202.  
21 H H Balfour, An Airman Marches (London, 1954), pp.45-46.  In the Second World War Balfour, as Air Minister, 
had to adjudicate on cases of LMF and remembered his own service experiences. H H Balfour Wings Over 
Westminster (London, 1973), pp. 50-51.  
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The War Office Committee of Enquiry addressed the influence of discipline and 
morale on the incidence of shell shock in the BEF, finding that of the fifteen 
factors most influential in reducing the incidence of cases the most important 
were:  Good Morale, High Standard of Discipline, Esprit de corps and  Good 
Officers, especially as regards leadership.22           This thesis has established, not 
surprisingly, the same factors affected the rate of Flying Sickness in the 
RFC/RAF.  It is argued here that in fact leadership is the predominate factor in 
producing good morale and where there is good morale aircrew failures are 
minimal.  There are no First World War studies which confirm this, but the many 
similar studies of World War Two aircrew show that good leadership always 
induces good morale and greatly reduces failure rates.23   
 
 
The War in The Air 
This study examines the incidence of psychological breakdown of aircrew 
involved in the air war over France.     Therefore, an analysis of that campaign is 
a major part of this study.  Chapters six, seven and eight cover the development 
and increasing intensity of that war. 
 
22 Cmd 1734 report, p.151 
23 D D Reid, ‘The Influence of Psychological Disorder on Efficiency In Operational Flying’,   E J Dearnley 
& P B Warr (eds.),  Aircrew Stress in Wartime Operations (London,1947),  p.43; R R Grinker & J P 
Spiegel,  Men Under Stress (McGraw-Hill, USA, 1963),  pp. 37-38. 
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Although, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and American aircrew flew with 
the RFC/RAF in the First World War, it has not been possible to calculate an 
incidence of flying Sickness for each nationality.    However, some cases have 
been identified.    In the case of Canada, five cases have been noted (identified by 
having served in a Canadian regiment before joining RFC).    Unfortunately, it is 
not always the case that Canadian national identity is stated on casualty cards and 
Canadians serving with RFC/RAF were subject to the normal British medical 
arrangements.     Similarly, Australian Squadrons serving in France were under 
British operational control and aircrew were treated under the same regime as 
RFC/RAF and not separately classified, but five Australian cases have been 
identified. There was also a significant number of aircrew from the other 
Dominions: New Zealand (200), South Africa (438) who are not identified as such 
on the cards, which also applied to Australians serving as individuals (that is not 
with their national forces).24     Casualty cards for all these officers  record service 
and squadron but unless the individual has served in a national regiment ( which 
is usually noted on Cards) their nationality will not be revealed, therefore it has 
not been possible to identify any cases of Flying Sickness.  
  One other service was engaged in operations over France, the United States Air 
Service Squadrons.   Apart from the Pursuit and Bombing Squadrons under US 
 
24 Molkentin, Australia and the War in The Air, p. 26 and p. 86. The New Zealanders 
included Keith Park, a senior RAF commander in the Second World War.  
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control and operating independently (not examined in this study), from June 1918 
the 17th and 148th Pursuit squadrons served with the RAF in France and their 
casualties are noted in the table below.   Both squadrons were Scouts (fighter) 
squadrons and like the Australian squadrons fully integrated with the RAF and 
their casualties with squadrons recorded on RAF Casualty Cards. 
Confusingly, many individual American pilots and observers were attached to 
RAF squadrons, including in the Independent Force, and did have their nationality 
noted on cards: four cases of flying sickness from this cohort have been identified.      
A major factor affecting the morale of squadrons and in turn the incidence of 
Flying Sickness was the casualty rate.   In 1915, casualties were bearable, a total 
of 132, (KIA, POW, KIFA) and during that year, there were only five cases of 
aircrew suffering from a psychological disorder.  (One of those was in the Middle 
East).  It was not until May that combat reports were passed from squadrons to 
wing headquarters and from these reports a gradual increase of air activity and in 
air fighting can be seen.     
In 1916, the number of RFC squadrons in France was increased to thirty-five and 
by December, casualties amounted to 550, a 316% increase over the year.   The 
number of aircrew removed for psychological reasons was 20.     In 1917 the 
intensity of the war over the front increased and the Germans, for a time obtained 
air superiority.   In spring 1917, the Germans introduced the Albatross fighter, 
much superior to the standard RFC fighter at that time the DH2, although the 
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Bristol fighter was introduced, initially with heavy losses.    April alone cost 316 
aircrew killed or missing, with a further 9 killed in accidents.   The official 
estimate of the length of operational service of aircrew (life expectancy) was about 
3.5 months.   In fact, at that time it was about three weeks.25        Total casualties 
for 1917 were 1832 a 333% increase and the number of aircrew diagnosed as 
suffering ‘flying sickness’ (now officially used for psychological disorders) was 
more than doubled at 46.     
The RFC (RAF from 1st April) regained superiority in the air in the last few 
months of 1917, which continued into 1918.    Fighting was particularly intense 
in March following the halting of the German offensive.     This change in the 
ground fighting also provided, for the first time, many perfect ground targets for 
aircraft, such as troops marching in columns and artillery batteries moving in the 
open.  However, as already been noted, casualties in this type of attack were 
heavy, sometimes as high as 30% of aircraft engaged.  One other effect of both 
the intensity of conflict was that both sides increased the strength of individual 
formations, leading to many large, and costly, ‘dog fights’ over the front.    The 
Germans, partly, due to shortages of both aircraft and fuel, sometimes declined 
combat: as the inevitability of defeat on the ground became clear, the GAF made 
strenuous efforts to protect their ground forces with sweeps across the battlefield 
 
25 TNA Air1/683?21/13/2234; D Winter, The First of The Few (London, 1982) p.152;   J Hamilton-Paterson, 
Marked for Death: The First War in the Air, (London, 2015), pp.137-138.  
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by combined squadrons, which also led to many air combats.   Casualties in 1918 
increased to a total of 2446 by the end of fighting in November, an increase of 
33.5%. (last action by RAF was 10th November, with 12 casualties,7 KIA 4 POW.  
Two of the seven were killed in a collision between two 46 squadron aircraft).    
The number of aircrew removed from flying duties for psychological reasons in 
1918 was 615. 
The Independent Force commanded by Major-General Trenchard, commenced 
operations in June 1918.  These operations, the first serious attempt at strategic 
bombing, (and partly a response to German daylight raids on London) were flown 
by four squadrons operating in daylight and five by night.     At first casualties 
were light but operations were hampered by the large number of early returns, 
particularly by Nos 55, 99 and 104 the day bombing squadrons.  Many of these 
early returns were for engine failure, but a significant number were for crew 
sickness.      Squadrons engaged on night bombing suffered fewer casualties than 
the day bombing units, partly because not until the last months of the war that they 
meet German fighters.   The three squadrons noted above also suffered the most 
casualties, low morale, leadership difficulties and high numbers of aircrew failure.      
Of the 277 casualties incurred by the IF, 76.5% came from, 55, 99 and 104 
squadrons and 66% of the flying sickness cases also came from these three.  The 
total of 45 cases of aircrew breakdown in only five months of operations, partly 
due to the large numbers of inexperienced aircrew, seems to indicate that there 
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were problems with morale and in at least one squadron, (55) leadership.    Two 
IF squadrons 55 and 99, were removed from operations for short periods after 
heavy casualties and shortage of replacements.   The performance of the 
Independent Force overall was disappointing: unreliable aircraft, inexperienced 
aircrews, bad weather and effective enemy defence measures combined to 
frustrate this first attempt at strategic bombing.       The results probably did not 
justify the casualties incurred.26  
The table below consolidates these figures and sets out the incidence of failure of 
aircrew serving on Western for the years 1915-1918.    Aircrew numbers are based 
upon the number of squadrons at the front on the dates stated, taking account of 
as far as is possible, the variations in squadron strengths, and sets out the numbers 
in France at dates shown.27      In 1915, a squadrons establishment allowed for 12 
aircraft, this was increased to eighteen in March 1916 and further raised in March 
1917 to 24, although some Independent Force aircraft strengths were set at twelve 
aircraft.28    The squadrons aircrew establishment numbers are more complex.  
Obviously, 12 (18/24) aircraft requires that number of pilots (plus some observers 
if two seaters), but account must be taken of the squadron commander and often 
pilots training but not yet ‘on’ strength  and on the other hand casualties, not yet 
 
26  Details of IF operations are in chapter eight. 
 
28 These were the night bombing squadrons flying the HP0/400 & HP1/400, twin engine 
with a crew of three. 
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replaced,  (on average it took four days for replacements to arrive, very often 
needing further training).    
The incidence of cases of flying sickness in Balloon Observers is based on the 
estimate of 40 balloon sections in BEF area in France in 1918.29   That estimate 
shows some 360 observers in place, with 45 cases of breakdown, incidence of 
12.5%. It has not been possible to verify casualty figures for Balloon observers.   
RFC/RAF                                                                                    
Date               Sqdns    Pilots     Obs       Casualties   Cas/Rate          Fly/Sick       Incidence30               
Dec.1915         17       204       25         132            49.6%            5                2.2%             
Dec.1916         35       630       60         550            79.7%            21               2.8%             
Dec.1917         54      1296      780       1832          88.2%            46               2.1%                 
Nov.1918        93       2232     1046      2446          74.6%           615             18.7%                       
 
Independent Force (from June-November)  
Dec 1918         9        162        252        277           66.9%          45                10.8%   
 
United States Air Service 
Nov 1918        2        40            0             24            60%              4                 10% 
 
 
29P C Ford, ‘The Practical Training of Balloon Observers’ Cross & Cockade Volume 35 (1) 2004 pp 13-21 
30Casualties include, Killed in Action, Prisoner of War, Killed in Flying Accident.  Although all squadrons 
also had aircrew recorded as Wounded in action (WIA) many were noted as ‘slight’ or ‘minor’ and therefore 
wounds have been disregards as the effect on squadron strengths cannot be calculated. 
341 
 
 
RNAS Squadrons on Western Front. (until 1st April 1918)    
Dec 1917          8        160        -                110           42%               
Mar 1918  15       260        80              24            10% 
 
The table based on the examination of casualty and incident cards, shows that up 
to the end of 1917, the wastage from flying sickness cases although significant, 
was bearable (that is, did not affect operational capability).  Even though by 
December 1917, the number of cases of flying sickness had more than doubled, 
the incidence remained low.     But in 1918, the RAF number of squadrons in 
France had almost doubled to 93, additionally, there was a great increase in the 
intensity of air operations and a large increase in casualties       There was also a 
very large increase in cases of aircrew breakdown.         At least in part, this was 
due to the considerable number of inexperienced and inadequately trained  aircrew 
(especially pilots) joining squadrons, their training had not shown them what to 
expect, and as already noted some squadrons in the IF had been taken out of the 
line to give extra training to replacements.     It is also clear that on some squadrons 
(eg No 99, 55)  morale had suffered, although an American report of RAF 
operations (including low level strafing) in 1918 noted ‘the British had one great 
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advantage over the GAF, they had had air supremacy for so long that morale 
remained high’.31    
As noted in chapter four treatment for flying sickness was inevitability a long 
process which required return to the Home Establishment.        In only forty-six 
cases aircrew were discharged from hospital, ‘returned to duty’, sometimes to a 
specific unit such as an aircraft park or training unit, but few even of those pilots 
or observers having been given a few weeks leave or a home posting, returned to 
action in France. In fact, many of the aircrew diagnosed were still being treated at 
the end of 1918, and several casualty cards record treatment into 1920/22.         
By 1918 the incidence of aircrew breakdown was such that it became a significant 
proportion of the wastage of RAF aircrew in France.  The casualty rate in 1918 
was 74.6%, adding the 18% of Flying Sickness cases raises the wastage to 92%.  
Official government figures for replacement pilots alone for 1918 showed; that to 
replace wastage in France for the period January-March 1749 replacement pilots 
were needed.  For April to December 9752 were required, in addition another 200 
were needed to replace operational wastage in England (mostly accidents), 
therefore the total number of pilots required was 11701.        It took eight months 
to train a pilot and at the time of this estimate there were a little over 5000 in the 
system.     However, allowing for the 28% wastage accepted in training and 
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numbers of casualties, it needed 1900 pilots a month to start training.32     These 
figures confirm the submission here that the incidence of flying sickness was a 
significant factor in the war in the air. 
These figures also show that if the war had continued into December 1918, the 
RAF would probably have been forced to curtail operations because of aircrew 
shortages.  
 
NCO and Airmen Aircrew 
One omission from the casualty and breakdown numbers above is mention of the 
contribution of non-commissioned officers and airmen aircrew in the analysis of 
the air war.  As noted in chapter one, NCO Pilots and observers were recruited 
almost from the start and many became casualties.  It is estimated that in 1918, 
some 120-150 NCO pilots were serving on squadrons in France and 
approximately 800 NCO observers.   There were also a number of air mechanics 
being used as air gunners, perhaps fifty or so.     Although it has not been possible 
to investigate the numbers of NCO aircrew breakdown in this study, it is possible 
to record the casualty figures for NCO and airman aircrew and these are set out 
below.33 
 
32 Figures extracted from H A Jones, The War in The Air (HMSO, 1922), Volume V, Chapter VIII, pp. 
425-435. 
33 In November 1918 the strength of the RAF was 27.000 officers and 247,161 NCOs and airmen. It is not 
practical to examine all medical records, but research into squadron records may be able to extrapolate those 
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NCO and Airman Aircrew Casualties. Western Front 1914-1918 
       Pilots                  Observers/Gunners            Pilots          Observers/Gunners 
KIA       PoW                  KIA          PoW                KIFA                   KIFA 
23          13                      146              82                     9                         35 
Total = 390 
The seemingly large difference in the numbers of pilot to/observer casualties is 
due to the fact that most observers were flying with an officer pilot, whereas pilots 
most often flew solo when in scout single seaters or if in two seaters carried officer 
observers.34 
 
Aircrew psychological disorder 
This thesis is part of a continuum of study of the development of military 
psychiatry, beginning effectively with studies of the American Civil War and 
continuing with the Boer war and becoming fully recognized during the First 
World War when the vast increase in the scale of the problem caught the Army 
medical authorities by surprise and the recognition that psychiatric casualties were 
as important as physical wounds.       Following the war an effort was made to 
 
non-commissioned aircrew sent home for psychological breakdown.   During this study two cases of NCOs 
suffering from flying sickness have been identified.   
 32 Figures extracted from T Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield (Fetubi Books, 2014). 
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understand the causes of the Shell Shock (Flying Sickness) and perhaps note 
lessons for the future.   In 1922 the ‘War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell-
Shock’ chaired by Lord Southborough was formed, the terms of reference were: 
To consider the different types of hysteria and traumatic neurosis ,commonly called 
‘shell shock’; to collate the expert knowledge derived by the service medical authorities  
and the medical profession  from the experience of the war, with a view to recording for 
future use the ascertained facts as to its origin, nature, and remedial treatment, and to 
advise whether by military training or education, some scientific method of guarding 
against its occurrence can be devised.35 
 
As to causation, most psychiatrists believed the cause of shell shock was fear, the 
inevitable result of sustained and intense combat.    Professor Rivers for example 
argued that shell shock was a ‘hysterical defence against intolerable fear’.    
However, the most impressive witness to the enquiry was Squadron Leader W 
Tyrrell DSO MC of the RAF medical services.  He gave evidence as a medical 
officer, but he had also been removed from the front suffering with shell shock.  
He said: 
Shell Shock is born of fear.   Its grandparents are self-preservation and the fear of being 
found afraid.  Any emotion which has to be repressed or concealed demands an 
unrestricted but well-concealed output of nervous energy.   Craven fear is the most 
extravagant prodigal of nervous energy known.    Under its stimulus, a man squanders 
nervous energy recklessly in order to suppress his pent-up emotion, and mask or 
camouflage that which if revealed will call down ignominy upon his head and disgrace 
him in the eyes of his fellows. 36     
 
The committee agreed that shell shock was a meaningless term as the evidence 
showed that most sufferers were in fact suffering from a nervous breakdown 
 
35 Cmd 1734 Report p. 2. 
36 Cmd 1734 Report p. 31. 
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brought about by fear fatigue and horrifying experiences.   The committee having 
accepted the medical view about the cause could only recommend ‘suitable 
training’ and the promotion of high morale as ways of reducing combatant failures 
with combat stress’. 
In the years immediately following the First World War several reports upon the 
psychological effects of flying and the causes of psychological disorders were 
produced.     Birley, in a report (1920) upon temperament and service flying drew 
attrition to the individual nature of the pilots work and making the important point 
that suitability for flying does not automatically mean suitable for operations.  
Several reports by Birley (1923), Rivers (1920) Archer (1939) confirmed the view 
that psychological disorders were caused in varying degrees by fear at various 
levels of consciousness. 
 These reports seem to have been overlooked in the interwar years and as already 
noted, the RAF in the Second World War was surprised at the level of aircrew 
failure, after only slight to moderate amounts of combat stress.   Response to this 
failure was prompt and the system of a nominated ‘tour’ of either, number of 
operational hours, or numbers of operational missions was implemented.     
Additionally, in Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands, wherever possible 
doctors were included in the squadron establishment, thus ensuring both medical 
advice to commanding officers and care of aircrew.    In World War Two as in the 
First World War there was a steep increase in the number of psychiatric casualties 
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with the increase of operations.       Concern about the rate of this aircrew failure 
led to the introduction of the term LMF (lack of moral fibre), introduced by the 
RAF Chief of Air Staff, to deal with cases of aircrew who ‘will not face 
operational risks’    LMF was to be used as an administrative procedure in cases: 
Where there is no physical disability, no justification for the granting of rest from 
operational employment and, in fact, nothing wrong except a lack of moral fibre. 
 
And it was further directed that:  
cases of loss of moral among flying personnel should be frankly recognized and reported 
to higher authority and no attempt should be made to obtain posting action on other 
grounds. 37   
 
Making LMF an administrative action enabled cases to be differentiated from 
genuine cases of psychological disorder (Neurasthenia, flying sickness) which not 
only avoided flying but which were also entitled to a war pension.   There was 
(and still is) controversy about the introduction of LMF, commanders thought it 
necessary, but many aircrew felt that it could penalize some who had done their 
best, but still failed.   Group Captain Cheshire, the most decorated airman of 
World War Two, thought it justified in a brutal war.       On the other hand, 
Squadron Leader David Strafford-Clark thought it ‘very harsh indeed’38  Noble 
Frankland DFC, the co-author of the Official History of the Strategic Air Offense 
 
37 E Jones, ‘LMF: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the Second World War’  The 
Journal of Military History Vol 70 No 2 (2006),  pp. 439-458 & p.442; C P Symonds & D J Williams  ‘Personal  
Investigation of Psychological Disorders in Flying Personnel of Bomber Command’  Air Publication 3139 
(HMSO,1947) pp. 31-64.   
38 E Jones, LMF p 440 
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and a bomber navigator felt that crews had to be denied sympathy and psychiatric 
treatment , otherwise the ‘the withdrawal rate would have produced a front line 
of green novices’39   In fact as noted above the numbers of breakdown by aircrew 
in the First World War contributed to the aircrew shortage and in the Independent 
Force, lack of trained aircrew was a significant problem.  
In the Second World War, following the First World War procedure, a network of 
NYDN centres were set up.  However, unlike the First World War practice, on 
arrival, aircrew were stripped of rank insignia and flying Badges.  In fact, the 
system operated as though the man was a coward unless he could prove 
otherwise.40    A major reason for this aggressively deterrent approach was the 
fear of contagion expressed by a number of senior commanders,  “ that unchecked 
LMF could cause havoc in a combat squadron”41    This view was in fact held by 
the Air Minister, a First World War pilot who said: 
LMF was dangerously contagious. One LMF crew member could start a rot which might 
spread not only through his own crew but through the whole squadron, particularly when 
there happened to a lot of inexperienced crews replacing casualties.42 
 
However, Balfour also described how following parliamentary misgivings about 
LMF being equated with cowardice, and thus leading to unfairness, it was decided 
 
39 Quoted by Ben Shepard in War of Nerves, (London,2000), p. 297. 
40 S C Rexford-Welch, The Royal Air Force Medical Services, Volume II Commands (HMSO,1955),  
pp.127-128 & pp. 260-261. 
41 Wells, Courage and Air Warfare p. 194.   
42 H Balfour (Lord Balfour of Inchrye) Wings Over Westminster (London, 1973),  p.195 
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that all cases should be considered by the Air Minister before action was taken, 
and accordingly each case came before him for decision.43 
The causes of breakdown in the Second World war were the same as in the First.   
The report by Symonds and Williams noted above, stressed the negative effect of 
casualties on the morale of the squadron, but also noted the positive effect of good 
leadership.44  
Comparison of breakdown rates with the First World War is complicated but 
possible. In World War Two the RAF was not only much larger but consisted of 
many different operational roles including many not existing in 1918. However, a 
comparison can be made with Bomber, Fighter and Training commands, which in 
any case had most failures.    One other difficulty is that the official figures 
produced in AP3139, are expressed in ‘man-years’, but the document explaining 
the concept also notes that the man-year rate is ‘roughly the same as per cent 
average strength’ (used in this study)45.     
The table below sets out the figures for psychological disorders and LMF in RAF 
Second World War aircrew: 
                        
 
 
43  Ibid, p.196. 
44  Symonds & Williams, p. 49 & p. 53. 
45  C P Symonds & d J Williams, ‘Clinical and Statistical study of Neurosis Precipitated by Flying Duties’ in 
AP 3139, Chapter X, pp.140 -172, p. 140 & p.170.   
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       Neurosis                  LMF 
1942-43          2505                         416 
1943-44          2989                         307 
1944-45          2910                         306 
The incidence of psychological disorder was, in night bombers 12% , in day 
bombers 11.2%, in fighters 6%, in Middle East operations which included 
bombers and fighters 10.4% 46    Bomber Command, which had very large casualty 
rates accounted for a third of all LMF cases and perhaps surprisingly, as all were 
volunteers, another third failed during training.    One major difference between 
the two wars was the outcome of treatment of psychological disorders, in World 
War Two, some 30% of aircrew were returned to full flying duties and another 
five per cent to limited flying duties, as opposed to the forty odd flying sickness 
patients who were returned  to duty in the First World  War.       Notwithstanding 
the differences in calculations, it is clear that the breakdown rate of aircrew on the 
Western Front in 1918, 18.7% was greater than the 1939-1945 rate, 10.0- 12.0% 
(depending upon command). 
This study covers a hitherto unexamined area: the effects of combat stress on 
aircrew in The First World War.   It has demonstrated that the intensity of combat 
 
46 Symonds & Williams, p.170. 
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and heavy casualties determines the incidence of aircrew failure.  It has 
established the crucial role of good morale in limiting the scale of flying sickness.   
It has also confirmed the importance leadership in the shaping of morale.  In order 
to achieve these results, the individual medical results of 27,000 RFC/RAF 
officers have been analyzed and coordinated to the operations undertaken by 
Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Air Force. 
        
352 
 
                                                                              Bibliography 
1. Primary Sources 
 
a) National Archives of the United Kingdom 
Air 1 Air Historical Branch Papers 
Air 29 Operations Record Books  
WO 339 Officer’s Services, First World War   
 
b)    Royal Air Force Museum. Hendon 
    RAFM Vault Casualty Cards Archive-Personal 
    RAFM Vault Casualty Cards Archive- Incident 
 
c) Australian War Memorial, Canberra  
AWM4 Australian Imperial Force- Unit Diaries 1914-1918 
AWM 7/8 Australian Flying Corps- Squadron Records 
  
2. Published Primary Sources                   
a)  Air Publication 125, The Royal Air Force in the Great War (Air Historical Branch,1936) 
     Bowyer. C.,                Royal Flying Corps Communiques 1917-1918  ((London, 1998)   
     Butler, A. G.,             Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services Vol II The        
Western Front (AWM,1940), Vol III Special Problems and Services (AWM,1943)  
    Cutlack, E M.            The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume 
VIII;  The Australian Flying Corps (University of Queensland (AWM), 1923)  
    Jackson, W.                History of the Second World War, The Mediterranean and Middle 
East Vol VI part II (HMSO,1987) 
353 
 
   Macpherson, Maj-Gen, Sir, W. G., History of the Great War, Medical Services Vol I Services 
in United Kingdom, Vol II General Services, Vol III Western Front (HMSO, 1923)        
   Macpherson, Maj-Gen, Sir, W. G., History of the Great War, Medical Services, Diseases of 
the War,    Vol I Diseases of the Mind          Vol II Aviation and Tanks 
  Molkentin, M.,        The Centenary History of Australia in the Great War     Volume 1 Australia 
and the War in the Air (Oxford University Press, 2014) 
  Raleigh, Sir, W. (Vol 1) & Jones, H. A.  The Official History of the Great War, The War In 
The Air     Vols I-VI (Imperial War Museum, !922-1937)                      
 Rexford-Welch, S. C., Medical History of the Second World War; The Royal Air Force 
Medical Service      Vol II Commands (HMSO, 1955) 
 Webster. Sir Charles & Frankland, N. The Strategic Air Offense Against Germany, 1939-1945   
Volumes 1-IV (HMSO, 1961) 
 Wise, S. F., The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force; Volume 1 Canadian Airmen 
in the First World War (University of Toronto Press, !980) 
b)   Reports  
  Air Publication 3139, Psychological Disorders in Flying Personnel of the Royal Air Force 
Investigated During the War 1939-1945 (HMSO, 1947) 
Air Services Medical (US War Department, 1919) 
 Dearnally. E J & Warr. A J, Aircrew Stress in Wartime Operations. Papers from the Flying 
Research Committee (HMSO, 1947)       
 Gilcrest, N, S, ‘An Analysis of Causes of Breakdown in Flying’ BMA Vol 2,1918 
US Air Force Historical Studies No 78.  Morale in the AAF in World War Two, (USAF 
Historical Division, 1953) 
Report of the Committee of The War Office of Enquiry into ‘Shell Shock’ Cmd 1734 (HMSO, 
1922) 
Medical Research Council No 53, The Medical Problems of Flying, Reports 1-VII (HMSO, 
1920) 
Strafford-Clark, D, ‘Morale and Flying Experience, Results of a Wartime Study’ British 
Journal  of Psychiatry Vol 95 pp 10-50 
 
354 
 
c)  Diaries & Memoirs  
Personal Diary of Major Mick Mannock VC DSO** MC* (London, 1923,1966) 
Sykes, F, H, (Sir), Major-General) Aviation in Peace and War (London, 1921 
d)   Biographies   
Ash, E, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution 1912-1918 (London,1999) 
Boyle. A,  Trenchard (London,1962) 
 
  
3. Secondary works 
 a)     Books 
Ahrenfeldt, R. A., Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War (London, 
1955) 
Anderson, H. G.,  The Medical and Surgical Aspects of Aviation (London, 1919) 
Aspry, R. B.,         The German High command At War (New York, 1991)  
Babington. A.,       For the Sake of Example (London, 1983) 
Balfour. H.,           Wings Over Westminster (London,1973) 
Baring, M.,           Flying Corps Headquarters (London, 1914-1918 (London, 1920, 1985)  
Barker, R.,           The Royal Flying Corps in World War One (London, 1995) 
Bourne, J  Liddle, P Whitehead, I Eds The Great World War 1914-1945 (London,2000) 
Carrington, C F.,    Soldiers from the War Returning (London, 1965) 
Charlton. L. E. O.,  War from The Air (London, 1935) 
Cole, E. & Cheeseman, E. F.,   The Air Defence of Britain 1914-1918 (London, 1984) 
Collier. B.,             A History of Air Power (London, 1974) 
Cooksley, P. G.      Royal Flying Corps Handbooks 1914-1918 (Stroud, 2007) 
Corns. C.& Hughes-Wilson. J.,   Blindfold and Alone (London, 1989) 
355 
 
Craven, W. J. & Cates, J.,   The Army Air Force in World War II (University of Chicago 
Press, 1958) 
Crook. M. J.            The Evolution of the Victoria Cross (Ogilby Trust, 1975)    
Crozier, F. P.,          A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land (London, 1930) 
Davies, R. Bell.,      Sailor in the Air   (London, 1967) 
Dean, M. D.,           The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars (London, 1979) 
Donitz, K.,              Twenty Years and twenty Days (Naval Institute Press, 1990) 
Douglas. W. S, 1st Baron Douglas of Kirtleside,  Years of Combat; First Volume of the 
Autobiography of Sholto Douglas  (London, 1963)  
Dun, J. C.,            The War the Infantry Knew (London,1994) 
Dunmore, S & Carter. W.,     Reap the Whirlwind (London, 1992)  
Evans, R. J.,          The Third Reich at War 1939-1945 (London, 2008) 
Gardiner, L.          The Royal Oak Court Martial (London, 1965) 
Gould-Lee, A.       Open Cockpit (London, 1969) 
Goulter, C. J. M., A Forgotten Offensive, RAF Coastal Command’s Anti-Shipping     
Campaign (London, 1955) 
Grehan, J.  & Martin, M.    Far East Air Operations (London, 2014) 
Grinkler. R. R., & Spiegel. J. P.,    Men Under Stress   (New York, 1945) 
Grinnell-Milne, D.,   Wind in the Wires (London,1937) 
Hallion, R. P.,        Strike from the Sky (Smithsonian Press, 1989) 
Hamilton-Paterson, J.   Marked for Death; The First War in the Air  (London, 2016) 
Hare, P.,               The Royal Aircraft Factory (London, 1990) 
Hart. P.,                Somme Success (Pen & Sword, 2012) 
Haywood. J. S., Stopped at Stalingrad, The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East       
(University Press Kansas, 1998)  
Hennessy, P & Jinks, J.,     The Silent Deep, The Royal Navy Submarine Service since 1945 
(London, 2015) 
356 
 
Henshaw, T.,       The Sky Their Battlefield (Fetubi Books Barnet, 2014) 
Hooton. E. R.,      War Over the Trenches 1916-1918 (London, 2010) 
Jefford, Wg Cdr, C. G.   Observers and Navigators; non-pilot aircrew in RFC, RNAS & 
RAF (London, 2014) 
Layman, R. D.,     Naval Aviation in the First World War (London, 1996) 
Jones, I.,              Tiger Squadron, 74 Squadron in Two World Wars (London,1954) 
Lee, A. G.,           Open Cockpit (London, 1969)  
Lewis, C.,             Sagittarius Rising (London,1936,1994) 
Lewis, P.,             The British Bomber Since 1914 (London, 1980) 
McCudden. J. B. T., Flying Fury (Baily Bros Kent, 1968,1973) 
Macintyre. D.,        Wings of Neptune (London, 1963) 
Macmillan, N.,        Into the Blue (London, 1929) 
Miller. E., (Ed)       The Neurosis in War (New York, 1943) 
Money, R. R.,          Flying and Soldiering (London, 1936) 
Moore. W.,              The Thin Yellow Line (London, 1974) 
Morris. A,                The First of the Many (London, 1968) 
Morrow, J. H.,          The Great War in The Air (Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1993) 
Mulligan. T. P.,        Neither Sharks Nor Wolves (London, 1989) 
Myers. C S.,             Shell Shock in France 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 1940)  
Neitzel. S.,               Tapping Hitler’s Generals; Transcripts of Secret Conversations 1942-
45 (Pen & Sword, 2007) 
Neumann. G. P.,     The German Air Force in The Great War (London, 1920) 
Norris, G.,              The Royal Flying Corps A History (London, 1982)  
Padfield, P.,            Donitz, The Last Fuhrer (London, 1984) 
Pattinson. L A.       History of 99 Squadron (Cambridge, 1920) 
357 
 
Philpott, W.,          Bloody Victory (London, 2009) 
Price. A.,               Dogfight (London, 1993,2009) 
Probart, H.,           Bomber Harris, His Life and Times (London, 2003)  
Probart, H.,           High Commanders of the Royal Air Force (Air Historical Branch, 1991) 
Richards, D.,       Portal of Hungerford; The Life of Marshal of the Royal air Viscount 
Portal of Hungerford (London,1977) 
Robinson, D. H.,   The Dangerous Sky (Henley on Thames, 1973) 
Saunders, H. St. G,. Per Ardua, The Rise of British Air Power 1911-1939 (London, 1944) 
Scott, A. J. L.,       Sixty Squadron RAF (E-Book. 1920, 2014) 
Sheffy, Y.,         British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914-1918 
(London, 1988)  
Sheffield, G. & Gray, P.     Changing War, The British Army, The Hundred Days Campaign 
and The Birth of the Royal Air Force.  (London, 2013)   
Shephard, B,             A War of Nerves; Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914-1994  (London, 
2002) 
Slobodin, R.             W. H. R. Rivers (Stroud, 1978,1997)   
Stokes, A. & Kite, K.,     Flight Stress, Fatigue and Performance in Aviation.   (Aldershot, 
1994) 
Sweetman, J.,         Cavalry of The Clouds (Spellmount, 2010) 
Taylor, Gordon.,   The Sky Beyond (London, 1966) 
Taylor, J. W. R,    Jane’s Fighting Aircraft of World War One (London, 1919,1990) 
Watson. A.,          Enduring the Great War, Combat, Morale and collapse in the |British 
and German Armies 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 2009) 
Watson. A.,           Ring OF Steel (London, 2014) 
Wells, M. K.,        Courage and Air Warfare   (London, 1995) 
Williams. G. K.,  Biplanes and Bombsights; British Bombing in World War One (AUP 
Alabama. 1999) 
Winter, D.            The First of the Few   (London, 1982) 
358 
 
Novels 
Yeates, V. M.,     Winged Victory (London, 1934, 2010) 
 
b)   Articles and Chapters 
Barker, C. N. Lt Col., ‘A Regimental Officer’s Analysis of Morale’   RUSI Journal Vol 
107 (1962)    pp 327-332  
Bartov, O.,       ‘Daily Life and Motivation in War, The Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union’     
The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol 12 (2) (1989)  pp 201-202 
Bartov, O.         ‘Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich’     Journal of Modern History 
Vol 63 (1991) pp 44-60 
Bogacz, T.            ‘War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England 1914-22; The Work of 
the War Office Committee into Shell-shock’       Journal of Contemporary History Vol 24 
(1989) pp 227-256  
Collins. M, D.,        ‘A Fear of Flying; diagnosing traumatic neurosis among British Aviators 
of the Great War’      First World War Studies Vol 6 No 2 (2015) pp 187-202  
Dillon, F.,               ‘Neurosis Among Combatant Troops in the Great War’    British Medical 
Journal Vol 2 (4096) (1939) pp 63-66 
Dye, P.,                 ‘The Aviator as Superhero’   Air Power Vol 7 (3) (2000)   pp 65-74 
English, A, D.,           ‘A predisposition to Cowardice? Aviation Psychology and the Genesis 
of LMF’      War and Society Vol 13 (1) (1995) pp 15-23 
Fennell. J.,           ‘Courage and Cowardice in the North African Campaign; The Eighth 
Army and Defeat in the Sumer of 1942’        War in History Vol 20 (1) (2013)   pp 99-122  
French. D.,             ‘Discipline and the Death Penalty in the British Army in the War Against 
Germany in the Second World War’        Journal of Contemporary History Vol 33 (4) 
(1998) pp 531-545 
Fry. W. M.          ‘The Bishop Affair’     Cross & Cockade International Vol 32 (1) 2001 
pp 38-45 
Greenhous. B.,      ‘Billy Bishop-Brave Flyer, Bold Liar’ Canadian Military Journal Autumn 
2002 pp 61-64 
Halstead, J. Sterling., ‘Trained by the Royal Flying Corps’[     US Naval Proceedings ( 
February, 1917)   
359 
 
Hart, S.,            ‘Montgomery’s, Casualty, Conservation and ‘colossal cracks’, 21 Army 
Groups Operational Technique in NW Europe 1944-5.’       Journal of Strategic Studies 
Vol 19 (4) (1996) pp 132-153 
Hocking, W. E.,  ‘The Nature of Morale’     The American Journal of Sociology Vol 47 (3) 
(1941) pp 303-311  
Jones, E.,            ‘LMF, The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the RAF in the Second World 
War’ The Journal of Military History Vol 70 (2) (2006) pp 439-458 
Jones. E.,      ‘Historical approaches to post combat disorders’     Philosophical 
Transactions; Biological Sciences   Vol 361 (1486) (2006) pp 533-342 
Jones, E. & Palmer, E.,   ‘War Pensions (1900-1945); changing models of psychological 
understanding’      British Journal of Psychiatry Vol 180 (2002) pp 274-275 
Jones, E. & Wessely, S.  , ‘Cases of Chronic Fatigue After Crimean War and Indian Mutiny’        
British Medical Journal vol 319 (7225) (1999) pp 1645-1647 
Jones, E. & Wessely, S.,‘Battle for the mind; World War I and the birth of military 
psychiatry’      Lancet, Vol 348 (2014) pp 1708-1714 
Jones, E. & Wessely, S., ‘Forward Psychiatry in the Military; its origins and Effectiveness’          
Journal of Traumatic Stress Vol 16 (4) (2003) pp 411-419 
Jones, E. Hodgins-Vernaas, H. McCartney, H. et al, ‘Post combat syndromes from the Boer 
War to the Gulf War; a cluster analysis of their nature and attribution’         British Medical 
Journal Vol 324 (2002) pp 321-323 
Kingston-McCloughry, E. J., ‘Morale and Leadership’    RUSI Journal Vol 74 (1929) pp 
305-310 
Mackenzie, S. P.,               ‘Morale and the Cause; The Campaign to Shape the Outlook of 
Soldiers in the British Expeditionary Force 1914-1918’        Canadian Journal of History 
Vol 25 (2) (1990) pp 213-232 
McCarthy, J.,                     ‘Aircrew and the lack of Moral Fibre in the Second World War’     
War and Society Vol 2 (1984) pp 87-107 
Mileham. P.,                     ‘Morale Counts’      RUSI Journal Vol 145 (6) (2000)  p 62-64 
Mulligan, T. P.,                 ‘German U-Boat Crews in World War II, Sociology of an Elite’    
Journal of Military History Vol 56 (2) (1992) pp 261-281 
Palmer, I.,                       ‘Battle Stress and its Treatment’      RUSI Journal Vol 143 (1) 
(1998) pp 65-66 
360 
 
Paris, M.,                       ‘The First Air Wars-North Africa and the Balkans 1911-13’   Journal 
of Contemporary History Vol 26 (1991) pp 97-109 
Paul, O.,                     ‘Da Costa’s Syndrome or Neurocirculatory Asthenia’     British Heart 
Journal Vol 58 (1987) pp306-315   
Poster, M. F.,            ‘Thoughts on war, trauma and the need for diplomacy’   International 
Forum of Psychoanalysis Vol 23 (1) (2014) pp 63-65  
Reid, D. D.,             ‘The Historical Background to Wartime research in Psychology in the 
RAF’ in Dearnley,E. J. & Warr, P.B. Eds, Aircrew Stress in Wartime Operations (London, 
1948) 
Shepard, M. I.             ‘Extracts from Memoirs of Gordon Shepard 1924’ Cross and Cockade 
Vol 8 (1) (1977)  
Shils. S. A. & Morris Janowich., ‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World 
War II’       Public Opinion Quarterly Vol 12 (1948) 289-315 
Strachan, H.,             ‘Training, Morale and Modern War’ Journal of Contemporary History 
Vol 41 (2) (2006) pp 211-227  
Symonds, AVM, Sir, C. & Wg Cdr, Williams, D. J. ‘Clinical and Statistical study of 
Neurosis Precipitated By Flying Duties’    in Dearnaly, E, J. & Warr, P. B., Aircrew Stress 
in Wartime Operations (London, 1979) 
Webb, T. E. F.,         ‘Dottyville-Craiglockhart War Hospital and shell shock treatment in 
the First World War’     Journal of The Royal Society of Medicine Vol 99 (2006) pp 342-
346S 
Wessely, S.,            ‘Twentieth-Century Theories on Combat Motivation and Breakdown’  
Journal of Contemporary History Vol 4 (2) (2006) pp 269-286  
Wittower, E. & Spillane, J. P., ‘Neurosis in War’ British Medical Journal Vol 1 (4129) 
(1940)  pp 308-310 
Wood, P.,                 ‘Da Costa’s Syndrome (or effort syndrome)’      British Medical Journal 
Vol 2 (1941) pp 767-772 
 
4. Unpublished Theses  
Jordan, D. J.,          The Army Co-Operation Missions of the Royal Flying Corps/ Royal Air 
Force 1914-1918    (PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1997)  
Loughran, T. L,        Shell Shock in the First World War Britain; An Intellectual and Medical 
History      (PhD Thesis, University of London 2006) 
361 
 
Molkentin, M. W, J.,   Culture, Class and Experience in The Australian Flying Corps (BA 
Hons Thesis        (University of Wollongong, 2004) 
Sheffield, G. D.,     Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army 1902-
1922 , (PhD thesis, University of London 1994) 
 
5.    Online sources 
WWW.uboatarchive.net/luethlecture.htm  accessed 17th Dec 2016 
Calvary of the Clouds,. Tv Documentary West Tv (1987) accessed Dec 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
